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ABSTRACT
Arms control and disarmament issues figured prominently 
in the UN in the late 1970s and early 1980s, along with other 
regional and international security issues. This occurred in 
the wake of the General Assembly’s first special session on 
disarmament in mid-1978, which was also attended by numerous 
non-governmental organisations involved in related issues. 
The special session was held largely at the non-aligned 
group’s urging and also because of general concern that the 
United Nations had not focused on disarmament issues since the 
late 1950s. The non-aligned states sought to reduce the 
dominance of the superpowers by promoting a greater role for 
the UN in maintaining international security and in 
influencing the pace and pattern of global arms control. The 
multilateral diplomacy that ensued however proved quite 
unproductive and deepened the sense of crisis regarding the 
UN’s future. The distinctive approach of the non-aligned 
states compounded the problem posed by the lack of progress in 
arms control in US-Soviet relations.
The superpowers displayed little enthusiasm for any 
significant multilateral control, either over military 
competition or over armed conflicts between states. The 
Soviet Union seemed to be even less interested than the United 
States. The numerical majority of the non-aligned group in 
the UN probably reinforced the superpowers’ preference for the 
existing bilateral structure for dealing with international 
security issues. In any case, the imbroglio in multilateral 
diplomacy and obstacles in bilateral relations between the 
superpowers indicated that there were serious difficulties in 
the way of any significant arms control progress and that its 
prospects would remain limited, especially in the absence of 
progress in pursuit of other international security goals.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the basic purposes of the United Nations - indeed 
the most important one - is to eliminate the ‘scourge of wax’. 
This goal was spelled out eloquently at the outset of the UN 
Chaxter’s preamble. With that end in view, the UN was 
expected to establish an international system of collective 
security based - as it was subsequently agreed at least in the 
declaratory sense - on the principle of gradual reduction of 
armaments and armed forces as the immediate, on-going 
objective and of disarmament as the ultimate, long-term goal.
The question of arms control and disarmament has thus 
been one of the UN’s principal concerns from the outset. 
Apart from many scores of resolutions passed as part of its 
somewhat weary routine business, the General Assembly has also 
passed several major resolutions aimed at initiating renewed 
efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament 
negotiations. In addition, and more usefully, the UN has 
served as a forum for either promoting or undertaking 
negotiations, initially between the superpowers, along with 
their principal allies, and later more multilaterally.
Arms control diplomacy intensified in the UN in recent 
years and became one of the organisation’s chief 
preoccupations. The General Assembly organised two special 
sessions devoted to disarmament issues. Apart from 
member-states, these sessions were attended by representatives 
from a large number of non-governmental organisations directly 
concerned with international security issues. The first one 
held in 1978, produced what is known as the Final Document - a 
detailed agreed text of principles and priorities, but one 
that reflected a shaky consensus at the lowest common 
denominator. Yet, the document could still be regarded as an 
achievement, especially in view of the UN’s complex process of 
multilateral diplomacy. The first special session also 
reactivated the Disarmament Commission - the UN’s deliberative 
body for disarmament issues - which had been dormant for many 
years.
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A more important development following the first special 
session was the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) - the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. The CD 
became more representative of the international community and 
more closely linked to the General Assembly and the 
Disarmament Commission. These steps reflected a broad-based 
interest in refurbishing the UN’s institutional involvement in 
arms control and disarmament issues through an accelerated 
process of deliberations and negotiations.
In recent years, negotiations have been not only more 
multilateral but also more international in character. In the 
late 1940s and 1950s, negotiations were limited to the 
superpowers and some of their allies. In the early 1960s, the 
expansion of the multilateral context began with the creation 
of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. 
Further expansions in the late 1960s and subsequently, have 
resulted in an enlarged negotiating body of 40 member-states, 
including a sizable congery of non-aligned states from 
different Third World regions. Despite the importance of 
bilateral and limited multilateral bodies established by the 
superpowers, the CD provides the only international 
negotiating forum of its kind, along with its impressive 
infrastructural support system provided by the UN Secretariat.
In the long run, the viability of the UN may well depend 
on the organisation’s ability to contribute to the evolution 
of a structure of collective security or at least a more 
effective system of bilateral and multilateral restraints than 
at present in existence. Otherwise, there is a risk that 
resurgent political tensions and conflicts may in time - and 
not necessarily in some distant future - wreck the 
organisation. In this respect, past experience of the 
inter-war period and the League of Nations provides little 
comfort. In the post-war period itself, the UN came close to 
being undermined or severely weakened on several occasions in 
the 1950s and 1960s because of the direct or indirect impact 
of the ’Cold War’. Examples that come to mind are the initial 
crisis over the criteria for admission of states to the UN; 
China’s attempt in the mid-1960s to draw some Third World 
states away from the UN; and the political and financial
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crisis following the UN’s controversial involvement in the 
Congo in the late 1950s and early 1960s. More recently there 
has been unprecedented American antipathy towards the UN-, 
partly or perhaps largely because of changes (brought about 
mainly by the non-aligned states) in the organisation’s 
political style and administrative performance.
This thesis focuses on multilateral arms control 
negotiations conducted in the UN on the following subjects: 
comprehensive test ban (CTB), chemical weapons (CW), and 
comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD). The period 
starts from 1978, the year when the General Assembly held its 
first special session on disarmament, and extends up to the 
end of 1984, incorporating the General Assembly’s second 
special session - a follow-up to the first one - in 1982.
These issues were not, of course, the only ones under 
some form of negotiation or deliberation in the UN during the 
1978-84 period. But they were generally regarded by states 
involved in multilateral diplomacy to be the more important 
and urgent. Other considerations also had a bearing on the 
decision to limit the focus of the thesis to the areas 
described - most importantly the constraints of time and 
space. The choice of subjects also seemed sufficient to 
provide a good picture of the pattern and problems of arms 
control diplomacy in the UN in recent years, if not over a 
longer period. Other subjects seemed less important and the 
extent to which they were negotiated or discussed was also 
very limited.
Several factors influenced my decision to work on arms 
control diplomacy in the UN. First, having worked as a 
consultant to the UN’s Disarmament Affairs Department in 
1982-83 on an inter-governmental study to explore the ground 
for comprehensive control of the competitive build-up and 
spread of conventional weapons, I became more conscious of the 
disagreements prevailing among the major groups of states. It 
seemed to me that many of the disagreements were partly a 
result of poor mutual understanding and a preoccupation with 
short-term interests. In principle, these disagreements 
should be amenable to solution. But there are also other more
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serious conflicts of interest both between individual states 
and groups of states, which do not seem amenable to solution 
in the short or medium term. The ability to identify which 
disagreements are in principle soluble and which axe not (at 
least in the short term) would seem to be a necessaxy 
condition for progress.
Inter alia, I felt the need to know more about the state 
of multilateral diplomacy in the UN. Moreover, arms control 
diplomacy in the UN is relatively unknown outside the 
organisation and the foreign offices of most states. Recently 
the situation has improved, but by no means substantially. 
Though negotiations and discussions in UN-related forums have 
lately received more publicity, research and writing on such 
subjects have generally been limited in scope and detail. 
Notwithstanding its limited achievements, the UN has served as 
a forum of some real importance for multilateral diplomacy 
since its inception. Its activities in the arms control axea 
burgeoned over the past decade, perhaps most conspicuously in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s - the period covered in this 
thesis.
Structure
The first chapter provides a general background. It 
examines US-Soviet relations on arms control between 1978-84 - 
a period marked by intense controversy and instability. The 
focus of this chapter is confined to superpower relations 
because of their central, almost over-riding, importance to 
the prospects of multilateral arms control and also because 
relations between the non-aligned group of states, on the one 
hand, and the central alliances (NATO and WTO), on the other, 
are discussed in the second chapter.
The second chapter discusses the changes in multilateral 
diplomacy in the UN in recent years, the growth of the UN’s 
institutional structure and the somewhat complicated and 
cumbersome process by which arms control and security-related 
issues are debated, deliberated and sometimes negotiated. A 
greater part of this chapter focuses on the activities of the 
UN’s related bodies, both of a permanent and ad hoc nature.
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More attention has been given to those organs with a direct 
bearing on arms control negotiations, such as the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva, the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission and the General Assembly’s First Committee in New 
York.
Chapters three, four, and five deal respectively with 
negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, a chemical weapons 
ban, and a comprehensive programme of disarmament. They 
provide a historical background to recent negotiations, a 
chronological description of the negotiations themselves, an 
analysis of the issues at stake and a summary.
Chapter six takes up the verification issue that has 
often impeded the progress of negotiations in the UN - and 
outside it - since the beginning of the post-war period. The 
issue not only figured prominently in CTB, CW, and CPD 
negotiations but also has a significant bearing on axms 
control in general. This chapter focuses on the recent 
controversy between the superpowers and the technically 
complicated and politically intense debate in the United 
States about Soviet compliance behaviour. It also discusses 
the hardening of official American attitude and greater public 
sensitivity during President Reagan’s first term to conceptual 
and practical questions about Soviet compliance.
The thesis concludes with a summary of the results of 
each chapter and makes a general evaluation of the UN’s role 
in arms control - in particular its institutional structure 
and processes. This chapter also evaluates the impact of 
bilateral superpower relations and relations between the 
non-aligned group and the superpowers, on the UN’s role in 
arms control and on arms control in general. Since the 
chapters covering CTB, CW, CPD negotiations contain their own 
concluding paragraphs, more attention has been given in this 
chapter to broader observations about the UN, the superpowers, 
and the non-aligned states in relation to conceptual and 
political aspects of arms control.
Sources
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Primary source material for the chapters on CTB, CW and 
CPD negotiations included a somewhat bewildering variety of UN 
documents and published position papers by participating 
member-states. Such documents consisted of the following: 
regular and special reports to the General Assembly by 
relevant UN bodies and the multilateral forum in Geneva; 
published working papers by member-states; official 
statements by governments during debates and discussions in 
the UN or UN-related forums; descriptive - but not always 
very clear - accounts of negotiations and other activities in 
the UN Secretariat’s yearbooks and its other periodicals; and 
unpublished conference-room as well as other informal papers 
meant for private circulation among the participating 
countries, some of which I was able to glean during my 
field-trip in Geneva. I also interviewed and spoke informally 
to representatives of various member-states.
For the chapters on superpower relations and the 
verification issue, I relied mainly on articles in journals 
and newspaper reports and analyses, drawn from a variety of 
sources originating mostly from the United States. It took 
some time to get accustomed to working with UN documents and 
the difficulties encountered would have been even greater if I 
had not gained some familiarity with them during my 
consultancy with the UN. A strong case can be made for the UN 
to consider seriously streamlining and improving its 
documentation system in areas of clear public and academic 
interest.
Finally, the term ‘disarmament’ is used flexibly in the 
UN. As pointed out in a joint working paper by Mexico, Sweden 
and Yugoslavia earlier in August 1970 (CCD/313), ’disarmament’ 
as used in various UN forums ‘is a generic term which 
encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to 
the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, the 
limitation, the reduction, or the elimination of armaments’.
All dollar figures are in US currency.
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SUPERPOWER RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL
Introduction
Detente between the superpowers lasted for a brief period 
in the first half of the 1970s. East-West relations began to 
deteriorate in the mid-1970s, declining sharply in the late 
1970s and worsening still further, almost to a new ‘Cold War’ 
situation in the first half of the 1980s. [l] Soviet military 
involvement in the Angolan civil war in the mid-1970s and in 
the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1978, its 
support for Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, and its own 
large-scale military intervention in the Afghan civil wax in 
late 1979, contributed greatly - but by no means wholly - to a 
resurgence of the American perception of the Soviet Union as a 
dangerously expansionist power. Such a perception - not 
ubiquitous, but increasingly wide-spread - was related to a 
deeply pessimistic assessment of a relative decline of 
American power and position in the world. This combination 
led to a reassertion of what became known as neo-conservatism. 
The neo-conservatives exploited public concern about Soviet 
aggression and American weakness, and promised to rebuild 
American strength to confront Soviet expansionism. 
Conservative success was dramatically underlined in Ronald 
Reagan’s impressive electoral victory in 1980.
The 1970s was a highly productive period for arms 
control, both in terms of agreements reached and subjects 
negotiated or discussed. [2] While the subsequent period has 
not necessarily been the least unproductive one since the 
Second World War, the contrast with the years preceding it has 
been sharp.
The subjects under negotiation in this latter period were 
much more limited, and the progress in negotiations were much 
slower, if not haltingly slow and some would even say 
negative. In the United States, arms control methods of the 
past came under vehement and even unprecedented criticism, and 
the idea that arms control should remain an essential element 
of American national security policy was increasingly 
challenged.
Page 8
The Carter Period
During the Carter period, the conservatives had zealously 
opposed SALT II and the approach to arms control it 
symbolised. Their opposition which began during President 
Nixon’s first term seemed to derive from the view that arms 
control tended to distract the United States from the vital 
task of containing Soviet expansionism. Disillusionment with 
detente (which had been over-sold by some of its proponents), 
together with the very real difficulties of negotiating with 
the Soviet Union, helped the conservative campaign.
Shortly after President Carter’s election victory in late 
1976, the CIA leaked reports of a revised assessment of Soviet 
military effort, strength and intentions. The revised 
assessment showed the Soviet Union to be ’moving ahead of the 
United States in military strength [and to be] developing the 
capacity to fight a nuclear war because they had worked out a 
strategy based on preparing and winning a limited nuclear 
war’.[3] The revised assessment was produced not by the CIA 
itself but by outsiders. The outside experts - referred to as 
‘Team B ’ - included some leading ‘hardline’ conservatives who 
later served in the Reagan Administration.[4] The outsiders 
were asked to review the CIA’s own internal assessments of the 
Soviet threat. The review was based largely on the CIA’s 
upward revision of its long-standing estimate of the share of 
defence spending in Soviet Gross National Product (GNP). The 
revised estimate had put Soviet military expenditure over the 
past five years at 11 to 12 percent of Soviet GNP - up by as 
much as 6 percent, representing a 50 percent rate of 
increase.[5] It is important to note that the CIA was not 
saying that the Soviet Union was spending more on defence, but 
simply that the Agency had underestimated the GNP share of 
Soviet military expenditure. Whatever the merits and the 
actual significance of the new assessment, its acceptance by 
the CIA’s director as the organisation’s official position 
helped the conservatives to promote their cause in subsequent 
years.[6]
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Developments in various Third World regions in the second 
half of the 1970s also helped the conservative cause. The 
protracted crisis of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan followed in quick 
succession, making a considerable impact during the election 
year and contributing significantly to the public’s perception 
of growing Soviet and Third World threats to the United States 
and concern about American ability and willingness to confront 
them.
At the time of President Carter’s exit from executive 
power, the ratification of SALT II had been indefinitely 
shelved for fear of its decisive rejection by the Senate. 
Even in June 1979 when the agreement was signed, the question 
of ratification had apparently hung in the balance.[7] In 
1980, President Carter also felt constrained to suspend arms 
control talks with the Soviet Union, including the ones he had 
initiated. One of President Carter’s last actions was to 
revise and raise substantially the defence budget for fiscal 
year 1981.[8] He also announced a five year defence plan that 
envisaged an annual real-term spending increase of about 5 
percent. [9] The shift in the Carter Administration’s stance - 
initially a fairly ‘dovish’ one it- .reflected mounting 
conservative pressure and the growing conservative mood of the 
electorate. In giving way to substantial pressure, President 
Carter clarified his own position in his last budget message 
to Congress. He said: ‘There will be advocates of higher 
defense levels, but after careful review I do not believe that 
higher spending would add significantly to our national 
security’.[10]
The Carter period witnessed both a general rise of arms 
control in American national and international security policy 
and its steady and then rapid decline. At first, arms control 
received ‘unprecedented priority’.[ 11] President Carter’s 
personal enthusiasm and ambition were such that in his first 
SALT II proposal in 1977, he departed from the earlier 
bilateral understanding that the SALT process would be a 
gradual one and sought instead deep cuts in weapon systems. 
In addition to SALT II, which was the most important item on 
the arms control agenda, the Administration was also quick to
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address other concerns.
As early as March 1977 the Administration had also 
proposed the creation of US-Soviet working groups for pursuing 
or promoting negotiations on eight different subjects: 
anti-satellite weapons, chemical weapons (CW), civil defence, 
comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB), conventional arms 
transfers, demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean, prior 
notification of missile tests, and radiological weapons, 
including new types of mass destruction weapons.[12] In 
addition, the Administration also moved quickly to deal with 
the question of horizontal nuclear proliferation by involving 
a large number of countries, including some non-parties to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in a study to evaluate the 
proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel cycle 
(INFCE). The Administration also agreed to an increased UN 
role in promoting global and regional arms control. In 
particular, the Administration highlighted the relatively 
neglected area of regional arms control in the Third World and 
offered technical support to facilitate relevant negotiations 
and agreements, especially in the area of verification.
Of the eight subjects proposed by the Administration, 
negotiations failed to take place on civil defence and prior 
notification of missile tests, although an understanding on 
the latter was reached in the context of SALT II negotiations. 
The superpowers held several rounds of talks on arms transfers 
in 1977 and 1978 before a shift in the American position led 
to an early deadlock. [13] These talks were discontinued in 
December 1978. [14] The Indian Ocean talks ended even earlier - 
in February 1978[15] - presumably because developments in the 
Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf altered previous 
assessments of American security interests in the region. The 
talks on anti-satellite weapons began in June 1978 and were 
last convened in June 1979. Preparations for the fourth round 
of talks coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
which prompted the United States to suspend the 
negotiations.[16] CTB and CW negotiations dragged on in the UN 
forum with limited progress, but the superpowers were able to 
present an outline agreement on radiological weapons in July 
1979. This, however, failed to satisfy a number of states
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involved in multilateral negotiations in the Committee on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, especially Sweden and India.[17] 
The main objection centred on the scope and definition of 
radiological weapons, but the lack of consensus did not 
prevent an outline agreement from being introduced in the CD 
as a basis for pursuing concrete negotiations. It did, 
however, cast a pall of gloom on the prospects of progress. 
The voluminous INFCE study, completed in early 1980, led to 
some clarification and lessening of tensions on technical 
issues, but failed to make any political headway. Finally, 
the Administration was finding it increasingly difficult to 
sustain its policy of unilateral restraints on the transfer of 
weapons to Third World countries. [18] By 1979 the 
Administration’s early enthusiasm for arms control had largely 
disappeared.
Although the Kremlin and the White House eventually 
reached agreement on SALT II, the delays and difficulties 
encountered during the negotiations weakened the agreement’s 
impact on the public and diminished the enthusiasm of its 
supporters. More importantly, inveterate opponents of SALT 
II, and of the SALT process itself, were able to portray 
developments in the Third World - particularly the Soviet 
gains in Angola, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Ethiopia - as 
increasingly threatening to the United States. Such 
developments seemed to make arms control counter-productive or 
at any rate less important than a major military build-up at 
home and a reassertion abroad of American militaxy strength 
and political resolve. By the time SALT II was agreed, 
superpower relations had deteriorated considerably. Detente 
had failed to make any lasting impression on both sides. 
Although SALT II consummated a decade-old negotiating process, 
the emergent crisis in bilateral relations threatened to 
negate that consummation.[19] The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan brought the crisis fully into the open, 
undermining the future prospects of arms control still 
further.
The Reagan Period
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American military expenditure had already begun to 
increase during the the Carter period. After marginal 
increases in 1977, 1978 and 1979, defence spending registered 
a substantial rise for fiscal years 1980 and 1981. [20] But the 
Reagan Administration planned a much greater increase in 
miltary effort, moving quickly to revise the Carter 
Administration’s plans for defence spending and military 
policy. The initial five-year plan (1982-1987) envisaged an 
expenditure of 1.5 trillion dollars. alia, the plan 
proposed the production of 17,000 nuclear weapons over the 
next decade, partly to replace some weapons to be retired, but 
largely as additions for new ICBMs, SLBMs, cruise missiles and 
bombers.[21] The strategic modernisation programme included a 
large number of new high yield gravity bombs and over 8,000 
warheads for new Trident C-4 and II SLBMs, ICBMs, and cruise 
missiles, both sea as well as ground launched.
In 1982 the Administration obtained approval from the 
Congress for a 13 percent increase over defence spending in 
1981.[22] In constant 1984 dollars, American defence spending 
rose from 170 billion dollars in 1980 to 227 billion dollars 
in 1984, an increase of about 35 percent or an average annual 
real-term growth of about 9 percent.[23] During this period, 
the Administration’s requests for defence spending invariably 
exceeded the amount later approved by the Congress. 
Congressional cuts ‘averaged 6.2 percent of [President 
Reagan’s] original requests’.[24] Notwithstanding this, a 
Congressional Research Service study reported that the 
Administration received ‘97.5 [percent] of the funds it 
anticipated needing in 1981 when it first projected its 
defence spending requirements’.[25] The updated defence plan 
proposed in 1984 for the next five years envisaged an 
expenditure of 1.9 trillions dollars, totalling 2.6 trillion 
dollars at current prices for the period 1982-89 and raising 
the share of defence in the federal budget from 23 percent in 
1980 to a projected figure of about 36 percent in 1989.[26]
The main rationale for the steep rise in American defence 
spending was the assumption that the Soviet Union was growing 
militarily stronger and that it was, as it had been for quite 
a number of years, spending more than the United States.
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Within the bureaucracy, however, this particular question was 
not free of controversy. In 1983 the CIA presented a revised 
estimate of the pattern of Soviet military expenditure. The 
new assessment maintained that Soviet defence spending during 
the period 1977-81 had grown at about 2 percent on an average 
annual basis.[27] More significant was the disclosure that the 
procurement of militaxy hardware had increased ‘only slightly 
during the period when measured in rubles and did not grow at 
all in d o l l a r s [28] The prevalent view until then (based on 
certain assumptions about the nature of Soviet economy and 
polity) had put the growth of Soviet defence spending at 3 to 
5 percent - twice or more than the rate indicated by the 
revised CIA estimate.[29]
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) later agreed with 
the CIA’s estimate for the period up to 1981.[30] But the DIA 
differed from the CIA’s analysis that the trend of slow growth 
in Soviet defence spending and hardware procurement had 
continued through 1982 and 1983.[31] The CIA and DIA figures 
for the rate of increase in 1982 and 1983 and the likely rate 
for 1984 differed substantially. NATO’s own assessment 
tallied with the CIA’s.[32] The CIA estimated a ‘modest’ rise 
in 1983, perhaps by 1 or 2 percent, compared to the DIA’s 
calculation of 5 to 8 percent and its prediction of a similar 
increase for 1984.[33] In late 1984, the Soviet President, 
Konstantin Chernenko’s statement in a Politburo meeting 
strongly suggested that Soviet military expenditure was being 
raised. He reportedly said: ‘We cannot fail to see the 
growing aggressiveness of [American] imperialism, its attempts 
to gain military superiority over the socialist 
community’.[34] A stepping-up of Soviet military expenditure 
was also reported by the Financial Times which quoted a senior 
Soviet general as saying that ‘defence spending has been 
raised because of the greater threat from the US and other 
NATO countries’.[35]
To the Administration the CIA’s revised assessment of 
Soviet spending did not imply that the rationale for increased 
American spending had been invalidated. Both the CIA and DIA 
- the latter apparently to a greater degree - still considered 
Soviet military procurement to have been significant. The
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CIA’s Deputy Director, Robert Gates, contended: ’the awesome 
fact is that despite a temporary levelling-off in the rate of 
growth in Soviet military procurement, the Soviets 
consistently not only outspent the US throughout[1977-83], but 
[also] produced far more missiles, planes, warships, tanks, 
and other weapons than the US...’. [36] Nevertheless, the new 
estimates presented a picture that was less alarming than the 
one that President Reagan’s supporters had been propagating 
for a number of years.
The American defence build-up took place against a 
background of heated contention about the state of the central 
military balance. The United States complained that the 
Soviet Union had acquired significant superiority in some 
areas (particularly heavy ICBMs) and also an overall edge in 
nuclear and conventional forces. The Soviet Union argued that 
a parity continued to exist and that American defence efforts 
were aimed at achieving military superiority. The conduct of 
nuclear arms control negotiations by the superpowers and other 
diplomatic exchanges between them revealed that the two 
adversaries held different views about the concept of balance, 
with the United States insisting on bilateral quantitative 
equality and the Soviet Union emphasising the more flexible 
and less defined concept of ’equal security’ which took into 
account its different and more vulnerable geostrategic 
position.
The Administration’s presentation of the Soviet military 
threat also included claims about the changing balance in 
weapon-related technology. The Pentagon claimed that the 
American lead in basic technology had dwindled alarmingly and 
the advantage in specific weapon-technology was being 
lost.[37] The reality was, however, rather different from the 
picture conjured by the Administration’s glossy publication of 
Soviet Military Power or the Pentagon’s reports to the 
Congress.[38] The Soviet Union continued to lag behind 
significantly in military technology and even more seriously 
in basic technology.[39] The Soviet strategic systems were 
also, on balance, more vulnerable than those of the US, less 
reliable and at a lower level of readiness. In addition, the 
United States retained its lead in command, control,
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communication and intelligence capabilities. The issue of 
greatest concern to conservatives in the years preceding 
President Reagan’s assumption of office, was the alleged 
vulnerability of American ICBMs to a first strike by more 
numerous and powerful Soviet counterpart weapons. The notion 
that a ‘window of vulnerability’ existed played a significant 
role in shaping public perception of a militarily significant 
strategic imbalance between the superpowers. The MX missile 
was intended to shut the ‘window of vulnerability’. In part, 
domestic controversy over the MX missile prompted the 
Administration to appoint a commission headed by Gen. Brent 
Scowcroft to examine strategic issues and hopefully come up 
with bipartisan conclusions. The Scowcroft Commission’s 
conclusions undermined, or at least considerably weakened, the 
Administration’s long-standing thesis that the United States 
faced a ‘window of vulnerability’. [40]
Insofar as the American ICBM vulnerability problems 
existed and were destabilising, they could be resolved by the 
introduction of new weapon-systems, such as a single-warhead 
mobile missile (’Midgetman’), and by new approaches to arms 
control, such as ‘double build down’[41], both of which had 
strong support in the Congress. As with other questions, the 
issue of strategic vulnerability also reflected the 
Administration’s tendency to overplay the theme of Soviet 
military threat. Unattentive members of the public might well 
have assumed that the ’window of vulnerability’ threatened all 
American strategic systems. In fact, it threatened only the 
land-based missiles (that is, 20 percent of warheads) and some 
elements of the bomber and submarine forces. A disarming 
‘first strike’ against American ICBMs would still have left 
thousands of American warheads unscathed on submarines. The 
exaggeration of the Soviet nuclear threat was due in part to a 
perceived need to counteract the influence of the 
Administration’s opponents on public opinion. But it was 
probably more an attempt to win public and Congressional 
support for the hardliners’ preference for an overall policy 
that relied less on arms control and distinctly more on an 
active containment of the Soviet Union, in the style of the 
pre-detente period.
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In the 1980 election year, the Republican Party platform 
had called for a high level of military expenditure, sustained 
over a long-term, to close the alleged gap with the Soviet 
Union and ‘ultimately reach the position of military 
superiority that the American people demand’.[42] The Reagan 
Administration denied any intention to seek superiority, but 
doubts that political and ideological motives (apart from 
closing the perceived or alleged gap with the Soviet Union) 
underlay its short and medium term programme of defence 
build-up were harder to dispel. President Reagan himself 
indicated that the Soviet Union could not compete with the 
United States in defence spending, presumably because of 
evident economic constraints prevailing in the Soviet Union. 
He reportedly said: ‘The Soviets - they are up at full pitch. 
I doubt if they could expand their military production 
anyplace above where it is right now or the rate that it 
is...they know that they can’t match us if there is [an arms] 
race’.[43] The view that any effective policy of containment 
should include attempts to weaken the Soviet Union internally 
was one that Richard Pipes, a prominent academic, had 
canvassed support for before his appointment by President 
Reagan as the National Security Council’s (NSC) chief 
specialist on Soviet affairs in 1981-82....
During the better part of President Reagan’s first term, 
superpower relations were marked much less by a business-like 
conduct and disproportionately more by polemical exchanges, 
mutual recrimination, and other diplomatic demarche aimed at 
influencing domestic and international public opinion on 
ideological, political, and security-related issues that 
engaged active public attention and came to dominate public 
debate in the United States and Western Europe in the early 
1980s.
At his first press conference in January 1981, President 
Reagan alleged that ‘the only morality they [the Soviets] 
recognise is what will further their cause [of world communist 
revolution], meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to 
commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain 
that...’.[44] Such rhetorical attacks continued, with 
references to the Soviet regime as an ‘evil force’ culminating
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in the public condemnation of the Soviet Union as an ‘evil 
empire’ and a call to fellow Americans to engage 
self-confidently in the struggle between ‘good and evil’.[45] 
In another major public relations exercise, the Administration 
began its first year in office with the publication of a 
defence booklet Soviet Military Power, (to be brought out on a 
regular basis), that focused on presenting the Soviet military 
threat in as graphic a manner as possible. (The first edition 
was widely criticised for being one-sided and alarmist. 
Subsequent editions have been less shrill in tone). In due 
course, the Soviet Union reacted in a like manner with its 
publication of Whence The Threat To Peace? - which was a 
mirror image of the one by the United States.[46] The 
Pentagon’s publication of Soviet Military Power attempted to 
justify the rise in American defence spending and also to 
back-up the Administration’s thesis that American defence had 
suffered from a decade of serious neglect[47] - and one that 
had created an imbalance that would take years of high 
spending to correct.[48]
President Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric, especially in 
the wake of the Korean Airlines incident in September 1983, 
drew increasingly sharp Soviet reactions suggesting the 
growing ascendancy of ‘hawkish’ influence in the Kremlin. The 
Soviet government expressed deep pessimism about the prospects 
for the improvement of relations with the United States under 
the Reagan Administration. Probably goaded by the furore 
following the Airlines incident - not to mention the Reagan 
Administration’s continued portrayal of the Soviet Union as an 
‘evil empire’ - the Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, declared: 
’If anyone had any illusions about a possible evolution for 
the better in the policy of the present American 
Administration, such illusions have been completely dispelled 
by the latest developments’.[49]
The Republican Party platform had pledged to concentrate 
first on strengthening American security through an overall 
military build-up before engaging in arms control 
negotiations.[50] Despite its declarations to the contrary, in 
comparison with previous administrations, the Reagan 
Administration gave low priority to arms control. Indeed, the
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Administration did not initially appear to have an arms 
control policy at all[5l] and seemed unclear about what it 
sought from arms control with the Soviet Union, apart from 
what it disliked about the composition of the Soviet nuclear 
force. President Reagan’s limited knowledge of arms control 
issues exacerbated the problems posed by a cumbersome 
decision-making process and sharp divisions within the 
Administration. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a strong 
inclination among most senior members of the Administration to 
downplay arms control, if only to keep public attention 
focused on the perceived Soviet military threat and to 
minimise opposition to the on-going defence build-up.
The Administration adopted a curious or rather an 
expedient attitude towards the decade-old arms control 
process. It decided to abandon the SALT framework for future 
arms control negotiations on offensive strategic weapons and 
also distanced itself in different ways from the agreements 
that previous administrations had reached with the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s, but without renouncing them. The 
Administration decided to abide by the limitations embodied in 
the TTBT and PNE agreements on the basis of reciprocity, while 
refusing to present those agreements, for ratification to the 
Senate unless the Soviet Union agreed to substantially alter 
their verification provisions. Similarly, the Administration 
eventually chose not to undermine the SALT II agreement, at 
least for the time being, while still in strong disagreement 
with its substantive and verification provisions.
Though opposed to the ratification of SALT II and TTBT 
agreements, the Administration showed little hesitation in 
regarding ambiguous or suspicious Soviet behaviour as acts of 
violation similar to legal infringements of de iure 
agreements. Not long after the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
(START) negotiations started, the ABM agreement - the only de 
lure SALT-related agreement - also began to lose its 
pre-eminent status. While Soviet compliance behaviour caused 
understandable concern that significant violations of that 
agreement may have occurred, President Reagan’s introduction 
of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) into the arms 
control controversy between the superpowers, and his strong
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attachment to it, threatened to undermine a crucial basis of 
the arms control process that had been underway since the 
early 1970s - more fundamentally than Soviet compliance 
behaviour. Testing of SDI components would violate the terms 
of the ABM treaty, even before it was known that SDI could 
work.
Arms Control Negotiations
President Reagan’s election promise that he would 
vigorously pursue nuclear arms control once in office 
contrasted with his administration’s performance. The 
Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks did not begin until 
November 1981 and it was until May 1982 that President Reagan 
was able to announce a proposal to commence his START talks. 
The opening START proposal was based on a ‘highly unstable 
compromise’ within the Administration.[52] It had been hastily 
adopted apparently in deference to Congressional impatience 
and it continued to give rise to bureaucratic infighting while 
the negotiations went on without an agreed format.
The Polish crisis - first the possibility of Soviet 
military intervention and then the -takeover by the Polish 
military in December 1981 - may have caused an initial delay 
in the Administration’s START initiative because of its 
insistence on tying progress in arms control to acceptable 
Soviet behaviour. But there were other reasons for delay and 
indecision. Within the ranks of the Administration, 
conservative ‘hardliners’ and moderates vied for dominance in 
policy-making. The former, unlike the latter, were in no mood 
to seek compromises with the Soviet Union. As President 
Reagan himself put it at the UN’s second special session on 
disarmament in June 1982 that ‘Soviet aggression and support 
for violence around the world has eroded the confidence needed 
for arms negotiations’.[53]
President Reagan’s generally poor understanding - in some 
cases surprising ignorance[54] - of nuclear arms control 
issues and his limited involvement in policy-making allowed 
the divisions within his Administration to persist to the 
extent that no comprehensive or clear-cut policy was adopted
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for START talks. ’Hardliners’ played a relatively dominant 
role in both INF and START talks, perhaps a little more in the 
former. They enjoyed a more entrenched position in the White 
House than the moderates, and were determined to make a 
significant break with the past SALT process, even if this 
meant formulating proposals that were not necessarily 
negotiable. Their position was essentially that no agreement 
was better than a bad agreement. They were able to frustrate 
the efforts of moderates in INF talks for much of the duration 
of negotiations. In START talks the Congress eventually 
intervened on the side of moderates to pressure the 
Administration to adopt a more flexible and less radical 
negotiating stance.
Neither INF nor START talks had proceeded far before they 
were terminated unilaterally by a Soviet walk-out. As a 
result, the potential impact of the issue of Soviet compliance 
or non-compliance - with existing and future agreements was 
not felt. There would probably have been less division within 
the Reagan Administration on that issue and the position of 
the ‘hardliners’ would probably have prevailed. In other 
words, the issue of compliance and verification would probably 
have led to a breakdown in talks even if the Soviet Union had 
not staged a walk-out.
American START proposals had represented a major 
departure from the SALT approach. The United States sought 
massive reductions of Soviet ICBMs, especially - and over a 
relatively short period of time - the heavier SS-18s and 
SS-19s. At the same time, the United States sought to 
minimise the impact of arms control on its defence 
modernisation programme.[55] Soviet reaction to American 
proposals and Soviet counter-proposals suggested clearly that 
the Soviet Union had little, if any, intention to proceed on 
the basis of rapid reduction. [56] In addition, the Soviet 
Union indicated that its interest in START negotiations would 
depend on the outcome of INF talks.[57] Apart from the 
verification question which was premature to introduce in the 
negotiations, the two sides were sharply divided over the 
American insistence on ’throw-weight’ limits and on the status 
of sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union strongly
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opposed the inclusion of direct control over the throw-weight 
of missiles and bombers, while the United States did not wish 
that sea-launched cruise missiles should fall within the 
purview of strategic arms control.[58] Staunch American 
conservatives were particularly adamant on the inclusion of 
throw-weight limits in an arms agreement and almost equally 
opposed to the inclusion of sea-launched cruise missiles 
limits.
Congressional intervention towards the end of START talks 
in late 1983 apparently pushed these issues into the 
background, but it remained unclear whether the matter had 
been resolved within the Administration. The chief American 
negotiator reportedly declared to his Soviet counter-part 
that, despite Congressional interference, the ‘basic position 
of [the Reagan] Administration had not changed’.[59] The 
hybrid American proposal that called for a working group to 
examine the double build-down concept was summarily dismissed 
by the Soviet Union as a ‘worthless exercise’.[60] On the eve 
of the Soviet boycott of the START talks, confusion seemed to 
reign almost supreme over the Reagan Administration’s policy.
It appeared that the Administration ‘quite simply no longer 
knew what it wanted in strategic arms, .control, much less how _ 
to get it*.[61] While the United States had greatly altered 
and complicated - the original framework for strategic arms 
control negotiations, the Soviet Union had compounded the 
difficulties of START by linking it with INF talks. With 
internal divisions within the Reagan Administration remaining 
unresolved, the START talks stagnated. By 1983 negotiations 
over the substance of START proposals were being conducted 
much less between the United States and the Soviet Union than 
between the Reagan Administration and the Congress, especially 
the Senate.[62]
The INF talks, which were accorded more public and 
official importance than the START talks, proceeded almost as 
dismally as the latter. During much of the negotiations, the 
Reagan Administration clung to its zero-option proposal - that 
is, the removal of all Soviet SS-20s in exchange for the 
non-deployment of American Pershing IIs and Tomahawk cruise 
missiles. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, maintained
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that the SS-20s against NATO in Europe balanced the French, 
British and other NATO deployments. The Kremlin also warned 
that the deployment of American missiles would be matched by 
further SS-20 deployments and the abandonment of INF talks. 
The Soviet Union also called for a moratorium on deployments 
on both sides while the INF talks continued. Attempts by the 
American and Soviet chief negotiators to explore the ground 
for a compromise led to some progress, but the compromise 
which embraced the idea of trading Pershing IIs for a 
reduction of SS-20s seemed abhorrent to President Reagan and 
his ‘hardline’ officials back in Washington.
The Soviet chief negotiator, Yuli Kvitsinsky’s 
involvement in secret parleys was apparently based on the 
incorrect but understandable assumption that the initiative of 
the chief American negotiator, Paul Nizte, had official 
blessing. [63] This impression may in turn have given the 
moderates in the Kremlin both the opportunity and 
encouragement to pursue a compromise. However, Nitze’s 
initiative lacked official support. It also became cleax that 
the Reagan Administration had no intention of trading Pershing 
IIs against SS-20 reductions. Immediately after this somewhat 
unusual episode, the Soviet policy. reverted back to 
inflexibility.[64] Upon his return to Geneva for the next 
round of START talks, Kvitsinsky explained to Nitze that his 
informal search for a possible compromise had seriously upset 
the Kremlin leadership.[65] This may have been a diplomatic 
ploy, but perhaps more likely it reflected the greater 
influence of ‘hawks’ in Moscow in circumstances of political 
disarray among the moderates.
Under pressure from West Germany and, to some extent, 
Britain, the Reagan Administration eventually modified its 
negotiating stance and agreed to pursue the less-than-zero 
option. But the proposal made little impact on the Soviet 
Union. This was partly because deployment of Pershing IIs was 
apparently non-negotiable and partly because the American 
proposal, if adopted, would have changed very little anyway. 
It was widely believed by Western analysts that the Soviet 
Union was hoping that political pressures within Europe would 
preclude American INF deployments. If the Peace Movement and
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its political allies could block deployment, the Soviet Union 
could have its ‘cake and eat it too’.
But the ability of the Peace Movement to deliver the 
‘goods’ was never certain and the Soviet Union needed to 
demonstrate flexibility. Thus, during the course of INF talks 
the Soviet Union offered to reduce its SS-20 deployments in 
exchange for the non-deployment of American missiles. The 
level of reductions offered eventually came down to current 
French and British deployments, on the understanding that 
future increases in French and British deployments would give 
the Soviet Union the right to increase its own deployment. 
The Soviet offer could hardly be described as a major 
concession, since its deployments were already far more 
numerous than NATO’s counterpart deployments in Western 
Europe. Indeed, after some flexibility in its negotiating 
stance, ’the Soviet Union indicated that up to about 600 
warheads were surplus to [its] requirements, provided no US 
intermediate-range missiles appeared in Europe’.[66] The 
United States, on the other hand, insisted on the principle of 
bilateral equality between American and Soviet deployments not 
only in relation to Europe but also the Far East. Further 
private attempts by the chief American and Soviet negotiators 
to revive attempts at compromise succumbed to reluctance, if 
not simply a lack of interest, on the part of both 
governments.
While Paul Nitze enjoyed a special status and was thus 
fairly secure in espousing compromise and moderation, (as he 
also tried to do from the sideline for START talks), this was 
not the case with the American Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency’s (ACDA) veteran Director, Eugene Rostow. The latter’s 
support for a flexible INF policy greatly displeased President 
Reagan and his inner circle of advisers. He was eventually 
dismissed in 1983 and replaced by kenneth Adelman, a person of 
lesser status and experience in arms control, but one who 
enjoyed close association with some of the Administration’s 
‘hardliners’, having already served hitherto as Jeane 
Kirkpatrick’s deputy at the UN. Concern over the 
Administration’s patchwork overall policy on nuclear arms 
control and its apparent indifference towards the fate of INF
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and START negotiations generated pressures at home and abroad 
for a more pragmatic and active policy. A visible shift in 
American INF policy in 1983 came after pressure by the West 
German government (with British support) for a more flexible 
policy. [67] The original American framework for START 
negotiations was also substantially modified in response to 
increasing pressure from the Congress. [68]
Though not tailor-made to suit the predilections of 
staunch conservatives, the Reagan Administration’s INF and 
START policies had consistently leaned more towards the 
‘hardliners’ approach than the moderates. By 1983 external 
pressures had forced the Administration into a number of 
compromises[69], but by then the impending deployment of 
American missiles in Western Europe had already cast a shadow 
over the short-term fate of INF and START negotiations.
Another significant development with profound 
implications for the START negotiations was President Reagan’s 
apparently firm decision in early 1983 to accelerate R&D for 
an SDI capability. This seems certain to have reinforced 
Soviet reluctance to move rapidly towards a reduction in 
strategic nuclear arms, though its impact on INF negotiations 
is less clear.
Both INF and START negotiations were accompanied by 
unusual public exchanges between the Kremlin and the White 
House that eroded the confidentiality of negotiations and gave 
the impression that these negotiations were being conducted 
largely for propaganda purposes. The INF talks ended in 
bitterness between the chief American and Soviet negotiators, 
who had hitherto maintained a cordial business-like 
relationship. Even worse, both governments in an attempt to 
bolster their image of ‘toughness’ in facing up to pressure 
from the adversary[70], tried to undermine the integrity of 
each other’s negotiators. The Soviet Union displayed less 
restraint in this respect and even went to the extent of 
publicly undercutting its own negotiator.[71] Both negotiators 
later went public with conflicting versions of their secret 
negotiations which had seemed to promise a settlement based on 
substantial compromise on both sides. [72] The breakdown of INF
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talks was also followed on each side by official attacks, 
initiated by the Reagan Administration, that held the other 
side entirely responsible for the failure.[73]
A central assumption underpinning the American INF 
position was that the Soviet Union would only take the INF 
negotiations seriously and be prepared to make concessions 
after the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles had been deployed. 
Partly for this reason, the United States did not seem anxious 
to engage in compromises with the Soviet Union prior to 
deployment. Paul Nitze took a different and more optimistic 
view of the prospects for agreement, but he was over-ruled by 
the White House in his efforts to promote compromise. The 
Kremlin held firmly to its position that any compromise on its 
part would be conditional on the cancellation of American 
deployments and also linked to French and British deployments. 
The Soviet Union seemed determined not to grant recognition to 
American deployments, especially Pershing IIs.
In his private negotiations with Nitze, Yuli Kvitsinsky 
had canvassed various compromise positions in a way that 
suggested the presence of moderates in the Kremlin and some 
instability in the Soviet decision-making process.[74] 
However, Kvitsinsky’s somewhat nervous and very careful 
handling of secret talks with Nitze, plus the Kremlin’s 
exaggerated denial of any role in the informal 
Kvitsinsky-Nitze deal, and later the Soviet Defence Minister’s 
reiteration of the principles supposedly governing Soviet INF 
policy, seemed to indicate that while divisions did exist 
within the Kremlin, the ‘hardliners’ finally had more control 
over decision-making.
Thus, notwithstanding the tentative attempts at 
compromise between Nitze and Kvitsinsky outside the official 
forum, the two countries held on to divergent courses on the 
INF issue. A settlement would have required major bilateral 
concessions to deal with the conflicting concepts of balance. 
Given the Reagan Administration’s declared policy of 
negotiating from strength and its anti-Soviet rhetoric, a 
settlement, since it involved more than marginal concessions 
on both sides, ran the risk of being perceived by ‘hardliners*
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in both the White House and the Kremlin as a significant 
political defeat. A settlement that seemed even marginally 
more advantageous to the other would likely have been regarded 
as nothing less than political capitulation. This also seemed 
to be the case with START talks. Both the principles 
underlying the new American framework for negotiations and 
their practical implications were probably all the more 
objectionable to the Soviet Union because its acceptance could 
have been seen as conceding political victory to the Reagan 
Administration.
A dominant feature of the Reagan Administration’s START 
approach was that if it were forced to engage in negotiations, 
the United States should inter alia seek ‘nothing less than a 
top-to-bottom overhaul of the Soviet arsenal, and to 
accomplish changes in the nuclear balance that the United 
States had not been able to bring about by dint of its own 
defense programs’.[75] Heightened political sensitivity, 
because of the rapid decline of overall superpower relations, 
combined with divergence in approach and the technical 
complexities of INF and START issues, to produce a situation 
that made progress exceedingly difficult. Arms control 
diplomacy tended to symbolise overall superpower relations - a 
deterioration in those relations made success in reaching 
agreement all the more difficult. Both sides seemed locked in 
a larger psychological and political ’contest’. For the 
United States, arms control served as one more means to 
impress the Soviet Union with its new mood and resolve. For 
the latter, it was equally important not to allow the former 
to impose its conceptions of what arms control should be in 
their bilateral relationship.
Despite the political and technical complexity of issues 
in INF and START talks and the general deterioration of 
US-Soviet relations, ‘many American officials and some outside 
experts as well[,] were convinced that... there might have been 
a major breakthrough in late 1983 or early 1984’ if the Korean 
Airlines incident had not occurred.[76] It seems more likely, 
however, as Strobe Talbot has argued, that the Airlines 
incident probably ‘crystallised negative trends that were 
already far advanced’.[77] It is probably also the case that
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Andropov’s angry and gloomy statement following the Airlines 
incident ‘did not represent a shift or abandonment [of 
policy]; rather it may have ratified a policy that had been 
gathering momentum for some t i m e [78]
Verbal onslaughts on both sides however decreased 
appreciably in 1984 and efforts to break the arms control 
deadlock began at American initiative. ’The chilly fall of 
1983 [gave way to] the spring thaw of 1984’[79] and the 
situation continued to improve until some tangible progress 
was made towards the end of the year. In January 1984, before 
Andropov’s death, the Reagan Administration began to change 
the tone and composition of its policy-statements regarding 
relations with the Soviet Union, especially on arms control. 
With the passing away of Andropov and his replacement by 
Chernenko, the United States adopted a more conciliatory 
posture and the Soviet Union, after it became clear that 
President Reagan’s re-election was almost certain, showed 
greater reciprocity. [80] The Administration continued to 
suffer from an internal lack of cohesion, but the President 
and the Secretary of State exerted more control over the 
conduct of diplomacy.
. „■ . •«**A*.
The Reagan Administration began to display more concern 
with arms control; and was most immediately interested in 
starting discussions to explore the ground for resuming arms 
control negotiations. The initiative was justified on the 
grounds that the United States could now negotiate from 
strength. Echoing President Reagan’s earlier speech to the 
American Legion, George Shultz said: ‘We have rebuilt our 
strength so that we can defend our interests and dissuade 
others from violence’. [81] In September 1984, President Reagan 
proposed the concept of an agreed guideline to chart the 
course of arms control talks with the Soviet Union for the 
next 20 years.[82] George Shultz continued with the 
conciliatory tone. Curiously, he said that the Reagan 
Administration would not link arms control to acceptable 
Soviet behaviour around the world.[83] Both sides subsequently 
agreed that they would engage in exploratory talks for 
starting negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in early 
1985. [84] Another positive step by the Reagan Administration
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was the appointment of Max Kampelman, a moderate, as the chief 
strategic arms negotiator. His predecessor, Edward Rowny had 
been a staunch opponent of SALT II. The latter’s 
idiosyncratic, if not unprofessional, handling of START talks 
had helped to retard progress and reduce the negotiations to 
the ‘most acrimonious and contentious’ transaction of business 
since 1969, when the strategic arms control talks began.[85]
Thus, towards the end of the Reagan Administration’s 
first term, arms control negotiations remained in limbo with 
serious difficulties still in the way of resuming 
negotiations. But political and ideological attacks had 
moderated (having reached almost a full pitch in late 1983) 
and both sides began to make some effort to arrest the 
alarming trend in their relations, especially in the area of 
arms control which had suffered most. The ‘spring thaw’ 
continued through summer and by late autumn there were signs 
of a likely resumption of preliminary talks in 1985. The 
Reagan Administration had forsaken its earlier views about the 
Soviet Union. But there was less rhetoric, as well as more 
mention of American interest in arms control and a better 
working relationship with the Soviet Union.[86]
Towards the end of 1984, the Reagan Administration’s 
interest in arresting and perhaps reversing the negative drift 
of US-Soviet relations on arms control was beginning to be 
reciprocated by the Kremlin. Indicating that the Soviet Union 
continued to adhere to the late Leonid Brezhnev’s conciliatory 
approach, President Chernenko, Andropov’s evidently moderate 
successor, encouraged the Reagan Administration to make 
diplomatic overtures. [87] Interestingly, a Pravda commentary 
strongly suggested that under Chernenko the ‘hawks’ in the 
Kremlin had been contained in their confrontational attitude 
towards the Reagan Administration on arms control.[88] It is 
likely that Chernenko’s success, or partial success, was 
significantly aided by encouraging signs and diplomatic 
initiatives from the White House. President Reagan’s easy 
re-election also probably helped the moderates in the Kremlin.
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The Kremlin ‘hardliners’ probably stood on firmer ground 
on the INF issue than on START. While a return to INF talks 
was strongly rejected by the Kremlin as long as American 
missiles remained deployed in Western Europe[89], the 
difficulties in the way of starting preliminary discussions 
for resuming START negotiations were removed by the American 
proposal that both sides should first develop a new basis for 
negotiations on all major issues. [90] But moves by both sides 
to revive the defunct arms control process were not 
accompanied by any substantive change in their positions on 
specific issues. In the United States, the conflict between 
State Department moderates and Pentagon ‘hardliners’ continued 
to persist.[91]
Developments in 1984 were not uniformly positive for arms 
control. Steps taken by the Reagan Administration to 
accelerate R&D for its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
sparked off domestic debate about American strategic policy 
and difficulties as well as risks of drastically restructuring 
the basis of deterrence between the superpowers. President 
Reagan’s evident enthusiasm for the ‘Star Wars’ concept and 
his administration’s optimism about the scheme’s medium-term 
prospects introduced yet another contentious issue between the 
superpowers. President Reagan’s initial ‘Star Wars’ speech 
had brought a swift Soviet reaction. Yuri Andropov had 
rejected President Reagan’s claim that SDI was intended for 
purely defensive purposes. He had expressed strong misgivings 
about SDI, maintaining that it would enable offensive weapons 
to be used as a first strike capability. [92] Evidently, the 
SDI issue altered the framework of the decade-old arms control 
process, more significantly than the Reagan Administration’s 
START policy. More immediately, the SDI raised questions 
regarding the integrity and viability of several existing 
agreements, particularly the ABM treaty.
After President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech in March 
1983, his administration moved quickly to embrace the idea and 
begin a dedicated pursuit of R&D for space weapons. During 
June-October 1983, two panels were set-up to examine the SDI 
concept. The panels considered the prospects of space weapons 
to be very encouraging and supported the feasibility of a
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multilayer ABM system by the turn of the century, which the 
Pentagon readily accepted.[93] An interagency panel 
subsequently proposed a vigorous research effort at an 
estimated cost of 18 to 27 billion dollars for the initial 
1985-89 period.[94] In January 1984, President Reagan 
requested the Congress for 2 billion dollars for fiscal year 
1985 to pursue the technical feasibility of ‘Star Wars’.[95]
The domestic debate on SDI gathered momentum in 1984, 
spurred by the issue’s importance to the outcome of 
preliminary talks agreed between the superpowers for early 
next year. Critics challenged the technical feasibility of 
‘Star Wars’ and questioned the political wisdom of pursuing 
the grandiose scheme of ABM defence implicit in President 
Reagan’s opening speech and the Administration’s subsequent 
pronouncements and related activities. [96] They argued against 
both the feasibility of an impenetrable defence against 
ballistic nuclear missiles and the desirability of a partial 
defensive system.[97] Critics also seriously doubted that the 
Soviet Union could be drawn into accepting the 
Administration’s new concept of deterrence and strategic 
balance.[98] They asserted that SDI’s very existence 
threatened the future of the ABM treaty and it would impede 
progress in nuclear arms control.[99] The Administration’s 
proposition that for some years its SDI would not violate the 
ABM treaty failed to convince the critics or placate their 
immediate concerns about the erosion of arms control 
prospects. The ABM treaty, according to critics, prohibited 
not only the development and deployment but also the testing 
of ‘Star War’ weapons and ‘components’.[100] They disagreed 
with the Administration’s claim that near-future tests, 
envisaged in its SDI programme, would not be significant 
enough to constitute an infringement of the ABM treaty.[101] 
Much of the debate about infringements hinged on whether or 
not the systems tested should be seen as components of an ABM 
system, in which case they were banned - or as adjuncts, in 
which case they were permitted.
SDI proponents generally tended to concede that the ‘Star 
War’ weapons would probably fail to provide a ‘leak-proof’ ABM 
defence for the foreseeable future. But they considered a
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partial defensive system to be worthwhile, even if its 
unimpeded pursuit necessitated a substantial amendment of the 
ABM treaty or indeed its dissolution.[102] Proponents also 
argued in favour of SDI because they disliked the doctrine of 
mutually assured destruction (MAD), apparently the prevailing 
form of deterrence.[103] Opponents either challenged the 
assumption of MAD as the prevailing doctrine[104] or, more 
importantly, argued that technical difficulties and adverse 
Soviet reaction would more likely deny any improvement of 
deterrence through SDI.[105] Some of them criticised SDI more 
strongly. They asserted that SDI would in fact lower 
deterrence to a dangerous level, especially during the 
protracted period of transition.[106] Leading opponents saw 
SDI either as a folly because of its effect on the ABM treaty 
or more fundamentally as a dangerous illusion. To add to the 
SDI debate, there were others who opposed the original idea as 
unrealisable but supported a scaled-down version of the 
concept as a way of reducing vulnerability, and also ‘the 
force level at which MAD operates’ or rather the extent of 
destruction that might otherwise occur if deterrence should 
fail.[107]
The highly contentious issue of ‘Star Wars’ added a new 
dimension to the problems associated with the progress of arms 
control, casting a grim shadow on prospects immediately beyond 
1984. In calling for a resumption of talks, President Reagan 
did offer to ‘consider’ restraints on the testing of 
anti-satellite weapons once negotiations on nucleax weapons 
got underway.[108] But this alone did not constitute an 
important signal of flexibility.
The SDI issue hung somewhat darkly over the prospects for 
an early resumption of nuclear arms control negotiations. The 
superpowers stood sharply divided over how the issue should be 
addressed in their preliminary talks. President Reagan was, 
it appeared, ‘still pushing for Star Wars in its original, 
grandiose and fundamentally non[-]negotiable form’. [109] It 
also seemed that the Soviet Union would adopt a ‘hardline’ 
attitude, linking its willingness to accept major reductions 
in START talks to either a renunciation of SDI by the United 
States or at least restraints on R&D related to SDI. Soviet
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concern about SDI was also reflected in increased Soviet 
interest in banning anti-satellite weapons and in its 
insistence that the ‘militarisation of outer space’ should be 
regarded as a priority question in bilateral efforts to 
restaxt nuclear arms control talks.[110] The possibility of a 
compromise based on permitting ‘Star Wars’ research but 
precluding testing - which would also contain growing 
apprehensions about the near-term fate of the ABM treaty - 
offered the only apparent hope that the arms control situation 
might improve after over a year of breakdown and several years 
of stagnation. At any rate, it seemed very unlikely that the 
Soviet Union would embrace the Reagan Administration’s SDI 
concept or accept any significant departure from the approach 
to nuclear arms control implicit in the ABM treaty. Thus, 
despite the new moves being made towards negotiations at the 
end of 1984, the American stress on SDI was generating 
additional uncertainties about progress.
Anti-satellite arms talks (ASAT) were another area of 
strategic arms control where little, if any, progress was made 
during the period of President Reagan’s first term. In the 
Carter period, the superpowers had engaged in several rounds 
of talks in 1978-79 before they were formally suspended by the 
United States following Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan. The Soviet Union subsequently resumed its 
anti-satellite weapon tests, reportedly in reaction to growing 
opposition to the ratification of SALT II in the Senate.[ill] 
(During the 1978-79 talks the Soviet Union had unilaterally 
observed a moratorium on testing). Soon after the 
installation of the Reagan Administration, the Soviet Union 
renewed its proposal for a resumption of negotiations to 
‘preclude the militarisation of outer space’. [112] The 
proposal covered space-based anti-satellite weapons. The 
Reagan Administration’s reaction was one of implicit rejection 
of such talks. President Reagan spoke of the importance of 
using outer space as a defence zone to ‘strengthen the 
security of the United States’.[113] The American Defense 
Secretary, Casper Weinberger, went further in calling outer 
space a ‘crucial’ area of defence where the United States 
planned to get ‘actively engaged’.[114] Reportedly, the 
Pentagon had set 1987 as the target year for the deployment of
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anti-satellite weapons.[115] Many observers saw the American 
anti-satellite programme as the first step towards adopting 
the ‘Star Wars’ scheme.[116]
In mid-1983, after President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech, 
the Soviet Union again called for negotiations to ban 
anti-satellite weapons as well as other space-related weapons. 
The initial American response was one of relative 
indifference.[117] Subsequently however the Administration 
raised objections about the Soviet proposal, the main 
contention being that verification would be an unwieldy 
problem. [118] The Soviet Union had already completed testing 
of its relatively crude anti-satellite system, while the 
United States moved close to initial testing of its more 
advanced system.[119] The Reagan Administration was critical 
of the Soviet proposal’s inclusion of the space shuttle in the 
proposed ban. (The shuttle could be used and indeed was 
intended to aid the testing of advanced anti-satellite 
weapons).[120] The Administration also argued that 
verification of compliance with several provisions in the 
Soviet draft treaty would be a serious problem. More 
revealingly, it stated that ‘any Soviet cheating on an ASAT 
agreement, even on a small scale, could pose a prohibitive 
risk’.[l2l] The Administration did not reject the Soviet 
proposal, but it neither accepted the Soviet overture for 
talks nor did it offer a counter-proposal. Indeed, any such 
steps would have contradicted the over-riding decision to 
proceed with SDI.
The situation with regard to ASAT talks became more 
complicated in 1984. The Soviet Union’s 1983 proposal went 
beyond anti-satellite weapons in space. In mid-1984, the 
Soviet Union again reiterated its proposal for talks on the 
de-militarisation of outer space. This time the Reagan 
Administration agreed to discuss the matter if the talks 
included offensive nuclear weapons, but not in a negotiating 
context.[122] Any interest in negotiations seemed limited to 
anti-satellite weapons. In addition, the Administration 
wanted to lower the status of such talks, reducing its purpose 
to seeking ‘agreement on feasible negotiating 
approaches’.[123] The Soviet Union disagreed with the
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composition of the American agenda and also with downgrading 
the status of the talks.
To summarise, the ASAT talks were first suspended by the 
Carter Administration and then initially rejected by the 
Reagan Administration. Signs of limited American interest in 
discussing the question emerged subsequently. But by then the 
Reagan Administration had embraced the ‘Star Waxs’ concept and 
the Soviet proposal had gone beyond ASAT to embrace talks on 
all space-related weapons, a subject the Reagan Administration 
was even less interested in negotiating or becoming involved 
in.
The Reagan Administration’s more receptive stance and its 
gestures to the Soviet Union for a return to arms control 
talks were prompted by various considerations. These included 
European concern about the collapse of arms control talks in 
late 1983, President Reagan’s anti-Sovietism or rather the 
extent to which he may have antagonised the Soviet Union, and 
possibly the ‘disapproving response of mainstream America, 
whose votes were vital to his re-election’.[124] It may also 
be the case that President Reagan did not wish to be seen 
embarking on the controversial ‘Stax Wars’ scheme without 
attempting to draw the Soviet Union into some agreement on it.
From the available account of INF and START talks as well 
as public statements by Soviet officials, the ‘hardliners’ 
apparently carried more influence in the Kremlin and the 
moderates seemed very much on the defensive. The Soviet 
Defence Minister, Dimitri Ustinov, appeared to be one such 
’hardliner’ who played an important role in the policy-making 
process. The military also seems to have played a significant 
‘hawkish’ role. [125] Little is reliably known about the 
politics of decision-making on arms control in the Kremlin. 
The imbalance between Soviet secrecy and relative American 
‘open-ness’ can cause a distorted impression of greater 
American responsibility for the failure or problems of axms 
control. The relative secrecy that shrouds the Soviet 
decision-making process creates uncertainty about the nature 
of Soviet policy and makes it enormously difficult to come to 
grips with the politics of superpower relations on axms
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control. This can only add to the problems of arms control.
Much more reliable information is available on the 
interplay of moderate and neo-conservative influence on the 
Reagan Administration’s arms control policy. The State 
Department generally adopted a relatively moderate approach, 
being opposed to a sharp break with the way the arms control 
process had evolved in the 1970s. The Pentagon played a 
‘hardline’ role with some ‘missionary’ zeal and enjoyed easier 
access to decision-making in the White House. The NSC and 
ACDA figured less importantly than in previous 
administrations. The top officials in the Pentagon involved 
in arms control policy - Casper Weinberger, Fred Ikle and 
Richard Perle - worked together to promote the ‘hardline’ 
approach. The State Department lacked political and 
conceptual cohesion, which weakened its ability to counter the 
Pentagon’s influence on the Presidency. George Shultz who 
lacked expertise in arms control was amenable to the 
Pentagon’s influence.[126] The Pentagon also enjoyed other 
advantages. Richard Perle played a highly active and often an 
effective role on the Pentagon’s behalf, paxtly because of his 
considerable expertise and sharp political acumen. The 
Pentagon had also successfully persuaded .. the chief American 
START negotiator, Edward Rowny, not to waver from his 
‘hardline’ attitude, both on matters of substance affecting 
the negotiability of proposals and on the procedural handling 
of negotiations.[127]
Richard Perle’s role was highly significant in 
policy-making on arms control. Perle was able to establish 
and ‘expand his power base at the Pentagon with the full 
support of Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, who share[d] 
Perle’s views - if not his grasp of history and the arcane 
elements of arms control’. [128] Strobe Talbot’s detailed 
inside account and other news reports portrayed Richard Perle 
as a forceful and influential person with a strong ideological 
hostility towards the Soviet Union, who was determined that 
the United States should seek to restructure its arms control 
relationship with the Soviet Union, regardless of the latter’s 
reaction and its effect on arms control. Perle’s influence on 
START and INF talks began to weaken only after the Congress
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began to extert pressure on policy-making. In an effort to 
placate the Congress and attract bipartisan support for his 
administration, President Reagan and his NSC chief eventually 
asserted their control over policy-making and began to 
entertain outside advice.[129]
Briefly then, the arms control process during President 
Reagan’s first term was more unproductive than in any other 
period since the late 1950s or perhaps the early 1960s. In 
the INF talks, initially both the superpowers displayed 
considerable inflexibility. Subsequent moderation failed 
however to resolve the issue of equal reductions. Differences 
over the status of French and British deployments made the 
question of balance contentious and strategically 
sensitive.[130] Uncertainty about West European acceptance of 
impending American deployments also dampened the seriousness 
of negotiations, especially on the American side. The 
negotiations ended abruptly and bitterly with an indefinite 
Soviet walkout from INF and START talks in late 1983. But the 
negotiations had reached an imbroglio long before the formal 
breakdown. On INF and START, despite some flexibility at a 
later stage, the superpowers had gone to the negotiating table 
with proposals and positions that made...„compromise difficult, 
both from a political and technical standpoint. This period 
of superpower relations was unprecedented in that no central 
arms control negotiations were held in 1984, remaining frozen 
for over a year. The final year of this period however 
witnessed moves initiated by the Reagan Administration to 
re-start arms control talks and both sides eventually agreed 
to explore a new framework for this purpose. Whether such 
moves would, in effect, lead to a new phase of relations on 
arms control remained uncertain, partly because of the weight 
of pre-existing problems and partly because of the new ‘Star 
Wars’ controversy.
American Arms Control Debate
The period since the late 1970s also witnessed growing 
domestic controversy in the United States about the relevance 
and significance of arms control for national security. The 
consensus behind American arms control policy had been shaky
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from the outset and it was not long after the SALT process got 
underway that criticism of SALT negotiations grew and 
developed into either a general opposition to arms control or 
a profound scepticism of its importance. In large measure, 
the decline of enthusiasm for arms control arose out of 
disappointment, and even disillusionment, with the results of 
negotiations since the mid-1970s, and also with the pattern of 
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. The meagre results 
of SALT negotiations, in comparison with high expectations, 
and the competitive posture of Soviet defence and foreign 
policy during the SALT process helped critics to challenge 
either the arms control concept or the approach that had been 
adopted and its underlying assumptions. Soviet involvements 
in Angola, Ethiopia, Indo-China and particularly its military 
intervention in Afghanistan shaxpened public fears of the 
Soviet Union and led to a major erosion of support for arms 
control in the United States. The burgeoning body of critics 
included a number of converted liberals. Opinion within this 
body varied from an outright criticism of arms control as an 
important component of security policy, to less fundamentalist 
objections or reservations about the actual practice of arms 
control. The debate in the United States touched on a nexus 
of issues that opened up superpower ..relations to a broad 
reappraisal.
The overwhelming support for arms control in the Senate 
at the time of SALT I ’s ratification in 1972 disappeared by 
the time SALT II negotiations were concluded in 1979. A 
significant loss of support for arms control became evident 
when the ratification of SALT II by the Senate became a 
problem for the Carter Administration. ’Wide-spread 
disenchantment with the SALT process’ and an erosion of 
expectations had occurred, affecting ‘both those who [had] 
been for and those who [had] been against the results achieved 
so far’.[l3l] Although still an advocate of arms control, 
Leslie Gelb remarked, after resigning his post as Director of 
the State Department’s Politico-Military Bureau, that the arms 
control approach adopted in the 1970s had ’essentially 
failed’. [132] Subsequently, during President Reagan’s first 
term, the importance of arms control weakened considerably as 
the perceived need for a major military build-up and a more
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competitive global posture took precedence in policy 
formulation. Thus, by the time President Reagan assumed 
office in early 1981, arms control had already run into a 
major crisis.
Opponents of arms control raised a complex set of 
criticisms that were both specific to arms control and also of 
a more general nature. Generally, these could be summarised 
as follows: (l) post-war experience of arms control with the 
Soviet Union failed to measure up to the expectations that 
underscored the original support for arms control; (2) the 
positive results of arms control were meagre while the 
negative consequences were substantial - arms control proved 
advantageous to the Soviet Union while damaging to the United 
States; (3) structural differences between Soviet and 
American societies, such as Soviet secrecy and American 
‘open-ness’, severely limited the potential of arms control 
and made it logistically strenuous and also politically 
divisive for the United States; (4) there can be no assurance 
that arms control would inhibit Soviet behaviour - thus axms 
control would fail to contain Soviet influence in the world; 
(5) the superpowers do not share a similar strategic doctrine 
or a common perception of arms control - as such, their 
attitudes are incompatible; (6) in view of its past conduct 
and its communist ideology, the Soviet Union cannot be 
expected to perform responsibly in the arms control arena; 
and (7) there are no compelling reasons to seek security 
through arms control or to believe that there is no 
alternative to negotiating with the Soviet Union - indeed, the 
pursuit of arms control distorted and inhibited national 
defence effort and encouraged an accommodative attitude that 
risked degenerating to appeasement, if not to political 
capitulation.
The collapse of consensus within the American arms 
control community and the intensity of the debate about past 
experience with arms control is probably best summarised in 
the public exchanges between Henry Rowen, a former president 
of the Rand Corporation, on the one hand, and Henry Kissinger 
and Brent Scowcroft, on the other, both of whom served as NSC 
advisers to former presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford,
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respectively.[133] Reflecting the general conduct of debate, 
the Rowen-Kissinger exchange showed that moderate and liberal 
supporters of arms control generally adopted a defensive 
attitude, unlike the more self-assured conservatives, perhaps 
because the latter had become more numerous and on balance the 
public mood had turned sour towards the liberal approach.
Conservative opposition to the arms control process 
inherited from the 1970s derived from a cluster of objections 
about the conduct of negotiations, the impact of those 
negotiations on American defence effort, and the failure of 
arms control to contain Soviet behaviour around the world. 
Some liberals and moderates continued to defend the SALT 
approach, while others, like Kissinger and Scowcroft, sought a 
revised approach, while still disagreeing with conservative 
criticism of the theory and practice of arms control during 
the Nixon and Ford periods. Kissinger and Scowcroft offered a 
different explanation from the conservatives for the perceived 
slack in American defence effort and a growth of Soviet 
military involvement in the Third World in the 1970s. They 
argued strongly that the responsibility for the situation lay 
with the debilitating domestic political effects of the 
Vietnam War and the Watergate ,<>jscandal. [ 134] In the 
circumstances, they maintained, arms control could not have 
been expected to accomplish more.
Opponents argued that ‘strategic arms control has 
exhausted its potential and should be avoided because it is 
technologically unrealistic, has a distorting effect on 
Western defence efforts, and is bound to hurt the West 
relative to the Soviet Union’.[135] They also argued that ‘the 
nature of Soviet society, political objectives, and military 
posture makes stable arms control agreements impossible’.[136] 
A crude version of this argument ‘portrays the Soviets as 
liars and cheats [while the] more sophisticated version 
stresses the tradition of secrecy and concealment as 
instruments of defense in Russian history and the restrictive 
perception of agreements with bourgeois states that 
characterizes communist ideology’. [137] A fundamental issue in 
this context was the status of mutual deterrence in Soviet 
military thinking. Opponents argued that Soviet writings
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emphasised war-fighting and war-winning military doctrines, 
which ran counter to the concept of mutual deterrence that had 
been central to the arms control approach of the United 
States.
Staunch conservatives in the Reagan Administration, and 
outside it, argued against arms control and referred to the 
experiences of the inter-war period. The Soviet Union was 
equated with Japan and Germany in the 1930s, as another 
totalitarian power ‘in relentless pursuit of imperialist 
expansion and hegemony[138] The assertion was made that it 
was not just the past historical record but also ‘the nature 
of superpower conflict [that fails to provide] rational 
justification for the faith in arms c o n t r o l [139] Such a 
faith was characterised as ‘the great superstition of our 
time’.[l40] Richard Perle expressed similar scepticism about 
the value of arms control. He said that in the past ‘some 
rather nasty wars [had] followed a regime of arms 
c o n t r o l [141] The hardliners’ arguments did not go 
unchallenged even within the Administration as a cautionary 
statement by President Reagan’s strategic arms control 
negotiator, Max Kampelman, to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, indicated. He criticised., the liberals for 
neglecting the danger posed by Soviet military power, but also 
admonished ‘hardline’ conservatives for being so ‘overwhelmed 
by the difficulties [presented by Soviet military power and 
ideology] as to place all their trust in military power and 
its use alone’.[142]
But the ‘hardliners’ continued to assert their distaste 
for arms control, questioning its usefulness for ‘slowing the 
arms race, saving money [or] taming the Soviet Union’.[143] 
They also dismissed arms control as ‘injurious to US 
interests’.[144] During policy-formulation for INF and START 
talks, influential Administration officials tended to 
downgrade the negotiability of proposals and, in defence of 
their stance, they often overstated the point that a hasty 
agreement was worse or more dangerous than no agreement. On 
occasions, when bureaucratic infighting became particularly 
tense, they displayed more visibly their underlying dislike of 
arms control.
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More numerous than ‘hardline’ opponents were those who 
continued to support arms control but questioned the approach 
of past American policy and the benefits so far associated 
with the arms control process. Such critics were more 
concerned about practical issues in arms control between the 
superpowers. Another issue of common concern to moderate and 
‘hardline’ critics was ’linkage’ - that is, the expectation 
that the arms control process would inhibit Soviet military 
build-up and ‘at least temper Soviet behaviour in regional 
crises’.[145]
Critics who had little sympathy for the concept of arms 
control seemed fewer than those whose opposition was directed 
at the way arms control had been managed in the past. 
Criticism of past attempts at arms control and of arms control 
per se was probably more intense during President Reagan’s 
first term because the conservatives deemed it imperative to 
engage in a massive defence build-up. Strong criticism of 
arms control, even if it tended to go into excess, became 
something of a political necessity for the conservatives, who 
wanted to put the liberals on the defensive, and also create 
and sustain public support for a major military build-up. As 
the Administration’s experience with., -the ....Congress showed, 
outside pressure in favour of arms control did have some 
adverse effect on the defence programme, though not to any 
significant degree. A publicist asked: ‘Why is MX so 
unsatisfactory?’ His own reply was: ’Because of an arms 
agreement’.[146]
Many critics saw arms control as symbolising American 
weakness or representing a decline of national morale 
following the Vietnam debacle and the Watergate scandal - a 
period coinciding with growing American involvement in the 
SALT process. The period was also closely associated with the 
diplomacy of detente, a concept that became increasingly 
distasteful to the conservatives. The intensity of criticism 
also drew from the status that arms control acquired in the 
1970s. Even a moderate critic remarked that ‘arms control, 
once just an element of Western political and military 
strategy, [had] grown into a full-blown theology’.[147]
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Arms control advocates would probably have conceded some 
ground to their adversaries in the debate in less conflictual 
circumstances. The advocates had been subjected to a 
protracted ‘barrage’ of criticism that had reduced and 
threatened to undermine their public influence and foothold at 
a critical juncture for arms control. There were ‘hardliners’ 
among the general body of critics who seemed determined to 
exploit any opportunity to damage the future prospects of arms 
control. The prevailing mood of conservatism probably 
accentuated the dangers the advocates perceived in conceding 
to the critique of ‘hardliners’. Another factor that could 
well have hardened the advocates in their resistance to 
conservative criticism was that many of them had been 
personally affiliated with the management of arms control 
diplomacy in the 1970s. As such, criticism of arms control 
was often taken personally. Finally, and more fundamentally, 
the severity of the arms control controversy reflected 
contrasting political beliefs between the liberals and 
conservatives and the sensitivity of those beliefs to the arms 
control issue.
The arms control controversy was characterised by 
adversary politics: ’Those on one side_preache[d] that axms 
control [was] the only true path to peace; those on the other 
denounce [d] it as a snare and a delusion because the Russians 
[were] liars and cheats’.[148] Concerned about the breakdown 
of consensus on arms control, a Congressman of some 
long-standing experience lamented that the debate between the 
conservatives and liberals had ‘taken on the attributes of a 
religious schism’.[149] Placing himself in the ‘beleaguered 
[political] center’, he summarised the divergence between the 
conservatives and liberals in the following terms:
The conservative mindset about nuclear weapons is 
that superiority is best and, failing superiority, 
that it is essential to have absolute formal 
equality on as many points of comparison as 
possible. Vulnerabilities in any given part of 
the deterrent must be dealt with by shoring up 
that particular part at any cost. In the 
conservative view, counterforce capability is
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essential, the more the better; and it must be 
backed by extensive civil defense and shielded by 
a massive anti-ballistic missile system. As for 
arms control, less is better and none is best - a 
conviction based on fear that the arms control 
process only builds false optimism in the West 
while allowing the Soviets to maximise their 
advantages by means both legal and illegal.
Typically, the liberal approach to these same 
issues finds the goal of nuclear superiority 
malevolent, most forms of partial inferiority 
meaningless, and formal equality irrelevant. 
Particular vulnerabilities do not matter in view 
of the general invulnerability of mutual assured 
destruction. Counterforce capability is not only 
unnecessary but provides a potential impetus 
toward the pitfalls of nuclear war-fighting, 
[sic] The arms control process should aim at 
complete nuclear disarmament, which could begin 
with a nearly complete preliminary moratorium. 
[Since] virtually nothing the Soviets might do 
could confer upon them immunity to a US 
retaliatory attack... liberals tend to be 
dismissive of concerns about verification and 
ready to view all questions of compliance as 
resolvable through diplomatic channels, no matter 
how indeterminate the outcome and slow its 
coming.[150]
Arms control has also been perceived as ‘neither a 
panacea nor a trap; [but] simply [as] an honorable endeavour 
that, for all its virtues, has serious limitations’.[151] It 
is arguable and even questionable whether the endeavour has 
always or often been an honourable one on either side. It is 
also uncertain how serious the limitations are. But, that 
there are limitations, at least for short and medium term, 
seems obvious. While the conservative critics tended to adopt 
a highly pessimistic view on this matter, the liberal 
advocates generally acknowledged prevailing limitations but
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retained the hope and expectation of improvements in the 
future.
Perhaps the most important limitation has been the 
Kremlin’s strong attachment to secrecy and the bearing this 
continues to have on the nagging question of verification. 
Critics and advocates of arms control have been less divided 
on this than on other issues. The verification problem could 
lessen over time, but it is still likely to remain an 
important issue. Even worse, it could persist in its present 
form ‘into the indefinite future, [while] important elements 
of the American body politic [could] continue to harbor grave 
doubts about the adequacy of any conceivable verification 
system’.[152] Though highly significant, the verification 
problem does not uniformly affect all areas of arms control 
and in some cases it cannot be regarded as a major limitation, 
at least from a technical standpoint. Both, the technology 
for verification purposes, and the experience with monitoring, 
have been improving over the past several decades, and the 
requirements of verification also vary considerably.[153] 
There axe other difficulties that add to the verification 
problem, such as different ideas about balance and how best to 
secure it, questions concerning the relationship between axms 
control and national security, dissimilar perceptions about 
the ends and means of arms control, and mutual suspicions 
about motives and bona fides.
The contention that the arms control process of the 1970s 
had failed abysmally seems excessive. Despite eaxlier 
condemnation of SALT II and TTBT, the Reagan Administration 
informally adhered to these agreements and even made the 
strict observance of these agreements a significant issue. 
The belief that a radically new approach was needed, 
overlooked the difficulties which such an approach would be 
likely to create in the light of past experience of 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. The tendency of the 
conservatives towards excessive criticism suggested deeper 
reasons for downplaying arms control. One explanation could 
be a short-term political need to protect the defence build-up 
programme. Another could be a pessimistic assessment of the 
prospects of linkage in axms control and thus the need to
Page 45
revert back to the traditional policy of containment of Soviet 
power and influence in the world. An arms control 
relationship might not hinder short-term defence build-up, but 
it could come in the way of traditional containment policy, 
especially since the United States relied on ‘extended 
deterrence’ with nuclear weapons in pursuing its global 
containment goal. A serious problem of compatibility would 
probably exist between arms control as a long-term policy and 
traditional containment as an open policy-option, because of 
the sensitivity of the arms control process to the likely 
political and military ‘fall-out’ of the intense rivalry 
implicit in such a containment policy.
Arms control critics were however correct to worry about 
the political and technical difficulties of establishing an 
arms control relationship with the Soviet Union that could be 
both significant in scope and viable over time. They were 
also correct in arguing that negotiations should be conducted 
more rigorously than in the past, if only to ensure that 
agreements would not be susceptible to misunderstandings or 
amenable to exploitation by either side, as it had sometimes 
happened in the past. But the critics - and indeed some 
advocates as well - held unrealistic, political expectations 
about what arms control could be expected to achieve. The 
reference here is mainly to the concept of linkage or more 
specifically to the demand that arms control must - and could 
- inhibit Soviet behaviour even outside the arms control axea. 
Such a linkage ran the serious risk of exposing the arms 
control process to the complexities of the international 
political arena.
Criticism of arms control carried weight on some issues, 
while it seemed excessive or misplaced in other cases. On the 
whole, the conservative critics and liberal advocates tended 
to adopt antagonistic positions, perhaps because arms control 
had come to symbolise policy-differences over a wider range of 
issues concerning American foreign policy and US-Soviet 
relations.
Leadership Crisis
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Superpower relations were also characterised by problems 
of effective leadership and an unstable decision-making 
process. As perceptions of growing Soviet and Third World 
threats to American interests increased in the latter half of 
the 1970s, President Carter began to be seen as an inadequate 
leader. The crisis of direction and self-confidence however 
passed quickly with the public swing towaxds conservatism and 
the election of Ronald Reagan, who promised to restore 
American power and prestige in the world and projected a more 
reassuring ‘tough guy’ image.
While the United States resolved its leadership problem 
with little time-lag and moved more self-assuredly into the 
1980s, the Soviet Union became increasingly beset with its own 
complicated leadership crises. Externally, the Soviet Union 
faced the United States - its principal adversary - under a 
popular and politically aggressive leader, yet its aged 
leader, Leonid Brezhnev, was evidently in the grip of a 
serious and debilitating illness and its ruling elite was 
divided on important domestic and foreign policy issues. The 
image of a sagging leadership, also lacking in political 
cohesion, probably raised the self-confidence of the American 
leadership and reinforced its belief in the utility of a tough 
approach to the Soviet Union. No doubt, the contrast between 
the American and Soviet leadership on the more practical plane 
of arms control politics dimmed somewhat because of evident 
divisions with the ranks of the Reagan Administration. But 
the Administration was united in supporting an assertive 
posture towards the Kremlin and seemed quite comfortable with 
its arms control policy, even if it appeared to lack claxity 
or coherence. After all, much of the political pressure to 
proceed on arms control came from the outside - essentially, 
from the Congress and European allies across the Atlantic.
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MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND 
THE UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
Multilateral Diplomacy
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed probably the 
sharpest decline in relations between the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the United States, since the former’s creation in 
1961. Cuba’s chairmanship of the NAM and changes in American 
policy under the Reagan Administration deepened long-standing 
antagonisms on both sides. The tensions and divisions between 
the NAM and the United States were already well entrenched at 
the time President Reagan took office, following a turbulent 
decade that saw changes in the structure and content of 
multilateral diplomacy in the UN.
The pattern of multilateral diplomacy in the UN began to 
change noticeably in the late 1960s as Third World states 
continued to join the NAM and the latter became the 
numerically dominant body in the General Assembly. This 
structural shift led to ‘the advent of issues other than the 
Cold War and decolonisation, the emergence of middle and small 
powers as the main contestants, and a rise in the intensity of 
warfare, especially in local and bilateral disputes - all 
characteristics [also] of the period since 1970’.[l]
The NAM developed into a cohesive majority grouping in 
the UN in the early 1970s, especially after it called for a 
major restructuring of the international economic order and 
the General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States in 1974. Reflecting the NAM’s emergent 
mood, the Brazilian Ambassador rejected the concern of Western 
countries regarding the growing ‘politicisation’ of the UN. 
He claimed that the ideals of the UN Charter were being 
undermined by the superpowers and that ’’political realism" was 
being used as a pretext to transform the concept of peace into 
a "tolerable state of war"; the concept of disarmament into a 
"tolerable arms race"; and the concept of development into a 
"tolerable state of poverty".[2]
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The NAM’s emergence coincided with the immediate 
post-Vietnam and post-Watergate period, increasing suspicions 
in the United States of a Third World threat to American 
interests abroad. Such suspicions also ‘struck a responsive 
chord among Americans disillusioned with the United 
Nations’.[3] The Nixon Administration saw the NAM’s emergence 
as an adverse development. Alluding to it, Henry Kissinger 
complained, in a speech in New Delhi in 1974, that ‘bloc 
diplomacy of any kind is anachronistic and self-defeating. We 
see a danger of new patterns of alignment that axe as 
artificial, rigid and ritualistic as the old ones’.[4] 
Abortive American attempts during the Carter period to 
moderate the NAM’s attitude towards the United States, 
particularly Cuba’s influence at the 1979 Havana Summit of 
non-aligned countries, led to still greater official antipathy 
towards the UN where the NAM had been exercising what was 
described as the ‘tyranny of the majority’ since the early 
1970s.[5]
American interest in the UN had begun to decline in the 
1960s. Loss of influence in the UN reinforced the growing 
tendency towards unilateralism. Official attitude to the UN 
was noticeably unfavourable during the Nixon Administration, 
even before the NAM’s emergence as a cohesive body in the UN. 
The balance-of-power approach, embraced enthusiastically by 
President Nixon and his NSC adviser, Henry Kissinger, 
conceptually reinforced the estrangement between the United 
States and the UN - a process that was already well underway 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[6]
The early 1980s saw an unprecedented decline of American 
enthusiasm for the UN. On balance, the general public 
remained supportive of the UN, though less than in the 
past.[7] But political support for the UN had diminished 
substantially. The Senate, for example, made it a requirement 
for the State Department to report annually on the voting 
pattern in the UN, so that American aid could be linked to the 
voting behaviour of recipient-states.[8] The assessment of 
American ties with the UN during President Reagan’s first term 
was ‘dominated almost exclusively, both inside and outside the 
government and in the broader political arena, by those for
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whom the problems of multilateralism are often a vindication 
of the efficacy of unilateralism’. [9]
President Carter’s moderate approach gave way to his 
successor’s initial attempts in the UN to ignore the NAM and 
deal with its member-states on an individual or regional 
basis.[10] For the first time, the United States also made a 
formal complaint to the NAM arguing that the latter’s attitude 
towards the superpowers was biased in favour of the Soviet 
Union. Letters were sent to 64 non-aligned states pointing 
out that the NAM’s ministerial communique of September 1981 
had criticised the United States no less than ‘nine times by 
name and dozens of times by implication’ while failing to 
directly mention the Soviet Union in the context of 
Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Chad.fll] The NAM however proved 
too cohesive for the United States to succeed in by-passing 
the organisational framework and dealing with its 
member-states on a bilateral basis. The strategy of 
indifference towards the NAM was subsequently replaced by 
acknowledgement of the NAM as a political grouping of some 
consequence. India’s chairmanship of the movement in 1983 
gave the Reagan Administration an opportunity to declaxe 
American support for the principles of non-alignment with a 
view to encouraging moderation. But success was marginal at 
best despite some reciprocal effort on India’s part. The 
declaration following the NAM’s 1983 summit in New Delhi 
’castigated the United States 23 times by name, while citing 
the Soviet Union only once in a neutral context’.[12]
The NAM grew progressively from a 25-member body (with 
over one-third from the Middle East) at the time of its 
establishment in 1961, to an organisation four times as large 
in 1983. The near-completion of the de-colonisation process 
by the mid-1970s led to greater concern with issues of 
international economic reform and the political and military 
competition between the superpowers. Concern with the latter 
led in turn to major attempts to revive the questions of 
global arms control and the UN’s collective security role, 
which had not received any significant attention since the 
early post-war years. A major development from the point of 
view of the NAM’s role in the UN was the decision taken at the
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fifth non-aligned summit, held in Colombo in 1976, to enlaxge 
and turn the NAM’s coordinating committee in the UN into a 
permanent office. It was also decided that, apart from a 
regular annual meeting of foreign ministers, member-states 
would meet in response to developments in the international 
arena of interest or concern to the organisation as a whole. 
The summit meeting reiterated the NAM’s long-standing call for 
a world disarmament conference, reflecting even greater 
support within the movement for global disarmament 
negotiations, especially nuclear disarmament, which it had 
consistently raised since the beginning.
The NAM’s particular approach to international security 
issues was influenced heavily by the flexible procedures 
adopted for maintaining a semblance of unity within its
disparate ranks, as the movement continued to grow in size and 
heterogeneity. The greater extent of ‘anti-Americanism’ in 
the NAM’s diplomatic pronouncements in recent yeaxs - partly 
due to Cuba’s active partisan role - placed the movement’s 
unity under heavy stress and prompted India, when it took over 
the chairmanship, to veer the NAM to a more moderate course. 
Indonesia’s interest in a more assertive role also
strengthened the near-term prospects of. moderation. Yet, this 
nascent development - that is, the need to contain radicalism 
in order to ensure unity, if not also a measure of realism 
did not imply a change in the NAM’s approach to arms control 
or the UN’s international security role. The approach to such 
issues reflected to a considerable extent the influence of
some of the NAM’s major member-states, notably India, 
Argentina and Brazil.
Various factors can be attributed to the NAM’s vociferous 
criticism of the United States: (l) strong American
opposition to non-alignment in the 1950s; (2) continued
American dislike of the concept of a non-aligned political
grouping since the NAM’s inception, notwithstanding some 
moderation of American attitude during the Kennedy and Caxter 
periods; (3) the NAM’s perception of American ambivalence 
towards the de-colonisation process; (4) sensitivity of most 
the NAM member-states to American support for Israel, American 
unwillingness to agree to radical measures against apaxtheid
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in South Africa, and a unilateral American approach towards 
the current crisis in Central America; (5) shifts in American 
attitude towards non-alignment at the declaratory level and 
thus a lack of confidence about the prospects of consistent 
American sympathy for the non-aligned concept; (6) 
differences over questions of world order, especially 
disappointment with the American rejection of the Law of the 
Sea Treaty (following many years of negotiations in the 1970s) 
and frustration over little progress on the wide-ranging issue 
of a new international economic order, first raised in 1974; 
(7) dissatisfaction with the changes in America policy under 
the Reagan Administration, not only on regional issues but 
also and probably more on arms control; (8) the NPT 
controversy and the NAM’s frustration with American handling 
of the nuclear proliferation issue and more recently the 
evident lack of American interest in a nuclear test ban 
treaty; (9) the influence of radical members on the NAM’s 
pronouncements, facilitated in part by political and economic 
radicalism injected into the movement in the early 1970s and 
even earlier; (10) a general tendency towards anti-American 
rhetoric, partly in deference to domestic opinion; and (ll) 
the overwhelming need for consensus to keep a large and 
varied, and also a loosely organised movement together.
Several factors underscore the lack of American sympathy 
for the NAM: (l) the difficulties of obtaining broad Third 
World support for a containment policy towards the Soviet 
Union; (2) the NAM’s opposition to specific American policies 
in Third World regions, especially the Middle East, Southern 
Africa, and Central America; (3) the NAM’s strong criticism 
of American arms control policy and of superpower reliance on 
the concept of nuclear deterrence; (4) differences in outlook 
on world order - both political and economic; (5) the NAM’s 
muted criticism of the Soviet Union, in contrast to its fairly 
rabid criticism of the United States; (6) loss of American 
influence in the UN, perhaps largely because of the NAM, and 
also the latter’s indifference to the former’s concerns about 
the drift of multilateral diplomacy in the UN; (7) reduction 
of American influence in the Third World, at least partly 
because of the NAM’s emergence; and (8) the inclusion in the 
NAM of states closely associated with the Soviet Union and the
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ability of such states to unduly influence the NAM’s political 
stance and diplomactic pronouncements.
The NAM’s apparent lack of antipathy towaxds the Soviet 
Union is perhaps explained in part by the former’s 
preoccupation with issues involving the United States to a 
greater degree. Other factors include: (l) the Soviet 
Union’s general support for anti-colonial movements; (2) its 
support for the Arab cause in the Middle-East dispute; (3) 
its fewer and less fundamental economic and financial links 
with the Third World as a whole; (4) its more supportive 
stance on disarmament and global socio-economic issues, at 
least at the rhetorical level; and (5) its better relations 
between some influential members of the NAM, most notably 
India.
The decline of American interest in multilateralism as 
exemplified at the UN General Assembly was perhaps abetted by 
the ‘inability of the United States to define and maintain any 
kind of strategic orientation towards the United Nations’.[13] 
By contrast, the Soviet Union has continued to view the UN ’as 
a vehicle to delegitimize the postwar international order 
constructed by the capitalist nations ,.>..while retaining its own 
political prerogatives to act unconstrained by multilateral 
obligations’.[14] In this exercise the Soviet Union has been 
helped greatly by the festering rift between the NAM and the 
United States that has existed for over a decade and worsened 
in recent years. Similarly, the Third World has been seeking 
to ‘liquidate the remnants of colonialism and upgrade its 
position in the international division of labor’[15], while 
attempting to reduce the political and economic influence of 
the major powers through greater multilateral control.
The early 1980s witnessed considerable diplomatic 
activity in the UN on a host of security-related issues. The 
poor results showed somewhat starkly that multilateral 
diplomacy had reached an imbroglio. The disagreements between 
the groups of states were numerous and drew partly from 
conceptual divergence that had widened. The process that 
started in the early 1970s, largely at the NAM’s initiative 
and urging, seemed to have run a full circle by about the
Page 65
mid-1980s. The UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, tried 
to draw the attention of member-states to the prevailing 
crisis of multilateralism, especially with regard to 
international peace and security issues. In his 1982 annual 
report to the General Assembly, he remarked that the 
international community was moving ominously close to ’a new 
international anarchy’ - a concern he continued to express in 
subsequent reports and major speeches.[16]
Introduction t2 UN Machinery
The UN was created above all to ‘save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’.[17] The Charter proposed 
to pursue this goal through a system of collective security, 
characterised more by the regulation of armaments and armed 
forces than by their reduction. Disarmament did not figure in 
the Charter’s scheme. Political and technological 
developments however brought disarmament and arms control 
issues to the forefront. The Charter’s system of collective 
security depended crucially on political cooperation between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. But active rivalry 
between them in the immediate post-war period undermined the 
system envisaged by the Charter. The .increasing remoteness of 
collective security, the outbreak of ‘Cold War’ between the 
superpowers, and the new danger of nuclear war revived public 
interest and official involvement in disarmament and arms 
control issues.
For over a decade in the immediate post-war period, arms 
control and disarmament issues were debated, discussed and 
negotiated exclusively within the UN framework. The UN lost 
some of its importance in the late 1950s when negotiations 
began to take place in external bilateral, trilateral and 
multilateral bodies. Such issues as the prevention of 
surprise attack and the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, 
were negotiated in special conferences convened by the 
superpowers in 1958. In 1959 the superpowers constituted a 
Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) in Geneva, in which 
representation was restricted to the NATO and WTO alliances. 
The question of general disarmament was also negotiated 
outside the UN in 1960. In 1962 the superpowers replaced the
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TNDC by an Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). 
However, the link between the UN and the multilateral body 
established by the superpowers in Geneva - first in 1959 and 
later reconstituted on a number of occasions - grew closer 
with the passage of time. Initially, the negotiations on arms 
control and disarmament were confined to the superpowers and 
their major NATO and WTO allies, both inside and outside the 
UN. The expansion of the multilateral context begctn in the 
early 1960s and by the late 1970s a fairly large number of 
non-aligned and neutral countries became participants.
The UN’s involvement in disarmament and arms control 
issues increased greatly as a result of decisions taken at the 
General Assembly’s first special session on disarmament in 
1978, which was held at the initiative of non-aligned 
countries. The UN’s disarmament machinery grew considerably. 
Largely because of the non-aligned countries, the practice of 
adopting scores of resolutions and working through an 
extensive and tight schedule of tasks has meant that the UN’s 
business has frequently been conducted at a hurried and hectic 
pace, sometimes with patently unrealistic aims. Partly for 
procedural reasons, the annual output of printed material and 
documents has been voluminous.
Atomic Energy Commission
The UN’s reaction to the general anxiety caused by the 
development of atomic weapons in mid-1945 and their almost 
immediate use against Japan by the United States was prompt. 
The General Assembly’s first act, after the UN came into 
existence, was to create a commission for reaching agreement 
on nuclear disarmament. Sponsored by the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, the resolution establishing 
the Atomic Energy Commission was passed unanimously after a 
brief discussion in January 1946.[18]
The Commission’s composition was confined to Canada and 
all the eleven countries represented on the Security 
Council.[19] The Commission’s task was to recommend an 
arrangement for eliminating all other weapons of mass 
destruction and ensuring that atomic energy would be used only
Page 67
for peaceful purposes.[20] The negotiations got deadlocked at 
an early stage. The Soviet Union opposed the wide scope of 
international control on the peaceful use of atomic energy 
sought by the United States and considered the American scheme 
of nuclear disarmament to be to its disadvantage. The 
Commission’s work ended for all practical purposes in 
1949.[21] In early 1950 the Soviet Union also refused to 
participate in informal consultations as long as China 
continued to be represented by the government in Taiwan.[22]
Commission for Conventional Armaments
The initial proposal to consider the regulation and 
reduction of conventional armaments came from the Soviet 
Union.[23] But the Soviet Union subsequently withdrew its 
proposal in favour of a general regulation and reduction of 
armaments and armed forces.[24] In 1947 the Security Council 
established the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 
comprising all countries represented on the Security Council. 
The decision however was not supported by the Soviet Union. 
The absence of a Soviet veto was perhaps related to diplomatic 
considerations. The proposal for discussions on conventional 
arms reduction had initially come from the Soviet Union 
itself.
The Soviet Union and the Western countries differed on 
the terms of reference of the Commission. The Soviet Union 
regarded a prohibition on atomic weapons to be a prerequisite 
for progress on conventional weapons and wanted to have this 
reflected in the Commission’s terms of reference. [25] The 
Western countries envisaged an initial agreement on the 
submission of information on conventional weapons and armed 
forces[26], but the Soviet Union refused to go even this far 
unless the Commission formally accepted the interdependence of 
atomic and conventional arms control. [27] Eventually, in 1950, 
the Soviet Union challenged the representative status of the 
government of Taiwan and discontinued its participation in the 
Commission’s work.[28] The Commission was disbanded in 1952.
Disarmament Commission
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The Disarmament Commission was established by the General 
Assembly in 1952, soon after the two separate commissions on 
atomic and conventional weapons were dissolved. The 
Commission’s task was to ‘prepare proposals’ on nuclear, 
biological, and chemical disarmament, and on the limitation 
and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.[29] 
The Commission was established at the initiative of the United 
States, Britain and France, despite objections by the Soviet 
Union. The 12-member Commission consisted of Canada and of 
all states then represented on the Security Council. After 
1954 the negotiations were conducted in a sub-committee of the 
Commission, whose membership was confined to the five 
permanent members of the Security Council.[30] By the time of 
its last session in 1957, the Sub-Committee had held a total 
of 157 meetings.[31]
In 1957, 14 additional countries were admitted to the 
Commission, following Soviet criticism of the Disarmament 
Commission’s and the Sub-Committee’s limited and ‘one-sided’ 
composition as well as pressure from other countries, notably 
India, for expanding the membership of both bodies.[32] The 
Soviet proposal that the Commission should be made into a 
permanent body consisting of all UN -..member-states was not 
accepted by the General Assembly.[33] Consequently, the Soviet 
Union suspended its participation in the work of the 
Commission and the Sub-Committee.[34] The Sub-Committee was 
dissolved in 1958, while the Commission was provisionally 
expanded to include all member-states of the UN. But 
negotiations on disarmament issues began to occur outside the 
UN, particularly in the TNDC and later in the ENDC and CCD. 
For the next two decades, the Commission remained virtually 
inactive, meeting in 1960 at American request to review the 
situation following the failure of disarmament talks held 
outside the UN. [35] During this period the Commission met 
again in April-June 1965 at Soviet request to discuss the work 
of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), 
particularly on the question of nuclear non-proliferation.[36]
The Disarmament Commission was reconstituted and revived 
in 1978 at the General Assembly’s first special session on 
disarmament. All UN member-states gained representation in
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the Commission. The Commission’s work covered a wide range of 
disarmament and arms control issues, but it ceased to have any 
sort of negotiating function, becoming the UN’s central 
deliberative body and being capable only of making 
recommendations to the General Assembly. The Commission meets 
regularly in substantive session once a year in May and June.
The new Disarmament Commission began its work by 
assisting preliminary negotiations in the CD on a 
comprehensive programme of disarmament. Other major items in 
the Commission’s agenda were curbing the arms race, 
particularly in nuclear weapons, and promoting progress on the 
reduction of military budgets. The Commission’s agenda also 
included consideration of confidence-building measures and the 
1982 report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and 
Security Issues (ICDSI).[37] The Disarmament Commission’s 
consideration of these agenda items did not lead to any 
concrete results. Indeed, the Soviet Union opposed proposals 
for reporting military budgets, while the United States 
questioned the value of considering the general question of 
reduction unless there was progress on the initial issue of 
reporting military budgets.[38]
Ten Nation Disarmament Committee
Disagreement between the superpowers over the membership 
and terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission led to 
the termination of disarmament negotiations in the UN in 1958. 
Attempts to revive the Commission as a negotiating forum 
failed and consequently the Sub-Committee was dissolved in the 
same year. The foreign ministers of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Britain, and France, met in August 1959, to 
discuss the resumption of disarmament negotiations. 
Subsequently the four powers announced an agreement to create 
a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) to explore ‘avenues 
of possible progress’ on arms limitation and reduction, 
starting with an agreement between the NATO and WTO 
countries.[39]
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The TNDC’s declared aim was to prepare the ground for 
reviving disarmament negotiations in the UN.[40] The four 
powers also declared that the decision to establish a 
negotiating body outside the UN was not intended to reduce the 
UN’s role in the disarmament field.[41] But they did appear to 
deny the UN a primary role. [42] The negotiations in the TNDC 
ended soon. The Soviet Union withdrew immediately after its 
revised disarmament proposal was rejected by the United 
States. The United States had adopted a cautious approach to 
disarmament, seeking military transpaxency and the 
consolidation of a control system prior to any significant 
reductions of armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union 
sought drastic disarmament measures at any early stage, aimed 
largely at eliminating American nuclear superiority and 
military presence in Central Europe. Unable to draw the 
Western states to its basic negotiating framework, the Soviet 
Union and its WTO allies impetuously withdrew from the TNDC in 
June 1960.
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
Shortly after assuming office in early 1961, President 
Kennedy initiated consultations with...the Soviet Union for a 
fresh start at disarmament negotiations, following the 
breakdown of talks in the TNDC and the rapid decline of 
tripartite negotiations on a nuclear test ban.[43] In 
September 1961 the superpowers issued a joint statement of 
principles that would form the basis of multilateral 
negotiations. In December 1961, the General Assembly 
unanimously passed a joint resolution proposed by the 
superpowers for an early resumption of disarmament 
negotiations and the establishment of an Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. Apart from the ten 
NATO and WTO countries already represented in the TNDC, the 
membership of the ENDC was extended to Sweden and seven Third 
World countries, notably India, Brazil, Egypt and Mexico. 
Although formally a member, France did not participate in the 
ENDC.
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Like the TNDC, the ENDC was independent of the UN, though 
loosely linked to the General Assembly. The ENDC began its 
work in early 1962, devoting its attention to general 
disarmament and some partial measures - namely, a nuclear test 
ban, nuclear non-proliferation, and confidence-building 
measures. But the ENDC’s main concerns were general 
disarmament for the first few years and later nuclear 
non-proliferation.[44] The NPT was negotiated in the ENDC and 
the negotiations resulting in the Partial Test Ban Treaty were 
also conducted in the ENDC in 1962 and 1963. Similarly, the 
‘Hot Line’ agreement between the superpowers in June 1963 was 
negotiated within the ENDC framework, at American initiative 
after the Cuban Missile crisis.
The ENDC was reorganised in 1969 to give it a higher 
diplomatic status. The Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament (CCD) took its place. Shortly before its 
reconstitution, the ENDC’s membership had been increased by 
the addition of Japan, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Argentina, the 
Netherlands and Pakistan. The ENDC’s agenda had also been 
considerably enlarged in 1968 after the success of NPT 
negotiations and agreement between the superpowers to begin 
SALT talks. The ENDC’s revised agenda .consisted of four 
categories of items: (l) nuclear measures, (2) non-nuclear 
measures, (3) other collateral measures, and (4) general 
disarmament.[45] The ‘nuclear measures’ focused on nucleax 
arms limitation and reduction rather than nuclear disarmament. 
Various types of measures were specified, such as a nuclear 
test ban, a ban on the production of nuclear weapons or 
fissionable materials for use in weapons, reduction of nuclear 
weapons, and nuclear free-zones. The ‘non-nuclear measures’ 
included the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons as 
well as regional arms limitation. Under ‘collateral measures’ 
the prevention of an arms race in the sea-bed and similar 
steps were specified. Initially, the ENDC’s primary task was 
general disarmament, but this issue later receded into the 
background.
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
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In 1969 the ENDC was transformed into the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). With the addition of West 
Germany, East Germany and Iran in 1975 the CCD’s total 
membership rose to 31. The ENDC’s 1968 agenda was carried 
over into the CCD, which began its work on the prohibition of 
chemical and biological weapons and of nuclear weapons in the 
seabed.[46] Later, in the mid-1970s, the CCD devoted much of 
its attention to prohibiting the military or hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques.[47] The CCD’s work was 
characterised by numerous technical meetings among experts on 
various subjects, particularly chemical and biological 
weapons, a nuclear test ban, and environmental modification 
techniques.[48] On the nuclear test ban question, the CCD 
established an ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts in 1976 to 
examine the issue of detection and identification of seismic 
events by international means.[49]
Before its reorganisation in 1978, the CCD also focused 
on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament 
(CPD). The subject had been introduced earlier in the CCD’s 
agenda following a General Assembly resolution in late 1969. 
For all practical purposes, the agenda item ‘general and 
complete disarmament’ was replaced by the CPD concept. 
Shortly before its reconstitution, the CCD agreed to create a 
working group on the CPD question, but the group’s work did 
not get beyond procedural and organisational matters.
The negotiations in the CCD produced some positive 
results. In 1971 a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement 
of nuclear weapons in the seabed was presented to the General 
Assembly and the treaty took effect in 1972.[50] Also in 1971, 
identical texts of a draft convention on the prohibition of 
biological weapons and toxins, substantially negotiated in the 
CCD, were presented to the General Assembly by the 
superpowers. After relatively minor revisions, the draft was 
unanimously approved by the General Assembly and the 
convention came into force a few years later in 1975.[51] In 
1976 the CCD prepared a draft convention banning the military 
or hostile use of environmental modification techniques, 
following negotiations over a period of two years.
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Though less important, the CCD also prepared a number of 
special reports for the General Assembly on a nuclear test 
ban, environmental modification techniques, and the 
implications of peaceful nuclear explosions for arms 
control. [52] In addition, the CCD organised a study on all 
aspects of the question of nuclear-free zones, as requested by 
the General Assembly.[53] The study was completed in 1975 and 
published as a UN document.
Committee on Disarmament
As agreed at the General Assembly’s first special session 
on disarmament in 1978, the CCD was reorganised in 1979 into 
the Committee on Disarmament (CD). Its membership was 
expanded and some other organisational changes were 
introduced. The CD became a 40-member body with closer links 
to the UN. A personal representative of the Secretary General 
was appointed to serve as secretary of the CD. The CD was 
required to submit annual reports to the General Assembly and 
relevant documents to all member-states of the UN.[54] As a 
result of wide-spread criticism, including strong French 
objection, the CD’s chairmanship was rotated on a monthly 
basis among all member-states.[55] Previously, both in the CCD 
and the ENDC, the two superpowers had shared the chairmanship 
on a permanent basis. A limited number of non-members were 
permitted to participate but without the right to take part in 
decision-making.[56] Also, all non-members acquired the right 
to express their views on subjects of particular concern to 
them under the CD’s consideration.[57]
As a general rule, the CD’s plenary meetings were opened 
to public viewing.[58] The principle of consensus, which 
prevailed in predecessor bodies, was retained but this later 
gave rise to some serious contention between the Group of 21 
and the United States in particular. At the beginning of its 
1984 session, the CD went through yet another change of 
nomenclature. The Committee decided to designate itself as 
the Conference on Disarmament. The changes were essentially 
‘cosmetic’. The working groups became committees and the 
chairman and secretary of the CD became president and 
secretary-general, respectively.
Page 74
The number of non-member participants in the CD increased 
to a total of 21 in 1984.[59] Most non-members have remained 
the same in recent years. About half of them are from Europe 
and include Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Spain. The 
participation of non-members has ranged from mere attendance 
to active involvement either in plenary meetings alone or in 
subsidiary bodies as well. On the whole, the involvement of 
such non-members increased with the passage of time. Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Spain have been the most 
active. [60] Although in principle the CD has not opposed a 
further expansion of its membership, some members have been 
reluctant to admit new ones because of concern about the 
efficiency of the CD’s work.
Proposals for a policy on the membership question were 
made by a number of member-states. Several approaches were 
broached for further consideration, such as permitting a 
limited expansion in stages over a 12 to 15 year period.[61] 
The phased approach was suggested, rather than a one-stroke 
expansion, to make it easier for the CD to maintain its 
efficiency and its internal political balance during the 
expansion process. The UN Secretariat suggested a more 
fundamental way of dealing with the membership question on a 
long-term basis.[62] The concept of an umbrella-type 
conference was put forward in two alternative forms for the 
CD’s consideration. One would be to expand the CD to include 
all non-members with an interest in participation, but to 
operate largely through subordinate committees with limited 
membership. The other would be to keep the CD’s membership 
frozen and to accommodate interested non-members in 
subordinate negotiating bodies.
The CD’s method of work and organisational structure have 
been under consideration for some years. Some tangible 
progress was made on measures to streamline the CD’s 
procedures in order to provide maximum time for more 
substantive work. [63] For example, there was agreement on the 
need for a more flexible approach in preparing the CD’s annual 
reports to the General Assembly - hitherto a time-consuming 
exercise.[64]
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At the time of its establishment in 1979, the CD adopted 
a general agenda containing what was termed as a ‘decalogue’ 
of issues. The agenda has included such indeterminate 
subjects as "disarmament and development" and "disarmament and 
international security", as a result of accepting the General 
Assembly’s Final Document of 1978 as the agreed guideline for 
the CD’s work. The other eight subject-headings in the CD’s 
agenda were: (l) nuclear weapons in all aspects; (2) 
chemical weapons; (3) other weapons of mass destruction 
(including radiological weapons); (4) conventional weapons; 
(5) reduction of military budgets; (6) reduction of armed 
forces; (7) a comprehensive programme of disarmament; and 
(8) collateral or confidence-building measures. In practice 
however the CD focused on a limited number of issues. Five 
working groups (or committees as they were later called) were 
created in 1980 for dealing specifically with chemical 
weapons, a nuclear test ban, radiological weapons, a 
comprehensive programme of disarmament, and negative security 
assurances to non-nuclear weapons states against the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. Efforts by the Socialist 
Group and the Group of 21 to create working groups to consider 
measures for the prevention of nuclear war and an arms race in 
outer space proved futile because of sustained opposition from 
the United States. The Western countries considered the 
subject of nuclear war prevention to be premature. They also 
felt that the proper concern should be the prevention of war 
in general.[65] As with its predecessor bodies, in theory the 
CD’s goal remained ‘the attainment of general and complete 
disarmament under effective international control’.[66]
General Assembly
The General Assembly is the central deliberative body of 
the UN, where inter alia disarmament and arms control issues 
are debated and recommendations are made. But much of the 
debate and deliberation occur in the Assembly’s First 
Committee. As a result of agreement at the first special 
session on disarmament, the First Committee has been dealing 
exclusively with disarmament and international security 
matters since 1979. The move to reorganise the First 
Committee was first made in 1976 when the UN reviewed its role
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in the disarmament field. [67] The Committee’s agenda usually 
consists of roughly two dozen items, mostly related to arms 
control and disarmament.[68] Almost as much time is taken up 
by debates as is devoted to drafting resolutions for the 
General Assembly’s subsequent adoption.[69] The debates are 
not rigorously organised. The delegations can, as they often 
do, refer to any or all agenda items in their general 
statements. All UN member-states are represented on the First 
Committee, but usually much less than half of them take part 
in the debate. The number of participants nevertheless 
remains high.[70] The First Committee meets every year in 
October and November.
The General Assembly’s plenary sessions are often devoted 
to adopting resolutions drafted in the First Committee. 
Sometimes, when there is consensus, resolutions are adopted 
without a formal vote. For their adoption, the resolutions 
require at least two-thirds support from member-states present 
and voting. Since its inception in 1946, the General Assembly 
has passed a very large number of resolutions on disarmament 
and arms control issues. As of 1983, over 550 resolutions had 
been adopted. Of these 49 were passed in 1981 alone; 57 in 
1982; and approximately 70 in 198.21» though a few of these 
were non-substantive in nature.[71] Some of these resolutions 
have particular significance for the UN’s role as a 
deliberative body, while the rest has generally been part of 
the General Assembly’s routine business.
The General Assembly also creates ad hoc subsidiary 
bodies. The results of deliberations in such forums are also 
recommendatory in nature. At the initiative of non-aligned 
countries, the General Assembly held two special sessions on 
disarmament in 1978 and 1982, in a largely unsuccessful 
attempt to persuade and pressure the superpowers to accelerate 
progress on issues listed in the CD’s agenda and to make a 
binding commitment to a disarmament process.
The General Assembly’s promotional activities aimed at 
mobilising public and non-governmental support for axms 
control and disarmament increased noticeably in recent years. 
The General Assembly also sponsored a series of studies on
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security issues. The first such study was undertaken in 1962 
on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. Since 
then more than 30 studies have been carried out either by 
independent experts or by groups of governmental experts 
assisted by outside consultants and the UN Secretariat.[72] 
Some of the subjects dealt with include: confidence building 
measures; conventional arms control; regional disarmament; 
nuclear-free zones; the relationship between disarmament and 
international security and between disarmament and 
development. In addition, the Secretariat regularised its 
publication of the social and economic consequences of the 
arms race and military expenditure. The objective of most of 
these studies has been to provide member-states - those with a 
major interest in the subject concerned - the opportunity to 
explore a basis for future negotiations. Though useful, on 
the whole such studies have made little headway towards this 
goal.
Security Council
Article 26 of the UN Charter gave the Security Council 
the responsibility of formulating plans for establishing ‘a 
system for the regulation of armaments’,..,. .The Security Council 
proved politically unable to embark on this primary task. It 
established a Military Staff Committee in early 1946, but 
negotiations to create an international police force, as 
envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter, never occurred. The 
Committee ‘ceased to function beyond 1948 after failing to 
reach agreement on the military requirements of the United 
Nations’.[73] The Security Council did however play a limited 
role in the disarmament field for a brief period in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. The Commission for Conventional 
Armaments, which functioned for a few years, was created by 
the Security Council, though the General Assembly provided the 
initial impetus. The Security Council also serves as a body 
to which complaints regarding compliance with certain 
disarmament and arms control agreements can be made. An 
example is the Biological Weapons Convention, although the 
United States later regarded such a procedure to be inadequate 
for deterring or confirming alleged acts of infringement.
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The question of strengthening the Security Council’s role 
in arms control has been under discussion in a special UN 
committee since 1976. The non-aligned group proposed 
dispensing with the rule of unanimity in deciding on certain 
matters, such as sending fact-finding missions to areas of 
conflict and settling disputes between states.[74] The 
non-aligned group’s move has been resisted by the permanent 
members of the Security Council, especially the Soviet Union. 
The question of collective security was also reintroduced in 
the General Assembly’s 1983 agenda, but the superpowers showed 
little interest in considering the matter.
The non-aligned countries have been the strongest 
advocates of strengthening the UN’s collective security role. 
Their position was elaborately presented by Sierra Leone in 
the First Committee.[75] Acknowledging the subject to be 
‘enormously complex and intricate’, Sierra Leone proposed a 
gradual approach and urged exploring ways of implementing the 
Charter’s collective security provisions in the most effective 
and practical manner.[76] It believed that a sort of 
"symbiotic” relationship existed between collective security 
and significant arms control. Sierra Leone posited that ‘the 
preponderance of collective security forces [could not] be 
guaranteed or achieved if the arms race continued unabated. 
Therefore with the institutionalisation of the collective 
security provisions of the Charter, the implementation of 
total or at least partial disarmament [would become] necessary 
for member-states’.[77] As such, it argued, states would be 
prepared to agree to significant arms control ‘only with the 
establishment of a system of collective security’.[78] Arms 
control and collective security were not however ends in 
themselves but important means intended to restore the 
‘authority and effectiveness of [the UN] as a guarantor of 
international peace’.[79]
Special Committees
The General Assembly has sometimes created special ad hoc 
bodies for pursuing specific arms control measures. Two 
notable examples are the Committee on the Indian Ocean and the 
Panel on Military Budgeting. The Committee on the Indian
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Ocean was established by the General Assembly in 1972 to 
develop the basis for an international agreement to turn the 
Indian Ocean into a zone of peace through measures to contain 
the competitive military presence of the superpowers. The 
Committee initially consisted of 15 member-states but later 
included all littoral and hinterland states, major maritime 
users of the Indian Ocean, and the permanent members of the 
Security Council.
The Committee held a meeting of littoral and hinterland 
states in 1979, but its more important task was to convene a 
conference inclusive of other states with a major interest in 
the Indian Ocean. After many formal and informal meetings in 
1981, the bulky 48-member preparatory committee reported a 
lack of consensus on the desirability of such a conference 
because of opposition from the United States and some of its 
NATO allies.[80] The United States did not subscribe to the 
"zone of peace" concept for the Indian Ocean and stressed the 
right of states to individual and collective self-defence 
under the UN Charter.[8l] The Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan had a major bearing on the American attitude.[82] 
The preparatory committee failed to agree on a specific date 
for convening the conference, and more,importantly, on its 
terms of reference.[83]
The Panel on Military Budget was established by the 
General Assembly in 1978. It consisted of six countries: the 
United States, Sweden, Japan, Nigeria, Peru, Indonesia and 
Rumania. Interest in reducing military budgets was first 
aroused by a Soviet proposal in 1973 for a 10 percent 
reduction of military expenditures by the permanent members of 
the Security Council and the reallocation of some funds for 
development assistance. The Panel’s task was to test and 
evaluate the system for reporting military expenditure already 
developed by technical experts employed by the UN Secretariat.
The Panel completed its work in 1980 and, as it had 
recommended, the General Assembly appointed a group of experts 
to propose solutions to the technical issues of verification 
and comparability of military budgets of states. A very 
limited number of countries cooperated with the work of the
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Panel. In particular, the Soviet Union and its WTO allies 
opposed the move to develop a standardised reporting 
instrument for military expenditure because it was considered 
unduly intrusive. Support for the idea of creating a system 
for reducing military expenditures came essentially from the 
United States and members of the European Economic Community.
The General Assembly also created other committees. At 
the initiative of non-aligned countries, the General Assembly 
established a preparatory committee in 1980 for convening a 
conference in 1983 to promote international cooperation in the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. [84] Reflecting the sensitive 
nature of the issue, the preparatory committee consisted of 
over 50 member-states, including all the nuclear weapon states 
and significant non-nuclear weapon states.[85] The conference 
failed to materialise. The nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states could not agree on the extent to which 
non-proliferation concerns should prevail over the need for 
easy access to nuclear technology and other supplies for 
peaceful uses. The non-nuclear weapon states stressed the 
principle of non-discrimination and the unrestricted right of 
states to pursue peaceful nuclear programmes.[86]
In 1973 the General Assembly created an ad hoc committee 
to consider holding a world disarmament conference. Proposal 
for such a conference came initially from the non-aligned 
states at their inaugural summit meeting in Belgrade in 1961 
and since then it has been periodically reiterated. In recent 
years, a more determined advocate of the idea has been the 
Soviet Union. The Western countries continued to question the 
desirability of staging such a conference. Their opposition 
increased after the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan. Though supportive of the idea, the non-aligned 
states have not been eager to proceed with the conference 
without some prospect for success. The United States did not 
believe that sufficient political agreement existed on issues 
likely to be addressed at such a conference. Indeed, it felt 
that the proposed conference would hinder rather than assist 
efforts at arms control.[87] Another noteworthy committee 
established by the General Assembly was on the peaceful uses 
of the sea-bed. It was created in 1967 and played a useful
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role in assisting conclusive negotiations on that subject in 
the ENDC.[88]
At the initiative of the Soviet Union, the General 
Assembly created a special committee in 1977 to consider 
drafting a world treaty on the non-use of force in 
international relations.[89] By early 1984 the 35-member 
special committee had held six sessions, but without making 
any progress on the basic question of approach. The Soviet 
Union wanted the principles enunciated in the UN Charter to be 
reiterated separately in a parallel treaty.[90] The 
non-aligned countries went further than the Soviet Union. 
They wanted such a treaty to be based on a wider concept that 
would include forms of political and economic coercion.[91] 
The Western countries opposed the idea of a treaty. They 
argued that the UN Charter had already dealt with the subject 
and that the new treaty, if drafted differently, would create 
confusion and undermine the former. [92] The Western countries 
proposed that strengthening the principle of non-use of force 
should rather be pursued through the existing UN machinery, 
particularly by giving the Secretary General and the Security 
Council more authority to undertake fact-finding missions.[93]
In 1983, at the initiative of non-aligned countries, the 
General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to consider 
the question of implementing the collective security 
provisions of the UN Charter and called upon the Security 
Council to give effect to those provisions.[94]
Little progress was made in the 47-member special 
committee, which had to contend with substantive as well as 
procedural issues. [95] The committee’s main achievement was 
the Manila Declaration of 1982, an insignificant document that 
reiterates generalities already agreed in other documents, 
including the UN Charter. Moreover, the main issue before the 
special committee was the rule of unanimity in the Security 
Council’s decisions on disputes between states, armed 
conflicts, and violations of arms control agreements. The 
United States and the Soviet Union opposed limitations on the 
unanimity rule in the Security Council. The Soviet objection 
was particularly firm.[96] The United States wanted the
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question of modifying the Security Council’s method of work to 
be left to ‘some future time’, at least until the question of 
lesser changes had been fully considered.[97]
Special Conferences
The UN has organised special conferences to review 
periodically the implementation of certain arms control 
agreements concluded under its auspices. Special conferences 
have also been held to negotiate specific agreements. Three 
conferences were held to review the NPT at intervals of five 
years, starting in 1980. At the NPT review conferences the 
main issue has been the fulfilment of obligations by the 
nuclear weapon states towards curbing the nuclear arms race.
A review conference for the Biological Weapons Convention 
was held in 1980. At the time, no serious controversy arose, 
both with regard to observance of the Convention’s prohibition 
of use and its verification provisions.[98] The 1972 treaty 
banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction on the sea-bed was reviewed on two 
occasions - in 1977 and 1983 - and a third conference is 
expected to be held in 1988 or 1990. The main purpose of 
periodic review has been to ensure that the objectives of the 
treaty are not being undermined by major technological 
developments. The 1983 review conference called on the CD to 
consider further measures to strengthen the sea-bed 
regime.[99]
The 1980 convention on ‘inhumane’ weapons (covering 
land-mines, booby-traps, incendiary and fragmentation weapons) 
was ultimately the outcome of conferences convened by the 
General Assembly in 1979 and 1980. These conferences followed 
technical meetings among governmental experts and negotiations 
outside the UN framework in Switzerland during 1974-1977.[100]
UN Secretariat
The General Assembly decided to strengthen the UN 
Secretariat’s activities in disarmament affairs after a major 
review in 1976 of the UN’s role in this field. The idea of a
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comprehensive review was first proposed by the Secretary 
General in his annual report of 1975.[101] In 1977 the 
Disarmament Affairs Division in the UN Secretariat was 
upgraded and reorganised into the Centre for Disarmament. The 
Centre’s tasks were ‘to undertake or participate in pertinent 
studies and in the dissemination of information on 
disarmament’ and also to provide logistical and administrative 
services to the work of conferences and committees (especially 
the CCD in Geneva) engaged in disarmament-related 
activities.[102] The Centre acquired more prominence when it 
was given the responsibility of implementing the World 
Disarmament Campaign agreed at the General Assembly’s second 
special session on disarmament in 1982. In 1983 the Centre 
was converted into a full-fledged Department for Disarmament 
Affairs, with an Under Secretary General as its head.
Since the mid-1970s the UN Secretariat has been 
publishing two periodicals through its disarmament wing - 
previously the Centre for Disarmament and currently the 
Department for Disarmament Affairs. One is titled 
Disarmament, a triannual started in 1977. It usually covers 
disarmament-related activities in the UN and in the 
international field, and provides short book-reviews of recent 
publications on relevant subjects. The other is titled The 
United Nations Disarmament Yearbook and has been appearing 
since 1976. It provides a fairly detailed coverage of debates 
and negotiations on subjects related to disarmament and arms 
control in the UN’s agenda. The Department for Disarmament 
Affairs also issues useful summaries of the UN’s 
disarmament-related activities in the form of Fact 
Sheets.[103] In addition, for the past two decades, the 
Secretariat’s Department for Public Information has been 
publishing the UN Chronicle on a monthly basis. This 
periodical reports on the conduct of current diplomacy in the 
UN and includes summaries of disarmament-related activities.
Another feature of the UN Secretariat’s promotional 
activities is the annual observance of the Disarmament Week, 
which began in 1978 and takes place in October. The UN’s 
specialised agencies and the Secretariat’s information centres 
in member-states participate in this exercise. The latter
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also cooperates with interested non-governmental organisations 
to publicise the UN’s disarmament-related activities and the 
perceived dangers of the arms race.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
At the General Assembly’s first special session on 
disarmament in 1978, the French President Giscard d ’Estaing 
proposed the establishment of an international institute for 
disarmament research. The proposal was subsequently approved 
by the General Assembly and the United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established in Geneva in 
1980, with initial financial assistance from France. In 1982 
UNIDIR became a permanent autonomous body of the UN and a 
close working relationship was established with the 
Secretariat’s Disarmament Department. UNIDIR’s task was to 
conduct research to assist the negotiations in the UN and also 
to increase public understanding of problems affecting 
disarmament negotiations. UNIDIR initially focused on data 
collection for disarmament research and on promoting 
cooperation and coordination among relevant academic and 
research institutes and centres in the world. A major 
conference was organised by UNIDIR -in 1981, attended by 
directors of 50 disarmament-related research institutes from 
different regions of the world and 15 international 
organisations belonging to the UN system.[104]
Several projects were also initiated in cooperation with 
individual experts and other research organisations. The 
subjects dealt with the reduction of armaments and the 
security of states; the prevention of accidental nuclear wax; 
the creation of a disarmament data base; and analysis of 
issues related to disarmament and development.[105] A number 
of other subjects were identified for future research, such as 
chemical weapons, the theory and practice of arms control, and 
the implications of new weapon-technologies for axms 
control. [106] As of early 1984, UNIDIR’s publications 
included: Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (by Daniel Frei 
and Christian Catrina); Repertory of Disarmament Research 
(with an extensive bibliography of research material on 
disarmament and information on international and national
Page 85
research centres engaged in disarmament or related research); 
National Mechanisms and Institutions for Disarmament (by 
Volker Rittberger); and Disarmament and Security (by Voju 
Dimitrijevic).[107]
§D§£ialised Agencies
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) was 
established in 1972, following a UN sponsored environmental 
conference in Stockholm. Inter alia, the declaration adopted 
at the conference stated: ‘Man and his environment must be 
spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of 
mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt 
agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the 
elimination and complete destruction of such weapons’.[108] 
Since the late 1970s, NEP has been assisting member-states to 
deal with the problems caused by the material remnants of wax, 
particularly mines. It has also been involved in the 
advancement of research and the dissemination of information 
on the depletion and protection of the ozone layer in the 
earth’s upper atmosphere.
More generally, UNEP has tried to draw governmental 
attention to the environmental effects of certain types of 
military activity. UNEP was asked by the General Assembly to 
examine the harmful effects of military activity on nature and 
recommend measures for the protection of nature, including 
controls on military activity.[109] In 1981, UNEP’s governing 
body called upon states to stop the arms race and allocate a 
small fraction of their annual military expenditure for 
development assistance and environmental protection. [110]
On the basis of instructions contained in the Final 
Document adopted at the General Assembly’s first special 
session on disarmament in 1978, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has 
engaged in promoting the goal of disarmament. It organised a 
world congress on disarmament education in 1980, which 
recommended an elaborate programme for encouraging 
disarmament-related research and education at all levels and 
for influencing public opinion in support of disarmament.[111]
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An ambitious plan of action for the 1980s was formulated by 
UNESCO. [112] A number of projects were completed, including 
Armaments^ Arms Control and Disarmament^ A University Level 
Education edited by Marek Thee; UNESCO Yearbook on Peace arid 
Conflict Studies; and Strategic Doctrines and Their 
Alternatives by Y. Sakamoto.[113] Other relevant publications 
sponsored by UNESCO include Violence and Causes, which 
contains a collection of essays by prominent authors and 
reflects UNESCO’s long-standing interest and involvement in 
issues concerning the causes and effects of violence in 
national and international society from an interdisciplinaxy 
point of view. [114] UNESCO also works in cooperation with the 
UN’s relevant subsidiary bodies in educational, research and 
other promotional efforts.
In recent years, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has 
also been engaged in promotional activities. The rationale 
for this has been that a nuclear war would create the most 
serious danger to the life and health of the world’s 
population, whereas more peaceful conditions would facilitate 
the release of resources for the progress of human health in 
the world.[115] WHO has been specifically involved with CW 
negotiations in the CD. Representatives of WHO have 
participated in technical discussions in the CD on the 
toxicity of chemicals and identification of potentially 
harmful chemicals.
The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), though not 
directly involved in disarmament matters, has been associated 
with UNEP’s work on the ozone layer and on the peaceful uses 
of environmental modification techniques.[116] More recently, 
the services of WMO were sought by the CD to conduct an 
experimental international exchange of seismic data in 
connection with negotiations on a nuclear test ban.
Advisory Board of Disarmament Studies
It was agreed at the General Assembly’s first special 
session on disarmament in 1978 that the UN should undertake 
various studies to assist the negotiating process and also to 
promote public awareness of disarmament problems. The General
Page 87
Assembly decided that an advisory board of eminent persons 
should be set-up to advise the Secretary General on the 
conduct of the UN’s role in this respect. Of a number of 
proposals, the advisory board initially recommended four 
subjects for study: a world disarmament campaign; zones of 
peace and cooperation; verification problems; and, 
prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and 
fissionable material for weapons purposes.[117] The proposal 
to carry out a study on a world disarmament campaign, and 
later the study itself, were approved by the General Assembly. 
The Board’s main task was to recommend a variety of studies 
related to a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD). 
But this could not materialise because the CPD negotiations in 
the CD proved inconclusive. The Advisory Board helped in the 
establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research (UNIDIR) by advising on its mandate, the composition 
of its advisory council, and its programme of work. The Board 
reviewed its own role and proposed that it should be empowered 
to render advisory opinions on disarmament matters at the 
request of the General Assembly or the Secretary General.[118] 
The Board also considered its involvement in the conceptual 
field - that is, enlisting the services of prominent 
individuals to promote a new philosophy conducive to the 
pursuit of disarmament. Partly because of practical 
considerations, the idea did not enjoy wide support within the 
Board. The Board consists mostly of high-ranking government 
officials or ex-officials.[119]
United Nations University
With its headquarters in Tokyo, the United Nations 
University works in cooperation with 32 associated 
institutions and a large number of scholars in more than 60 
countries to promote studies and disseminate knowledge about 
problems of global economic, social and cultural development. 
Since 1982, the University has been operating on the basis of 
a five-year programme and a set of inter-related themes for 
research. One such theme is titled Peace^ Security^ Conflict 
Resolution^ and Global Transformation. The University began a 
project on military R&D in Asian countries in 1983. But its 
involvement in the broader subject of ’Peace and Global
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Transformation’ appears to be at a nascent stage. 
Assessment
The UN’s disarmament-related activities increased quite 
considerably in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
activities include public information, promotional exercises, 
studies, debate, organised discussion, exploratory talks, and 
negotiation. At its core, the UN’s disarmament machinery 
consists of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (for 
negotiations), the Disarmament Commission in New York (for 
deliberations), and the First Committee in New York (for 
debates and preparatory work for the General Assembly’s 
plenary sessions). A salient feature of the machinery’s 
evolution in recent years has been the establishment of a 
close link between the General Assembly and the CD. The CD 
reports regularly to the General Assembly, like the latter’s 
subsidiary bodies. The non-aligned countries were not however 
able to persuade the superpowers to grant pre-eminent status 
to the CD as the world’s negotiating body for arms control or 
to concede a central role and primary responsibility to the UN 
in the field of arms control and disarmament. There has been 
qualified acceptance of the importance~of the CD and the UN in 
general.[120]
Much of the machinery’s growth occurred as a result of 
decisions taken at the General Assembly’s first special 
session on disarmament in 1978. The machinery would have 
grown more substantially if various member-states had 
succeeded with some of their proposals. [121] For example, 
France had proposed the establishment of a satellite 
monitoring agency and an international fund for 
development. [122] Sri Lanka sought the creation of a world 
disarmament authority, while the Netherlands proposed that an 
international disarmament organisation should be the subject 
of a UN-sponsored study. [123] By the time the General Assembly 
held its second special session on disarmament in 1982, the 
differences between the major groups of states over a range of 
issues had become more evident and their attitudes had either 
hardened or showed little sign of mellowing. Consequently, 
fewer negotiations took place than had originally been hoped
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and even these moved slowly and uneasily. On the deliberative 
side, a large number of issues were introduced in the agenda, 
but little progress was made towards mutual accommodation. 
The main results were greater and more intense debates and a 
considerable increase in the UN Secretariat’s public 
information and promotional activities.
There has been concern about the rhetorical nature and 
loose structure of debates in the First Committee.[124] The 
excessive number of agenda items and the repetitiveness of 
many resolutions have also been criticised.[125] The subject 
of streamlining the machinery has been under discussion for 
some time in a special committee. Yet there is considerable 
resistance to any major cut-back on debates, agenda items and 
resolutions. The United States proposed the drastic measure 
of excluding those items from the agenda which offered little 
prospect of agreement. The non-aligned countries have opposed 
such suggestions. India’s attitude, for example, has been 
that the existing situation was preferable to controls over 
debates and agenda items, which would lead to a ‘suppression 
of the voice of sanity and reason’.[126] The Soviet Union has 
also been strongly opposed to proposals seeking to limit 
debates, resolutions and the size...,..of the agenda. [127] It 
probably perceives that the existing system will continue to 
work more to America’s disadvantage, in view of the problems 
in the NAM’s relations with the latter. As far as the CD is 
concerned, there has been some progress towards improving its 
method of work. But no definite solution of the vexatious 
issue of membership has emerged. More than 10 countries have 
applied for membership of the CD, already a fairly large body 
and sufficiently representative of the major groups in the UN.
The CD is likely to extend its membership to four 
additional states. The selection will be based presumably on 
the principles of geographical distribution and political 
balance. With regard to the important questions of size, 
composition and method of work of the CD, the more numerous 
group of non-aligned and neutral countries would do well to 
adopt a pragmatic approach, aimed at preserving and if 
possible enhancing the CD’s authority, so that the negotiating 
body can function more effectively in future in more
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propitious circumstances.[128]
The non-aligned countries raised the question of reviving 
the UN’s collective security role, especially to increase the 
sense of security of states unable to deter aggression or 
defend against the use of force by global or regional powers. 
Collective security has also been regarded as a necessary 
condition for malting significant progress towards arms control 
and disarmament. The non-aligned countries have sought a 
modified version of the collective security system envisaged 
in the UN Charter. They want to curtail the power of veto of 
the permanent members of the Security Council in deciding on 
measures to deal with acts of aggression and the use of force. 
Neither superpower has supported the idea of giving effect to 
the Charter’s collective security provisions. The United 
States has also opposed limitations on the unanimity rule on 
the grounds that such a measure would be too drastic at the 
present juncture and that, at any rate, the UN’s 
constitutional development should proceed along evolutionary 
lines.[129] The Soviet Union has been even more resistant to 
any such amendment of the Charter.[130]
The recent expansion of the UN ’ s,*^disarmament machinery 
has given greater opportunities to states to deliberate and 
negotiate on arms control measures and to gauge the prospects 
of progress or agreement on security-related issues. 
Political tensions between the superpowers, and between them 
and the non-aligned countries as a whole, marred the conduct 
of multilateral diplomacy. Mainly because of the NAM’s 
procedural and substantive approach to disarmament issues, the 
UN’s activities have some times tended towaxds haste and even 
wastefulness. But the stagnation in multilateral diplomacy on 
arms control has had more to do with the marked deterioration 
of superpower relations in recent years and their greater 
preference for unilateralism.
American preference for unilateralism was evident in the 
Reagan Administration’s basic approach that more important and 
effective than arms control or a greater international 
security role for the UN was a national policy that supported 
the principles of the UN Chaxter governing inter-state
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relations and opposed transgressions by other states. The 
Soviet interest in multilateralism was also minimal. It was 
largely limited to the Soviet proposal for a separate 
convention on the non-use of force in international relations. 
Apart from being peripheral to the central issue, the proposal 
risked starting new controversies and damaging the status of 
principles embodied in the UN Charter.
The objection of the superpowers to any changes in the 
Security Council reflects their desire to preserve not only 
their privileged status in the UN but also their ability to 
operate autonomously in the international political arena. 
The Soviet Union bluntly rejected any changes in the way the 
UN has been functioning in the international security field. 
Under the Reagan Administration, the United States expressed 
its preference for unilateralism in the UN. It said that arms 
control could never be a substitute for the ’harsh and 
unremitting effort to sustain peace directly’ - presumably by 
relying on a competitive military and political posture 
towards the Soviet Union and other Third World 
adversaries. [131] There axe however other problems as well. 
The United States feared that changes sought by the 
non-aligned countries could be used irr,ways detrimental to the 
basic purposes of the UN Charter. The experience in recent 
years with the NAM’s ‘politicisation’ of the UN was perhaps an 
important reason for concern in this respect. More generally, 
poor relations between the major groups of states only helped 
to deepen mutual apprehensions and suspicions.
The rationalisation of existing procedures of the UN will 
no doubt help to improve efficiency, but as a UN study on 
institutional arrangements pointed out, ‘it is ultimately the 
will of states to make the best use of [the machinery] and 
their readiness to negotiate which will determine the level of 
progress made’.[132] Progress will also depend on addressing 
conceptual disagreements between the major groups of states. 
The superpowers and the non-aligned countries have been 
selective in their support for arms control measures and often 
quite insensitive to each other’s concerns. The non-aligned 
countries have placed the primary responsibility for arms 
control on the superpowers; some leading members of the NAM
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are not prepared to pursue purely regional measures unless the 
superpowers lead the way by negotiating significant agreements 
of a global nature.
Notwithstanding the problems, the UN machinery has had a 
number of successes in the past. The PTBT in 1963, the ‘Hot 
Line’ agreement also in 1963, the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, 
the NPT in 1968, the Sea-Bed Treaty in 1971, the Biological 
Weapons Convention in 1972, the ENMOD Convention (about 
environmental modification techniques) in 1977, and the 
Inhumane Weapons Convention in 1980, are achievements of 
varying degree of importance which were negotiated either 
entirely or partly within the UN framework. But failures and 
setbacks have greatly overshadowed successes, especially when 
compared to the goals the UN set for itself.
Recent years have been the least productive. The reasons 
seem to be numerous: work overload caused by the introduction 
of a large number of items in the agenda, coupled with the 
UN’s circuitous procedures; the technical and political 
complexity of many issues; the inevitable difficulties of 
reaching agreement among a large number of countries with 
different interests; divergent attitudes towards arms control 
and disarmament; the excessive use of the machinery for 
purposes of debate and mutual recrimination, and sometimes 
quite patently for propaganda; differences between the 
superpowers and the non-aligned countries over the nature and 
causes of the arms race, the balance of responsibility of 
states towards arms control, and the priority of issues; 
greater assertiveness of the non-aligned countries on arms 
control issues; the deterioration of superpower relations and 
the failure of their bilateral negotiations; changes in 
American arms control policy under the Reagan Administration; 
the reluctance of the superpowers, especially of the United 
States, to initiate negotiations on some subjects in the CD; 
and the negative effect of the Soviet Union’s relative 
inflexibility on the verification issue.
Conclusion
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In recent years, American and Soviet attitudes towards 
the UN’s role in arms control have been much less divergent 
than on most other issues. During the Carter period, however, 
American attitude seemed flexible and cautiously accommodative 
towards the non-aligned countries on the question of expanding 
the UN machinery and bringing it into a closer relationship 
with bilateral and multilateral negotiations conducted outside 
the UN framework. The Carter period also witnessed evident 
American interest in promoting regional arms control, 
including confidence-building measures in Third World axeas, 
through efforts either in the UN or outside it.
The General Assembly’s first special session on 
disarmament seemed to promise a beginning for a significant UN 
role in arms control. But support for this from the 
superpowers had been tentative. At any rate, it had not 
extended to a wider UN role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Moreover, changes in 
American attitude towards multilateralism under the Reagan 
Administration depressed the prospects of greater UN 
involvement in arms control. More importantly, multilateral 
diplomacy was bedevilled by differences of approach and 
preoccupation between the major groups of states.
At its core, the UN machinery functions at a hectic pace 
and to a large extent in a confused and sterile manner. Its 
work has been characterised much more by debate than by 
negotiation or deliberation. Debates are of course a 
legitimate and important part of the machinery’s function, but 
the proceedings of the UN have been dominated by debates to a 
greater degree than was intended and there has even been a 
spillover of debates and polemics in the CD. More rational 
procedural approaches could mitigate some of the consequences 
of sharp disagreements among states. There is reasonable 
prospect that some improvement in procedures will emerge in 
due course. But the problem is more fundamental than mere 
procedure and the machinery cannot be expected to conceal or 
contain to any significant degree the political effects of 
major differences amongst states over a range of general and 
specific issues. The non-aligned countries have played an 
assertive role over the past decade and appear determined to
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use the UN forum for promoting their ideas about world order 
and expressing their difficulties with an international system 
dominated by the superpowers and beset, above all, by their 
political and military rivalry.
In a speech to the non-aligned summit meeting in New 
Delhi in 1983, the UN Secretary General urged that ‘we now 
need to develop the United Nations more as a forum for 
negotiation and agreement and less as a place for 
confrontation and endless d e b a t e [133] Significant progress 
in arms control between the superpowers, especially in the 
nuclear field, could bring about some changes in the 
non-aligned group’s attitude. It would certainly introduce a 
new element, making it harder for the non-aligned group to 
maintain its existing stance. Concern about the state of 
multilateral diplomacy and the UN could lead to more restraint 
in the future, but conceptual divergence between the major 
groups of states will limit progress.
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NEGOTIATIONS FOR A 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
Introduction
Approximately 1,500 nuclear explosive devices were tested 
during the 1945-84 period.[l] About 400 of these were 
atmospheric tests. The superpowers ended atmospheric tests 
with the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 
August 1963. France, not a party to the PTBT, did not cease 
atmospheric explosions until 1975, by which time it had 
conducted 41 such tests. [2] China, also not a party to the 
PTBT, was generally believed to have stopped atmospheric 
testing in 1981. It later transpired that such tests had not 
completely ceased. The official China News Agency also 
reportedly indicated that atmospheric tests were continuing, 
though the emphasis had shifted to underground tests. [3] In 
early 1986, however, the Chinese government announced that it 
would no longer conduct atmospheric tests. [4] According to 
SIPRI, till 1980, China had conducted 22 atmospheric tests.[5]
Over 360 nuclear tests occurred during the 1978-84 
period; more than 300 of these were caxried out by the 
superpowers.[6] According to SIPRI’s figures, the level of 
Soviet tests during this period was distinctly higher than the 
American, but the annual levels of both countries did not 
fluctuate noticeably. [7] The pattern of Soviet tests looks 
different if Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) are excluded, 
not to mention low-yield tests. The number of nucleax weapon 
tests by the Soviet Union reportedly declined from 20 in 1978 
to 6 in 1982, while the American tests increased from 12 in 
1978 to 19 in 1982. [8] According to a claim by a private 
American organisation, later officially confirmed, the Reagan 
Administration during 1982-84 conducted a number of secret 
tests. [9] The exact number of such tests has not been 
disclosed nor has it been possible to make a reliable estimate 
from available information. At least 12 and possibly as many 
as 19 unannounced tests are known to have taken place, of 
which only 8 were detected.[10] Other secret tests went 
unrecorded. The method of concealment used is not apparently 
known.
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Nuclear weapon tests have been conducted for various 
technical purposes: to develop new types of weapons; to 
bring about desired changes in the radiation, thermal and 
blast effects of weapons; to test the effects of nuclear 
explosions on the performance and survivability of weapons as 
well as other equipment; to ascertain the reliability of 
weapons in the stockpile; and to improve the security and 
safety of weapons. Nuclear weapon tests are also conducted on 
a miniaturised scale in laboratories.[11] Such tests are 
generally regarded as supplementary to those conducted in the 
natural environment. Within the United Nations, the continued 
testing of nucleax weapons has been condemned on numerous 
occasions by the General Assembly, which has passed over 40 
resolutions urging the conclusion of a CTB treaty.[12]
Historical Background
The CTB question was first raised by India in 1954 
against a background of growing public concern about the 
hazards to human life and the environment posed by the 
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. The Indian Prime 
Minister, Pandit Nehru, urged that ‘some sort of what may be 
called ’’stand-still" agreement’ should be reached to stop 
nuclear explosions, pending progress towards nuclear 
disarmament.[13] The question was subsequently raised in the 
United Nations by the Soviet Union and soon after by a number 
of other countries. Because of difficulties encountered 
during negotiations, preoccupation with general disarmament 
lessened somewhat. The focus of attention in the General 
Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee, 
began to turn increasingly towards the CTB question.
Eventual Soviet acceptance in June 1957 of the principle 
of stationing control posts in its territory for monitoring 
compliance with a test ban agreement resulted in expressions 
of more serious interest in the CTB question by other nuclear 
weapon states. The United States linked its acceptance of a 
test ban to the ‘satisfactory’ functioning of verification 
procedures, once a test ban had been put into effect, and also 
to progress in other areas of disarmament negotiations.[14] 
The Soviet Union stressed that a test ban should be pursued as
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an independent measure, all the more so because, as it axgued, 
progress in this area should be easier and would facilitate 
negotiations on general disarmament issues. [15] Nevertheless, 
after a spate of correspondence in mid-1958 between Premier 
Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, the two leaders agreed to 
establish an expert group to determine the technical 
feasibility of a CTB treaty.
A fairly positive report by the expert group led to an 
early convening of tripartite negotiations between the United 
States, the Soviet Union and Britain in Geneva in October
1958. The United States suspended its weapon-tests with the 
commencement of negotiations. After a brief resumption in 
late October and early November of 1958, following unilateral 
suspension in March 1958, the Soviet Union also suspended its 
weapon-tests. When the Geneva negotiations resumed in January
1959, the United States withdrew the linkage it had earlier 
sought between a test ban and other disarmament negotiations.
The negotiations soon ran into a snag. The United States 
questioned the findings of the expert group on the technical 
capability for detecting underground nuclear tests. New data 
based on very recent experiments caxried out by the United 
States were presented to the conference, indicating a major 
departure from the estimates of the expert group.[16] The 
United States now challenged the technical feasibility of an 
adequate system of verification and declared that the 
deficiencies of the seismic monitoring methods were such that 
they could only be compensated by a ’burdensome number of 
on-site inspections, which would be the principal remaining 
tool to identify possible underground nucleax explosions’.[17]
When the attempt to reach agreement over the requirements 
of verification failed, the United States proposed in February 
1959 that negotiations should be directed towards a limited 
ban on underground nuclear tests. The proposal envisaged a 
ban on nucleax tests of a detectable threshold of 4.75 seismic 
magnitude or more. The proposal also sought up to 40 on-site 
inspections annually to ensure against clandestine tests in 
breach of the threshold.[18] The Soviet Union offered to 
accept the proposal on the condition that on-site inspections
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would be strictly limited in number and that a moratorium 
would apply to tests below the threshold. During the 
moratorium, the negotiating parties would undertake joint 
research to improve methods of detection of smaller 
underground tests. The Soviet Union indicated that joint 
research could be completed in 4 to 5 years. The Soviet 
proposal for joint research was accepted by the United States 
and the United Kingdom. However, the Soviet Union rejected 
the related American proposal for the creation of a joint pool 
of nuclear devices to be used for experimental purposes, which 
would be open to inspection before their use. Inspection of 
its experimental nuclear devices was not acceptable to the 
Soviet Union.[19]
In April 1961, jointly with Britain, the United States 
renewed its earlier initiative. American willingness to 
reduce its demand for on-site inspection by more than half, 
however, failed to alter the Soviet position that more them 
three annual inspections would not be acceptable. The Soviet 
Union declared that the question of inspection was ultimately 
a political matter. Apprehension was expressed that in view 
of the existence of military alignments in the world, a large 
number of inspections would provide opportunities for 
espionage.[20] The Soviet position hardened further when it 
insisted that the control authority under a test ban treaty 
should be governed by a three-member council representing the 
three negotiating parties.[21] The American proposal for a 
single chief executive selected from a neutral country was 
rejected on the ground that ‘while there are neutral states, 
there are not nor can there be neutral men’.[22]
The negotiations reached a dead-end when the Soviet Union 
made it clear that it would not compromise on its position 
concerning on-site inspection and joint administration by the 
control authority.[23] At the same time, it urged that the CTB 
question should be merged with negotiations on general 
disarmament. In contrast to its original position, the Soviet 
Union questioned the relevance of separate negotiations on the 
CTB question on the ground that growing international tensions 
had created an adverse situation. [24] Shortly afterward, it 
resumed nuclear weapon tests, after about three years of
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suspension, declaring tests by the United States to be 
imminent and anticipating increased military competition.[25]
The United States and the United Kingdom continued to 
seek a separate treaty on a CTB and considered such a treaty 
to be ‘a matter of the highest priority’ in the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva, newly 
constituted in early 1962. The Soviet Union now opposed even 
the principle of international inspection and control, 
maintaining that national means of detection were sufficient 
to ensure compliance.[26] On-site inspection and an 
international control authority would only be acceptable to 
the Soviet Union in the context of a wider agreement on 
disarmament.[27] Nevertheless, an exchange of letters between 
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev resulted in a fresh 
approach to the problem.[28] A new basis for negotiations was 
found in a scheme that would involve the use of tamper-proof 
automatic seismic stations to be placed in the territory of 
each party, together with a limited number of on-site 
inspections. The Soviet Union proposed an upper limit of 
three annual inspections, while the United States sought from 
8 to 10 inspections. The United States indicated that it 
might reconsider its demand for a minimum of 8 inspections, 
provided a satisfactory agreement could be reached on 
inspection procedures.[29] The Soviet Union argued that the 
American demand for a minimum of 8 inspections was more than 
what even some American experts believed would suffice and 
insisted that the question of on-site inspection should be 
settled before inspection procedures were finalised.
In view of the impasse, the Soviet Union proposed that 
negotiations should now focus on a ban to be limited to the 
atmosphere, outer space and underwater.[30] It was pointed out 
that such a ban would free the negotiations of the thorny 
inspection issue. The proposal for a partial test ban was 
first put forward jointly by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in August 1962 as an alternative to a CTB. At that 
time the Soviet Union had rejected the alternative approach on 
the ground that a partial test ban would in effect sanction 
underground tests. [31]
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After a brief period of negotiations - facilitated 
greatly by the absence of the verification problem because of 
the deployment by the United States of satellites capable of 
detecting atmospheric nuclear tests - a Partial Test Ban 
Treaty (PTBT) was concluded between the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in August 1963.[32] 
Another factor was ‘the desire for conciliation and 
flexibility’ that prevailed in both Moscow and Washington DC 
following the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.[33] The 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, for example, 
reportedly stated in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in 1963: 
’History has so developed that without mutual understanding 
between the USSR and the USA... agreement cannot be reached on 
a single international problem’.[34]
The CTB question continued to be considered in the ENDC. 
The United States maintained that without on-site inspection, 
verification procedures would be inadequate. It argued that 
since seismic methods would not be able to detect and identify 
a certain proportion of seismic events, at least some on-site 
inspection would be indispensable as a hedge against 
clandestine violations.[35] The Soviet Union continued to 
maintain that national means of detection would provide an 
effective deterrence against violations. Indeed, the Soviet 
Union also made the patently unrealistic claim that it would 
be ‘impossible’ to conduct clandestine tests.[36] Sweden’s 
proposition that ‘the problem of verification be approached 
from the standpoint of deterrence against violations rather 
than certainty of verification’ failed to break the 
deadlock.[37] Anxious to see progress towards a CTB, the 
non-aligned states also advanced a number of proposals for a 
ban on underground tests above a threshold capable of being 
monitored by available seismic methods, either with or without 
a moratorium on tests below that threshold. The Soviet Union 
offered to accept a threshold-ban, provided such a ban was 
accompanied by a moratorium on other tests. [38] The United 
States opposed the proposal for a moratorium on the ground 
that it would not be subject to verification procedures and 
thus there would be no assurance of compliance.[39] The Soviet 
proposal for an exchange of scientific data to help cleax 
suspicion of violation was considered by the United States to
Page 111
be an important measure but inadequate on its own.
The impasse over the inspection issue turned attention in 
the ENDC to the question of creating an international seismic 
monitoring system as the central verification instrument. A 
Swedish proposal to establish a ‘detection club’ received wide 
support in the ENDC. The United States expressed strong 
interest in the proposal. The Soviet Union, though in general 
agreement with the idea, continued to insist that verification 
should rest primarily on national means and that an 
international exchange of seismic data should be conducted on 
a voluntary basis.[40]
In the early 1970s, several ideas were put forward by 
various countries in the re-constituted Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva to revive CTB 
negotiations. A threshold-ban of different levels of seismic 
magnitude, a scheme to phase out nuclear weapon tests, or a 
moratorium on underground tests, were proposed. But neither 
the United States nor the Soviet Union supported such 
approaches. The United States adopted the position that, 
although important progress had been made to improve the 
capability of seismic detection, .„.methods, technical 
difficulties continued to persist. [41] The United States 
claimed that the detection of low-yield tests, particularly 
those done by evasion techniques (for example by conducting 
tests in ‘soft’ geological structures or in an existing cavity 
to ‘decouple’ the explosion from its normal seismic effect) 
posed serious problems from the standpoint of fulfilling the 
requirements of ’adequate’ verification.[42] A similar- 
difficulty was expressed with the identification of ambiguous 
seismic events. On-site inspection, the United States argued, 
was still needed to supplement national technical means.[43]
The Soviet Union stood opposed to any proposal that fell 
short of a comprehensive ban.[44] However, it now expressed 
its readiness to cooperate in creating an international 
seismic monitoring system, which it believed would adequately 
supplement the national technical means of verification and 
would provide a reliable guarantee of detection of clandestine 
tests.[45] For different reasons, the United States and the
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Soviet Union continued to reject proposals for a moratorium on 
weapon-tests as a first step towards a treaty. The United 
States declared verification to be a stumbling block and the 
Soviet Union possibly did not wish to interrupt its on-going 
weapon-tests.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the superpowers soon changed their 
attitudes and after a brief period of negotiations agreed to a 
bilateral threshold-ban in 1974. The difficulties encountered 
in negotiating a SALT II agreement presumably presented the 
disagreeable prospect of a US-Soviet summit meeting in 
mid-1974 without an arms control agreement to sign. The need 
to bolster the process of detente seems to have led to TTBT 
negotiations in spring 1974 and to an agreement during the 
summit. The negotiations were initiated by the Nixon 
Administration. Apparent Soviet interest in a CTB eventually 
gave way to President Nixon’s concern that such a treaty would 
not find sufficient support in the United States and that a 
TTBT was ‘the only way we will get the support in the 
Congress’.[46] A TTBT seemed a convenient exercise because of 
the relative ease of negotiations, since verification 
requirements and the risk of violation did not seem 
significant, and also because it enabled the superpowers to 
show some tangible progress on the CTB question. Moreover, 
although the TTBT was concluded after a brief period of 
negotiations, the date of its coming into effect was postponed 
long enough to cause little disturbance to either side’s 
weapon-test programme. Negotiations for a treaty on peaceful 
nuclear explosion (PNE) were separated and delayed because of 
strong Soviet objection to the American position that PNEs 
should be completely banned and also presumably to facilitate 
a TTBT.
The TTBT treaty imposed a ban on underground tests in 
excess of 150 kilotons and stipulated the intention of the two 
parties to keep the number of permitted tests to a minimum and 
to pursue negotiations with the aim of concluding a 
comprehensive test ban treaty.[47] A follow-up treaty to limit 
and regulate peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) was signed in 
April 1976, which fixed an upper ceiling of 150 kilotons on 
single explosions and 1.5 megatons on group explosions.
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Interestingly, at Soviet initiative, a bilateral understanding 
was reached that acknowledged the ‘technical uncertainties 
associated with predicting the precise yields of nuclear 
weapon tests [that could] result in slight, unintended 
breaches of the 150 kiloton threshold’.[48] The two parties 
agreed that a couple of such explosions in a year would not be 
considered violations, but they would consult on the matter. 
During the period between the signing of the 1974 treaty and 
March 1976, when the treaty was to take effect, many 
high-yield tests occurred on both sides.[49] Ratification of 
the treaty by the Senate soon became an issue in the United 
States, largely because verification and arms control issues 
were becoming increasingly controversial. Notwithstanding the 
failure of the United States to ratify the treaty, the parties 
tacitly agreed to adhere to the ceiling stipulated in the two 
treaties.
Alongside multilateral deliberations in the CCD, 
trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom on a CTB were revived in 1977, 
after a lapse of 14 years. These negotiations produced 
general agreement on several important issues. The Soviet 
Union abandoned its earlier insistence that the question of 
PNEs should be considered outside the framework of CTB 
negotiations. It also agreed to the emplacement of seismic 
instruments in its territory in addition to an international 
seismic monitoring system. The principle of on-site 
inspection was accepted. The Soviet Union also withdrew, at 
least provisionally, its earlier refusal to negotiate a treaty 
without the participation of France and China, the other 
nuclear, weapon states.
In their joint report of July 1980[50], the trilateral 
negotiators declared that they continued to attach ‘great 
importance’ to CTB negotiations. Significant progress was 
reported in several areas, especially on the verification 
issue. In areas where substantive work remained to be done, 
and despite the strains brought about by the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and the related American decision not to 
proceed with the ratification of SALT II, the report expressed 
the determination of the parties to conclude their
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negotiations successfully. In November 1980, however, several 
weeks after the presidential election, these negotiations were 
unilaterally suspended by the Carter Administration, 
presumably to keep official policy in line with the policy 
approach of the in-coming administration of President Reagan, 
though by this time President Carter’s CTB policy had already 
come up against considerable opposition within the 
administration and outside it.
Negotiations in the CD
Although placed at the top of the CD’s agenda in June 
1979, it was not until April 1982 that a working group was 
established to consider exclusively the question of a CTB 
treaty. During the intervening period, the CD’s activities on 
the CTB issue were limited to general discussions in plenary 
meetings. Meanwhile an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts - 
created in 1976 by the CCD, the CD’s predecessor body 
continued to examine the question of an international system 
for the detection and identification of seismic events. 
During the period 1977-1980, the trilateral negotiations on a 
CTB treaty were conducted outside the CD. Joint reports of 
these negotiations were however submitted to the CD in 1979 
and 1980.
Critical of the trilateral negotiations and anxious to 
upgrade the CTB negotiations, the Group of 21 [51] endeavoured 
to start multilateral negotiations on the subject in the CD. 
In addition to expressing its general disappointment with the 
1979 report of trilateral negotiations and the delay in the 
report’s submission to the CD, the Group of 21 declaxed that 
there was ‘no justification to delay any further the 
initiation of concrete negotiations’ in the CD on a CTB 
treaty.[52] The Group of 21 continued to insist that a working 
group should be created in the CD even if the trilateral 
negotiations should make progress in the future.[53] The 
progress report submitted to the CD by the trilateral 
negotiators in July 1980 indicated that some positive results 
had been achieved. The Group of 21 however found these 
negotiations unacceptable because the proposed treaty was 
envisaged for a limited three-year period and the permanent
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members of the Security Council would enjoy a special status 
on questions of amendment and compliance.[54]
Opposed to the idea of creating a working group in the 
CD, the united States and the United Kingdom argued that the 
best way forward lay in confidential negotiations and thus in 
the continuation of the trilateral forum.[55] The United 
States pointed out that as the trilateral negotiators had 
agreed in their 1980 report, it was appropriate that these 
negotiations alone should be pursued ‘for the time being’.[56] 
Like the Group of 21, the Socialist Group supported the 
proposition that negotiations on a CTB should proceed at both 
levels. [57] The suspension of the trilateral negotiations by 
the United States in November 1980 led to increased efforts to 
initiate multilateral negotiations in the CD.
The United States and the United Kingdom continued to 
oppose the creation of a working group during the CD’s 1981 
sessions. The United States explained that its policy 
concerning the whole question of a CTB was under review and 
therefore it could not agree to forming a working group.[58] 
The United States was however prepared to cooperate to find 
‘alternative ways for the Committee , to undertake active 
consideration of [the CTB] issue’.[59] The United Kingdom, 
stressing the importance of confidentiality, continued to 
maintain that the trilateral negotiations offered ‘the most 
realistic way forward on a comprehensive test ban’.[60] The 
United States soon altered its declared rationale for opposing 
multilateral negotiations in the CD. In the General Assembly 
debate in 1981 the United States announced that it had 
relegated a CTB treaty to a long-term goal.[6l] It argued that 
the international situation was not propitious for an 
immediate CTB and, further, that a CTB would not eliminate the 
threat posed by nuclear weapons. A more specific concern was 
the adverse impact of a CTB on the Administration’s nuclear 
weapons modernisation programme.
The Group of 21 expressed extreme dismay with the 
continued refusal of the United States to agree to create a 
working group in the CD even after the suspension of 
trilateral negotiations. While calling for the immediate
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resumption of trilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union also 
urged the establishment of a working group in the CD to 
promote the ‘speediest possible conclusion of a treaty’.[62] A 
proposal was presented by a number of states belonging to the 
Group of 21 seeking changes in the rules of procedure so that 
the creation of a subsidiary body by the CD could not be 
unduly prevented by the need for consensus. [63] The Group of 
21 also expressed its frustration with the failure of the 
trilateral negotiators to provide more information about the 
trilateral negotiations. [64] Wide-spread support for 
multilateral negotiations persisted in the CD. Both the 
Socialist Group and the Group of 21 continued to urge the 
creation of a working group. Though opposed to negotiations, 
the United States eventually agreed to the setting-up of a 
subsidiary body and proposed that such a body should be 
established to focus sharply on the specific issues of 
verification and compliance.[65] The ostensible purpose of 
this exercise however remained unclear; it was widely 
believed to be a stalling exercise.
The Question of Mandate
A Working Group was established in --April 1982 with a 
mandate confined to the substantive examination of the 
long-standing issues of verification and compliance. No firm 
link was provided between these deliberations and negotiations 
aimed at concluding a treaty. The mandate simply expressed 
the hope that a ‘discussion of specific issues in the first 
instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a 
nuclear test ban’.[66] The Group of 21 had sought a mandate 
that would sanction negotiations covering the ‘scope, 
verification of compliance and final clauses’ of a CTB 
treaty.[67]
The Working Group could not proceed with its task during 
the 1982 sessions. Its mandate became a subject of heated 
debate. The discussions were conducted without a programme of 
work for which no consensus existed. The Group of 21 
considered the mandate to be inadequate since it had failed to 
provide for negotiations that would lead to the conclusion of 
a treaty. They felt that before proceeding to discuss the
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content of its existing mandate, the Working Group should 
rather deal first with the question of obtaining a wider 
mandate from the CD. This suggestion was strongly opposed by 
the United States which was not prepared to negotiate a treaty 
‘at this time’, though it was interested in substantive 
discussions on the verification issue.[68] The United States 
maintained that since the history of CTB negotiations was 
‘rife with illustrations of the verification obstacle’, the 
proper task of the Working Group was to address that 
problem.[69]
The Group of 21 and the Socialist Group argued that the 
main problem affecting the CTB issue was a lack of political 
will and that technical questions were secondary. Having 
reluctantly accepted the limited mandate and eager to have it 
replaced forthwith, they argued weakly that the discussions 
which had already taken place should be regarded as having 
exhausted the existing mandate and that the next immediate 
step for the Working Group should be to obtain a mandate from 
the CD that would permit negotiations towards a treaty. The 
United States and the United Kingdom argued that partly 
because the Working Group’s discussions were unstructured, 
‘considerable work remained to be done in resolving various 
issues relating to verification and compliance’.[70]
The Group of 21 and the Socialist Group also contended 
that the question of verification, as set out in the mandate, 
could not be properly examined unless it was clear what the 
scope of the prospective treaty would be - that is, whether 
the treaty would be about weapon-related tests or such tests 
as well as other tests conducted for peaceful purposes. The 
United States envisaged the scope of verification to be a 
general ban. The Group of 21 wanted the Working Group to deal 
with a ban on weapon-tests. Though agreeing with the Group of 
21 on the question of scope, the Soviet Union did not want the 
question of PNEs to be left out completely, proposing that it 
be covered by a separate protocol at a later stage. The 
specific question of scope and the general question of an 
adequate mandate prevented the Working Group during its 1982 
sessions from examining the verification issue on the basis of 
an agreed programme of work. The Group of 21 and the
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Socialist Group had accepted the idea of a limited mandate for 
the Working Group only as a brief exercise to be followed by a 
mandate that would permit comprehensive negotiations. The 
United States, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to any 
further growth of the CD’s role in the CTB issue.
In the following year (1983), however, the different 
groups of countries displayed some flexibility. Though 
opposed to a widening of the Working Group’s mandate, the 
United States agreed not to prevent ‘other delegations from 
forwarding views on particular issues that in their opinion 
have a bearing on the verification and compliance aspects of 
the prospective treaty as a whole’.[71] It was agreed in the 
CD that the issues of verification and compliance could not be 
discussed in isolation - that is, without reference to the 
scope of prohibition. The Group of 21 accepted the broad 
characterisation of scope as contained in the mandate, but on 
the understanding that the verification system envisaged by 
the mandate would be universal and non-discriminatory - that 
is, it would provide equal access to all parties to the 
prospective treaty. The new flexibility, in the words of the 
Chairman of the Working Group, had opened the way for a 
‘broadly ranging substantive examination. of most, if not all 
essential and relevant issues’ under the existing mandate.[72]
Following the initial compromise achieved through 
informal meetings, further procedural progress was made in the 
Working Group, resulting in an agreed programme of work, 
marked by minor de facto modifications of the previous 
mandate. The agreed programme of work consisted of six 
subjects covering verification aspects, including the means of 
verification, the requirements and elements of verification, 
the procedures for complaint, and on-site inspection. In 
order to ensure that the consideration of these matters would 
not depart from the past pattern of negotiations, it was 
agreed that past proposals should be taken account and the 
Working Group should also ‘draw on the knowledge and 
experience’ gained over the years in various negotiating 
bodies. [73] Other modifications were designed mainly to 
appease the Group of 21 and the Socialist Group. According to 
the new formulation, the purpose of the mandate was to make
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progress towards a ‘corresponding treaty’.[74] The original 
mandate had merely referred to ’a nuclear test ban’, leaving 
out the word ‘treaty’.[75] The term ‘corresponding treaty’ was 
introduced and it was agreed that it would be universal and 
non-discriminatory - a point strongly emphasised by the Group 
of 21. It was also agreed that the examination of the 
verification issue would take place in the context of .‘all 
relevant aspects of a treaty on a nuclear test ban’.[76] In 
general, while the Group of 21 agreed not to press the issue 
regarding the scope of prohibition, the United States agreed 
to accept a less restrictive discussion over the verification 
issue.
The compromise was largely superficial in that the 
opposing sides continued to adhere to their conflicting 
positions on the CTB issue and the CD’s role in the matter. 
The original mandate remained essentially unchanged. The 
modifications to the mandate were introduced only as part of 
the agreed programme of work. Yet, the original mandate had 
been replaced for all practical purposes, though discreetly 
and only temporarily superseded. The references to ‘treaty’ 
in the new formulation did not signify any substantive change 
of the mandate or of the attitude of^ -the United States which 
had been the principal opponent of any mention of ‘treaty’ in 
the mandate. The compromise over the wording of the mandate 
did make it possible for the Working Group to function on the 
basis of a programme of work during its 1983 sessions. This 
did not however prevent the issue of the mandate from 
re-emerging during the course of the Working Group’s meetings.
The new compromise, though it had produced a programme of 
work, was limited to the wording of the mandate. Those 
opposed to its content had accepted the verbal modifications 
with obvious reluctance. The Soviet Union argued that the 
subject of mandate had already been examined in recent years 
by the CCD, and recalled that in the past the United States 
had left such technical issues to a committee of experts. 
According to India, the argument that the mandate had not been 
exhausted was ’merely a camouflage* for concealing a lack of 
interest in a nuclear test ban treaty.[77] At the end of the 
1983 session, the situation with regard to the issue of the
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mandate reverted back to the sharp cleavage that had existed 
before.
Opposed to detailed discussions on the verification issue 
alone, most member-states demanded that a new mandate that 
would provide for comprehensive negotiations should be put in 
place ‘without further delay’. [78] The United States 
maintained that the existing mandate had not been fulfilled 
and argued that, despite an agreed programme of work, the 
Working Group had failed to devote enough time to the 
verification issue during its 1983 sessions.[79] It was 
alleged that 40 percent of the Working Group’s time had been 
devoted to the preparation of its annual report to the CD.[80] 
The United States expected a ‘sharper focus’ on the 
verification issue than had been the case in the Working 
Group, and expressed annoyance at efforts to link the question 
of the mandate with other issues. [81] The United Kingdom 
referred to several items in the programme of work, including 
the question of on-site inspection, and claimed that little 
discussion had taken place on those issues.[82] The United 
Kingdom, which generally supported the United States on the 
CTB issue, had sought a ‘detailed consideration’ of the 
verification issue and regarded this approach to be the 
‘correct path’ towards the goal of a CTB treaty.[83]
Since the United States was opposed to negotiations 
either in the CD or outside it, its insistence on an elaborate 
examination of the verification issue lacked a clear rationale 
and was widely believed to be a political ruse. The Group of 
21 and the Socialist Group were not prepared to delve into the 
verification question unless the exercise formed part of 
negotiations aimed at concluding a treaty. Unless this was 
the case, the verification issue could be easily exploited to 
disguise a lack of interest in a treaty. The Soviet Union 
bluntly maintained that the verification problem could not be 
resolved by means of a debate and charged that the United 
States had turned the Working Group, which was a negotiating 
body, into a debating club.[84]
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The reduction of a CTB treaty to a long-term goal by the 
Reagan Administration gave rise to considerable misgivings in 
the CD, especially among the non-aligned and neutral states. 
The absence of a clear purpose in the mandate, together with a 
general distrust of American motives, strengthened the 
opposition of the Group of 21 and the Socialist Group to an 
exclusive focus on the verification issue. Although the 
United States and the United Kingdom argued that a wider 
mandate was premature since discussion under the existing 
mandate had not been exhausted, they offered no incentive to 
other groups by way of accepting a link between a wider 
mandate and progress on the verification issue. Their 
position on that issue remained obscure. Moreover, such a 
link would not have necessarily induced other groups to accept 
a consideration of the verification issue for a longer period, 
since what constituted an adequate examination of the 
verification issue would be open to conflicting 
interpretations. Despite protracted discussion, the United 
States could still have argued that the mandate had not been 
exhausted or, indeed, that an exhaustive examination had 
revealed disagreements and, as such, a wider mandate would 
serve no useful purpose.
Another possible difficulty could have been the 
reluctance of the Group of 21 and, perhaps equally, the 
Socialist Group to ‘legitimise’ the verification issue. A 
linkage would still have implied acceptance of a separation of 
the verification issue from other issues and as such a 
recognition of the primacy of that issue. At any rate, a 
linkage offer would have required a substantial change in the 
Reagan Administration’s defence policy and axms control 
approach. The Administration was evidently committed to 
strategic - that is, nuclear - modernisation as a matter of 
top priority and a CTB would have made much of that programme 
impossible to implement. A CTB would have constrained the 
strategic modernisation programme more than any other 
negotiating exercise at the time.
The CTB question was not considered at the working group 
level during the 1984 sessions. The positions of the major 
groups hardened on the subject of the working group’s mandate,
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with the result that no working group could be established. A 
general exchange of views occurred in the CD’s plenary 
meetings, where Japan and Austria submitted proposals for a 
gradual implementation of a CTB on the basis of a new (lower) 
threshold test ban which would avoid the admittedly difficult 
problem of detecting very low threshold (say below three 
kiloton) explosions. Another proposal called for a steady 
reduction of nuclear tests by the superpowers together with 
commitments by other nuclear weapon states not to exceed the 
levels reached by the former. [85] Concrete work on the CTB 
question was confined to the technical studies and preliminary 
tests of the international monitoring system undertaken by the 
Group of Scientific Experts. Discussion on the mandate issue 
ended amid ‘mutually recriminating rhetoric, allegations of 
hypocrisy and general frustration over the inability of the 
[CD] to make any substantial progress on the first item of its 
agenda’.[86]
and Compliance
A verification system for ensuring compliance with a CTB 
treaty has been a long-standing issue and among the most 
contentious ones facing the Working Group. Since its creation 
in 1976, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been 
dealing with the question of developing an effective 
international network of exchange of seismic data for the 
detection and identification of seismic events. The United 
States and the United Kingdom objected to the system envisaged 
by the Scientific Group. The system was believed to have the 
potential capability to detect and identify seismic events at 
or above a body-wave magnitude of 4.5 with a 90 percent 
probability.[87] Objections to the system were related to the 
range of its global coverage, the effectiveness of its 
detection capability, and its technical efficiency in handling 
seismic data.
The United States argued for more global coverage, both 
in the general sense and in relation to specific regions that 
axe prone to a high incidence of seismic activity or possess 
such geological characteristics as would cause explosions to 
produce smaller than average seismic signals.[88] The United
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Kingdom also emphasised the importance of adequate global 
coverage, considering it to be ‘crucial for monitoring those 
countries with large land masses’ - presumably with the Soviet 
Union especially in mind.[89]
Regarding detection capability, the United Kingdom made a 
number of criticisms of the system envisaged by the CD’s 
technical Group of Scientific Experts.[90] It argued that, 
given a detection threshold of 4.5 body-wave magnitude, most 
nuclear explosions below that threshold would go undetected, 
and low-yield clandestine tests of up to three kilotons could 
be carried out without being detected. In addition, the 
system’s capability to detect explosions above 4.5 magnitude 
with a 90 percent probability implied that some explosions 
above the detection threshold would also go undetected. The 
United Kingdom’s principal concern, however, was focused on 
the dangers posed by clandestine tests of militaxily 
significant high yield. It was argued that tests of up to 30 
kilotons would not be detectable if conducted in favorable 
geological conditions. Such tests could be carried out either 
in dry alluvium soil or in large artificially created 
underground cavities. Clandestine tests by evasion techniques 
in the order of ‘a few tens of kilotons’.(in undetected breach 
of a treaty) would enable the violator to ’realise a very 
significant military advantage’. Evasion techniques would 
make it possible to test tactical nuclear weapons as well as 
the fission triggers of strategic nuclear weapons. More 
importantly, it was also argued that the possibility of 
clandestine tests would put some states at a greater advantage 
than others.[91]
The United States and the United Kingdom also expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the available methods of data 
processing and the transmission of the more detailed Level 2 
data.[92] The United States called for the emplacement of 
high-quality seismic instruments in the proposed international 
network. Automated processes, it was argued, would be needed 
to cope with the large volume of data which the proposed 
system would generate. Currently, such a requirement, the 
United States maintained, could not be met. While conceding 
that research in this been area has been quite active, the
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United States also maintained that as yet ‘no well-proven 
solution involving the use of automated processes’ had 
emerged.[93] In general, the United States described the 
system envisaged by the Scientific Group to be ‘largely 
theoretical in nature’ and lacking in technical sophistication 
to be able meet the demands of efficiency it expected of an 
international network.[94] The United Kingdom stated that a 
‘great deal of work’ remained to be done by the Scientific 
Group.[95] Both countries also supported Sweden’s proposal 
that an international monitoring system should also be able to 
detect airborne radioactivity.[96] In addition, they proposed 
that the international network should be put in operation and 
tested out for reliability before a treaty was concluded.
On the issue of on-site inspection, the United Kingdom 
complained that the Working Group had failed to engage in a 
detailed consideration of the issue. [97] The United States and 
the United Kingdom considered it crucially important that a 
request for on-site inspection should not meet with refusal by 
a state-party to whom such a request was made. The United 
Kingdom argued that ‘no matter how good’ seismic detection 
methods might be, a ‘completely conclusive proof’ of 
compliance required reliance on on-site inspection. [98] 
Although compulsory on-site inspection was not explicitly 
demanded, it was clear that voluntary inspection was not 
acceptable to Britain.
Supporting the international seismic monitoring system 
suggested by the Scientific Group, the Socialist Group stated 
that, ‘the main structure and recommendations for a seismic 
monitoring network’ were already available and these provided 
‘an appropriate and valuable basis for drawing up detailed 
axrangements’ for establishing an international system of 
seismic data exchange.[99] The Working Group should therefore 
seek to ‘build upon the work done before* rather than immerse 
itself in ‘academic discussions on verification in 
§]?§£r§cto ’ • [100] Unlike the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union maintained that the Scientific 
Group’s system dealt effectively with the question of Level 2 
data.[101] The Socialist Group however agreed that technical 
improvements to the international monitoring system could be
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made when further technological developments took place.[102] 
But they opposed the position adopted by the United States and 
the United Kingdom that detailed arrangements for establishing 
an international network should be considered first and that a 
concrete system should be put in operation and tested out 
before the conclusion of a treaty.[103]
On detection capability, the Socialist Group argued that 
since no fool-proof system would be possible, the verification 
system under consideration should be one which was ‘attainable 
and will provide sufficient assurance that clandestine tests 
will be detected’.[104] While recognising the possibility of 
clandestine tests, they maintained that among the most 
important constraints against violations would be the risk and 
consequently the fear of a violation being detected. Some 
low-yield tests of a few kilotons might escape detection, but 
it would be ’most unlikely that a series of such tests’ would 
go unnoticed.[105] At any rate, they argued, the low-yield 
tests that could be ‘realistically’ carried out would be of 
‘little military value’.[106] A combination of national and 
international means of verification as well as procedures for 
consultation and enquiry would, in their view, adequately 
deter a potential violator. --
The Socialist Group also expressed serious doubts about 
the feasibility of evasion techniques, especially of methods 
that sought to coincide an explosion with an earthquake or 
make an explosion resemble an earthquake. Regarding the 
‘decoupling’ technique[107], they acknowledged that there was 
some scope for conducting low-yield tests, but pointed out 
that the ’possible cratering following an explosion in dry 
alluvium or results of excavation work necessary for creating 
an underground cavity, could be detected by satellites’.[108] 
They also suggested that the ‘decoupling’ method could be made 
even more hazardous by improving detection capability through 
a combination of improved satellite monitoring and additional 
seismic means.[109] The Socialist Group made references to 
statements by Sweden and Canada in support of their contention 
that technical perfection cannot be achieved and that the 
question of adequate verification was ultimately a matter of 
political judgement rather than a question of technical
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sufficiency.[110] The Soviet Union also drew attention to the 
view expressed by two eminent American experts that the 
problem affecting the verification issue was ’overwhelmingly 
political rather than technical and must be recognised as 
such’, [ill] The Socialist Group also opposed the Swedish 
proposal, supported by the United States and the United 
Kingdom, for the expansion of the international monitoring 
system to include the detection of airborne radioactivity. 
The argument being that there was no need for it, since the 
PTBT had functioned satisfactorily.[112]
On the issue of on-site inspection, the Soviet Union 
referred to the understanding reached during the trilateral 
negotiations which had not departed from the principle of 
voluntary inspection. It cited the joint report of 1980 which 
suggested that the agreement concerning verification 
procedures was satisfactory for ensuring compliance. The 
Soviet Union complained that the present demand by the United 
States and the United Kingdom that a request for inspection 
should not be capable of rejection was, in effect, a reversion 
to the principle of compulsory inspection.[113]
The Soviet draft treaty presented to the CD in February 
1983[114] provided for voluntary inspection. A refusal of a 
request for on-site inspection would be accompanied by a 
formal explanation. In the event of refusal, the next step 
for the state seeking on-site inspection would be to approach 
the proposed Committee of Experts to seek further 
clarification of the situation which had given rise to doubts 
about compliance. The Committee of Experts would then 
‘facilitate more extensive international consultations and 
cooperation... in the interests of (ensuring) compliance with 
the provisions of the treaty’. However, the Committee could 
only take decisions on the basis of consensus - that is, the 
Soviet Union would retain the power of veto. An investigation 
of complaint was reserved for the Security Council where, 
again, decisions would depend on the existence of consensus 
among its five permanent members. The Soviet draft treaty, 
however, envisaged special bilateral agreements between states 
to provide additional measures to facilitate the verification 
of compliance.
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The Socialist Group argued that on-site inspection could 
not ‘add much to the capability of the verification 
system’. [115] They made references to a working paper 
submitted earlier to the CCD by Sweden in which the 
proposition was made that on-site inspection could not 
increase the detection capability of the verification system 
because, essentially, it could only help to clarify the nature 
of an event that had already been detected, though not 
adequately identified.[116] However, the Socialist Group’s 
acknowledgement that ‘it is hard to imagine that a country 
would allow inspections in an area where an illicit explosion 
has been conducted’ and that ‘the expected rejection of 
requests for on-site inspection would be their main function’ 
seemed to strengthen the case for obligatory inspection.[117] 
The special arrangements envisaged in the Soviet draft treaty 
of 1983 offers the possibility of on-site inspection by 
challenge on a reciprocal basis. Significantly, special 
arrangements between the nuclear weapon states were conceived 
in terms of providing ‘additional assurance’ and also as a 
’confidence building measure of its own’.[ll8]
The Group of 21’s position, as argued by India at some 
length, was that ’the present means of verification available 
are sufficient to ensure compliance with a treaty on nucleax 
test ban’.[119] Likewise, Pakistan expressed the view that the 
technical problems concerning verification and compliance had 
been resolved and the problem was one of political will.[l20] 
References were made to a statement by the UN Secretary 
General in 1972 that ‘the technical and scientific aspects of 
the problem [of verification] have been fully explored; that 
only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve 
a final agreement [on a CTB treaty]’.[121] India repeatedly 
expressed dismay at the refusal of the United States and the 
United Kingdom to provide a concrete clarification of what was 
meant by their insistence on ‘adequate’ verification. The 
latter’s general response was that the question of adequacy 
was complex and related to a ’host of political and technical 
factors’ was regarded as vague, unsatisfactory and 
insufficient to induce the Group of 21 to be flexible on the 
question of engaging in a detailed discussion on the 
verification issue.[122]
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The Group of 21 opposed the proposal for using 
sophisticated technology in establishing the international 
network, declaring that the use of latest technology was not 
strictly necessary and that in the interest of enabling all 
parties to have equal access to the international exchange of 
data, a widely used technology would be more appropriate.[123] 
The Group of 21 also opposed the proposal for including the 
detection of airborne radioactivity in the envisaged 
international monitoring system. Like the Socialist Group, 
the non-aligned states questioned the need for it, pointing to 
the satisfactory functioning of the PTBT over the past 20 
years. They wanted the Working Group to confine its concern 
to the underground testing of nuclear weapons.[124]
Regarding on-site inspection, the Group of 21 maintained 
that its applicability would be confined mainly to events 
already detected and located by seismological means and that, 
at any rate, clandestine tests could only be of limited value. 
The issue however seemed to be of secondary concern to the 
Group of 21.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
The status of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in a CTB 
was another highly contentious issue. The issue’s importance 
was already evident in the controversy over the question of 
the mandate during the Working Group’s 1982 sessions, when a 
programme of work could not be agreed because of the 
unresolved question of linkage between verification and the 
scope of a CTB.
The Group of 21 took the position that the scope of a 
future treaty on a CTB should be based on the preamble of the 
1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which declares that the Treaty 
is intended to be part of an effort to achieve the 
4discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for 
all time...’.[125] India envisaged current negotiations as a 
continuation of the unfinished effort to achieve a complete 
ban on nuclear weapon tests. It declared that ‘what is 
required now is to extend [the PTBT] prohibition to the 
testing of nuclear weapons underground’[126] and referred to
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the Final Document agreed during SS0D1 which spoke of 
prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.[127]
Brazil, one of the Group of 21’s more outspoken members, 
argued that a ban on PNEs would undermine Article V of the 
NPT, which stipulates that PNEs can serve useful scientific 
and economic purposes and obligates the nuclear weapon state 
paxties to make the potential benefits of PNEs available to 
the non-nuclear weapon state parties on a non-discriminatory 
basis.[128] Brazil argued further that the non-nucleax weapon 
states which are parties to the NPT had already renounced the 
right to conduct their own PNEs or retain the weapon-option. 
A ban on PNEs would entail the denial of their right under the 
NPT to have access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
This would further unbalance the NPT regime in favour of the 
nuclear weapon state parties.[129]
Brazil also pointed out that American and British 
insistence that a CTB should extend to PNEs does not accord 
with the agreement reached during the trilateral negotiations, 
which envisaged separate negotiations for PNEs and sought 
their regulation rather than their prohibition.[130] Reference 
was also made to the 1976 PNE Treaty between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, which does not ban PNEs but provides 
verification procedures to ensure that weapon-tests are not 
surreptitiously conducted under the pretext of PNEs.[l3l] 
Brazil stated that the adoption of the NPT and PNE treaty for 
a CTB approach would mean that the nuclear weapon states would 
be the only ones ‘able to derive military benefits from their 
peaceful nuclear technology’.[132] In general, Brazil 
perceived the inclusion of PNEs in a CTB treaty to be an 
attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to 
preserve the special status of nuclear weapon states, which it 
bitterly called a policy of ‘nuclear apartheid’.[133]
The United Kingdom contended that the preamble of the 
PTBT could not be ’reasonably used as the basis for excluding 
a wider ban’.[134] The goal of the PTBT as set out in Article 
IB was a treaty that provided for the ’permanent banning of 
all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions 
underground...’. [135] As such, the United Kingdom argued, the
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language of the PTBT was ‘at best inconclusiveness’ as it 
alleged other General Assembly resolutions were.[136] Pointing 
to the inconsistent terminology in various documents, the 
United Kingdom maintained that the question of scope should 
therefore be decided on the basis of ’present day needs’.[137] 
Along similar lines, Australia also maintained that both the 
NPT and the 1977 report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group of the 
International Atomic Energy (IAEA) on Nuclear Explosions for 
Peaceful Purposes envisaged a regime that covered not only 
nuclear weapon tests but also ‘other nucleax explosive 
devices’.[138]
On the basis of ‘present day needs’, Britain argued that 
unless PNEs were also prohibited, it would be extremely 
difficult to ensure that a ban on weapon-testing was being 
faithfully observed, since such tests could be conducted in 
the guise of PNEs.[139] Unless PNEs were banned, the technical 
problems of verification would also assume more serious 
proportions. It was even argued that in practice it would be 
impossible ‘to work out a regime for conducting nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes that would preclude 
acquisition of military benefits ’ . [140] Britain also pointed 
to the danger that PNEs would in effect*, be a means by which 
non-nuclear weapon states could acquire a nucleax weapon 
capability.[141] The strongest advocate of including PNEs in a 
CTB was the United States, which argued that ‘no way has been 
discovered to preclude the acquisition of military benefits 
from nuclear explosions, regardless of the label attached to 
the explosion for "peaceful” purposes’.[142] A future test 
ban, the United States stressed, must provide ‘assurance that 
parties to the treaty which had previously tested nuclear 
explosives were not continuing to do so. And, second, 
assurance that parties not known to have carried out nuclear 
explosions in the past do not begin to do so’. [143] The 
American Plowshare Programme for examining the feasibility of 
PNEs for civil uses was abandoned in the early 1970s, after it 
was concluded that PNEs were at best of marginal value. 
According to SIPRI, the United States has not conducted PNEs 
since 1973.[144]
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The United Kingdom would prefer to see PNEs included in 
the main body of a CTB treaty, but would be prepared to accept 
the approach adopted during the trilateral negotiations, which 
left the question of regulation of PNEs to be worked out by 
separate negotiations to be initiated immediately after the 
conclusion of a treaty on weapon-tests. In the meantime, a 
moratorium would be observed on PNEs. The trilateral 
negotiations did not conclusively settle the issue of whether 
PNEs would be banned or regulated. According to the joint 
report issued by the trilateral negotiators in 1980, it was 
agreed that the separate protocol on PNEs would be consistent 
with the PTBT and would take the NPT into account.
The Soviet draft treaty of 1983 made a distinction 
between nuclear weapon tests and PNEs, and reiterated the 
Soviet position advanced during the trilateral negotiations. 
The Soviet proposal envisaged a separate agreement for PNEs 
and sought to regulate them. Once a treaty prohibiting 
weapon-tests was concluded, a moratorium would be declared on 
PNEs, which would last until an agreement setting out 
procedures for conducting PNEs was reached. The Soviet Union 
stated that it attached considerable importance to PNEs. 
Their potential economic benefits ...were declared to be 
significant.[145] The United States and the United Kingdom 
were criticised for adopting a different position on the 
question of PNEs from the one agreed during the trilateral 
negotiations.[146] The Soviet Union regarded the concerns 
expressed about the dangers of PNEs to be of secondary 
importance and even peripheral when compared to the importance 
of banning weapon-tests. [147] It accused the United States of 
attempting to divert attention from the urgency of reaching an 
agreement on weapon-tests, arguing that the question of PNEs 
could be resolved once agreement was reached on the 
prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. [148] The Soviet position 
on the PNEs issue in recent years has been fairly consistent. 
American attitude hardened under the Reagan Administration, 
leading to an impasse between the superpowers on that issue in 
the CD. The declared loss of American interest in a CTB meant 
that the Reagan Administration could adopt an inflexible 
attitude and remain indifferent to the imbroglio.
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The Group of 21’s position on the PNEs issue differed 
somewhat from the approach adopted earlier by the non-aligned 
states in the ENDC and by the non-nuclear weapon states at the 
1968 conference of non-nuclear weapon states on the 
non-proliferation issue. At that time, the non-aligned states 
had agreed to a universal regime to regulate PNEs, even though 
this was to be done only in the event of an agreement on a 
comprehensive test ban treaty, with which the question of PNEs 
was declared to be ‘closely l i n k e d [149] At the 1968 
conference the view was widely supported that PNEs should be 
regulated in close association with a CTB treaty.[150] Indeed, 
the position of most non-nuclear weapon states was that PNEs 
should be regarded as exceptions to a general prohibition of 
all nuclear tests.[151] After a CTB treaty was concluded, a 
separate regime should be negotiated to lay down the 
conditions under which PNEs could be conducted. Although the 
regulation of PNEs was made conditional on the conclusion of a 
CTB treaty, the right of states to freely conduct PNEs was not 
recognised. While stressing the importance of PNEs in terms 
of their potential benefits, the non-nuclear weapon states 
also called for a system of ‘effective international 
safeguards’ and ‘strict international control’ to regulate 
PNEs.[152] For example, for some years since, India continued 
to express its acceptance in principle of a system of 
regulation of PNEs as long as this was done in the context of 
a CTB treaty.[153]
The positions of the United States and Britain on the 
PNEs issue, however, changed little since the subject was 
deliberated in the CCD in the mid-1970s. Apart from the 
question of ‘adequate’ verification, the PNEs issue was 
regarded by both countries to be a ‘crucial’ obstacle to a CTB 
treaty.[154] Although not opposed in principle to 
accommodating PNEs in a comprehensive test ban treaty, the 
conditions placed on the verification system implied that the 
United States envisaged a ban on PNEs. Apart from the 
question of distinguishing PNEs from weapon-tests, the United 
States also sought to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from 
obtaining information of military value from PNEs.[155] The 
United States adopted the position that even if states were 
barred from using instruments for making detailed diagnostic
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measurements, ‘important weapons-related information’ would 
still accrue from PNEs.[156] It was pointed out that the 1976 
bilateral PNE treaty had not resolved the PNEs issue vis-a-vis 
a comprehensive test ban treaty. [157] At the time of 
negotiations on the PNE treaty, the United States had 
reportedly clarified its position that the treaty did not 
reflect a change of policy with regard to the question of PNEs 
by non-nuclear weapon states.[158]
The Soviet Union was consistent in its opposition to a 
ban on PNEs. In the CCD, the Soviet Union had asserted that 
benefits of much significance could be derived from PNEs, 
which constituted 4 one of the new and very promising avenues 
of nuclear energy uses*.[159] Thus, it was argued, a CTB 
treaty ‘must not create obstacles to benefitting from peaceful 
nuclear explosions’.[160] On the question of military 
implications of PNEs, however, there was a tangible relaxation 
of the Soviet position. In the CCD, the Soviet proposal had 
envisaged the NPT regime for all non-nuclear weapon states and 
a special regulatory agreement among nuclear weapon states. 
In the CD however the Soviet Union did not propose following 
the NPT example for non-nuclear weapon states. No distinction 
was made between states. The principle governing PNEs would 
be the same for all parties to a CTB treaty. Unlike the 
United States, the Soviet Union’s interest in PNEs for civil 
purposes did not decline during the 1970s or early 1980s. In 
the mid-1970s, Soviet advances in PNE technology were 
described as ‘largely theoretical’, as yet of limited 
practical application.[161] But the Soviet Union continued 
with its substantial PNE programme, reportedly conducting as 
many as 72 PNEs during the decade upto 1984 - a third or more 
of all its nuclear tests in recent years.[162]
The PNEs issue was partly linked to the unresolved 
controversy about the potential benefits of PNEs. This also 
had the effect of keeping in abeyance the implementation of 
Article V of the NPT. The question of PNEs has been under the 
consideration of the IAEA since the NPT came into effect in 
1970. In 1975, the IAEA presented a report to the first NPT 
review conference, which expressed the view that underground 
PNEs had ‘considerable potential’ for industrial, engineering
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and scientific research purposes.[163] The review conference 
itself, however, could not reach agreement on how the NPT 
should deal with the PNEs issue. Consequently, the IAEA was 
instructed to create an Ad Hoc Advisory Group of Experts to 
examine the question. The Advisory Group submitted its report 
to the United Nations General Assembly in 1977. The report 
expressed the belief that in some respects PNEs could prove to 
be of ‘unique value’ in the course of time.[164] PNEs were 
however believed to be at an early stage of development.[165] 
The Advisory Group found it difficult to draw conclusions 
about the role of future technologies on the basis of 
available data, which was considered inadequate.[166] On the 
question of military implications of PNEs, India and Argentina 
had disagreed with the view of other members of the Advisory 
Group that all PNEs could ‘in some fashion’ be employed as 
weapons.[167] The report was not however intended to be a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject.[168]
The second NPT review conference in 1980 also failed to 
resolve the PNEs issue and asked the IAEA Board of Governors 
to keep the subject under review, as the Board of Governors 
had itself suggested when submitting the Advisory Group’s 
report in 1977. In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly 
established a preparatory committee for the task of organising 
a conference to reach agreement on the question of peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy. The conference was scheduled to take 
place in 1983 but did not materialise. After holding its 
fourth session, the Preparatory Committee concluded that the 
issue of non-proliferation had created a deadlock and it was 
therefore inadvisable to hold such a conference.[169] In the 
Preparatory Committee, the non-nuclear weapon states had 
reiterated the position adopted by the seventh non-aligned 
summit meeting, held in New Delhi in 1983, that 
‘non-proliferation considerations should not be made a pretext 
for preventing states from exercising their sovereign right to 
develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in accordance 
with their national needs and priorities’.[170] The nuclear 
weapon states, on the other hand, emphasised that ‘any 
principle for international cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy... should be universally acceptable in order 
to avoid any sense of insecurity amongst nations... that
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nuclear capabilities might extend beyond the power generation 
needs and the social and technological applications’.[171]
France and China
France and China did not participate in the deliberations 
of the CD’s CTB Working Group. In support of their position, 
both countries began by questioning the importance other 
member-states attached to a CTB. France maintained that a CTB 
would not significantly restrict the ability of the 
superpowers to continue with nuclear arms build-up. It argued 
that the superpowers would be able to make ‘any qualitative 
improvements they might desire without carrying out new tests’ 
in view of the data acquired from the large number of 
weapon-tests already conducted by them.[172] China asserted 
that at the present stage a CTB would have no effect at all on 
the existing or future nuclear arsenals of the 
superpowers.[173] Implicit in the argument of both France and 
China was the suggestion that while a CTB would fail to 
restrain the superpowers, it would present difficulties for 
the lesser nuclear powers. Or rather, France and China 
believed that a CTB would have asymmetrical implications for 
them and the superpowers. They were^interested in a greater 
degree of limitation on the nuclear arsenals of the 
superpowers than on their own.
France adopted the position that for a CTB to be 
significant and acceptable, it must be placed within the 
framework of ‘a process of nuclear disarmament’ or ‘an 
effective disarmament process’.[174] More specifically, France 
expressed its willingness to join a CTB in the event the 
superpowers undertook to reduce their nuclear arsenals to a 
level that would ‘markedly narrow the gap’ in relation to the 
French nuclear force. [175] China also expressed a similar 
view. It emphasised the great disparity in the size of the 
nuclear arsenal between the superpowers and other nuclear 
weapon states. China made its willingness to forego 
weapon-tests conditional on the superpowers accepting the 
prohibition first, and also undertaking other measures to 
reduce their nuclear arsenals.[176] A CTB on its own, in 
China’s view, would have the effect of consolidating the
Page 136
superpowers’ supremacy in nuclear weapons.[177] For the most 
part, China displayed a general lack of interest in the CTB 
issue in the CD. France however supported the move to examine 
the verification issue, stating that its refusal to 
participate in the Working Group did not mean that it 
underestimated ‘the importance of establishing an effective 
and non-discriminatory international verification 
system’.[178] France also expressed scepticism about any 
‘genuine readiness’ by the superpowers to abandon nuclear 
weapon tests. [179]
Although France and China attempted to belittle the 
importance of a CTB, this did not mean that they necessarily 
opposed the idea. They rather believed that a CTB should be 
closely linked to other nuclear disarmament measures or at 
least to a process of substantial nuclear weapons reduction by 
the superpowers. Both countries, it may be mentioned, were 
strongly supportive of proposals for establishing a working 
group in the CD to consider the question of negotiating 
nuclear disarmament measures.
China’s attitude changed considerably in early 1984, when 
the CD was faced with serious procedural difficulties on the 
issue of resuming consideration of the CTB question in a 
subsidiary body. In February 1984, China declared in the CD 
that if such a body were established, it would reconsider its 
policy of non-participation. The change in China’s attitude 
apparently resulted from an overall review of its role in 
multilateral arms control diplomacy and it formed part of a 
general increase of China’s interest in nuclear arms 
control.[180]
The Linkage Issue
The Group of 21 conceived a CTB to be aimed primarily at 
the nuclear weapon states. Horizontal proliferation was 
considered by them to be an almost non-existent problem, 
whereas vertical proliferation was viewed as an increasingly 
ominous phenomenon. The attempt by some nuclear weapons 
states, particularly the United States, to maximise horizontal 
non-proliferation objectives through a CTB, beyond what had
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already been achieved under the NPT, was viewed by the Group 
of 21 as a distortion of the purposes of a CTB. A CTB was 
linked to the formal pledge made by the nuclear weapon states 
in the PTBT to extend the ban on their weapon-tests to 
underground explosions. The question of underground 
explosions could not be resolved in 1963 after protracted CTB 
negotiations had reached a deadlock over the verification 
issue. Equally important, the pledge to work towards a CTB 
incorporated in the PTBT was also regarded as an obligation 
assumed under the NPT, as part of the balance of 
responsibilities between non-nuclear and nuclear weapon 
states. In relation to the NPT, the issue of linkage has 
existed since the time the nuclear non-proliferation question 
was being negotiated in the ENDC. Linkage has figured 
prominently in the non-proliferation controversy at the NPT 
review conferences.
The question of an ‘acceptable balance of mutual 
responsibilities and obligations’ had been emphasised by the 
Group of 8[l8l], representing the non-aligned states, during 
the NPT negotiations in the ENDC. A CTB was one of several 
measures the nuclear weapon states were expected to take in 
reciprocity for the renunciation of the.weapon-option by the 
non-nuclear weapon states. [182] Following the conclusion of 
the NPT and the General Assembly’s approval of it, the 
non-nuclear weapon states held a major conference in 1968 on 
the non-proliferation issue. The conference reaffirmed a 
direct link between horizontal and vertical proliferation 
efforts. In a resolution sponsored by 21 countries, the 
conference had called upon the nuclear weapon states to begin 
CTB as well as other nuclear arms control negotiations 
immediately.[183] A resolution devoted to horizontal 
non-proliferation, sponsored by Pakistan, which urged all 
non-nuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards, enjoyed 
the least support among all the resolutions adopted by the 
conference, while the ones urging vertical non-proliferation 
drew the strongest support.[184]
The final declaration of the first NPT review conference 
held in September 1975 expressed ‘serious concern’ over the 
continuation of the nuclear arms race.[185] It called for the
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‘early and effective’ implementation of Article V of the NPT. 
A CTB was declared to be ‘one of the most important measures’ 
the nuclear weapon states were expected to take to contain 
their nuclear arms race.[186] Anxious that a CTB treaty should 
be concluded as soon as possible, many non-nuclear weapon 
states proposed that a treaty of limited duration could be 
sought as an immediate first step.[187] The review conference 
was preceded as well as followed by General Assembly 
resolutions urging the nuclear weapon states to undertake CTB 
negotiations in the CCD as a top priority item in the 
agenda.[188]
At the second NPT review conference held in September 
1980, most non-nuclear weapon states strongly objected to the 
view of the nuclear weapon states that the latter been 
faithfully discharging their obligations under the Article VI 
of the NPT on nuclear disarmament measures.[189] The 
non-nuclear weapon states asserted that not only had the arms 
race intensified but also that an alarming trend had emerged 
towards the development of nuclear weapons and doctrines 
suitable for wax-fighting purposes.[190] They also expressed 
displeasure with the pace of the trilateral CTB negotiations 
and called upon the negotiating parties, to.begin multilateral 
negotiations in the CD with the aim of concluding a treaty at 
the earliest possible date.[l9l] The non-nuclear weapon states 
also proposed that the nuclear weapon states should, in the 
meantime, observe a moratorium on weapon-tests.[192]
Acceptance by the United States of the NPT’s linkage with 
a CTB would have contradicted the Reagan Administration’s 
declared lack of interest in CTB negotiations in the CD and 
its imminent suspension of trilateral negotiations. The 
non-nuclear weapon states projected their views more 
forcefully on the issue of linkage than at the first review 
conference. Indeed, even the final document that emerged out 
of the first review conference was seen as a ‘bland 
compromise’ because differences and emergent tensions were 
barely concealed by superficial generalities.[193]
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By suggesting that a CTB was not necessarily significant 
even as a long-term goal,[194] the Reagan Administration had 
made a major departure from official policy under previous 
administrations since 1958. The international consensus on 
CTB’s link with the PTBT and the NPT thus virtually ceased to 
exist. It is true that American CTB policy had already begun 
to change towards the end of the Carter Administration. But 
the change under the Reagan Administration had a more 
fundamental bearing on the issue of linkage.
President Reagan acknowledged that the nuclear weapon 
states were obligated under the NPT to pursue nuclear 
disarmament measures in good faith.[195] However, the 
non-nuclear weapon states understood those measures to include 
a CTB. Thus, the CTB’s relegation by the Reagan 
Administration from a priority objective to a long-term goal 
was perceived by the non-nuclear weapon states to be a breach 
of the balance of obligations and responsibilities assumed 
under the NPT. The United States did not agree. It argued 
that the PTBT did not obligate the nuclear weapon state 
parties to engage in ‘continuous negotiations’ but only to 
seek a CTB through a ‘process of negotiations’.[196] Apart 
from the weak commitment reflected iiL^the reference to a 
‘process of negotiations’, the question of linkage suffered 
more from the characterisation of a CTB as a long-term goal. 
It may be recalled that the PTBT emerged out of negotiations 
that were intended to achieve a CTB. The PTBT recognises its 
own ‘incompleteness’ and appears to express a sense of urgency 
about achieving its principal aim of a CTB.
Brazil was particularly vehement in contesting that the 
continued testing of nuclear weapons is ‘legally incompatible’ 
with the obligation undertaken by the original parties to the 
PTBT to achieve a total ban.[197] It argued that regardless of 
changes in perception about national security interests, 
‘compliance with obligations assumed in a binding juridical 
instrument is quite another matter, since it involves the 
effectiveness of the international instrument itself and the 
credibility of the international legal framework as a 
whole’.[198] Brazil also contended that the reduction of a CTB 
to a long-term goal by the United States had altered the
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situation to the extent that ‘all parties to (the PTBT) are 
entitled to enquire about the respect for its provisions and 
about the status of the Treaty’. [199]
CTB Debate in the United States
Quite apart from the question of feasibility, some 
opponents have objected to the desirability of a CTB on the 
ground that it would prevent the modernisation of nuclear 
weapons, which they believe to be necessary for national 
security.[200] A test ban would, for example, forestall the 
development of one class of ABM weapons, which include the 
nuclear-pumped laser.[201] Under a CTB, the testing of nuclear 
explosion effects on the performance and survivability of 
weapon-systems would not be possible and this would be a 
significant loss.[202] Others object that a CTB would preclude 
options that could prove to be important for national security 
in the uncertain future.[203] Finally a strong argument is 
made for the necessity of reliability testing, which is said 
to be more important for the United States than the Soviet 
Union.
The issue of verification has been,.a „subject of heated 
controversy in the United States for many years - indeed, from 
the beginning of test ban negotiations in the late 1950s. 
Technical experts as well as arms control specialists remain 
sharply divided over whether a CTB can be adequately verified 
and even whether a CTB is to be considered worthwhile from the 
standpoint of American national security interests. The 
controversy is by no means an easy one to follow and reflects 
not only the complex nature of technical issues but also 
different political attitudes and preoccupations.
CTB opponents maintain that verification is not feasible 
for nuclear explosions of low-yield - that is, below 3 to 5 
kilotons.[204] It has been said that seismic methods of 
detection would not be able to distinguish a low-yield 
explosion from a large number of other seismic events of 
uncertain origin with which a low-yield explosion would get 
mixed. Thus, it would be particularly difficult to ‘pick out 
one of those events and claim a violation’.[205] The problem
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of detection would become more complicated if explosions of 
higher yield produced seismic signals of reduced intensity 
and, as in the case of low-yield explosions, they got mixed 
with a large number of an events of ambiguous nature.[206]
Particular concern has been expressed about the detection 
of tests carried out by evasion techniques. The testing of 
weapons in large underground cavities would considerably 
reduce the seismic signals emitted by such explosions. This 
could be one way of hiding explosions behind a large number of 
small seismic events of ambiguous nature. Even the 
emplacement of sophisticated seismic instruments on national 
territories, it is maintained, would fail to make a 
significant difference to detection capability at the 
low-yield range.[207] Such instruments, according to this 
view, would also figure prominently in the detection of 
explosions of higher yield. It has also been asserted that 
the inability to detect and identify low-yield explosions, 
including those which would be recorded at a much lower level 
of yield than their actual intensity, would diminish the 
utility of on-site inspections, since such inspections could 
only be brought to bear on events which can be located by 
seismic methods.[208] On-site inspections could only help to 
clarify the nature of an event which has been detected but 
remains to be clearly identified. Concern about the
possibility of clandestine tests also derives from the 
perception that it would work to the Soviet Union’s advantage 
because of the ‘closed’ nature of Soviet society and, further, 
that the advantage accruing to the Soviet Union would have 
significant strategic implications for the United States.[209] 
The limited value accorded to the role of ‘black boxes’ is not 
shared by all CTB opponents. Some of them have conceded that 
‘black boxes’ can greatly improve detection capability down to 
explosions of one kiloton yield.[210] However, tests at this 
level or below are still regarded as militarily significant.
CTB proponents generally maintain that the detection of 
low-yield tests is not a serious problem. They believe that 
‘any militarily significant explosion can be distinguished 
from a natural seismic event’.[211] The use of ‘black boxes’ 
would extend detection-capability to explosions of very low
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yield. [212] Proponents axgue further that just the risk of 
detection of clandestine tests, regardless of the military 
value of a test, would constitute a major deterrent. A 
detected breach would carry serious political costs. 
Moreover, parties to a test ban treaty would have to contend 
with the strong possibility that a refusal to permit on-site 
inspection in the event of a serious suspicion of breach would 
lead to the treaty’s abrogation.[213] To the party looking for 
violations, a 90 percent probability of detection would seem 
inadequate, but to the party contemplating a clandestine test, 
a 10 percent probability of being found out would appear very 
risky. It has even been argued that adequate verification is 
possible without necessarily including a provision for 
compulsory on-site inspections.[214] Regarding clandestine 
tests by evasion techniques, proponents maintain that tests in 
large underground cavities would be ‘technically difficult, 
very costly, and still quite vulnerable to detection and 
identification’.[215] They point out that the evasion 
technique involving the use of underground cavities would 
require large-scale excavation work easily observable to 
satellites.[216] The danger of venting following an 
underground explosion would also exist and would be detectable 
by radiation monitoring equipment., outside the Soviet 
territory. Some proponents have asserted that a CTB could be 
monitored with ‘high reliability even if extreme measures were 
taken to evade detection[217] Typically, the advocates have 
argued that there would be ‘a fairly high probability of 
detecting [and identifying] any significant Soviet 
cheating’.[218]
More serious than the issue of adequate verification has 
been the criticism that a CTB would undermine the reliability 
of weapon-stockpiles. A related concern has been that the 
maintenance of the stockpile requires experts who will not be 
able to retain their proficiency ‘without an R&D program that 
includes full-scale testing’. [219] Scientists and engineers 
responsible for the upkeep of the weapon-stockpile need to 
engage in experiments, including tests, because 
weapon-maintenance requires a theoretical-cum-experimental R&D 
programme. For practical reasons, they also need experiments 
to ‘sharpen their professional skill’.[220] Apart from the
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loss of competence, a CTB would also lead to the reduction of 
highly specialised scientific manpower, and this has been 
regarded as the ‘largest potential cost to the United States’ 
of a CTB.[221] In particular, in the event other parties 
decided to ‘break-out’ of a CTB, considerable time could be 
required to reconstitute scientific and technological assets; 
the lag in making adjustments could thus pose a threat to 
national security. Such CTB opponents maintain that the 
Soviet Union would not suffer from similar dislocation because 
the government, enjoying authoritarian power, could easily 
prevent it from happening.
While conceding that weapons have rarely been 
proof-tested for reliability, CTB opponents argue that 
weapon-tests conducted for other purposes in the past ’also 
confirmed the performance of those weapons or 
components’.[222] The concern however is not apparently with 
proof-testing, which would involve high-yield explosions, but 
rather with the perceived need to test the low-yield fission 
trigger of thermonuclear weapons, which is believed to degrade 
over time.[223] CTB opponents concede that a considerable 
amount of data has accumulated over the years about the 
performance of existing weapons, but argue that this knowledge 
would not be applicable to the new types of weapons being 
developed for planned deployment in the near future.[224]
CTB opponents further argue that in order to maintain 
weapons without reliability testing, a protracted research 
effort would be necessary with little assurance that 
alternative ways could be found to resolve the problem of 
weapon-reliability. [225] Other reasons for the need to test 
weapons are changes in the design of weapons or components 
introduced to fit new delivery systems or to provide for their 
enhanced safety. Occasional repair and replacement of 
components may also require tests to confirm the continued 
reliability of such weapons. Opponents maintain that 
identical spare-parts are very difficult to manufacture. 
Sophisticated calculations and non-nuclear laboratory tests 
are considered inadequate, since they cannot provide the 
‘guarantee’ that weapons are safe and will perform as 
expected.[226] Reference has often been made to the suspension
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of weapon-tests during the 1958-1961 period, when problems 
arose with the performance of the Polaris Al warhead.[227] 
Opponents have also referred to some other cases in the 1960s 
to bolster their argument that ensuring weapon-reliability 
would be a problem under a test ban.[228]
On the assumption that the weapon-stockpile would degrade 
under a CTB, opponents have argued their case on other related 
grounds. They maintain that declining confidence in 
weapon-reliability would weaken the nuclear deterrent. With 
its deterrent undermined, the United States would not be able 
to offer ‘credible’ security assurances to other countries. 
Such assurances axe considered to be ‘in the last analysis, 
the most important alternatives to proliferation’.[229] In 
this regard, particular reference has been made to the role of 
the ’nuclear umbrella’ provided by the United States to its 
NATO allies. The ‘nuclear umbrella’, it has been argued, is 
based on the ‘high reliability’ of the nuclear weapon 
stockpile.[230] Concern has also been expressed that a 
weakening of the nuclear deterrent would increase the 
importance of the conventional weapons balance, in which the 
United States is said to be inferior to the Soviet Union.[231] 
Finally, opponents maintain that a CTB would increase the arms 
race rather than slow it down. They argue that under a CTB 
both sides would be induced to enlarge their weapon stockpile 
as a hedge against the possibility that some weapons might 
fail in the event of use.[232]
CTB proponents question the concern over 
weapon-reliability. They refer to the joint statement issued 
by three eminent scientists, including one of the former 
directors of the Los Alomos Weapons Laboratory, to the effect 
that the weapon-stockpile could be kept reliable for as long 
as necessary.[233] Proponents maintain that nuclear explosive 
devices of previously tested design could be used and 
spare-parts identical to original specifications could be 
manufactured for replacement purposes. [234] Even if minor 
modifications became unavoidable, these could be accomplished 
if done with professional care. It has also been argued that 
many different types of nuclear weapons have been thoroughly 
tested in the past and that the existing stockpile consists of
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a wide variety of such weapons.[235] As such, the argument 
goes, the weapon-stockpile would not degrade uniformly and 
thus the deterioration of the stockpile as a whole would not 
be rapid. Moreover, any such deterioration which did take 
place would affect both sides, giving advantage to neither.
Other CTB advocates maintain that the difficulties 
associated with weapon-reliability are likely to arise in ‘the 
long term - if at all’.[236] Moreover, some decline of 
confidence in the reliability of weapons, it is further 
argued, could be regarded as desirable, because it would make 
it more hazardous to use nuclear weapons for pre-emptive 
purposes, for which a high level of confidence in 
weapon-reliability would be necessary.[237] Proponents have 
also strongly criticised the conclusions drawn by opponents 
from the case of Polaris A1 warhead[238], which the latter 
tended to regard as the most significant of the cases cited in 
support of their contention. Proponents maintain that a 
positive effect of a CTB would be to severely inhibit the 
qualitative aspect of the nuclear arms race. They have also 
stressed the significance of a CTB in the effort to prevent 
horizontal proliferation.
Suggestions have been made for a new (lower) threshold 
test ban in order to accommodate some of the objections of 
opponents and some of the concerns of proponents. On balance 
these suggestions have inclined more towards meeting the 
objections raised by opponents, who have enjoyed fax more 
influence over policy, particularly in recent years during the 
Reagan period.
Proposals have been made for a test ban threshold that 
would enable tests for weapon-reliability purposes. An 
appropriate upper limit, according to one suggestion, should 
be 30 kilotons, at which natural seismic events with which 
clandestine tests could get mixed, would be reduced to a small 
number for the purpose of identification. [239] No limit has 
been proposed on the number of permissible tests below the 30 
kiloton threshold. According to the same suggestion, the 
threshold in any case should not be less than 10 kilotons, 
because at lower levels there would be an unmanageably high
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number of ambiguous events. Evasion would still be possible, 
but it would be sufficiently difficult to ensure that 
clandestine tests would be quite rare.[240] Moreover, at least 
in theory, the balance of risk would be ‘symmetrical’ for the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Such a test ban, it is 
further suggested, should be made conditional on agreements 
between the superpowers to reduce the size of nuclear and 
conventional forces. Alternatively, weapon-tests could be 
phased out over a period of time. In the meantime, stores 
could be accumulated to prolong the reliability of the 
weapon-stockpile after tests had been completely phased out. 
Or, a threshold ban could be combined with quota restrictions 
on weapon-tests, but these are perceived to pose verification 
difficulties.[24l]
Another proposal has been to keep a threshold ban at 20 
kilotons, which is considered adequate for ensuring 
weapon-reliability.[242] This level has been recommended 
because while high enough for weapon-reliability purposes, it 
would also ‘inhibit severely the development of new [weapon] 
designs’.[243] Such a threshold ban should be accompanied by 
restrictions on the number of permissible tests. The number 
should be neither too high to encourage weapon-development nor 
too low to leave the problem of weapon-reliability unresolved. 
The optimum number of tests could be two or three on an annual 
basis. The possibility of abuse of permissible tests for 
weapon-development purposes would exist but there would be 
several constraints. Apart from the fear of detection, there 
would be the risk of endangering weapon-reliability, because 
of the small number of tests permitted. A treaty along these 
lines could be revised later to lower the threshold, provided 
technical difficulties could be satisfactorily resolved. For 
this purpose, there could be a provision in the treaty for 
making periodic reviews of the situation. In order not to 
‘legitimise’ weapon-tests by non-nuclear weapon states, it has 
been suggested that such states should be simply excluded from 
a threshold ban.[244]
CTB advocates admit that a threshold ban’s achievements 
would be quite modest. First, such a ban would permit the 
development of smaller nuclear weapons which could be freely
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tested. And, second, the problem of proliferation, especially 
the horizontal aspect, would remain fundamentally unaffected. 
However, there would be some positive effect on the 
non-proliferation issue, in the sense that the major powers 
would be seen to be attempting to meet the ‘restraints 
required of them by the NPT’.[245] In any case, advocates 
maintain, a threshold ban would be ‘a far cry from the present 
state of a f f a i r s [246] It would significantly stabilise the 
strategic relationship between the major powers by inhibiting 
the further development of strategic nuclear weapons and it 
could be seen as a confidence-building measure.[247]
Horizontal non-proliferation has been a significant 
concern of proponents and critics who are not in principle 
opposed to a test ban. Indeed, it has even been argued that, 
despite some adverse effect on weapon-reliability as well as 
other costs, a test ban still deserved support provided it 
encompassed the non-nuclear weapon states, especially the 
major ones.[248] Non-proliferation, according to this view, 
should be regarded as the overriding objective of a CTB.[249] 
If a CTB failed to have the intended effect on the non-nuclear 
weapon states, then on those grounds alone and on the basis of 
a special ‘escape clause’ the nuclear weapon states should be 
able to withdraw from the treaty.[250]
Recent American and Soviet Attitudes
The assumption of office by President Carter brought a 
marked revival of interest in nuclear test ban negotiations. 
A nuclear test ban was placed second, after SALT II, in the 
arms control priorities of the Carter Administration.[251] 
Negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and 
the United Kingdom were started in July 1977 and some tangible 
progress had been made by the time these negotiations were 
suspended by the United States. However, despite the optimism 
and earnestness expressed in the 1980 trilateral report, the 
United States informed the CD that the Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan had seriously upset the arms 
control process, including the work of the CD as a whole.[252] 
Indeed, the Carter Administration’s policy had begun to change 
even before the Afghanistan crisis, due to domestic pressure
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from CTB opponents and especially the Senate’s critical 
attitude. The chief of the American team in the trilateral 
negotiations reportedly claimed that the negotiations could 
have been successfully concluded ‘any time after late 1979’, 
but that the negotiating parties had lost their 
enthusiasm.[253]
President Carter began with a determined bid to pursue 
CTB negotiations. He sought a ban on all but laboratory 
tests. In an attempt to placate his opponents, he 
subsequently agreed to restrict the ban to a five year period. 
He also agreed to special safeguards to ensure 
weapon-reliability during the ban and to a resumption of 
full-scale testing after the ban ended.[254] The duration of 
the ban was further reduced to three years. Opponents however 
continued to lobby against a CTB and eventually prevailed in 
the hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 
Sharply critical of the Administration’s policy, the Senate’s 
Subcommittee decided that a ban should provide for a threshold 
of upto 10 kilotons for tests to cover both strategic and 
tactical nuclear weapons. Equally important, the 
Administration was informed that it should not reach any 
agreement with the Soviet Union until the controversial matter 
of ratification of the SALT II agreement had been 
settled.[255] President Carter’s efforts to promote test ban 
negotiations were also plagued by a resurgence of opposition 
to the TTBT from those who made allegations of Soviet breach 
of the 150 kiloton limit.[256]
The American CTB policy went through a major change under 
the Reagan Administration. After a year’s review of policy, 
the Administration declared that ‘under the present 
circumstances a CTB would not help to reduce the threat of 
nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear 
balance’.[257] The ‘expansionist policy’ and the 
4 extraordinary military build-up’ of the Soviet Union, it 
claimed, had ‘eclipsed’ the value of arms control[258], and 
also that a CTB would weaken the credibility of the American 
nuclear deterrent.[259] The trilateral negotiations were 
formally abandoned in July 1982. The Reagan Administration 
embarked on a stepped up programme of weapon-tests, with plans
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to produce a large number of new nuclear weapons. A nuclear 
weapon test was time, perhaps deliberately, to coincide with 
the 37th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima in August 
1945.[260]
An official study reportedly completed in 1982 had 
recommended the expansion of facilities for nuclear weapon 
testing, partly to accommodate additional testing in 
connection with President Reagan’s SDI programme. The study 
envisaged ‘approximately 30’ underground explosions in 1985 
and the need for establishing a new location because existing 
locations had ‘run out of space’.[261] Similarly, as part of 
the preparation for the planned increase of nuclear weapon 
tests, the Department of Energy proposed in 1984 ‘a $57 
million complex to house major assembly and storage facilities 
at the Nevada test site’.[262] In addition, the administration 
had already begun work since 1981 to set-up ‘a $39 million 
simulation technology laboratory [to] give scientists the 
capability to create in a lab radiation effects such as those 
in a real explosion’.[263]
The Reagan Administration expressed deep suspicion of 
Soviet breaches of the unratified TTBT, in addition to making 
continued allegations of Soviet violations of the SALT II 
agreement, also unratified. President Reagan charged that 
‘numerous violations’ had occurred.[264] He curiously argued 
that if the verification procedures had been ‘adequate’, his 
allegations would have been proved right.[265] However, in the 
opinion of various experts, the evidence did not necessarily 
imply that the Soviet Union had violated the 150 kiloton 
limit. The Director of Verification Programs at the Livermore 
Laboratory, (one of the two principal nuclear weapons reseaxch 
centres in the United States), declared that some Soviet tests 
which may appear to have exceeded the limit would fall within 
the ‘margin of uncertainty inherent in the use of seismic 
methods to determine explosive yields’.[266] Allegations of 
Soviet breaches were more strongly challenged by some other 
eminent experts on technical grounds. For instance, an 
official of the Defense Advanced Reseaxch Projects Agency 
pointed out that the measuring criteria used in the case of 
suspected Soviet tests, also showed ‘violations for some of
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our own shots’.[267] At least partly, the problem seems to 
have been the absence of valuable geological information about 
the characteristics of Soviet test-sites. Ratification of the 
TTBT would have made it obligatory on the Soviet Union to 
provide geological information as well as additional 
information to help clarify tests of uncertain magnitude. 
However, those deeply suspicious of the Soviet Union 
questioned the reliability of the information the Soviet Union 
would have provided under the terms of the treaty, if it had 
been ratified.[268] Thus, they argued that the treaty should 
be revised to include on-site inspection.
Off-site seismic methods of detection were considered 
inadequate by the Reagan Administration, which made its 
acceptance of the TTBT conditional on Soviet willingness to 
include on-site inspection in the verification protocol to the 
treaty.[269] The Reagan Administration also indicated that it 
wished to keep its option open for weapon-tests above the 150 
kiloton limit in case the Soviet Union further strengthened 
its ABM system.[270] The Soviet Union bluntly refused to 
renegotiate the TTBT and instead called upon the Reagan 
Administration to resume CTB negotiations. By contrast, when 
faced with opposition over the ratification of the 1974 
treaty, the Carter Administration had sought Soviet consent to 
the emplacement of special seismic monitoring instruments in 
each other’s territory - a proposition the Soviet Union would 
only accept in relation to a CTB.[271]
Recent years witnessed a revival of Soviet interest in a 
CTB and improvements in Soviet attitude towards specific 
issues. The 1975 Soviet draft treaty[272] marked the 
beginning of an important change in Soviet position on 
verification procedures. The long-standing insistence that 
verification should depend on national technical means alone 
was abandoned. The need for an international seismic 
monitoring system, which the Soviet Union had previously 
maintained should function on a voluntary basis, was 
accepted. [273] Similarly, the need for consultation, enquiry 
and complaint procedures was also accepted. Further 
improvement followed in the 1977 draft treaty[274] and during 
the trilateral negotiations. The Soviet Union agreed to the
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emplacement of special seismic instruments in its territory 
and to the idea of a treaty with limited duration, as proposed 
by the United States. The Soviet Union also withdrew its 
earlier demand that a test ban should include France and 
China. Indeed, changes in Soviet attitude encouraged the 
Carter Administration to believe that the ‘elusive goal of a 
comprehensive test ban at last appeared to be n e a r [275] 
Although compulsory on-site inspection continued to be 
rejected, the Soviet Union accepted the general principle of 
on-site inspection and evidently moderated its approach to 
that issue.[276] The 1983 Soviet draft treaty brought another 
noticeable concession. It spoke of special agreements aimed 
at bolstering the verification and compliance procedures 
provided in the treaty.[277]
Interestingly, the Soviet Union did not consider its 
draft treaty to be a final statement of its position. The 
Soviet Union had also indicated its wilingness to consider 
proposals by other member-states and had emphasised that in 
the event of the Working Group being given the mandate to work 
towards a treaty, it would ‘display a constructive 
approach’.[278]
A change of Soviet attitude also occurred on the PNEs 
issue. Opposition to control over PNEs was abandoned in the 
1976 PNE treaty. Indeed, the Soviet Union agreed in that 
treaty to compulsory on-site inspections for verifying 
compliance with the limit on group explosions. The 
verification provisions of the PNE treaty were hailed by the 
Carter Administration to be the ‘most detailed ever set out in 
any arms control agreement’.[279] The change in Soviet 
attitude also appeared to cover the question of PNEs by 
non-nuclear weapon states. The earlier Soviet position that 
PNEs should be reserved for the nuclear weapon states, as 
under the NPT[280], gave way to a regulatory system envisaged 
for all states in the context of a CTB. However, the Soviet 
Union continued to consider the potential benefits of PNEs to 
be important. Indeed, its position apparently 
strengthened.[281]
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While American interest in a CTB declined sharply in 
recent years, Soviet interest seemed to grow. The Soviet 
Union declared the trilateral negotiations to be of ’great 
significance[282] Until formally abandoned by the United 
States, the Soviet Union had been urging the immediate 
resumption of the trilateral negotiations. Similarly, the 
Soviet Union joined the Group of 21 in feverish efforts to 
start multilateral negotiations in the CD, both before and 
after the suspension of trilateral negotiations. The 
prohibition of underground tests was regarded by the Soviet 
Union as a matter of ’extraordinary importance’[283] that 
deserved the ‘speediest possible conclusion of a treaty’.[284] 
Because of evident loss of American interest in a CTB, Soviet 
enthusiasm could be seen in terms of political gamesmanship. 
But it was probably more than that. After all, through a CTB 
the Soviet Union could seek to impede the Reagan 
Administration’s defence modernisation programme or attempt to 
draw some domestic and international support away from the 
American defence build-up and towards a CTB which the United 
States had put in abeyance, perhaps for at least a decade.
Assessment
In the late 1950s, when the negotiations first began, 
Soviet and American attitudes stood in sharp contradiction. 
In the early 1960s, the gap narrowed but could not be bridged. 
After the collapse of CTB negotiations in early 1963, and 
despite the signing of the PTBT, Soviet attitude hardened 
considerably and remained so for over a decade; American 
attitude that a CTB was not feasible because of verification 
difficulties did not change either during this period. In the 
mid-1970s, the attitudes of both countries began to moderate. 
Subsequently, with the distinct change of American attitude 
under the Carter Administration, a general agreement was 
reached on the verification issue. This was partly because of 
President Carter’s partial break with traditional American 
insistence on compulsory on-site inspection procedures.
Under the Reagan Administration, however, the policy 
change introduced by President Carter was reversed. Official 
policy appeared to be even more stringent on the verification
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issue than that of preceding administrations. Opposition to 
an early reconsideration of the CTB question because of the 
priority given to defence modernisation, reinforced the 
Administration’s position on verification. Its attitude would 
very likely have been rigorous in any event, in view of its 
reaction to Soviet compliance behaviour and its attitude 
towards verification in general. During this period, the 
Soviet attitude retained some measure of flexibility that had 
been displayed shortly before and during the Carter period. 
The cleavage that had narrowed considerably during the Carter 
Administration, widened once again and quite significantly 
under the Reagan Administration - this time not because of a 
reversion to inflexibility in Soviet attitude, as witnessed 
during the 1963-1975 period, but because of an unprecedented 
hardening of American attitude and approach.
Over the past three decades the pattern has also varied 
from the stand point of initiatives taken by the superpowers 
and the interest apparently displayed by them in reviving CTB 
negotiations. Soviet initiative led to the first series of 
negotiations in the late 1950s. The rapid decline of Soviet 
interest in 1961 was followed by American and British 
initiatives until negotiations turned towards the less 
ambitious objective of a PTBT. After the PTBT, attention 
focused on NPT and strategic arms limitation negotiations. 
During this period, initiatives were taken by non-aligned 
states in the ENDC and the CCD, while the superpowers 
continued to adhere to their irreconcilable positions on the 
verification issue. Expressions of Soviet interest in CTB 
negotiations in 1974 and in 1975 were followed in early 1977 
by moves on both sides to revive negotiations, the United 
States making a major effort in this respect. After the 
suspension of the trilateral negotiations, initiatives 
continued to be taken by the Soviet Union and, as in the past, 
by the non-aligned states.
Superpower relations on the CTB question suggest an 
interesting pattern of power-politics, which could be 
summarised in the following manner. In the 1950s, faced with 
a substantial American nuclear lead, Soviet interest in a CTB 
reflected its desire to restrain the United States or freeze
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the American advantage. In the 1960s, following the Cuban 
missile crisis, Soviet interest in a CTB was at best minimal 
as it sought to catch up and nullify the American nuclear lead 
at all costs. In the 1970s, the increased interest of both 
countries in a CTB reflected the emergence of detente, nuclear 
parity, and the perception that establishing a meaningful lead 
would be difficult. In the 1980s, American interest in a CTB 
declined sharply, as it was concluded that the United States 
had fallen behind the Soviet Union and needed to engage in a 
major modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. Soviet interest 
in a CTB increased because it offered a way to restrain 
American defence efforts and preserve the prevailing nuclear 
balance.
A central feature of American CTB policy has been its 
emphasis on ‘adequate verification’. The Reagan 
Administration considered verification to be ‘one area in 
particular’ where much progress was needed.[285] It attempted 
to draw the CD into a detailed technical examination of that 
issue. The United States was agreeable to establishing a 
working group, provided it would devote itself exclusively or 
primarily to the verification issue. The term 4 adequate 
verification’ continued to lack clarity and definition. The 
degree of detection that would be considered adequate remained 
unclear. When pressed by the Group of 21, the United States 
argued that the concept was complex and dependent on ‘a whole 
host of political and technical factors’.[286]
The demand for ‘adequate verification’ had characterised 
American policy in the past. For example, in its 1973 report, 
the United States Foreign Relations Committee pointed out that 
no clear definition of ‘adequate verification’ could be 
obtained from government representatives during hearings on 
the CTB question. [287] A general definition offered at the 
time was that a system of verification should ‘reduce to an 
acceptable level the risk that clandestine test programs of 
military significance could be conducted under a CTB’. [288] 
The United States maintained that ‘adequate verification’ 
could not be defined in ‘simple numerical terms’ because it 
involved weighing the risks of violation against the means 
available for deterring and detecting them.[289] The
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requirement that the risk of violation should be ‘acceptable’ 
however, barely improved upon the demand that verification 
should be ‘adequate’. Indeed, the absence of concrete 
criteria and the continued stress on the need for adequate 
verification prompted the assertion by an influential observer 
that ‘the standard phrase "adequately verified" is in the 
nature of a somewhat fraudulent umbrella that serves to 
protect the administration - which ever one is current - from 
the necessity of facing some hard issues and choices’.[290]
More important than the conceptual issue was the question 
of linkage. While singling out verification for consideration 
by the CD, the United States was not clear about the purpose 
of such an exercise. No link between progress on the 
verification issue and the resumption of CTB negotiations was 
acknowledged. This had a significant bearing on the 
reluctance of the Group of 21 and the Socialist Group to 
discuss the verification issue in any depth. In other words, 
while the United States sought progress on the verification 
issue in the CD, its refusal to accept a link with follow-up 
negotiations had the predictable effect of ensuring that 
little progress would actually be made in the CD.
The Soviet attitude towards verification, in the context 
of a CTB, does not apparently pose insuperable problems. As 
mentioned earlier, the 1983 Soviet draft treaty did not 
provide for compulsory on-site inspection, but the principle 
of on-site inspection as well as procedures for consultation 
and enquiry were accepted and, more importantly, there was a a 
potentially significant provision for special bilateral 
agreements.
Also encouraging were declaratory statements by the 
Soviet Union on the CTB issue. It is however unlikely that 
the Soviet Union or the Group of 21 will display flexibility 
on the verification issue as long as no clear link is 
established between progress on that issue and follow-up 
negotiations. In other words, progress cannot be expected to 
be made on the verification issue outside the framework of 
negotiations. At the present time, therefore, progress seems 
to depend on a change of American policy.
Page 156
American attitude towards the question of on-site 
inspection has fluctuated over the years. The Eisenhower 
Administration sought a large number of on-site inspections. 
During the Kennedy Administration, the demand was reduced 
after agreement was reached to use special seismic monitoring 
instruments known as ‘black boxes’. The demand for some 
compulsory on-site inspections continued to be made until the 
trilateral negotiations were revived by the Carter 
Administration. During the election campaign in 1976, 
President Carter had asserted that advances in detection 
technology had made it possible to do without on-site 
inspections.[291] The Carter Administration had agreed to the 
principle of inspection by consent, although it would most 
likely have sought assurances that requests for inspection 
would not be invariably turned down. It is possible that the 
change in American attitude was facilitated by the fact that 
the treaty under negotiations was for a limited duration. It 
is of some interest in this context to recall that the 
Senate’s 1973 report, following extensive hearings on the CTB 
issue. Urging the Nixon Administration to revive CTB 
negotiations, the Senate had taken the view that advances in 
verification methods had rendered on-site inspection 
dispensable.[292]
A hardening of American attitude under the Reagan 
Administration - that is, a return to a more conservative 
stance - once again brought the issue back to prominence. 
Distrust emerged as a significant problem. Soviet compliance 
behaviour compounded the problem. Another contributory factor 
was the change in style and substance of American policy 
towards the Soviet Union under the Reagan Administration, 
which almost certainly deepened Soviet distrust of the United 
States. An influential view in the Reagan Administration 
asserted that ‘only agreements that can be verified 
independently [emphasis added] are worth concluding’.[293] On 
the basis of its allegations of Soviet breaches of several 
arms control agreements, the Reagan Administration expressed 
its preference for ’simpler, less ambitious’ agreements with 
the Soviet Union, unless there was ’some real breakthrough on 
verification’.[294]
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The Group of 21’s opposition to a ban on PNEs derived 
partly, but significantly, from their perception that such a 
treaty would reinforce the unbalanced treatment that the 
non-proliferation issue had received in the past. Bitterly 
disappointed with the way the NPT had functioned since its 
inception, the non-aligned states were all the more sensitive 
about accepting another unbalanced non-proliferation regime. 
A CTB treaty inclusive of PNEs would do more than prevent the 
non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons. It 
would deprive them of the potential for a weapon-capability 
and, perhaps less importantly, the use of nuclear explosive 
devices for purely peaceful purposes; the impact of such a 
treaty on vertical proliferation would be much more limited. 
The modernisation of nuclear weapons would be substantially 
inhibited, but some improvements would still be possible. 
Moreover, there would be no effective control over the 
quantitative increase of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21*s 
outlook on the PNEs question was also influenced in an 
important way by restrictions which had been imposed by some 
nuclear weapon states and other industrialised countries on 
the transfer of nuclear technology and related materials to 
non-nuclear weapon states, regardless of whether they were 
parties to the NPT. Other issues, such as negative security 
assurances by the superpowers to the non-nuclear weapon 
states, and nuclear disarmament measures, were additional 
factors for the cleavage over the PNEs issue.
The frustration among the non-nuclear state parties with 
the attitude of the superpowers towards the control of 
vertical nuclear proliferation made it easier for the 
non-party states to project their stance in the CD through the 
Group of 21. This could change if the grievance of most 
non-nuclear weapon states should dissipate in the event of a 
CTB or a major nuclear arms control agreement between the 
superpowers. But it still remains to be seen to what extent 
the major non-party states would be prepared to alter their 
position on PNEs in a CTB, especially if one of the nuclear 
weapon states - namely, France - continued to oppose a CTB. 
It is possible that countries, such as India, view the 
retention of the right to PNEs in a CTB as a necessary 
leverage to pressure the superpowers to proceed beyond a CTB
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towards substantial nuclear arms reduction, if not nuclear 
disarmament. They also possibly see PNEs as a way of keeping 
the weapon-option open in case nuclear arms control between 
the superpowers or among the nuclear weapon states fails to 
materialise to any significant degree.
The American demand for a ban on PNEs seemed an attempt 
to maximise the horizontal non-proliferation benefits from a 
CTB treaty. A ban on PNEs would in effect extend the NPT 
regime to those non-nuclear weapon states which are currently 
outside it. At a minimum, American policy apparently sought 
to bolster the NPT regime. A regulatory system for PNEs in a 
CTB would have altered the NPT regime, because under the NPT 
there is virtually a ban on PNEs by the non-nuclear weapon 
state parties, whereas a CTB treaty which permitted regulated 
PNEs would have had the effect of restoring the right to 
conduct PNEs to such states. It is possible that the attitude 
of the Group of 21 and the Socialist Group might change in the 
event the United States should agree to negotiate a CTB. But 
a moderate attitude on the part of the outspoken non-party 
states in such circumstances would be more likely to occur on 
the question of regulating PNEs. In signing the 1976 PNE 
treaty, the Soviet Union may have ..accepted some real 
constraints on its ambitious PNE programme[295], suggesting 
that it is not dogmatically opposed to a ban on PNEs. Soviet 
rejection of an outright ban on PNEs could change over time if 
its experience with PNEs should prove disappointing, as was 
the case with the United States.
While a regulatory system for PNEs would alter the NPT 
regime for the non-nuclear weapon states, the acceptance of a 
ban on weapon-tests by the more important non-nuclear weapon 
states, which have remained outside the NPT regime, could be 
regarded as a significant horizontal non-proliferation gain. 
But the superpowers apparently consider the principle of 
abstention from PNEs by the non-nuclear weapon states, as 
stipulated in the NPT, to be a valuable constraint against 
nuclear tests per se by other non-party states, as long as 
most non-nuclear weapon states remain parties to the NPT. A 
compromise on that principle is perhaps unacceptable because 
of fear that such a step would help to hasten the decline of
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the NPT.
The objective of imposing a ban on PNEs seems to be 
unrealistic for the time-being. Both the Group of 21 and the 
Socialist Group appear firmly opposed to it. Even the ‘middle 
way’ of an international regulatory regime for PNEs has not 
been supported by the Group of 21 nor has there been any 
indication that their attitude might change.
The agreement among the trilateral negotiators to permit 
PNEs was conceived within the framework of the NPT regime -
that is, while the nuclear weapon states would be able to
conduct PNEs, there would be a ban on such tests by
non-nuclear weapon states. According to articles IV and V of
the NPT, such a prohibition does not however preclude nuclear 
weapon states from conducting PNEs on behalf of non-nuclear 
weapon states on a bilateral or multilateral basis for the 
purpose of aiding the latter to develop and utilise the 
technology for peaceful uses. However, such PNEs were 
envisaged in the framework of an international agreement that 
would provide for appropriate procedures and safeguards, as 
well as an international body, which has yet to materialise.
The Carter Administration considered the 1976 PNE treaty 
to be a ‘precedent for regulating nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes’, presumably with the trilateral 
negotiations in mind.[296] It seems that American opposition 
to PNEs in a CTB treaty was directed principally at the 
non-nuclear weapon states. In other words, the PNEs issue 
becomes more contentious in the context of a universal treaty, 
especially a non-discriminatory one as sought by the Group of 
21. Even if the United States should withdraw its demand for 
a ban on PNEs, the Group of 21 would still have to contend 
with the less dispensable demand for regulating PNEs to ensure 
that PNEs would not be used for conducting weapon-tests, not 
to mention the American concern about military benefits 
accruing from PNEs.
A possible interim solution to the verification issue 
could be a test ban based on a clearly detectable threshold. 
The United States and the Soviet Union had accepted such an
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approach as a basis for negotiations in the early 1960s and 
some members of the Group of 21 had also suggested a similar 
approach in the past. Or, a test ban could be based on a 
threshold that would provide assurance of weapon-stockpile 
reliability - a matter of particular concern to many CTB 
opponents in the United States. A treaty along these lines 
may be confined to the nuclear weapon states. Given their 
horizontal proliferation concerns, the nuclear weapon states 
would hardly be likely to conclude such a treaty on a 
universal, non-discriminatory basis. To do so, from their 
standpoint, would be to ‘legitimise’ the testing of nuclear 
weapons by the non-nuclear weapon states.
Another problem of a political nature has been the 
refusal by France to accept a CTB at the present juncture or 
even to participate in the deliberations of the Working Group 
of the CD. While China eventually altered its attitude, 
France made its acceptance of a CTB conditional on a 
substantial reduction by the superpowers of their nuclear 
arsenals. A lack of clarity about the degree of reduction 
that would be considered adequate has added to the difficulty 
of assessing the future prospects for a CTB inclusive of 
France. However, in the past this,_problem did not prevent 
other nuclear weapon states from negotiating a test ban of 
limited duration or one intended to be for an indefinite 
period of time but dependent on its subsequent adherence by 
the lesser nuclear weapon states.
While still perhaps amenable to a compromise in the 
context of a treaty of limited duration, as in evidence during 
trilateral negotiations in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union 
has been more assertive in recent years on the question of 
French and Chinese participation in a CTB from the outset. At 
the time when the question of setting-up a working group in 
the CD was being actively considered, the Soviet Union had 
sought the involvement of France and China.[297] Earlier in 
the CCD, the Soviet Union had stated that the exclusion of 
France and China would give these countries ‘unilateral 
advantages... to the detriment of others’. [298] Indeed, the 
Soviet Union had stressed the inclusion in a CTB of all states 
‘advanced in science, technology and industry’.[299]
Page 161
Conclusion
The CTB issue has been plagued by vaxious problems 
affecting its future prospects over the short and medium term. 
The immediate obstacle has been the CTB ’ s relegation to a 
long-term objective by the United States since the early 
1980s. The Reagan Administration’s strong opposition to a CTB 
was also manifested by its declared preference for other 
approaches for restraining the nuclear arms race.[300] Barring 
the United States, there was a consensus in the CD on the 
importance of pursuing a CTB as an urgent objective. A change 
of CTB policy under the Reagan Administration appears very 
unlikely since it is linked to the overall policy of 
strengthening the nuclear deterrent with new types of nuclear 
weapons, to which the Administration remains strongly 
committed. However, even after the new weapon-systems have 
been tested and deployed, the question of weapon-reliability 
is likely to affect the CTB issue.
The attempt to focus attention on the verification issue 
outside the framework of negotiations only helped to aggravate 
the controversy over that issue. The short-term need 
political need to play down the importance of.negotiations 
because of the nuclear weapons modernisation programme 
probably explains in part the hardening of American attitude 
towards specific CTB issues. The verification issue does not 
require preparatory treatment before CTB negotiations are 
resumed. The attempt by the United States to deal with it in 
those terms only made matters worse.
The PNEs issue seemed more difficult to resolve. The 
Group of 21 is unlikely to agree to an arrangement similar to 
the NPT regime or, more generally, of a discriminatory nature. 
The NPT regime has been questioned by a growing number of 
non-nuclear weapon state parties to that treaty, not to 
mention the important non-party states, such as India, Brazil 
and Argentina. The United States sought a general ban on 
PNEs, but it seemed directed at the non-nuclear weapon states. 
Though evidently not interested in a CTB, at least for some 
time, the United States continued to regard the NPT to be the 
’corner-stone’ of its non-proliferation policy, expressing its
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intention to seek the NPT’s ’continued vitality[301]
Given the bipartisan support for the NPT regime in the 
United States, it is unlikely that a change of administration 
would lead to a policy-change on the PNEs issue. An outright 
ban on PNEs will probably remain unacceptable to the Group of 
21, especially if the controversy over the NPT persists, and 
the Group of 21 remains dissatisfied with the attitude of the 
nuclear weapon states towards other related issues. The Group 
of 21’s current insistence on the unrestricted right to 
conduct PNEs is not a position they have held consistently in 
the past. But whether this implies a probable change of 
attitude in the future cannot be assessed on the basis of 
recent deliberations in the CD. The Soviet Union too is 
opposed to such a ban and this also seems unlikely to change, 
at least in the near-term, in view of its long-standing 
emphasis on the potential benefits of PNEs and its active PNE 
programme. Yet, in the absence of a ban or any international 
control over PNEs, the technological refinement of PNEs would 
continue, allowing states to circumvent the ban on 
weapon-tests through PNEs.
A solution seems to point towards regulating, rather than 
prohibiting PNEs, as proposed by the Soviet Union and Sweden. 
The Soviet and Swedish proposals also envisaged a moratorium 
on PNEs until a regulatory regime was agreed. In other words, 
under the Soviet and Swedish proposals it is likely that no 
PNEs will be possible for a long time since negotiations on a 
regulatory regime are likely to be protracted. Moreover, 
under a regulatory regime, the right of states to conduct PNEs 
could be significantly limited. A regulatory regime would of 
course restore the right to conduct PNEs to those non-nuclear 
weapon states which have renounced this right under the NPT. 
But, not all non-nuclear weapon states are parties to that 
treaty and significantly such states include India, Brazil, 
Argentina and Pakistan. Moreover, a regulatory regime would 
not give the non-nuclear weapon states the unrestricted right 
to conduct PNEs, which the Group of 21 seemed to want.
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The persistence of the PNEs issue and the 
non-participation of France in CTB negotiations, strongly 
suggest that the pursuit of a universal CTB treaty is not a 
realistic aim at the present juncture, even if American policy 
should revert to that of the pre-Reagan period. The inclusion 
of all non-nuclear weapon states in a CTB complicates the PNEs 
issue to an irreconcilable extent and also comes in the way of 
a possible compromise between the United States and the Soviet 
Union along the lines of the 1976 PNE treaty or as agreed 
during trilateral negotiations in 1980. It therefore seems 
advisable to leave the PNEs issue to its present controversial 
status. Attempts by the United States or the Group of 21 to 
force a settlement of the matter are hardly likely to succeed. 
The French attitude is also a major impediment to a CTB of a 
comprehensive kind or of unlimited duration at the present 
juncture. The prospect of change in French attitude becomes 
more uncertain, if not more gloomy, in the absence of a 
significant nuclear arms control agreement between the 
superpowers or visible efforts aimed at one.
The trilateral approach pursued during the Carter period 
as at the beginning of CTB negotiations in the late 1950s - 
retains its relevance and utility and pjffers better prospects 
of success. The trilateral approach would not only help to 
avoid the spillover of the the NPT controversy but would also 
make it possible to bypass the problem posed by French 
objections to its participation at the outset in a CTB.
Verification does not seem to be an intractable problem. 
As discussed earlier, there have been encouraging improvements 
in the Soviet attitude. It seems clear however that further 
improvements are unlikely outside the framework of 
negotiations. Although the United States attempted to reopen 
the verification issue in the CD, the CTB debate in the United 
States in recent years has shown that there is greater 
ostensible concern about weapon-reliability, just as the 
Senate’s objection to the Carter Administration’s policy had 
centred on the weapon-reliability issue.
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The weapon-reliability issue is likely to persist even if 
there is a revival of official interest in a CTB, as the 
Carter Administration’s domestic difficulties with influential 
CTB opponents suggests. It therefore seems appropriate that 
the focus should shift to a test ban based on a kiloton 
threshold, together with limits on the number of permissible 
tests, high enough to ensure weapon-reliability while, at the 
same time, low enough to inhibit major weapon developments. 
Assurance of compliance would not however mitigate 
verification requirements applicable to a full CTB.
The prospects for such a threshold ban are bleak at the 
present time and they will certainly remain depressed for the 
duration of President Reagan’s second term. If support for 
both ‘strategic modernisation’ and SDI should continue, the 
prospects would remain poor for a longer period. While a 
change of administration may bring renewed support for 
negotiating a CTB, other problems which have beset past 
negotiations may still prove thorny. It is also reasonably 
clear that regardless of the additional problem posed by the 
Reagan Administration’s attitude, a CTB treaty which is 
universal, non-discriminatory and comprehensive, is not a 
realistic aim at the present juncture... - A more modest treaty 
which does not seek all of those features is more likely to 
succeed in the foreseeable future.
Though modest in comparison with a CTB, a threshold ban 
is not without its own importance. It would mark a further 
development beyond what was achieved by the PTBT over two 
decades ago. It could be presented as a major step towards a 
CTB and thus, as a partial and long overdue fulfillment of the 
pledge, if not indeed legal obligation, assumed by the 
principal nuclear powers in the PTBT and the NPT to seek a 
CTB. A threshold ban would help to improve the atmosphere in 
which the NPT controversy has been conducted. It would 
strengthen the position of the nuclear weapon states on the 
non-proliferation issue. It would help to reduce the growing 
disenchantment of many non-nuclear weapon states with the NPT. 
In other words, a threshold ban would help to bolster the NPT 
regime which has been weakening and to which the nuclear 
weapon states attach a great deal of importance. It is
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possible that a threshold ban, especially if combined with a 
significant nuclear arms control agreement, could considerably 
reduce the tensions between the ‘have’ and ‘have-not’ states 
over the non-proliferation issue. A threshold ban would also 
restrain the nuclear arms race as far as its qualitative 
aspect is concerned.
Briefly, attempts by the United States or the Group of 
21, as witnessed in recent years, to maximise their 
conflicting non-proliferation objectives will have to be 
scaled down in order to improve the prospects for progress on 
the CTB issue. Such a development seems hardly likely under 
the Reagan Administration. But a political change in the late 
1980s could once again bring CTB into prominence and lead to a 
modified approach. However, even a revival of official 
American interest in the resumption of CTB negotiations is not 
likely to lead to a breakthrough for the foreseeable future. 
Success is more likely to come in the context of a test ban 
that is neither comprehensive nor universal.
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NEGOTIATIONS FOR A 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN
Introduction
In the post-war period, the question of chemical weapons 
(CW) disarmament failed to engage the attention of the 
international community until the late 1960s. The use of 
herbicides and irritant agents by the United States in the 
Vietnam War generated pressures for strengthening the 1925 
Geneva Protocol [l] and also for eliminating chemical weapons 
under a more comprehensive regime. The nature of American CW 
policy was uncertain during the 1950s and 1960s. In any case, 
the deterrent role later assigned to chemical weapons did not 
apply to anti-plant and irritant agents, used extensively in 
the Vietnam War. The Soviet CW policy remained even more 
obscure, partly for lack of any policy-statements.
The goal of chemical disarmament gained universal 
acceptance in December 1969, when a General Assembly 
resolution adopted without a negative vote, urged an end to 
the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and 
biological weapons.[2] Substantive negotiations did not 
however begin until a decade later, initially between the 
superpowers and after 1981 at the multilateral level in the 
CD. Lack of progress on the verification issue between the 
superpowers led to an imbroglio in negotiations, offering 
little hope of a breakthrough in the near future.
Historical Background
The first disarmament-related resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1946 called for the elimination of all 
weapons of mass destruction[3], which were subsequently 
defined to include ’lethal chemical and biological 
weapons’.[4] The question of chemical weapons received some 
attention, along with biological weapons, in the Disarmament 
Commission established in 1952. But such attention was almost 
incidental, the Commission’s overwhelming concern being with 
nuclear and conventional weapons.
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The Soviet Union wanted negotiations on chemical and 
biological weapons to concentrate in the first instance on 
‘the question of violation of the prohibition of bacterial 
warfare, the question of the impermissibility of the use of 
bacterial weapons and the question of calling to account those 
who violate the prohibition of bacterial warfare’.[5] This 
Soviet preoccupation was related to American non-ratification 
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and alleged American violation of 
the Protocol in the Korean War. But the Soviet approach 
failed to obtain support in the General Assembly and the 
Disarmament Commission, where the United States enjoyed 
greater influence.
Maintaining that the Geneva Protocol was ‘inadequate and 
ineffective’[6], the United States proposed that the problem 
of violation should be approached on the basis of an elaborate 
system of verification and control. It also wanted the 
question of chemical and biological weapons to be considered 
as part of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, that 
aimed at preventing war rather than simply codifying laws to 
regulate the use of such weapons in war.[7] The United States 
contested the Soviet view that the Geneva Protocol had worked 
reasonably well during the Second World War. The United 
States pointed to Mussolini’s use of chemical weapons in 
Ethiopia in the 1930s despite Italy’s acceptance of the 
Protocol and also argued that the feax of reprisal rather than 
the Protocol had deterred Hitler.[8]
The Soviet Union continued to oppose a UN-sponsored 
investigation of its allegations of American violation of the 
Geneva Protocol, and at the same time persisted with its 
proposal for the universal ratification of the Protocol. In 
late 1953, however, the Soviet Union declared that the end of 
the Korean War had created ‘more favourable conditions for 
further action to avert the threat of a new war’.[9] It 
accepted the American approach that the elimination of 
chemical and biological weapons should be sought along with 
other weapons of mass destruction. The question of chemical 
weapons was then incorporated in proposals for a disarmament 
programme, but for some years, no detailed discussion took 
place on that subject in the Disarmament Commission.[10]
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Weapons of mass destruction, other than nuclear weapons, 
received more attention when general and complete disarmament 
became the declared purpose of disarmament proposals in the 
late 1950s.
The first Soviet proposal for general disarmament in 1959 
envisaged a prohibition on the production of chemical 
weapons.[11] The elimination of chemical weapons and the 
destruction of their production facilities was sought in the 
second or intermediate stage. [12] The United States proposed 
the destruction of chemical weapons over a more drawn-out 
period covering the second and third stages.[13] The ban on 
production and weapon-testing was placed in the second stage, 
along with a 50 percent reduction of the stockpile, but only 
in certain agreed categories. The destruction or conversion 
of facilities for the production and testing of weapons was 
also put in the second stage.
The United States and Britain stressed the importance of 
verification, and pointed to the need to inspect not only the 
quantity of chemical weapons to be destroyed but also the 
agreed levels to be retained until their complete elimination 
in the final stage of the programme .[14.] Supported by the 
United States, Britain proposed that the negotiations should 
be accompanied at any early stage by an expert scrutiny of 
‘the capabilities and limitations’ of a system of 
international control for inter alia preventing the 
manufacture of chemical weapons.[15]
After the failure of disarmament negotiations, chemical 
weapons ceased to be considered in the context of a programme 
for comprehensive disarmament. The Soviet preoccupation 
shifted back to the Geneva Protocol, following American use of 
chemical weapons in Vietnam. The Soviet Union sought 
universal adherence to the Protocol and ‘strict and absolute 
compliance’ with its principles and norms.[16] It understood 
the Protocol to encompass all existing and future types of 
chemical agents and methods of warfare.[17] The Soviet Union 
also proposed that, in any case, the use of chemical and 
biological weapons should be declared a crime against 
humanity.
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The United States maintained that the use of riot-control 
agents and herbicides were not covered by the Geneva Protocol. 
It sought negotiations for a fresh agreement because 
technological developments had necessitated a review of the 
Protocol. [18] The General Assembly adopted a resolution urging 
all states to ratify the Geneva Protocol and at any rate to 
fully respect its principles and norms.[19] The resolution 
also called upon the ENDC to negotiate the elimination of 
chemical and biological weapons. The resolution however 
failed to satisfy the Socialist Group, since the use of 
chemical and biological weapons had not been condemned as an 
international crime, and strict universal adherence to the 
Protocol had not been demanded.[20]
An important development occurred in 1968 when the ENDC 
agreed to recommend that the UN Secretary General should be 
requested to conduct an expert study on the effects of 
chemical and biological warfare.[21] The Secretary General, U 
Thant, had himself lobbied for such a study. In his 1968 
annual report, he had stated that while progress was being 
made towards nuclear arms control, the question of chemical 
and biological weapons had received scant attention in recent 
years and the subject had never been discussed in any depth in 
the UN.[22] The ENDC also included biological and chemical 
weapons in its own agenda of future work.
The UN-sponsored study undertaken and completed in 1969, 
declared that the capability for developing chemical and 
biological weapons had ‘grown considerably in recent years, 
not only in terms of the number of agents but in their 
toxicity and in the diversity of their effects’.[23] It 
emphasised that the danger of proliferation of such weapons 
applied ‘as much to the developing as it [did] to developed 
countries’. [24] The experts urged the ‘earliest effective 
elimination of chemical and biological weapons’.[25] They also 
believed that such a step would help to slow the momentum of 
the arms race and lessen international tension. In addition, 
U Thant called for strengthening the existing legal regime. 
In particular, he urged the accession by all states to the 
Geneva Protocol and a clear affirmation by them that the 
Protocol covered all existing and future chemical and
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biological weapons.[26]
For the first time in the post-war period, draft 
conventions were formulated on the prohibition of chemical and 
biological weapons. Britain’s proposal to the ENDC in July 
1969 was however confined to biological weapons. Supported by 
the United States[27], Britain argued that biological methods 
of warfare were ’generally regarded with even greater 
abhorrence than chemical methods’ and that a separation of the 
two issues would help to facilitate their resolution.[28] In 
September 1969, the Socialist Group announced a draft 
convention that sought the prohibition of both biological and 
chemical weapons.[29] The Soviet Union also wanted a prior 
accession by all states to the Geneva Protocol and an 
undertaking to strictly observe its proscriptions.[30] The 
non-aligned states strongly urged a convention covering both 
types of weapons.[31]
The question of strengthening the Protocol and separating 
chemical and biological weapons negotiations remained 
unresolved. Most member-states of the UN attempted to invest 
the Geneva Protocol with the status of a generally recognised 
rule of international law.[32] They adopted a General Assembly 
resolution interpreting the Protocol to outlaw ‘all biological 
and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical 
developments’.[33] The resolution however was opposed by the 
United States and Australia, and a large number of countries 
abstained.[34] But most abstaining countries subscribed to the 
resolution’s broad interpretation. They had procedural 
reservations about the resolution, presumably in deference to 
American objections.[35]
The use of chemical agents by the United States in 
Indo-China in the 1960s[36] caused domestic and international 
concern about the nature of American CW policy, especially 
with regard to the Geneva Protocol. This led to a 
policy-review and a clearer statement of American policy on 
the status and scope of the Protocol. Faced with domestic and 
international pressures, the United States declared its 
support for the Protocol, but insisted that the use of 
herbicides and irritant agents was not contrary to the
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Protocol because the materials employed in Vietnam 4 are 
commonly used by police forces for riot-control in many parts 
of the world and are commonly accepted as appropriate for such 
purposes[37] The United States also argued that riot-control 
agents and herbicides used in Vietnam were unknown at the time 
the Protocol was drafted in 1925.[38]
The American interpretation was only supported by 
Australia, Britain and Belgium. Canada lent its support but 
only for a brief period. The strongest advocate of the 
American position was Australia.[39] The irritant agents and 
herbicides used by the United States in Vietnam were also 
considered by Britain to fall outside the scope of prohibition 
under the Geneva Protocol. Somewhat vaguely, Britain axgued 
that the weapons in question were 4 not significantly harmful 
to man in other than wholly exceptional circumstances’ and 
less harmful than the tear-gases available in 1930.[40]
In December 1969, a General Assembly resolution 
supporting an extensive interpretation of the Geneva 
Protocol’s scope of prohibition was voted upon. A majority of 
parties to the Protocol defended the extensive interpretation, 
but a large number of other parties abstained for lack of a 
definite policy.[4l] Subsequently the situation changed 
significantly in favour of the extensive interpretation. 
Moreover, many other countries became parties to the Protocol 
in the early 1970s and most of them understood the Protocol to 
impose a comprehensive prohibition of use.[42]
The United States continued to oppose Soviet moves for a 
joint convention on biological and chemical weapons, arguing 
that such an approach would simply delay the prohibition of 
biological weapons, because verification problems associated 
with a ban on chemical weapons would be more difficult to 
resolve. [43] The United States also expressed its reluctance 
to eliminate its CW arsenal under an agreement that failed to 
provide adequate assurance of compliance by other 
countries.[44] The Soviet Union summarily dismissed the 
verification issue, claiming that it was an attempt by the 
United States to conceal its lack of interest in a chemical 
weapons ban and maintaining that a ban limited to biological
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weapons could lead to a greater CW build-up.[45] However, in 
March 1971, the Socialist Group agreed to address biological 
weapons separately.[46] Meanwhile, in vain, the non-aligned 
group continued to urge a combined convention.[47]
The work on a biological weapons ban did not take long to 
complete, largely because the United States did not insist on 
strict verification measures. The convention simply provided 
for consultation and cooperation in dealing with complaints 
through the Security Council. The American decision was based 
on the belief that biological weapons were not militarily 
useful. [48] Indeed, in 1969 President Nixon had publicly 
decided to unilaterally renounce the use of biological weapons 
and destroy stocks of such weapons. In September 1971, after 
minor revisions, the superpowers presented a joint draft 
convention to the General Assembly, which commended it without 
any negative vote. [49] The biological weapons convention 
incorporated a provision committing the parties to negotiate 
an early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.[50] 
The convention marked an initial step towards the prohibition 
of chemical weapons, in that the ban also extended to toxins - 
that is, chemical substances obtained through biological 
processes. The Soviet Union tried to revive interest on the 
CW question even before the biological weapons convention was 
formally opened for signature in April 1972.[51] A draft 
convention was presented in March 1972 in an apparent effort 
to initiate CW negotiations and elicit a clearer American 
commitment to a CW ban.
No change occured in the attitude of the superpowers and 
the non-aligned countries over the scope of prohibition. The 
Soviet Union regarded the question of scope to be a matter of 
‘paramount importance’ and also as ‘one of the two problems of 
primary importance confronting the [CCD] ’. [52] A ten-nation 
group of non-aligned states also called for a comprehensive 
ban. They objected to a partial ban, expressing their concern 
that such a ban would be discriminatory, particularly for 
countries that had not attempted to acquire chemical 
weapons.[53]
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The United States supported a ban limited to the 
development and production of the super-toxic category of 
chemical agents. The ban would not extend to the production 
of less toxic chemicals or the destruction of existing 
arsenals. [54] A limited ban, the United States argued, would 
reduce the problem of verification since dual-purpose 
chemicals, used also for peaceful pursuits, would be 
excluded.[55] The non-aligned group’s argument that less toxic 
agents should be banned because most countries did not possess 
adequate means of protection against such weapons made little 
impact on the United States.[56] The United States adhered to 
its position that for the time being a comprehensive ban would 
be enormously difficult to verify. [57]
The Soviet insistence on a comprehensive ban was later 
withdrawn. At their third summit meeting in July 1974, held 
in Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev and President Nixon agreed to 
undertake bilateral talks to ban super-toxic chemical weapons 
as a first step towards a comprehensive prohibition.[58] 
Despite pressure from most member-states in the CCD, 
especially the Socialist Group, the United States made no move 
to begin such talks until 1976. Consultations held in August
1976 reportedly dealt with a partial.ban, restricted to
super-toxic chemical weapons.[59] Meanwhile, the Soviet Union 
continued to express its preference for a comprehensive 
ban.[60]
Presumably because of wide-spread opposition in the CCD 
to a narrowly focused convention, the United States 
subsequently expressed interest in a Canadian proposal for a 
production ban on super-toxic chemicals; a similar ban on 
chemicals of lower toxicity which had no peaceful uses; a 
ban, not on the production, but on the filling of munitions 
with other dual-purpose chemicals, except those used 
domestically for riot-control; and a gradual reduction of the 
weapons stockpile. [61] Britain supported the Canadian 
approach.[62] Both Japan and West Germany, strong advocates of 
a fairly restrictive ban, also moved closer to the idea of an 
enlarged prohibition.[63]
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The superpowers eventually began bilateral negotiations 
in 1977. In the following year, they reported to the CCD that 
general agreement had been reached on the question of 
scope.[64] The bilateral talks apparently envisaged a 
comprehensive ban, suggesting a further change in American 
attitude.[65] But the superpowers differed substantially on 
the verification question. The Soviet Union wanted each 
country to be responsible for ensuring compliance in its own 
territory through a national control organ and to determine 
for itself the precise forms and methods of control.[66] The 
Soviet scheme also envisaged a voluntary exchange of 
information between countries. The Soviet Union considered 
compulsory on-site inspection to be both ‘undesirable and 
unnecessary’ because it would enable outside interference with 
‘a wide range of activities of states’ and also because 
industrial secrets could be easily obtained.[67] International 
control was limited to lodging complaints. The responsibility 
for investigating non-compliance was placed with the Security 
Council, where the power of veto would be available to the 
five permanent members. In other words, the Soviet Union in 
effect rejected any serious form of verification.
The United States objected strongly.to the absence in the 
Soviet scheme of any effective international verification 
procedures, particularly with regard to the destruction or 
conversion of CW agents and their production facilities.[68] 
It generally criticised the Soviet approach for presupposing 
the existence of complete confidence between governments.[69] 
The United States also found an alternative Swedish proposal 
unacceptable, which attempted to provide reasonable assurance 
of compliance rather than a strong deterrent against 
violations. [70] It wanted verification procedures to have the 
‘significant effect of deterring violations’.[71] A particular 
American concern was that a verification system should provide 
for an early detection of breaches, so that a significant 
military advantage accruing to the violator could be ‘rapidly 
countered by the creation of a deterrent in kind’.[72]
The Soviet Union subsequently declared its willingness to 
consider ‘additional supervision procedures’ for destroying 
the weapons stockpile - a matter of particular concern to the
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United States.[73] Projecting the new Soviet position, Poland 
and East Germany acknowledged to some degree the relevance of 
international control. Poland spoke of combining national 
means, as proposed earlier by the Soviet Union, with 
additional control measures for verifying the destruction of 
weapons.[74] East Germany spoke of a balance between national 
and international control measures.[75] The shift in Soviet 
attitude was limited, but it made the negotiations more 
meaningful.
In accepting a wider ban, the United States stressed that 
verification measures would have to consist of ’a variety of 
techniques, including exchange of information, the use of 
unattended tamper-proof seals, and on-site inspection of 
production facilities’.[76] On-site inspection was considered 
particularly important for confirming the destruction of 
declared CW stockpiles.[77] The United States maintained that 
verification measures could be devised that would not be 
unreasonably intrusive.[78] Both West Germany sind Britain 
pointed to the unfounded fears that had been expressed about 
the application of IAEA safeguards during the NPT negotiations 
in the late 1960s.[79] West Germany believed that the danger 
of exposing military or industrial secrets could be obviated 
‘at least to the extent that they were legitimate’ and 
regarded its own post-war experience to be instructive in this 
respect. [80] Acknowledging the complicated nature and the 
physical magnitude of the task of verifying a CW ban, the 
United States urged ‘innovative’ approaches to meeting the 
challenge.[81]
Negotiations in the CD
The Group of 21’s proposal to create a working group in 
the CD to complement the bilateral talks between the 
superpowers was not accepted by the latter. The United States 
believed that multilateral involvement would hinder the 
progress of its talks with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
expressed a similar concern but was prepared to examine the 
possibility of relating the CD’s work to the bilateral talks.
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A joint report by the superpowers on the progress of 
their bilateral talks was submitted to the CD in July 
1979.[82] They agreed that different degrees of control and 
methods of verification would apply to various activities. 
The destruction of weapons and facilities would be completed 
within 10 years. The destruction of facilities would begin 
not later than eight years after the convention went into 
force. They also agreed that weapons and facilities would be 
declared immediately after the convention went into force and 
their destruction would be periodically reported to an 
international control organ. The report did not indicate any 
approximate time for disclosing plans for the destruction of 
weapons and facilities. ’A significant degree of mutual 
understanding’ was reported on the question of compiling a 
list of chemical agents and their precursors whose production 
would be subject to either prohibition or control.[83] No 
progress was reported on the more crucial question of 
verification, but the report expressed the intention of the 
superpowers to 4 exert their best efforts to complete [their] 
bilateral negotiations and present a joint initiative to the 
[CD] on this most important and extremely complex problem as 
soon as possible’.[84]
In 1980 the CD established a special working group, but 
with no mandate to engage in concrete negotiations. The 
meetings of the Working Group in 1980 merely helped to clarify 
some areas of convergence and divergence of views. A Swedish 
proposal for extending the prohibition to ‘chemical warf axe 
capability’ introduced an additional issue. [85] Meanwhile, the 
superpowers submitted another joint report, after two further 
rounds of talks since July 1979. The 1980 report indicated 
agreement to limit the production and acquisition of 
super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile purposes to a 
maximum amount of one ton for each party. [86] Progress was 
also reported on the time-limits for making certain 
declarations. The declaration of weapons and facilities would 
be made within one month and plans for the destruction of 
production facilities would be declaxed within one year. But 
there was no agreement on the time-limit for declaring plans 
for the destruction of weapons or on the nature of information 
to be released. Similarly, no agreement was reached on the
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time of commencement of the destruction process. The joint 
report also revealed disagreement on the extent of control 
over CW agents of the irritant type as well as precursors in 
general.[87] In sum, the bilateral talks failed to make 
substantial progress. In particular, no tangible progress was 
made on the critical issue of verification.
In 1981, the CD undertook a detailed examination of the 
issues and later attempted to prepare the framework for 
negotiating a draft convention. The deliberations covered 
considerable ground and the issues were examined in much 
greater detail than in the past. The general structure of a 
draft convention was clarified and a consensus emerged for a 
revised mandate to build upon the work done in 1980 and 1981. 
The time and effort devoted by the CD to the CW question 
increased progressively, reaching a high point in 1982 and 
1983 when substantive negotiations took place under a revised 
mandate. In 1979, less than two weeks of plenary meetings 
were devoted to the CW question. [88] In 1980, 16 meetings were 
held at the working group level. The number of such meetings 
increased to 23 in 1981 and to 42 in 1982.[89]
The CW negotiations occurred at a time of heightened 
concern about the use of chemical weapons in armed conflicts 
and the horizontal proliferation of such weapons. This was 
caused mainly by Iraq’s substantial use of what was probably 
mustard gas against Iran, and repeated American allegations of 
Soviet and Vietnamese use of toxins and perhaps nerve gas in 
Afghanistan and Indo-China, respectively.[90] Allegations were 
also made of resort to chemical warfare in other regions, but 
the accusations did not persist for long and the matter 
received less publicity.[91] According to American officials, 
both the incidence and severity of chemical warfare in 
Afghanistan and Indo-China began to decline in the early 
1980s.[92] Nevertheless, concern about horizontal 
proliferation increased during this period. Shortly after 
confirmation of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, 
the United States and the ten European Community countries 
took steps to control the export of chemicals that could be 
used for making weapons.
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In the wake of Iraq’s continued use of chemical weapons 
against Iran, senior Reagan Administration officials claimed 
that more than a dozen countries, at least half from the Third 
World, possessed chemical weapons and the number of countries 
possessing chemical weapons could double in the next 
decade.[93] The Pentagon further highlighted the danger of 
horizontal spread by presuming that countries receiving arms 
from the Soviet Union were also ‘likely candidates’ for 
acquiring chemical weapons. The presumption was probably due 
to likely Soviet supplies to Iraq and suspicion of chemical 
warfare by the Soviet-supported Ethiopian army against 
‘separatists’ near the Sudanese border in early 1983. [94] 
ACDA’s Director, Kenneth Adelman, expressed the 
Administration’s concern and the hope that, in cooperation 
with other countries, ‘we can possibly nip this looming threat 
early, before chemical weapons become as commonplace as hand 
grenades in Third World armies’. [95] Publicity work in the 
United States also contributed to a sense of danger about 
horizontal proliferation. A private American study in early 
1984 declared that even limited proliferation could alter ’the 
balance of forces in various regions [and provide] the 
potential for regional conflicts to take on an entirely new 
dimension, as regards both regional -powers and, possibly, 
superpowers’.[96] A major reason for concern was the notion 
that chemical weapons could serve as the ‘poor man’s atom 
bomb’ - that is, as ‘a plausible deterrent to a nuclear 
weapons threat’.[97]
Concern was also expressed about the vulnerability of the 
United States to chemical attacks by terrorists, especially 
from the Islamic world. Allegations were made of growing 
Soviet involvement in the chemical warfare training of 
terrorists. Apart from the General Assembly, the CD itself 
witnessed heated exchanges between the superpowers on the 
chemical warfare issue. The Soviet Union resisted American 
efforts to invest the UN with the authority to investigate 
charges of chemical warfare, following the work of a special 
UN panel on allegations related to Afghanistan and Indo-China 
in 1982.
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At the general level, the CW negotiations in the CD had 
to deal with the destruction of weapons and facilities, 
controls on transfer of weapons and chemical agents, the 
non-production of weapons in commercial and other permitted 
facilities, a system for verifying compliance with these 
obligations and with the prohibition of use of chemical 
weapons already established by the Geneva Protocol. The 
multilateral negotiations in the early 1980s had a limited 
background of prior effort. The deliberations in the CCD had 
been usually general and irregular, also lacking in any 
substantial involvement by the superpowers. The bilateral 
talks between the superpowers provided some background to 
subsequent multilateral negotiations. But the multilateral 
talks had addressed general issues and later the United States 
substantially modified its approach.
The extent of superpower interest in CW negotiations was 
also in some doubt. Draft conventions were presented by both 
sides, an exercise they had not undertaken in relation to CTB 
and CPD negotiations. Indeed, the United States submitted a 
draft convention in 1983 and an updated version in 1984. But 
American and Soviet interest in the past had been minimal, 
except perhaps during the Caxter period. More importantly, 
possible Soviet non-compliance with the Geneva Protocol and 
the Biological Weapons Convention in the late 1970s and early 
1980s introduced an element of uncertainty about the Soviet 
interest in CW negotiations. Moreover, the Reagan 
Administration’s active participation in the CD followed 
abortive efforts to obtain Congressional funds to produce 
novel binary weapons, which would have further complicated CW 
negotiations. Congress had made its approval of funding 
requests conditional on prior efforts by the Administration to 
pursue CW disarmament in the CD.
Soviet flexibility on the verification issue in the CD 
could be regarded as indicative of its interest in CW 
negotiations, but such interest could well have been directed 
primarily at delaying American production of binary weapons, 
given the prior interest of the US Congress in CW 
negotiations. In any case, Soviet interest in CW negotiations 
declined sharply in early 1984 after some flexibility on its
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part failed to meet American concerns about adequate 
verification. Meanwhile, the United States revised its 
position and sought more rigorous verification measures. On 
the grounds that CW production could be easily disguised, the 
American proposal sought Soviet acceptance of inspection by 
personnel of all military and related facilities. The 
unprecedented extent of intrusion sought cast further doubt on 
the nature of the Administration’s interest in CW 
negotiations.
The American approach was shaped from the outset by the 
requirement that verification measures should constitute a 
strong deterrent against non-compliance and that the 
disarmament process should be tightly controlled and 
rigorously monitored. Criticisms of Soviet compliance 
behaviour in recent years underscored American demands for 
strict verification measures. But the revised position 
adopted in 1984 suggested the growing influence of ’hawks’ in 
the Administration. Their interest in weapons modernisation 
took precedence over arms control. They also wanted to 
confront the Soviet Union on the verification issue in all 
arms control negotiations underway at the time, regardless of 
the effect this would have on the progress of negotiations or 
on the negotiability of proposals. The revised American 
approach indicated almost complete distrust of the Soviet 
Union.
The Soviet Union was extremely circumspect about data 
disclosures before the destruction of weapons and facilities 
and wanted to retain control over the pace of destruction. On 
verification, it was only prepared to concede a limited degree 
of intrusive inspection. The Soviet Union displayed a similar 
attitude on the question of controlling precursors. It sought 
strict controls on precursors of particular concern to itself 
but in a manner that greatly reduced outside intrusion of its 
chemical industry. Similarly, the Soviet Union isolated 
binary weapons for special treatment, seeking their 
destruction over a much shorter period than for other chemical 
weapons. It was also very cautious about the disarmament 
process, envisaging a protracted period and retaining the 
right to determine its pace and pattern, as along as complete
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destruction was accomplished at the end of the agreed 10-year 
period. The Soviet position on verification measures was far 
removed from American demands.
The status of the Geneva Protocol also presented problems 
that could not be resolved. The essential difference was 
related to herbicides and irritant agents. As in the past, 
the United States did not want such agents to be banned nor 
did it accept the interpretation of most states that the 
Protocol’s prohibition covered herbicides and irritant agents.
The principal allies of the superpowers also played an 
active role in CW negotiations. The participation of Soviet 
allies was strictly in line with the Soviet approach. This 
was also generally the case with American allies. In 
particular, the revised American position on verification 
measures enjoyed uncritical support from the major NATO allies 
and Australia. As a group, the role of the non-aligned states 
was usually limited to urging continued efforts by the 
superpowers to reach agreement on a comprehensive ban, later 
punctuated by criticism of the revised American position on 
the verification issue. Of the Group of 21, Yugoslavia and 
Sweden participated actively in the negotiations.
declaration and Destruction
There was agreement in the CD that under the proposed 
convention, states would be required to declare their 
possession of CW agents, precursors, munitions and devices as 
well as facilities for their production and filling. Initial 
declarations were envisaged soon after the entry into force of 
the convention (or adherence to it), followed by periodic 
declarations of plans for the destruction of prohibited 
objects and submission of reports about their implementation. 
The disclosures would be subject to verification by 
international means. The United States generally sought more 
transparency than the Soviet Union, their differences being 
particularly marked on the question of disclosing the location 
of stockpiles and facilities.
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The United States wanted detailed information before the 
destruction process, on weapon stockpiles and facilities for 
the production of CW agents and munitions, as well as plans 
for the destruction of weapons and the immediate closure and 
subsequent destruction of facilities.[98] The facilities in 
question included those intended for peaceful purposes and the 
disclosure covered products manufactured for peaceful 
purposes. [99] Detailed information was also sought about the 
location and nature of facilities for the production of 
commercial chemicals which could serve as CW precursors. 
Similar data disclosures were envisaged for sites used for CW 
testing and evaluation. The declaration applied to facilities 
constructed or used in the past, regardless of whether they 
were still in existence.[100] The Soviet Union envisaged 
limited and general data disclosures, confined in the case of 
stockpiles and facilities to their location, ‘magnitude’ and 
‘capacities’.[101] Disclosures about the production of 
precursors would only be made on an annual basis and after the 
start of the destruction process.[102]
The negotiations in the CD led to some narrowing of 
differences between the superpowers on the extent of 
disclosures to be made about stockpiles of CW agents, 
precursors and munitions.[103] But Soviet flexibility did not 
extend to disclosures about devices and ‘specifically designed 
equipment’.[104] More importantly, the superpowers remained 
sharply divided over declarations about the location of weapon 
stockpiles. The United States wanted the initial declaration 
to include the precise location of stockpiles and the 
composition of stocks at each location.[105] The Soviet Union 
opposed any such declarations.[106]
Differences also persisted on the disclosure of 
production plants and other facilities. The Soviet Union 
wanted the declaration to state the number of munition-filling 
facilities and other facilities for the production of CW 
agents and their key precursors.[107] The information would 
cover the capacity of such facilities in terms of the type and 
quantity of chemical agents and key precursors.[108] The 
United States sought, in addition, similar disclosures about 
dual-purpose facilities; the last date of operation of
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existing or converted facilities, as well as their present 
use; and the precise location of all such facilities.[109] 
The Soviet Union seemed prepared to divulge the location of 
plants a year before their destruction, but not within a month 
of the entry into force of the convention, as desired by the 
United States.[110]
The question of declarations also dealt with facilities 
producing super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal and 
harmful chemicals and their key precursors for permitted 
purposes. The United States supported a British proposal that 
all such facilities should be declared at the outset and the 
information should cover their location, the substances 
produced and their uses.[ill] The Soviet Union agreed to 
annual declarations covering all precursors, but in addition 
wanted the disclosure to extend to the controversial irritant 
agents.[112] There was also no agreement on revealing the 
location of facilities for the production of key precursors of 
lethal and harmful chemicals.[113]
The question of declaring plans for the destruction of 
weapons and facilities did not for the most part present 
dif f iculties. [114] But the superpowers.^ disagreed on the nature 
of destruction to be carried out. The Soviet Union wanted to 
retain the option of converting CW agents and production 
facilities for permitted purposes.[ 115] The United States 
sought the complete destruction of weapons and 
facilities.[116] Resistance to the idea of conversion 
apparently derived from American concerns about the difficulty 
of verification and selection of candidate chemicals.[117]
While in agreement that the process of destruction of 
weapons and facilities should be completed within 10 years, 
the superpowers differed on the date of commencement and thus 
the duration of the destruction process, and also on the date 
of submission of plans for destruction. The United States 
wanted the destruction plans to be disclosed within one month 
of the convention taking effect, in contrast to 6 months for 
weapons and one year for facilities envisaged by the Soviet 
Union.[118] The United States proposed that the destruction of 
warfare agents and munitions should start within 6 months,
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instead of two years sought by the Soviet Union.[119] Again, 
the United States wanted the destruction of production and 
other proscribed facilities to begin within 6 months, but the 
Soviet Union proposed eight years.[120] With regard to binary 
weapons and facilities, the United States applied the general 
principle of a maximum of 6 months for the commencement date 
and not later than 10 years for the completion date. [121] The 
Soviet Union however differentiated such plants from all other 
facilities. The commencement date for eliminating binary 
weapons plants was set at not later than 6 months and the 
destruction period was sharply reduced to 2 years.[122]
On the question of transfer of super-toxic lethal 
chemicals, there was agreement that both the recipients and 
suppliers would provide advance notification of each transfer 
as well as annual summary reports of all transfers, disclosing 
their chemical names, weights and destination.[123] But 
disagreement persisted on the purposes for which the transfers 
would be permitted - that is, whether the transfers should 
apply restrictively to ‘protective’ purposes or to broader 
‘permitted’ purposes. Nor was there agreement on the scope of 
transfers - that is, whether the transfers should include key 
precursors of super-toxic lethal chemicals.[124]
Apart from declarations, the United States also sought an 
agreed procedure for destroying weapons and facilities.[125] 
The Soviet Union criticised the American proposal for being 
unnecessarily complicated and based on ‘exaggerated 
suspicion’.[126] The Soviet Union preferred the question to be 
left largely to the discretion of states as a matter of 
sovereign right.[127] It was prepared to discuss the American 
proposal, but only if such an exercise was aimed at reducing 
the intrusiveness of its verification procedure.[128]
Scope of Prohibition
The question of scope of prohibition did not present any 
difficulty with regard to lethal and incapacitating chemical 
weapons. It was agreed in the CD that the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of such weapons should be 
prohibited and that their production for permitted purposes
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should be allowed under a system of control. The status of 
herbicides and riot-control agents however continued to 
present problems. Most member-states wanted their use in 
armed conflict to be prohibited and believed that such a 
prohibition had already been established by the Geneva 
Protocol. The United States opposed the prohibition of such 
chemicals.
The United States had taken care in its 1983 draft 
convention to exclude herbicides and riot-control agents from 
the scope of prohibition by direct mention and also by 
clarifying ‘other harmful chemicals, and their precursors’ to 
mean incapacitating agents. [129] The Soviet draft convention 
did not explicitly include herbicides and riot-control agents, 
but the definition it proposed apparently implied a 
comprehensive scope of prohibition, though outside the 
domestic context.[130] The Soviet objection to such substances 
was made more apparent in the CD’s plenary discussion on the 
future convention’s relationship with the Geneva Protocol. 
China also supported a ban on herbicides and irritant agents 
for ‘fighting’ purposes.[ 131] China’s concept of ‘chemical 
warfare agents’ was meant to provide an extensive coverage, 
while excluding from the scope of prohibition the use of 
herbicides and riot-control agents within a state’s domestic 
jurisdiction. China seemed essentially interested in 
prohibiting the use of herbicides and irritants in armed 
conflicts between states.
Disagreement on the related question of definition 
persisted in the CD. [132] In addition to differences between 
the superpowers, China emphasised that the definition should 
specify the toxic effects of chemical agents in terms of 
death, temporary incapacitation, permanent injury and damage, 
rather them simply on the basis of death or other harm. China 
also proposed that the definition of toxic effects of chemical 
agents used for hostile purposes should not be restricted to 
human beings but should include animals and plants.[133]
Production of Super^Toxic Chemicals and Precursors
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Discussions in the CD on the question of precursors were 
’relatively vague’ until the production of binary weapons 
seemed imminent.[134] The Reagan Administration’s increased 
R&D funding for binary weapons technology and its plans for 
the replacement of unitary weapons with binary ones, raised 
the significance of the issue of precursors. The binary 
technique of mixing two chemicals of relatively low toxicity 
during the flight of the warhead to produce a super-toxic 
chemical agent made it possible to use precursors to lethal 
effect, thus giving a new significance to precursors as future 
CW components. The development of binary weapons technology 
also opened up the possibility of multicomponent weapons, 
increasing further the utility of precursors. The Soviet 
Union regarded the introduction of binary weapons to pose 
’serious additional problems’ for the progress of negotiations 
in the CD.[135]
Differences between the superpowers were related to a 
number of questions: whether the production of super-toxic 
lethal chemicals should be restricted to a single small-scale 
facility and only for security-related protective purposes - 
and if so, whether their production should be controlled by a 
ceiling on quantity or on the facility~t&.production capacity; 
whether the production of chemicals containing the 
methyl-phosphorous bond should be banned for all except 
protective purposes and their production for such purposes 
restricted to a single facility; whether the production of 
all key precursors should be undertaken in a single facility 
and only for protective purposes or whether their production 
should be allowed for some other permitted purposes as well. 
Another question concerned the quantity of super-toxic lethal 
chemicals and their key precursors that could be held at any 
given time for protective or other permitted purposes as well.
There was general agreement that the criteria for 
selecting key precursors for the purposes of control should 
include those chemicals which played a 4 particularly 
important’ role in determining the final character of chemical 
weapons and had limited civilian use.[136] It was also agreed 
that the criteria for selection would need to be periodically 
revised and updated and that exceptions could be made to allow
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the inclusion of certain chemicals which might not meet all 
the agreed criteria but could still be regarded as posing a 
risk.[137] However no agreement was reached on whether the 
criteria for selection should specifically refer to precursors 
which took part in the final stage of CW production, as 
proposed by the Soviet Union.[138]
There was no agreement on whether the definition of key 
precursors should be comprehensive or limited for the time 
being to the immediate purposes of the convention.[139] 
Limited progress was made on the more practical question of a 
provisional list of key precursors. There was a similarity of 
views on the inclusion of some precursors[140], but ‘views 
differed with respect to other chemicals and to the reasons 
why they should be put on a list of key precursors’.[141]
Representing the Socialist Group, Czechoslovakia 
envisaged the proposed list to contain only key precursors of 
‘extraordinary significance for the security of nations’ that 
could be easily used for CW production, particularly of the 
binary or multicomponent type.[142] The Socialist Group wanted 
the list to address key precursors of super-toxic CW agents. 
The main concern was with key precursors of lethal weapons for 
which the risk of evasion was considered particularly serious 
because of binary weapons technology.
The Socialist Group’s position that the proposed list 
should only deal with key precursors of super-toxic CW agents 
was not apparently a contentious issue. However, its emphasis 
on some key precursors was not acceptable to the United 
States. Czechoslovakia’s suggestion for a preliminary list 
stressed precursors with the methyl-phosphorous bond - as 
proposed earlier by the Soviet Union - and envisaged a smaller 
range of other key precursors than had been proposed by the 
United States as well as Britain, Australia and the 
Netherlands.
The Soviet draft convention allowed the production of key 
precursors and super-toxic lethal chemicals for all permitted 
purposes[143], but confined the production of the latter to a 
single facility and limited the quantity of such chemicals
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that could be held at any time to one metric ton.[144] The 
American draft convention was more restrictive, since the 
aggregate quantity of key precursors as well as super-toxic 
lethal chemicals allowed to be held was jointly limited to one 
metric ton. Both countries eventually modified their 
positions. The Soviet Union sought controls on the production 
of key precursors containing the methyl-phosphorous bond. The 
United States instead supported a British proposal for the 
controlled production of all key precursors of super-toxic 
chemicals in commercial facilities.
The Soviet Union focused on one class of precursors 
that is, those used for the production of most known variety 
of nerve gas. It proposed that the production of chemicals 
containing the methyl-phosphorous bond should be confined to a 
single small-scale facility and linked narrowly to protective 
purposes.[145] The Soviet Union argued that the detection of 
the methyl-phosphorous bond would be relatively easy, 
providing clear evidence of violation of the convention.[146] 
The prohibition of such precursors would greatly strengthen 
the means of ensuring compliance with the ban on CW 
development and production, since all known nerve gases, 
barring Tabun, possess the methyl-phosphorous bond. The 
Soviet Union also argued that such chemicals had limited 
commercial use and thus the economic cost of banning their 
commercial production would be insignificant.[147] Australia 
expressed interest in the Soviet proposal and supported the 
proposition that unless the advantages of detection accruing 
from a ban on commercial production were equivocal, such 
chemicals should be prohibited during the 10-year period 
agreed for the destruction of chemical weapons under the 
proposed convention.[148]
The United States doubted the effectiveness of the Soviet 
approach in preventing the illegal production of nerve agents, 
maintaining that it offered only a ‘partial solution’, because 
other key precursors could be used for making nerve agents, 
even if slightly less toxic.[149] The United States also 
objected to the Soviet proposal’s failure to provide for the 
disclosure and verification of facilities used in the past for 
the production of chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorous
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bond, and for its exclusion of key precursors of the nerve 
agent, Tabun. Above all, the United States disputed the low 
economic cost argument for banning the commercial production 
of key precursors containing the methyl-phosphorous bond.[l50]
Regarding transfers to non-party states, the United 
States wanted to limit the ban to super-toxic lethal chemicals 
and their key precursors. [151] The Soviet Union wanted to 
extend the ban to non-lethal chemicals, including 
incapacitants and irritants, as well as other key 
precursors. [152] It appears that the Soviet position on 
transfers to non-party states subsequently changed. The CD’s 
1983 report suggested agreement on the permissibility of 
transfers of incapacitants, irritants and other precursors, 
which the Soviet draft convention had earlier sought to 
prohibit.[153]
On the question of transfers among parties, the United 
States wished to restrict the supply of super-toxic lethal 
chemicals and their key precursors for protective purposes 
only and to a maximum amount of one kilogram over a one-year 
period.[154] The Soviet proposal did not seek any limit on 
amount and allowed transfers of all~-chemicals and their key 
precursors for protective as well as other permitted 
purposes. [155] An additional problem arose during the course 
of negotiations. The desirability of transfers of key 
precursors among parties even for protective purposes became 
an issue, presumably suggesting a hardening of American 
attitude. In other words, the American and Soviet approaches 
were eventually quite similar on the question of transfers to 
non-party states. But the United States was more restrictive 
than the Soviet Union on the subject of transfers to other 
parties.
Prohibition of Use
The prohibition of use was a major issue in the CD. 
Whether the proposed convention should incorporate a specific 
provision banning the use of chemical weapons and whether such 
a provision should also reaffirm the Geneva Protocol continued 
to present difficulties. The differences eventually narrowed
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on some related issues, but the progress was limited on the 
question of the Protocol’s primacy in defining the scope of 
prohibition.
A majority of countries, but the United States more 
emphatically, supported the inclusion of a provision banning 
the use of chemical weapons. The Socialist Group in 
particular opposed an independent provision in the convention. 
The Soviet Union argued that the prohibition of use was 
already a customary international law and the proposed 
provision was thus unnecessary.[156] It also expressed the 
fear that the comprehensive ban established by the Protocol 
might be undermined.[157] In addition, the Soviet Union argued 
that the inclusion of such a provision could start ‘a 
dangerous practice of undermining, by way of a new regulation, 
existing international treaties, if they happened to become 
politically inconvenient’.[158]
Those in support of mentioning the prohibition of use in 
the convention did not share the Soviet view because they felt 
that ways could be found to safeguard the Geneva Protocol. 
Their concerns were generally directed at certain deficiencies 
in the Protocol, such as the absence of^ ,a provision providing 
for the verification of compliance with the prohibition of 
use. They axgued that by incorporating a non-use provision 
the question of verifying compliance with the Protocol would 
fall within the scope of the proposed convention - thus, 
redressing a major weakness in the existing legal regime.[159] 
They also pointed out that the prohibition of use in the 
Protocol applied only to ‘wars’ and not to the broader 
contemporary phenomena of ‘armed conflicts’. [160]
The Soviet Union subsequently agreed to the inclusion of 
a non-use provision, but stressed the need for reaffirming the 
Geneva Protocol in the main body of the proposed convention in 
order to safeguard its comprehensive ban.[161] This was 
considered essential because in the past Britain and Canada 
had declared that they did not consider CS and other such 
gases, including riot-control agents, to be prohibited by the 
Protocol. [162] The Soviet Union also recalled that the United 
States had ‘left room for itself to use harmful chemicals not
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only for police purposes but also even for certain military 
p u r p o s e s [163] As such, a peripheral reference to the 
Protocol was insufficient for the Soviet Union.
It was not contested in the CD that the prohibition of 
use formed part of international law.[164] However, 
conflicting interpretations prevailed on the extent of 
prohibition embodied in the Geneva Protocol - or in existence 
under international customary law. The problem was primarily 
related to the long-standing dispute over the legal status of 
herbicides and riot-control agents.
There was general agreement in the CD that the main body 
of the convention could contain a provision stating that 
nothing in the convention should be interpreted as in any way 
limiting the obligations assumed by states under the Geneva 
Protocol.[165] But the United States apparently continued to 
oppose any reference to the Protocol in the operative part of 
the convention containing the non-use provision.
Attempts at compromise failed to bear fruit.[166] A 
suggestion that the convention could state its intention to 
‘complement’ the prohibition under the.Jaeneva Protocol failed 
to overcome the resistance of advocates of an independent 
non-use provision. [167] A strong reference to the Protocol was 
not acceptable to countries that supported a limited scope and 
thus did not wish the controversy on herbicides and irritant 
agents to carry over into a future regime. The absence of 
such reference was equally unacceptable to countries that 
believed that a comprehensive scope had already been 
established by the Protocol and had acquired the status of 
customary international law. The United States presumably 
felt that reaffirming the primacy of the Protocol would run 
the risk of investing the convention with a comprehensive 
regime, since most states adhered to an extensive 
interpretation of the Protocol. Conversely, most states 
supporting an extensive ban feared that a narrower regime 
would supersede the Protocol if the convention was not 
carefully drafted.
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In contrast to its restrictive attitude towards the 
definition of prohibited weapons, the United States sought a 
wider ban in other areas than had been provided by the Geneva 
Protocol.[168] There was agreement inthe CD that the proposed 
convention should forbid the use of chemical weapons not only 
among parties, as under the Protocol, but also against 
non-party states.[169] Similarly, it was agreed that the 
prohibition should not be limited to ‘wax’, as mentioned in 
the Protocol, but should apply generally to all armed 
conflicts.[170] There was consensus on the idea that the 
proposed convention should provide for the verification of 
allegations of use of chemical weapons on the basis of 
substantiated claims.[171] But only a preliminary discussion 
occurred on specifying procedures for verifying such 
allegations.[172]
To sum up, the negotiations in the CD eventually led to 
some progress. Agreement was reached to rectify deficiences 
in the Geneva Protocol. The danger of use of chemical 
weapons, particularly during the 10-year period for completing 
the destruction of weapons, was acknowledged. After all, 
unresolved allegations of use or false accusations could bring 
about the collapse of the convention ox abort the process of 
CW disarmament during the protracted 10-year destruction 
period. Agreement was reached in principle to redress the 
absence of verification procedures for ensuring compliance 
with the prohibition of use in the Protocol. But the 
prospects of progress on matters of detail seemed limited. 
The dispute over the status of herbicides and riot-control 
agents remained intense. The United States opposed 
prohibiting those substances or making any major reference to 
the Protocol. The Soviet Union insisted that the convention 
should reaffirm the Protocol and the proposed non-use 
provision should not be placed independently in the operative 
part of the convention.[173] Attempts at compromise proved 
difficult.
Substantive work remained to be done following the 
agreement in principle to extend the prohibition of use to all 
armed conflicts and to address allegations of non-compliance. 
The tasks related particularly to defining armed conflict for
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the purposes of the proposed convention and establishing 
agreed procedures of verification, especially the application 
of on-site inspection in the challenging conditions of armed 
conflict.
yndiniinished Security
The superpowers agreed in principle that no state should 
gain unilateral advantage during the CW disarmament process 
and a ‘balance of security’ should be maintained during the 
entire process.[174] They also agreed that the CW disarmament 
process should be conducted on the basis of a ‘general 
schedule’ worked out in advance.[175] Whether the process 
should be balanced according to the principle of parity or on 
the basis of existing or established ratios had not been 
considered in any detail.
The United States regaxded the principle of undiminished 
security to be ’one of the pillars of any effective arms 
control agreement’.[176] Similarly, the Soviet Union stated 
that without an agreed schedule the implementation of CW 
disarmament might be delayed until the last moment because the 
dates and rates of destruction oL^various categories of 
chemical weapons would not be uniform and this would cause 
mutual distrust.[177] The need for an agreed schedule was also 
stressed because any two states were unlikely to have 
identical quantitative and qualitative capabilities. The 
Soviet Union wanted an ‘even’ process that would prevent any 
party from deriving unilateral military advantage ’at any 
stage’ of the disarmament process.[ 178]
Although both the superpowers sought an agreed schedule, 
their differences over initial disclosures and the destruction 
of weapons and facilities, and over the production of 
super-toxic chemicals and key precursors came in the way of 
ensuring balanced reduction during the disarmament process. 
The risks of evasion also had a bearing on the principle of 
undiminished security. The Soviet Union seemed concerned 
principally with the danger of evasion posed by binary 
weapons. The Soviet Union declared that the introduction of 
binary weapons would ‘significantly undermine’ the principle
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of undiminished security, regarded as ‘basic’ to the 
implementation of a future convention.[179] The Soviet Union 
maintained that evasion would be much easier since specialised 
military facilities were not necessary for the production of 
binary weapons. It also argued that components of binary 
weapons did not require ‘several particulaxly dangerous 
precursors which are difficult to conceal, in contrast to the 
production of unitary chemical weapons’.[180] The Soviet Union 
therefore wanted ‘a special, very strict regime’ to prevent 
the clandestine production of binary weapons.[181]
The Soviet proposal for eliminating binary weapons 
facilities within two years of the convention taking effect 
was presented as ‘aimed at a certain equalization of the 
positions of the future parties to the convention’.[182] The 
implication appeared to be that, unlike the United States, the 
Soviet Union did not currently intend to construct such 
facilities and that the two parties to the proposed convention 
would thus find themselves in an unequal situation.[183] The 
Soviet position on binary weapons was regarded by the United 
States to be inconsistent with the principle of undiminished 
security because it was ‘extra-ordinaxily one-sided’ and 
intended to disarm the United States while retaining Soviet 
capability in unitary weapons.[184] Similarly, the Soviet 
proposal on precursors containing the methyl-phosphorous bond 
was not acceptable to the United States because of its 
unbalanced coverage of precursors.
Non^Stationing of Weapons
The status of chemical weapons in the territory of other 
states received little attention in the CD. The Soviet Union 
wanted to prohibit the stationing of chemical weapons in 
foreign territories to be prohibited during the disarmament 
process. It also wanted the withdrawal of chemical weapons 
present in foreign territories before the convention went into 
force, though no deadline was specified. [185] The United 
States did not directly address the question of non-stationing 
or withdrawal.[186] Presumably, no specific obligation was 
envisaged for withdrawal or non-stationing beyond the 10-year 
period proposed for the destruction of all weapons under a
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state’s jurisdiction or control.
Chemical Warfare Capability
The question of preventing the development of CW 
capability was raised by Sweden.[187] The proposed control 
would not however apply during the ten-year period for 
destruction of weapons, since existing stockpiles would 
represent a potential threat of use and thus states would need 
a retaliatory capability as an interim safeguard. Sweden 
believed that unless the prohibition was specifically 
extended, states that later withdrew from the convention could 
proceed to build an offensive capability in a relatively short 
time. It therefore wished to prohibit activities related to 
an offensive capability, though some disclosure of purely 
protective activities would also be required as an additional 
safeguard. The verification procedures would consist of 
access to military data, observation of military manoeuvres 
and on-site inspection of testing and training facilities. 
Although not denying the practical difficulties of verifying 
compliance, Sweden argued that similar perceptions had not 
prevented the the CD from addressing the question in relation 
to other issues. _ __ ____
The subject received little attention in the CD but it 
was provisionally included in the negotiating format. The 
superpowers did not consider the question of potential CW 
capability in their bilateral talks in 1979 and 1980 or in 
their subsequent draft conventions presented in the CD. Nor 
did they seem interested in the idea. Sweden’s idea evoked 
little interest in the CD partly because of the general belief 
that the prohibitions already agreed would adequately restrict 
the CW potential of states.[188] Also, verifying compliance 
with controls on the planning, organisation and training for 
chemical warfare was considered difficult.[189]
Confidence Building Measures
Confidence building measures (CBMs) figured in the 
American and the Soviet draft conventions and the CD’s 
negotiating format. The American and Soviet approaches
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however differed. The Soviet Union regarded the system of 
declarations to constitute CBMs[l90], whereas the United 
States considered CBMs to be ‘further legally binding 
measures’ for strengthening assurance of compliance in areas 
of paxticular concern, such as limitations on protective 
equipment and data disclosures on the nature of protective 
activities.[191] Also, CBMs were considered necessaxy by the 
United States to enable the ‘prompt detection’ of clandestine 
removal of weapons from storage sites during the 10-year 
destruction period.[192] Similarly, additional verification 
arrangements were deemed ‘particularly important’ for 
providing confidence that stockpiles and facilities had been 
correctly declared - that is, no undeclared stockpiles and 
facilities existed.[193]
Verification
The question of compliance had to be considered in 
relation to a variety of obligations and hypothetical 
situations. The verification system had to deal with 
declarations covering the possession or non-possession of 
stockpiles and facilities; the non-removal of weapons from 
storage sites; the closure and the continued inactive status 
of production facilities; the destruction of weapons and 
facilities; the controlled production of super-toxic lethal 
chemicals, key precursors and other harmful chemicals; the 
non-production of chemical weapons; and the non-use of 
chemical weapons. Verification procedures had to be devised 
not only for specific purposes but also for the general 
purpose of responding to suspicions of breach or clarification 
of ambiguity.
Initially, the American emphasis on the primacy of 
international verification measures diverged sharply from the 
Soviet position that international measures should be regarded 
as supplementary to national means.[194] The Soviet attitude 
changed in 1982, when limited mandatory on-site inspection was 
conceded for verifying the destruction of stockpiles. More 
flexibility followed, but the overall Soviet position 
continued to differ significantly from the American scheme, 
which consisted of systematic on-site inspection, additional
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verification arrangements for confidence building and the easy 
availability of on-site inspection on an ad hoc basis for 
various fact-finding purposes.
Systematic on-site inspection was regarded by the United 
States to be ‘an absolute necessity’ for any future agreement, 
especially because of the ‘the bitter experience of recent 
events [of alleged Soviet non-compliance] in Sverdlovsk (in 
the Soviet Union), south-east Asia and Afghanistan[195] It 
argued that the chemical industry would not be subject to 
undue intrusion, since on-site inspection would only apply to 
‘a limited and carefully defined group of facilities[196] 
The United States sought immediate on-site inspection of 
initial declaration of stockpiles, followed by continuous 
monitoring with on-site instruments along with periodic 
on-site inspection by personnel until the commencement of the 
destruction process.[197] The Soviet Union offered mandatory 
on-site inspection on a quota basis, but only for stockpiles 
held in specialised facilities for destruction. In the case 
of stockpiles held outside such facilities, the principle of 
on-site inspection by consent would apply subject to challenge 
procedures.[198]
The United States also sought immediate on-site 
inspection, followed by on-site inspection on a periodic basis 
and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments for 
confirming the initial declaration of production facilities 
and their inactive status until the commencement of the 
destruction process.[199] The Soviet Union only envisaged the 
possibility of on-site inspection through challenge 
procedures. [200] Mandatory on-site inspection even on a quota 
basis was excluded in the case of facilities. The Soviet 
Union merely suggested that the need for on-site inspection 
could be reduced proportionately if more reliance could be 
placed on inspection by emplacement of sophisticated 
monitoring instruments at the destruction facility.
For verifying the destruction of stockpiles and 
facilities, the United States wanted monitoring with installed 
on-site instruments as well as on-site inspection by 
personnel, both on a continuous basis.[201] Such inspection,
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when the destruction facility was being used for its stated 
purpose, was considered essential because of the need for 
visual surveillance and also for ensuring that the monitoring 
instruments were working properly. In the case of stockpiles, 
though agreeable to continuous monitoring with on-site 
instruments, the Soviet Union initially offered to permit 
on-site inspection by personnel on a quota basis.[202] This 
attitude was later modified. In January 1984 the Soviet Union 
agreed to continuous international inspection by 
personnel.[203] On the destruction of production facilities, 
however, the Soviet Union reverted back to the principle of 
voluntary on-site inspection by challenge.
The question of verifying the production of super-toxic 
lethal chemicals and key precursors also proved difficult to 
resolve. On the question of super-toxic lethal chemicals, 
agreement was reported on the need for on-site 
instruments.[204] But the Soviet Union proposed on-site 
inspection by personnel on a quota basis, whereas the United 
States sought such inspections on a more flexible basis.[205] 
The Soviet Union also failed to provide for the verification 
of facilities previously used for the production of such 
chemicals. __ .
Compliance with controls on the production of key 
precursors could only be addressed in general terms, given the 
absence of an agreed list of key precursors. Proposals for 
such a list remained tentative and the convergence of views 
limited. Even at the level of generalities, however, 
differences of approach between the superpowers were evident. 
A British proposal[206] supported by the United States, 
envisaged periodic on-site inspection on a random basis of all 
facilities used or designed for the production of all types of 
key precursors of super-toxic chemicals, whether lethal or 
not, and also those used or designed for such use in the 
past.[207] On-site inspection would be carried out inside as 
well as outside the facilities.[208] However, facilities 
producing chemicals capable of being used as weapons of 
limited toxicity would not be subject to on-site inspection. 
Because of their limited significance and other practical 
considerations, Britain suggested that verification in such
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cases should be limited to a mere declaration, perhaps 
supplemented by improved national self-control measures.[209] 
The declaxations would only apply to those facilities 
producing the chemicals in question above an agreed 
level.[210] The declaration itself would simply provide 
information about the uses being made of those chemicals.
The British proposal focused on the most dangerous CW 
agents. Intrusive means of verification were confined to a 
relatively small number of facilities. On-site inspections of 
a routine nature would be simple and confidential and also 
kept to a minimum.[211] The Soviet Union accepted on-site 
inspection by personnel, though on a fixed quota basis, of the 
production of super-toxic lethal chemicals to be carried out 
in a single small-scale facility, as agreed in the CD. But it 
was only agreeable to monitoring by on-site instruments and by 
annual data reporting for other lethal and harmful chemicals, 
and even less accommodative towards key precursors.[212]
The Soviet focus on certain key precursors did not cover 
all the particularly dangerous CW agents. As the United 
States had argued, the CW agents banned by the proposed
convention could be produced by alternative methods, even if 
at a slightly lower level of toxicity. On the risk of
evasion, the American approach rested not on prohibition but 
on controlling the production of all key precursors in 
commercial facilities and subjecting them to different degrees 
of monitoring, depending on their military importance and
scale of commercial production. The United States addressed 
the Soviet concern about the intrusion of the chemical
industry by confining routine on-site inspection to facilities 
producing key precursors of only super-toxic CW agents.
Soviet resistance to on-site inspection of key precursors 
- perhaps excluding chemicals with the methyl-phosphorous bond 
was reflected in a more detailed statement by
Czechoslovakia, representing the Socialist Group. The 
statement merely envisaged general supervision of facilities 
producing key precursors of super-toxic CW agents.[213] It 
suggested that the improvement of the ‘international 
atmosphere’ following the destruction of weapons and
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facilities would reduce the need for the more rigorous system 
of control applicable to precursors with the 
methyl-phosphorous bond.[214]
Greater difficulties arose on the question of compliance 
after the destruction of weapons and facilities had been 
completed. The Soviet draft convention did not offer any 
prospects for verifying compliance through compulsory on-site 
inspection. However, the negotiations in the CD seemed to 
suggest that, while retaining the right to refuse request for 
on-site inspection, the Soviet Union was prepared to agree 
that requests would generally be treated favourably and in 
good faith.[215] But the Soviet Union apparently declined the 
suggestion that refusal of requests for on-site inspection 
should be considered ‘an exceptional response’.[216] At any 
rate, the Soviet Union did not concede even limited mandatory 
on-site inspection upon request for fact-finding purposes.
The United States sought compulsory on-site inspection 
upon request and that ‘reasons for concern’ should be 
considered sufficient explanation for making such a 
request. [217] It also proposed that action at the bilateral 
level should not preclude recourse to multilateral action 
through the proposed international control organ.[218] 
Furthermore, prompt international on-site inspection as well 
as other fact-finding measures should be available to states 
upon request by one-third of a 15-member panel to be created 
under the convention.[219] The panel would consist of five 
permanent members - the United States, the Soviet Union, 
China, France and Britain. Other members would be selected 
according to the established procedure for the Security 
Council. States would be under ‘stringent’ obligation to 
permit on-site inspection upon request made through the 
panel.[220] Such a panel would also be empowered to 
investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons and 
evidence of such use would constitute a violation of the 
convention.[221]
A new dimension was added to the verification issue when, 
in April 1984, the United States called for "open invitation" 
inspections - that is, mutual obligations to permit
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international inspection on short notice of all 
military-related and government controlled facilities.[222] 
The United States acknowledged that the intrusion implicit in 
its proposal was unprecedented and could affect sensitive 
activities not related to chemical weapons, but it perceived 
the benefits to outweigh the risks. [223] In rejecting the 
American proposal, the Soviet Union complained that it was 
premised on total distrust between states. The Soviet Union 
regarded the American attitude on verification to be an 
obstacle to any agreement and ‘patently unacceptable’.[224] 
The American approach was dismissed as a ‘propaganda trick’ to 
cover up the Reagan Administration’s alleged plans to embark 
on ‘a large-scale preparation for a chemical war’.[225] 
Speaking on behalf of the Socialist Group, Mongolia maintained 
that the "open invitation" proposal ignored the principles of 
mutual interests and equal security often stressed by the 
Soviet Union.[226] The Soviet Union also charged that the 
American proposal would leave out most private American 
facilities while it would expose the entire Soviet chemical 
industry to intrusive inspection, because of state ownership 
and control of all plants in the Soviet Union. The United 
States claimed that its proposal would not have such an 
unbalanced effect. _— ....
To sum up, whether the production of certain precursors 
should be strictly controlled required further consideration 
in the CD, while the question of verifying the destruction and 
non-production of CW agents was nowhere near resolution. The 
Soviet Union resisted recourse to mandatory on-site inspection 
of facilities other than those engaged in the production of 
the most dangerous chemicals. Differences prevailed on 
procedures for verifying declarations, destruction and 
non-production. More importantly, the question of verifying 
allegations of use and non-compliance in general proved 
extremely contentious and complicated.
Miscellaneous
Another issue that apparently received little attention, 
presumably because of preoccupation with more immediate 
issues, was the Group of 21’s proposal that the future
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convention should contain a provision of international 
assistance to any party whose security might be endangered 
following the fulfilment of its obligations.[227] Such a 
provision was considered important because the Group of 21 
believed that states possessing chemical weapons would be more 
likely to use them against countries less well equipped for 
protection and unable to retaliate in kind.
American CW Policy
American CW policy remained ambiguous for two decades 
after the Second World War. Interest in ratifying the Geneva 
Protocol and in continuing the no-first-use or 
retaliation-only policy adopted during the Second World War 
declined during this period. In 1947 the Truman 
Administration decided not to seek the ratification of the 
Protocol, calling it ‘obsolete’. [228] Pressure also grew 
within the Administration to reverse President Roosevelt’s 
policy of no-first-use.[229] The erosion of this posture began 
with the Administration’s partial support for the Stevenson 
Report in 1950.[230] It accepted the recommendation that 
‘necessary steps be taken to make the United States capable of 
effectively employing toxic chemical agents at the onset of a 
wax’ [emphasis added] . [231] However, doctrinal and combat 
preparations for chemical warfare could not be effectively 
implemented since the no-first-use policy had not been 
officially renounced. [232] Thus, the overall policy lacked 
coherence.
Continued pressure for ‘a more candid recognition of the 
proper place of chemical and biological warfare’[233] 
eventually led to a major public shift of policy in 1958[234], 
though in reality the change might have occurred earlier in 
1956. [235] The Army and the Defense Department wanted to 
integrate all weapons of mass destruction for defensive as 
well as offensive purposes.[236] The shift of strategic policy 
from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’ in the late 
1950s increased pressure for using chemical weapons in waxs, 
whether general or limited.[237] The new policy called for 
‘preparedness’ to engage in chemical warfare, leaving the 
decision to use chemical weapons to the ‘discretion of the
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P r e s i d e n t [238] The change of policy did not necessarily 
imply a complete reversal of the no-first-use posture. But, 
especially because of the attitude of the Army, the Pentagon 
and the State Department, the shift was sufficient to cast 
doubt on the continuation of a no-first-use posture. The 
change at any rate implied a break with the more strict policy 
of no-first-use adopted during the Second World War, when 
first use was categorically rejected as a policy-option.
An attempt in 1959 to get the Congress to reaffirm the 
continued importance of a no-first-use posture proved abortive 
in the face of pressure from the Defense and State Departments 
that chemical or biological weapons should not be 
distinguished from other weapons of mass destruction.[239] The 
Defense Department maintained that chemical weapons were no 
more inhumane than other weapons, asserting that some new 
types of CW agents were in fact less inhumane because they 
could be ‘effectively used for defensive purposes with minimum 
collateral consequences’.[240] In support of its suggestion 
that chemical weapons should not be subject to a no-first-use 
stricture, the State Department declared that ‘adequate 
defensive posture across the entire weapons spectrum’ was 
necessary for defending American and., ‘the free world’s 
security’.[241] President Eisenhower himself when questioned 
in an interview gave a nebulous reply, casting further doubt 
on the status of the no-first-use posture.[242]
American CW policy emerged out of ambiguity and 
incoherence in the mid-1960s. In March 1965, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, announced a no-first-use 
posture in relation to lethal CW agents.[243] Irritant agents 
were specifically excluded. American policy still remained 
unclear on the use of non-lethal agents other than irritant 
agents - namely, incapacitants. However, a new development 
occurred in 1966 when the Johnson Administration supported a 
UN General Assembly resolution urging all states to observe 
the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.[244] It 
was the first time since the Second World War that the 
Protocol received official American approbation. The 
no-first-use posture implied in the support for the Protocol 
was not however intended to include incapacitants and
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irritants. In subsequent statements by Cyrus Vance in 1966 
and 1967 the no-first-use policy was again mentioned in the 
context of ’lethal’ chemical weapons.[245]
In 1969, after a policy review undertaken for the first 
time in 15 years, President Nixon reaffirmed the no-first-use 
posture and also specifically extended the renunciation to 
‘incapacitating chemicals’, showing clearly that the previous 
Administration had excluded incapacitants.[246] President 
Nixon also decided to unilaterally cease CW production. The 
1969 declaration did not however apply to herbicides and 
irritant agents, which were used on a large-scale in 
Indo-China, also by the previous administration. However, 
some months before the declaration, the Defense Department had 
made an ambiguous statement on the question of 
no-first-use.[247]
The Defense Department put forward the Administration’s 
CW policy as ‘part of a broader strategy designed to provide 
the United States with several options for response against 
various forms of attack’.[248] Significantly, the statement 
also said that ‘the United States does not have a policy that 
requires a single and invariable response to any particular 
threat’ and that chemical weapons ‘in many situations may be 
more effective than conventional [high explosive and 
projectile] weapons’. [249] Deterrence was declared to be the 
‘primary objective’ of American policy.[250] The thrust of the 
statement seemed to suggest general deterrence. Reference to 
chemical deterrence would seem unlikely if the intention had 
been to define a no-first-use posture. More importantly, 
despite the declaration of no-first-use by President Nixon, a 
subsequent statement by the American Ambassador in the CCD 
suggested that chemical weapons continued to be valued beyond 
their retaliatory role. [251] The statement was ‘suitably 
modified’ to accommodate President Nixon’s declared 
policy. [252]
Following his declaration, President Nixon sought the 
Senate’s ratification of the Geneva Protocol. But it was not 
until December 1974 that the Senate agreed to do so. Earlier, 
the Senate had objected to President Nixon’s interpretation
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that the prohibition under the Protocol did not include 
herbicides and irritant agents. The interpretation was later 
qualified. The right to first use of herbicides and 
riot-control agents was retained but only for defensive 
purposes. The qualifications were more restrictive on the use 
of herbicides. The resort to riot-control agents was also 
retained inter alia in ‘rear echelon areas outside the combat 
zone to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists 
and paramilitary organisations’.[253]
In their communique of July 1974, following a summit 
meeting in Moscow, the superpowers agreed to undertake a joint 
initiative to conclude multilateral negotiations on a CW 
convention. At American insistence, the proposed negotiations 
would initially focus on banning the most dangerous chemical 
weapons. Concern about verification difficulties was later 
declared to be the reason for seeking a limited ban.[254] But 
the United States did not pursue the joint initiative during 
the Nixon Administration.
At the time of the Nixon declaration in 1969, the 
question of modernising the CW arsenal with new binary weapons 
was left open until the technology .„had been sufficiently 
developed.[255] Meanwhile the focus of R&D effort shifted 
increasingly to binary weapons.[256] President Nixon’s 
decision to cease production of chemical weapons had followed 
a policy-review that down-graded the ‘confirmed status’ of 
previous estimate of the Soviet stockpile. [257] With the 
subsequent development of binary technology, the United States 
decided to modernise its stockpile. In 1973 the Army 
announced a modernisation plan and in the following year the 
Nixon Administration requested Congress for funds to construct 
a binary weapons production plant.[258] The request was turned 
down. A similar request in 1975 was also denied. Congress 
continued to support CW disarmament and wanted more time to 
assess the outcome of negotiations in the CCD.
A review of CW policy was undertaken soon after President 
Carter’s assumption of office in 1977. The new Administration 
decided that the CW arsenal would not be improved while 
negotiations with the Soviet Union continued.[259] During
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hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense 
Secretary Harold Brown reportedly testified that ‘contrary to 
the overly pessimistic description of our present chemical 
weapons stockpile... present stocks of chemical munitions still 
are a "credible” deterrent and they could cause "tremendous" 
damage if actually used against Soviet troops’.[260] President 
Carter also supported a comprehensive CW convention. The 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan caused both the Carter 
Administration and the Congress to modify their position on 
the binary weapons issue. In 1980 the Administration renewed 
the earlier request by the Nixon and Ford Administrations for 
funds to build a binary weapons production plant, which the 
Congress approved. The Administration nevertheless continued 
to pursue bilateral talks with the Soviet Union.
In March 1981 the Reagan Administration’s request for 
funds to obtain additional equipment for the binary production 
plant was also approved by the Congress. [261] The Congress 
however continued to deny authorisation for producing binary 
weapons, despite considerable lobbying efforts by the 
Administration. The Administration sought funds for the 
initial production of binary shells for 155mm artillery and 
‘Big-eye’ bombs for long-range air strikes. Its eagerness to 
proceed with binary weapons was reflected in the funding 
request in 1983 for ‘Big-eye’ bombs despite significant test 
failures, which were reportedly concealed from the 
Congress.[262]
In 1984 the Administration requested $95 million for the 
production of binary bombs and shells[263] and argued along 
two lines in support of immediate CW modernisation. First, it 
contended that the American stockpile no longer represented a 
credible retaliatory force because it was partly obsolete and 
the Soviet Union allegedly possessed a ‘massive arsenal’.[264] 
And, second, the production of binary weapons was considered 
necessary to pressure the Soviet Union in the CD to make 
concessions on the verification issue.[265] Earlier in 1981, 
the Administration had suspended bilateral talks with the 
Soviet Union, making its resumption conditional on prior 
Soviet flexibility on the verification issue. Limited 
acceptance of mandatory on-site inspection by the Soviet Union
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in the CD in 1982 did not change the Administration’s 
attitude; greater flexibility was demanded.
The Carter and Reagan Administrations also differed in 
their planned expenditures for strengthening CW capability. 
Towards the end of his term, President Carter proposed a 
five-year programme at an estimated cost of about $2.5 
billion.[266] The Reagan Administration’s five-year programme 
raised the funding request to $7 billion.[267] The GAO’s 1983 
report suggested that the Defense Department’s five-year plan 
for the 1983-87 period was part of a ten-year programme, 
estimated to cost $14 billion. [268]
In seeking Congressional approval for binary weapons 
production, the Reagan Administration declared chemical 
deterrence to be the aim of its CW policy. It stated that 
‘the United States will never be the first to use chemical 
weapons and will consider their use only in response to 
chemical attacks against us or our allies - and then only in a 
manner intended to discourage further attacks’.[269] The 
statement added that ‘the United States clearly views its 
possession of these weapons as an interim measure to provide 
deterrence until we can achieve a,^complete and verifiable 
chemical-weapon ban’.[270] The stockpile would only be 
qualitatively strengthened by ‘smaller, safer and more 
effective’ binary weapons.[271] The Defense Department however 
considered the existing stock of munitions to be ‘much less’ 
than the required level.[272]
A senior Reagan Administration official maintained that 
the Soviet Union had a CW capability to ‘attack, contaminate 
and severely degrade or halt operations at US or allied 
airfields, ports, supply and maintenance centres, command and 
control facilities and other vital combat support and supply 
functions’. [273] He also stressed the need to acquire a 
capability ’to impose similar restrictions’ on the Soviet 
Union. [274] It would appear unlikely that qualitative 
improvements, including the introduction of ‘Big-eye’ bombs, 
would provide a capability comparable to the Soviet Union’s 
alleged ‘massive’ and much greater arsenal.
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Congressional opposition to the Administration’s CW 
modernisation programme was characterised by a bipartisan 
coalition, consisting of Congressmen who otherwise supported a 
defence build-up. Indeed, the leading opponents were Ed 
Bethune and David Pryor, both Republicans and from the State 
of Arkansas, the location of the binary weapons production 
plant.[275] The two Congressmen did not want the United States 
to abandon the moral ‘high ground’ it enjoyed in relation to 
the Soviet Union since 1969, when the unilateral American 
moratorium on CW production was announced.[276] They 
maintained that the United States had ‘plenty of nerve gas in 
its arsenal now to deter the Russians’ and that additional 
weapons would be ‘almost like bringing a wheelbarrow of sand 
to the Sahara’.[277] Another argument was that the production 
of binary weapons would not immediately strengthen the 
chemical deterrent, because West European countries - the 
principal area of deployment - would be opposed to the 
stationing of such weapons on European soil. [278]
The Congress reportedly made October 1985 the earliest 
deadline for examining CW negotiations in the CD before 
deciding on the production of binary weapons.[279] At any 
rate, the Congress would probably be reluctant to permit an 
increase in the size of the American stockpile. Even the 
Senate, which was more sympathetic than the House of 
Representatives to the Administration’s policy, disapproved 
any quantitative improvement of the stockpile.[280]
To sum up, over the past decade, except during the Carter 
period, American CW policy reflected a clear preference for 
chemical weapons modernisation before engaging in concrete 
negotiations for CW disarmament or even a limited ban. The 
Ford Administration’s decision to begin bilateral talks with 
the Soviet Union and the Reagan Administration’s submission of 
draft conventions in 1983 and 1984 were subsequent to abortive 
efforts to obtain funds from Congress to produce new binary 
weapons. It was presumably clear to the Reagan Administration 
that funding requests in future would probably continue to 
depend on its record of efforts to negotiate CW disarmament in 
the CD.
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Soviet CW Policy
Several factors make it exceedingly difficult to attempt 
a systematic analysis of Soviet CW policy in the past and 
present: Soviet silence about its CW arsenal; lack of 
reliable evidence about the size and composition of the Soviet 
stockpile; wide variations in American estimates of it; 
extremely limited disclosures by the Soviet Union of its CW 
policy; and some uncertainties about Soviet chemical defence 
capability.
From the early 1950s till at least the late 1960s, the 
Soviet Union attached considerable importance to an effective 
CW defence capability. Its initial post-war CW policy 
apparently emerged in response to the American strategy of 
‘massive retaliation’. Reportedly, Soviet interest in CW 
defence began to increase noticeably at the time when the 
United States adopted an active containment policy alongwith 
the ‘massive retaliation’ strategy[28l] (which in turn was 
prompted by perceptions of a global Soviet military threat, 
following the Korean War). Statements by senior Soviet 
military officials in the mid-1950s suggested that defensive 
preparations were at a nascent stage and that little knowledge 
existed about the conduct of chemical warfare in the offensive 
and defensive modes.[282] Nevertheless, Soviet officials 
believed that ‘in the case of mass surprise attacks on the 
part of an aggressor, [chemical weapons could] find very wide 
employment’.[283]
The Soviet Union continued to maintain that the United 
States attached ‘great significance’ to the development of 
chemical and biological weapons for use in a future war.[284] 
Soviet statements in the 1950s and 1960s referred invariably 
to preparations against all means of mass destruction, on the 
assumption that in a general war the United States would also 
be prepared to make first-use of chemical weapons. [285] Soviet 
statements during this period did not dwell on chemical 
warfare in a limited conventional war or an armed conflict 
short of a general war.
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Though difficult to identify and assess all the major 
factors in the formulation of Soviet CW policy in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the following ones at any rate seem important: 
American strategies of ‘massive retaliation’ and subsequently 
‘flexible response’, particularly the former which left the 
question open as to whether chemical weapons would be used 
only for retaliation-in-kind; a concurrent American CW policy 
that was ambiguous about no-first-use; and American failure 
to ratify the Geneva Protocol until much later in 1974.
The Soviet obligation of no-first-use and 
retaliation-only under the Geneva Protocol was not applicable 
to its relations with the United States until about the 
mid-1970s. Like France, the Soviet Union had made a 
reservation when ratifying the Protocol in 1928, excluding the 
obligation of no-first-use in respect of states that had not 
ratified or ’definitely’ acceded to the Protocol.[286] It is 
therefore possible that the principle of no-first-use or 
retaliation-only might not have influenced Soviet CW policy 
towards the United States. However, the acquisition of a 
substantial offensive capability by the Soviet Union since 
American ratification of the Protocol in 1974 would not be in 
keeping with the spirit of the Protocol.. The Protocol does 
not prohibit the production of chemical weapons or limit the 
size of the stockpile, but a significant offensive capability 
would undermine the credibility of a no-first-use policy.
Claims of a significant Soviet offensive capability have 
been made since the late 1960s, particularly since the early 
1970s. The available evidence however has been far from 
reliable. Claims of a substantial Soviet self-defence 
capability - in terms of organisation, training and protective 
equipment - are more credible. But this does not necessarily 
imply the existence of a major offensive capability.
Almost all Soviet official statements and printed 
material in Soviet military journals to which reference has 
often been made in support of the claim of an offensive Soviet 
CW policy could just as well explain a defensive posture. 
Such statements have also been misinterpreted and sometimes 
quoted out of context or presented in a distorted manner.[287]
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There has however been one reference to printed material in a 
Soviet military journal which, if correct, would leave little 
doubt about an offensive Soviet posture. A Soviet 
middle-ranking militaxy official was quoted as having written 
that ‘chemical shells and missiles may be considered just 
ordinary weapons available to the militaxy commanders to be 
used routinely when the situation calls for it’.[288] But, the 
name of the author or the title of the military journal was 
not mentioned.
Yet, while giving abundant publicity to its defensive 
preparations, the Soviet Union persisted with its 
long-standing policy of silence on the size and composition of 
its retaliatory capability. It has only implicitly admitted 
that it possesses a deterrent capability. Soviet statements 
in recent years alleged that the United States had the world’s 
laxgest CW arsenal. The Soviet Union went to the extent of 
denying high Western estimates of its stockpile, suggesting 
that it was less than 150,000 tons of CW agents - the figure 
it cited for the American stockpile. The Western estimates 
range from a capacity for limited retaliation to a massive 
offensive capability. Even estimates of Soviet self-defence 
capability differ substantially, especially in comparison to 
similar American capability.
Apart from inadequate data, another factor that has 
contributed significantly to the controversy over Soviet CW 
capability has been the politics of defence policy in the 
United States. The pursuit of CW rearmament over the past 
decade met with significant opposition from the Congress. It 
was largely during this period - particularly the more recent 
one - that the Soviet Union was alleged to possess a ‘massive’ 
CW arsenal, several times larger than the one held by the 
United States. The Soviet Union’s ‘frequently expressed 
desire’ for negotiating CW disarmament was regarded simply as 
‘a deception or a propaganda move whose objective is to 
frustrate US efforts to redress the imbalance, thus prolonging 
the asymmetry in their own favour’.[289]
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Despite expressions of interest in CW disarmament, the 
Soviet position that national measures of verification should 
be central remained almost unchanged throughout the 1970s. 
The bilateral talks in the late 1970s failed to make any 
substantial progress on the crucial issue of verification. 
Extreme Soviet rigidity during this period strongly suggested 
a lack of serious interest in negotiations. It was not until 
1982 that some encouraging signs of Soviet flexibility were in 
evidence. But this could have been a calculated move to delay 
the introduction of binary weapons by the United States. The 
possible objective could have been either to catch up with 
American binary technology or acquire a lead in a chemical 
arms race considered imminent.
In recent years, the United States repeatedly accused the 
Soviet Union of chemical warfare in Afghanistan and by proxy 
in Indo-China. But the evidence cited has been highly 
controversial. Official American allegations were challenged 
by experts, whose alternative theory for the presence of 
mycotoxins in Indo-China was initially ridiculed by many, but 
later gained more acceptance.[290] Indeed, the Reagan 
Administration’s approach tended to weaken its credibility and 
made it vulnerable to some scathing Soviet criticism.[291] In 
any case, the evidence put forward by the United States cannot 
be regarded - at least as yet - as conclusive proof or 
compellingly indicative of Soviet guilt. In the case of 
Indo-China, the main evidence consisted of blood, urine and 
tissue samples purportedly taken from victims of chemical 
attacks, and also environmental samples from sites of reported 
chemical attacks. In relation to Afghanistan, the crucial 
evidence was a single contaminated gas-mask, apparently 
belonging to a Soviet military personnel. [292] In 1982 a 
four-member UN team, headed by an Egyptian general, 
investigated the charges of chemical warfare in Afghanistan 
and Indo-China. In December 1982, after receiving the report, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution, with 83 positive 
votes out of a total of 138, observing that no definite proof 
could be found, but the circumstantial evidence suggested ‘the 
possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some 
instances’.[293]
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To sum up, till the late 1960s, when the need for CW 
disarmament gained general recognition in the UN, Soviet CW 
policy seemed content with the partial regime established by 
the Geneva Protocol. The Soviet Union attempted primarily to 
prevent further use of herbicides and irritant agents by the 
United States. During this period Soviet CW policy was 
apparently based on the assumption of an offensive American CW 
strategy. The Soviet Union engaged in, at the very least, a 
major build-up of its self-defence capability. After the 
declaration of no-first-use by the United States in 1969, the 
Soviet Union criticised the delay in American ratification of 
the Geneva Protocol and the lack of American interest in 
substantive negotiations for a comprehensive CW convention. 
The Soviet position during the 1970s - that verification 
should depend largely on national self-control measures - cast 
serious doubt however on Soviet interest in negotiating a CW 
ban.
The bilateral talks with the Carter Administration 
witnessed some shift in Soviet attitudes on the verification 
issue. But a noticeable display of flexibility occurred later 
during substantive negotiations in the CD. Further 
flexibility seemed very unlikely. In January 1984 the Soviet 
Union proposed that a chemical weapons free zone should be 
attempted in Europe as a step towards a universal ban. 
Presumably alluding to the verification issue, the proposal 
considered it ‘undesirable for the complex technical questions 
that are the subject of [negotiations in the CD] to be 
introduced in the European talks’.[294] But the Soviet Union 
showed little interest in achieving chemical arms control by 
way of a negotiated treaty. A political statement was 
preferred because such a method would make it ‘possible to 
bypass some intricate issues of a technical nature’.[295]
Briefly, the nature of the Soviet proposal for Europe 
suggested a definite decline of interest in CW disarmament, 
whether partial or comprehensive. It indicated little 
prospect of any further modification of Soviet attitude on the 
verification issue. It also seemed directed at encouraging 
West European reluctance to accept the deployment of binary 
weapons likely to be produced by the United States in the near
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future. 
Assessment
Chemical weapons disarmament was introduced in the CCD’s 
agenda in 1968, but approximately a decade passed before any 
major effort was made to commence negotiations. The question 
of giving priority to a biological weapons convention took the 
CCD’s attention away from chemical weapons for the first few 
years. Then, the United States insisted that CW negotiations 
should initially seek the elimination of the most dangerous 
chemical weapons. The Soviet Union eventually agreed to a 
limited ban but American initiative was not forthcoming. 
Meanwhile, deliberations in the CCD continued without a clear 
purpose, in anticipation since 1974 of a joint initiative by 
the superpowers. The bilateral talks finally started in 1976. 
But the talks were actively pursued during the Carter period, 
when the United States also moved from a limited ban to a 
comprehensive prohibition. Despite the bilateral talks, the 
joint initiative proved difficult. Little progress was made 
on the verification issue, and the talks were promptly 
abandoned when President Reagan took office.
Before the bilateral talks were broken-off the CD’s 
involvement had already started, though only in a preliminary 
way. Despite procedural wrangles which took up some of the 
CD’s time, a fairly elaborate effort was made in 1982 and 1983 
to develop a negotiating text. The verification issue however 
proved too contentious and the negotiations slackened in 1984, 
amidst Soviet criticism of American efforts to make its draft 
convention the centre-piece of the CD’s negotiating text. [296]
The protection of industrial secrets and minimal 
disturbance to the chemical industry were concerns the Soviet 
Union had also expressed during deliberations in the CCD, when 
opposing intrusive verification measures. Yet, the British 
proposal for limiting the impact of verification measures, 
made the bulk of the chemical industry immune from on-site 
inspection. The Soviet Union was more sensitive about the 
possibilities of misuse of ad hoc on-site inspection 
procedures for political and general espionage purposes.
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Routine on-site inspection of declared stockpiles and 
production facilities would have provided limited 
opportunities for general espionage purposes. But compulsory 
on-site inspection at very short notice for verifying 
compliance with the convention as a whole, could have been 
used frequently to gain access to different parts of the 
Soviet territory and its military-industrial centres. While 
routine inspection to ensure compliance with the destruction 
of weapons and facilities would cease after the 10-year period 
for destruction, ad hoc inspection for fact-finding purposes 
would exist as a permanent feature of the convention.
Given the extent of intrusion sought by the United States 
for monitoring CW disarmament, the Soviet Union would have to 
go a long way to meet those requirements, further than the 
Kermlin has been either prepared or required to go in other 
arms control agreements or negotiations. Indeed, Soviet 
acceptance of certain verification measures in CW negotiations 
went beyond the limited on-site inspection it briefly agreed 
to in the early 1960s during negotiations for a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban treaty.
A more substantial change of Soviet.attitude would mark 
an unprecedented departure from its traditional opposition to 
intrusive verification measures. The fear that on-site 
inspection on request and at very short notice for various 
fact-finding purposes could be used for ulterior purposes 
probably had a crucial bearing on Soviet assessment of the 
costs and benefits of a CW convention. Acceptance of 
significant verification measures for CW disarmament would 
have also made it difficult for the Soviet Union to oppose 
similar measures for other arms control agreements.
The United States has traditionally emphasised 
verification measures for arms control agreements. In the 
rather exceptional case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 
such demands were overlooked because of the belief at the time 
that biological weapons would be extremely difficult to employ 
in war in any meaningful manner. The United States 
consistently demanded strict verification measures for CW 
disarmament since deliberations on this subject started in
Page 241
1968. Suspicion of Soviet use of chemical weapons and other 
allegations of Soviet non-compliance with some existing axms 
control agreements added a new dimension to the verification 
issue, making it more complicated and contentious. Yet, the 
Reagan Administration’s attitude continued to harden to an 
unusual extent. Arguably, the degree of intrusion embodied in 
the American approach suggested that the United States was not 
simply interested in CW disarmament but also sought additional 
political and military gains otherwise difficult to secure 
or rather that the additional gains accruing from easy access 
to almost all parts of the Soviet territory probably made CW 
disarmament a desirable objective.
Despite some display of flexibility, the Soviet approach 
did not address the danger of clandestine CW production, nor 
did it go fax enough in dealing with the question of 
allegations of use. Specifically, the Soviet Union failed to 
provide some measure of ad hoc on-site inspection for 
fact-finding purposes. Soviet reluctance was also evident in 
its opposition to the inclusion of a special fact-finding body 
in a future international control organ.
The American scheme would not hav.e~_ involved a . dramatic 
‘opening-up’ of Soviet society but it would have clearly been 
be an unprecedented step in that direction. Since the 
American society is relatively ‘open’, the Kremlin probably 
views its own secretiveness as an advantage. For that reason, 
its acceptance of the American scheme is probably perceived as 
a highly significant gain for the United States, much in the 
way of a zero-sum game. The Soviet ruling elite probably
regards secrecy to be too important an asset for domestic and 
international purposes to trade away for any arms control 
agreements, or at least those considered to be of limited 
value. Soviet interest in arms control could well be minimal 
or tentative with regard to non-strategic weapons, since a 
competitive build-up of such weapons would have little impact 
on the strategic balance.
The Reagan Administration’s desire to exert pressure on 
the Soviet Union during negotiations in the CD could not 
materialise because of Congressional disapproval. But the
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danger that the United States might begin a major weapons 
modernisation programme, unless the negotiations showed 
progress, would have exercised some pressure on the Soviet 
Union. The threat of impending binary weapons production was 
made fairly credible by Congressional approval of funds to 
construct a production plant in 1981. The modification of 
Soviet position on verification in 1982 and subsequently could 
have been a result of such pressure.
Congressional opposition prevented the outbreak of a 
chemical arms race in binary technology during President 
Reagan’s first term. But Congressional attitude changed in 
1985, when the question of binary weapons was to be 
re-examined. Paxtly because of the Administration’s success 
in convincing Congressmen about the greater safety of binary 
weapons, opposition in the House of Representative weakened, 
while support in the Senate increased. Some influential 
Democrats, notably Les Aspin, also supported the lifting of 
the 1969 moratorium on CW production.[297] In July 1985, a 
panel of Congressmen from both chambers agreed to lift the 
restriction on CW production.[298] The Administration was 
merely required to consult with NATO allies on the question of 
deployment of binary weapons in Western Europe. The House of 
Representatives withdrew its earlier demand that production 
should be linked to NATO’s consent on deployment in Western 
Europe.
The decision to authorise funds for binary weapons 
production will in all probability prompt a competitive Soviet 
response and lead to a major arms race. Pressures from the 
Army and other quarters in the United States to abandon the 
no-first-use policy and to regard chemical weapons as valuable 
for selective first-use - as witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s 
- could re-surface. The introduction of binaries reflects a 
wider interest in the modernisation of the CW arsenal - a 
process that could go on well into the 1990s.[299] But the 
danger of a patently offensive CW policy does not seem 
serious, because of constraints imposed by the Geneva Protocol 
and the difficulty of evading domestic scrutiny. Concern 
about such a development in the Soviet Union is greater, 
partly because of grounds for suspecting Soviet disregard of
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the Protocol in one form or another in recent year's and partly 
because concealment is easier in the Soviet Union. The danger 
however would be real of a major increase in the size and 
quality of the American CW arsenal, unless the Congress 
continued to insist on restraint. In the absence of progress 
in CW negotiations, those in favour of a major build-up would 
be in a stronger position to seek Congressional support for a 
more aggressive CW policy.
The recent failure of CW negotiations has increased the 
threat of a major chemical arms race in the near future. 
Along with its WTO allies, the Soviet Union warned that the 
production of binaries by the United States would ‘inevitably 
lead to a further dangerous spiral in the chemical arms 
race’.[300] The introduction of binaries would probably set in 
motion a drawn-out arms race. As the Soviet Union somewhat 
revealingly pointed out: ‘In the long-term, the range of 
chemicals capable of being used as components in these weapons 
will expand considerably, with a corresponding expansion of 
the range of binary mixtures of varying effect [not merely 
paralysis of the nervous system]’. [301] Binaries would also 
compound the difficulties of reaching agreement on CW 
disarmament in future. Again, as the.Soviet Union asserted: 
‘The basic difficulty in solving the problem of prohibiting 
chemical weapons stems from their particular nature: it is 
the difficulty of separating commercial chemicals from those 
which can be used for chemical weapons. The emergence of 
binary weapons will considerably complicate this already 
difficult problem’.[302]
The Reagan Administration’s eagerness to proceed with the 
production of binary weapons cast some doubt on the 
seriousness of its interest in CW disarmament. If Congress 
had acceded to the Administration’s repeated requests in 1982 
and 1983, the effect on CW negotiations would very likely have 
been counter-productive. The introduction of binary weapons 
would have further complicated the verification and control 
issues.
Page 244
Briefly, the failure of recent CW negotiations has raised 
the danger of a major chemical arms race between the 
superpowers. Such a development would make the progress of CW 
negotiations more difficult in future. The failure heightens 
the danger of further horizontal proliferation in the 
immediate years ahead. The Geneva Protocol is the only 
existing legal regime that deals comprehensively with the use 
of chemical weapons, but it does not prohibit the development, 
production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. The 
legality of transfer would permit the superpowers or other 
states in future to bolster the military capability of their 
allies and clients. States could develop their own capability 
for defensive or offensive purposes at affordable cost and 
without encountering serious technical difficulties.
Before long, the inevitable diffusion of technology would 
make the proliferation of binary weapons possible. The danger 
of terrorist groups employing chemical weapons would be 
greater in the absence of a CW disarmament agreement, partly 
because suitable chemicals can be obtained or manufactured 
without great difficulty.[303] Also, the introduction and 
subsequent dissemination of binary technology would make the 
handling of chemical weapons safer Tand therefore more 
attractive. An arms race in binaries will make CW disarmament 
a more remote possibility. This in turn would further weaken 
the impact of the Geneva Protocol’s prohibition of use.
Conclusions
During the first 25 years of the post-war period, the 
Soviet Union did not display any interest in CW negotiations, 
while the United States had no clear policy and seemed averse 
to constraints on its military power. The commitment of the 
superpowers remained doubtful even after CW disarmament became 
part of the agreed international agenda for arms control 
negotiations. American interest in CW negotiations increased 
markedly during the Carter period. The Reagan Administration 
also showed interest by way of presenting draft conventions in 
the CD. But this was perhaps a result of Congressional 
pressure. A shift in Soviet stance on verification during the 
1982-84 period suggested some interest in CW negotiations.
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But Soviet interest in CW negotiations evidently declined in 
January 1984; in August of that year in the CD the Soviet 
Union displayed an obvious reluctance to discuss the 
verification issue.[304]
The CW negotiations made some tangible progress in 1982 
and 1983. The progress however was too limited and the 
verification issue too contentious to encourage optimism about 
the near future and perhaps even the foreseeable future. A 
number of issues remained unresolved during CW negotiations in 
the CD, such as the verification of compliance with 
wide-ranging obligations, the control of precursors, and the 
status of herbicides and riot-control agents. Several other 
issues did not receive sufficient attention, including 
security assurances to states against violations of the 
convention, extension of the prohibition to CW training, 
controls on the production and acquisition of super-toxic 
chemicals, and the functions of the proposed international 
control organ.
Despite insufficient consideration of some issues, the CW 
negotiations had reached a stage where it seemed clear that 
the principal stumbling-block was the verification issue. The 
main parties to the issue were the superpowers and their 
differences were considerable. The resolution of the 
verification issue will depend on a dramatic change of 
attitude of one or the other superpower, or alternatively on 
substantial compromises. Even the latter seems unlikely, at 
least for the near future. An extended arms race in binaries 
is a very likely scenario. Such a development will add 
greatly to the onerous difficulties of reaching agreement on 
CW disarmament in future.
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NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE 
PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT
Introduction
General disarmament was not a declared goal of the 
international community in the immediate post-war years. A 
less radical concept of collective security, as reflected in 
the UN Charter, underscored the prevailing consensus. The 
initial focus was exclusively on the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons and an international system of control for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. A commission to negotiate 
such measures was established by the UN in 1946[l], and was 
followed in 1947 by the creation of another commission for the 
regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed 
forces.[2] Differences between superpowers over the procedure 
for prohibiting nuclear weapons and the scope of control over 
nuclear energy could not however be resolved, while the Soviet 
Union continued to object to a separate treatment of nuclear 
and conventional weapons.[3] Confronting an impasse, the two 
commissions ceased functioning in 1950, and in 1952 a unified 
disarmament commission was established.[4]
For most of the 1950s, proposals for a comprehensive 
programme of disarmament (CPD) tended more often to focus on 
varying degrees of arms control than on general disarmament. 
General Assembly resolutions on the subject invariably spoke 
in terms of the regulation and reduction [emphasis added] of 
armaments and armed forces. [5] A marked change in trend 
occurred in 1959, reflected in a major resolution adopted 
unanimously by the General Assembly towards the end of that 
year. The resolution spoke more unequivocally about putting 
an end ’completely and forever’ to "the arms race and about 
‘general and complete disarmament’[6], a term Premier 
Khrushchev had coined a little earlier in a speech at the 
General Assembly.[7]
A joint statement of principles issued by the superpowers 
in 1961 linked the CPD concept more closely to the goal of 
general disarmament. In 1962 both countries presented major 
proposals for a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
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The ensuing negotiations ground to a halt in 1964. A few 
years later the CPD concept was revived in connection with the 
General Assembly’s proclamation of the 1970s as the 
Disarmament Decade. However, it was not until 1978, following 
SSODI, that this subject was once again actively considered 
and introduced in the CD for negotiations.
Historical Background
The idea of a 4comprehensive and coordinated’ programme 
of disarmament was first put forward in August 1951 by the 
Committee of Twelve.[8] Established by the General Assembly, 
in addition to Canada, the Committee comprised the members of 
the Security Council. In its report the Committee recommended 
the establishment of a Disarmament Commission to integrate the 
work of the two hitherto separate commissions on conventional 
and nuclear weapons.[9] In April 1952 the United States 
submitted a proposal to the Disarmament Commission spelling 
out the essential principles for fashioning a disarmament 
programme.[10] It intended to make war ‘inherently impossible’ 
as an instrument for settling disputes between states and for 
this purpose sought the reduction of weapons and armed forces 
to a level consistent with the maintenance of internal 
security.[ll] The process of reduction was to be undertaken in 
a manner that would prevent any 4disequilibrium of power 
dangerous to peace’.[12] Another principle required the states 
to provide for ‘progressive and continuing disclosure and 
verification [in order] to achieve the open world in which 
alone there [could] be effective disarmament’.[13]
In June 1954, France and Britain made a joint proposal 
for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons but only 
limited control of conventional weapons and armed forces.[14] 
In May 1955, the Soviet Union also proposed the elimination of 
nuclear weapons but only limited reduction of conventional 
weapons and armed forces through a two-stage programme to be 
carried out in two years.[15] The Soviet proposal was followed 
about a year later by a provisional American proposal that 
discussed the requirements for initiating the first phase of a 
comprehensive disarmament programme.[ 16] The first phase was 
linked to the pursuit of limited arms control objectives, such
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as reducing political tensions, counteracting the danger of 
surprise attack, preventing a further escalation of the arras 
race, and creating conditions for advancing the disarmament 
process. The American proposal concentrated on issues of 
verification and administrative control and left the question 
of measures for the proposed Armaments Control Organisation to 
decide at a later stage. Central to American preoccupation 
was acceptance by states of a strict system of international 
control prior to an agreement on disarmament measures for the 
programme’s first phase, for which limited objectives were 
clearly envisaged.
The American position differed significantly from the 
joint proposal of the Western Group of states presented 
earlier in March 1955.[17] In the joint proposal the United 
States had agreed that a reduction of conventional weapons and 
armed forces to pre-determined levels would be followed by 
nuclear disarmament which France and Britain had initially 
proposed in the interest of reaching a compromise agreement 
with the Soviet Union. A later American proposal of April 
1956 also differed from the guidelines proposed even earlier 
in April 1952, when a substantial reduction of weapons and 
armed forces was regarded by the United States to be one of 
the essential principles of a disarmament programme.
France and Britain modified their position in March 1956 
in another attempt to bridge the cleavage between the American 
and Soviet positions.[18] Their joint proposal suggested a 
three-stage disarmament programme for the partial reduction of 
conventional weapons and armed forces of all states in 
accordance with pre-determined levels. The disarmament 
programme did not address the question of general disarmament, 
even as a long-term goal. The main objective of the 
Anglo-French proposal apparently was the reduction of the 
danger of war, particularly the prevention of surprise attack. 
Another Soviet proposal in March 1957 essentially reflected 
the approach it had previously advanced.[19]
The superpowers differed on the importance of nuclear 
disarmament, the extent of reduction of conventional forces, 
and the scope of the inspection and control system. A
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difficult problem for the progress of negotiations was 
American unwillingness to accept obligatory measures and also 
its desire to link every stage of a limited arms reduction 
process to a favourable assessment of the prevailing 
international political situation.[20] The Soviet Union 
insisted on ‘clear-cut commitments’ and objected to the arms 
reduction process being made ‘contingent on the solution of 
various political issues’.[21]
Renewed efforts were made in 1959 to revive disarmament 
negotiations. A meeting of the foreign envoys of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France held in Geneva in 
September 1959 produced a joint communique which expressed 
agreement to resume disarmament negotiations.[22] Almost 
immediately Britain proposed an outline for a CPD, envisaging 
a progressive three-stage disarmament process that sought a 
CTB in the first stage and significant disarmament measures in 
the second stage, to be followed in the third and final stage 
by a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other 
non-conventional weapons.[23] The final reduction of 
conventional weapons and armed forces to a level consistent 
with the requirements of internal security was linked to 
progress in nuclear weapons reduction___
The British initiative was immediately followed by an 
ambitious Soviet proposal for a programme of ‘general and 
complete disarmament’.[24] The Soviet Union now sought ‘not 
the balance of armaments, which every state endeavours to 
interpret in such a way as to turn it to its own advantage, 
but the inability of states to wage a war for lack of material 
means’.[25] The proposed programme was to be carried out in 
the shortest possible time. A four-year period was suggested. 
The proposal, which was made in a speech by Premier Khrushchev 
at the General Assembly, met with positive response from the 
United States, though doubt was expressed about Soviet 
willingness to resolve the verification issue and establish an 
international control system able to effectively maintain 
international peace.[26]
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Subsequently, the Soviet Union modified its position in a 
more detailed proposal presented in June 1960.[27] The new 
programme differed significantly from the previous one, in 
that the emphasis shifted from conventional to nuclear 
disarmament measures in the early stages of the disarmament 
process. In June 1960, shortly after Soviet rejection of a 
joint Western proposal, the United States submitted a revised 
programme for general disarmament to the newly-constituted 
TNDC in Geneva.[28] The programme consisted of three stages; 
measures in each stage would be carried out in a phased 
sequence and within specified time-periods. The progress of 
the disarmament programme would depend on a positive decision 
before the beginning of each stage as to whether the 
requirements of verification had been met. The ultimate goal 
of disarmament was visualised in terms of a world consisting 
of ‘free and open societies’. [29]
One Soviet criticism, similar to that directed at the 
previous joint Western proposal, was that the American 
programme was too limited in scope[30], being described as 
‘not disarmament under international control... but control 
over armaments’ and, as such, a programme that would serve 
more the purpose of conducting ^ ..espionage. [31] Another 
criticism leveled at the American proposal was that it offered 
no assurance that the second and third stages of the programme 
would be implemented after the completion of the first stage. 
In the Soviet view the American programme was drafted in such 
a way that ‘the point of their practical application [may] 
never be reached at all’.[32]
The situation improved a year later when the superpowers 
signed a joint statement of principles to govern their 
proposals for a disarmament programme.[33] Apart from defining 
the nature of general disarmament, the joint statement 
stipulated that a CPD should be implemented in stages; within 
specified time limits; in a manner that would avoid creating 
military imbalances; and that the progress of the disarmament 
programme should be subject to review at each stage in order 
to determine by common agreement whether past measures were 
being complied with and the requirements of verification for 
the next stage had been met. In 1962, both countries
Page 274
submitted major proposals for general disarmament to the 
newly-constituted ENDC in Geneva.
The Soviet draft treaty envisaged a three-stage programme 
for implementation in four years - each of the first two 
stages in fifteen months and the third stage in one year.[34] 
The Soviet programme was subsequently revised, with the period 
of time for the programme’s implementation being extended by 
an additional year and the stress on nuclear disarmament 
measures during the first stage being somewhat reduced.[35] 
The American draft treaty also envisaged a three-stage 
disarmament programme, but differed on the question of 
time-span. Each of the first two stages would be spread over 
three years and the third stage would be implemented ’as 
promptly as possible’.[36] Under the American programme the 
disarmament process would be closely monitored and its 
progress from one stage to the next, and from one phase to the 
next within each stage, would be subject to a favourable 
decision about the working of verification procedures. The 
application of verification procedures extended beyond the 
weapons to be reduced, to those to be retained, in order to 
obtain assurance that existing stockpiles did not exceed 
agreed levels. Unlike the United Sjtates, the Soviet Union 
sought significant nuclear disarmament measures during the 
first stage. Similarly, the dismantling of foreign military 
bases (of which the Soviets had very few) and the withdrawal 
of foreign troops was placed in the first stage by the Soviet 
Union. The United States, by contrast, put such measures in 
the final stage.
The superpowers attempted to develop a joint draft treaty 
but failed to make any significant progress in the initial 
effort on the introductory part of such a treaty.[37] Indeed, 
even the title of the treaty became a contentious issue. [38] 
Differences could not be resolved on the question of military 
bases; the balance to be struck between nuclear and 
conventional disarmament measures; whether or not the 
equipment of the proposed international police force should 
include nuclear weapons; and the linkage between the progress 
of the disarmament process and the scope of verification 
procedures.
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The Soviet Union continued to press for nuclear 
disarmament before the final stage of the programme and for 
starting such a process in a substantial way in the first 
stage. The United States wished to reserve such measures for 
a much later stage of the programme. The Soviet Union also 
objected strongly to any verification procedure that would 
have the effect of exposing sensitive military secrets while 
armaments and armed forces continued to exist in large 
numbers.[39] It maintained that intrusive verification 
procedures at an early stage of the disarmament process - that 
is, while the means of waging war were still intact - would 
create a sense of vulnerability and thus increase insecurity 
and exacerbate the danger of war. The American suggestion for 
adopting the ‘zonal’ approach[40] for carrying out inspections 
failed to assuage Soviet apprehensions about the ‘danger of 
important military information being disclosed which might be 
used to the detriment of the security of states’.[41]
The Soviet Union sought an excessively short period for 
the implementation of disarmament and rather revealingly 
focused on eliminating American military advantages in the 
first two stages. Moreover, it offered little assurance that
the disarmament process would not be_.aborted or violated,
leaving the Soviet Union with a favourable military balance 
that would have been difficult to secure through military 
competition. The United States was equivocal about the goal 
of disarmament. Even with respect to arms control, it sought 
a mechanism that could have provided the means to arrest or 
retard the disarmament process with little procedural 
difficulty. Mutual suspicion seemed too deep-rooted for the 
parties to have confidence in each other’s willingness to 
engage in a disarmament exercise. Sharp ideological 
differences also burdened the disarmament negotiations with 
basic disagreement about the nature of a disarmed society.
Briefly then, the superpowers showed little interest in 
pursuing disarmament. Their negotiations appeared to be 
dominated by power-political motivations. Perhaps in part 
reflecting its sense of strategic inferiority, the Soviet 
Union consistently sought the elimination of American nuclear 
superiority and the weakening of American military strength
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abroad, especially in the central theatre of Europe. For the 
most part, the United States seemed preoccupied with ‘opening 
up’ the Soviet territory and the workings of the Soviet 
political and defence system to the outside world and to its 
own monitoring capabilities. However, towards the end of 
disarmament negotiations in the ENDC, the American approach 
became more balanced. But the Soviet attitude remained 
essentially unchanged, both on substantive measures and 
verification provisions.
The ‘spirit’ of Camp David, following the meeting in 1959 
between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, was 
hardly reflected in disarmament negotiations in terms of 
flexibility of approach. Neither did the Vienna summit 
meeting in 1961 between President Kennedy and Premier 
Khrushchev lead to any tangible change of attitude. The ‘Cold 
War’ permeated the disarmament negotiations. The Cuban 
Missile crisis in late 1962 did however subsequently moderate 
the American posture, but the Soviet interest in disarmament 
negotiations declined further. After the humiliation suffered 
during the Cuban Missile crisis, the Soviet Union confined its 
focus to specific measures for eliminating nuclear weapons.
Background to Recent CPD Negotiations
The process that led uneasily to CPD negotiations in the 
early 1980s began with a major General Assembly resolution in 
December 1969, declaring the 1970s to be the Disarmament 
Decade. The resolution urged the CCD to elaborate a 
comprehensive programme ‘dealing with all aspects of the 
problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and 
complete disarmament under effective international control’, 
which would provide the CCD with ‘a guideline to chart...the 
course of its future work and its negotiations’.[42] The CCD 
was also urged to simultaneously intensify its efforts on 
specific arms control measures.
The proposal for the adoption of such a resolution had 
come from the UN’s Secretary General U Thant, who believed the 
world stood at ‘a most critical crossroad’.[43] The 
competitive build-up of arms between the superpowers was
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perceived to pose a serious threat to the security of states, 
the survival of mankind, and incurred heavy social and 
economic burdens. A CPD, he hoped, would reflect a 
wide-ranging ‘global partnership’, not only to stem the arms 
race but also to improve the human environment, defuse the 
population explosion and generate the momentum required for 
‘world development e f f o r t s [44] U Thant felt that, unless 
such a partnership emerged within a decade, these problems 
might reach ‘such staggering proportions that they would be 
beyond our capacity to c o n t r o l [45] He proposed that a CPD 
should be ‘balanced and flexible rather than rigid’, though 
priority should be given initially to controlling the nuclear 
arms race.[46]
Since the failure of disarmament negotiations in the 
early 1960s, the ENDC’s focus had shifted to specific 
measures. The concern among many member-states had grown that 
the ENDC’s work had drifted away from the issue of general 
disarmament which they generally considered to be the UN’s 
principal task since 1959. The agenda adopted by the ENDC in 
August 1968 for the following year, for instance, had placed 
the question of general disarmament at the bottom of its list 
of priorities.[47] The adoption of the-resolution seeking CPD 
negotiations was soon followed by attempts on the part of some 
states in the CCD to engage in a more organised consideration 
of the issue. The Netherlands, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia 
called for the resumption of negotiations on general 
disarmament on the basis of joint principles agreed between 
the superpowers in September 1961.[48] The Netherlands 
observed that at the time of ENDC’s creation, the General 
Assembly had recommended uninterrupted CPD negotiations on the 
basis of fundamental principles agreed earlier between the 
superpowers. One of these principles stated that efforts 
directed towards specific measures should not deflect 
attention from the CPD issue but rather that these measures 
should ‘facilitate and form part of [the CPD] programme’.[49] 
Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia attempted to gain the CCD’s 
acceptance of their view that the UN should play a primary 
role in disarmament negotiations and also that the CCD should 
reaffirm the General Assembly’s resolution of 1959, declaxing 
general disarmament to be ‘the most important [question]
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facing the world today’.[50]
Exploratory discussions in 1976 resulted in the CCD’s 
decision to consider the CPD question in the following 
year.[5l] Differences of opinion on the proposed CPD’s nature 
persisted in the CCD but the decision was finally taken to 
establish a working group. [52] Accordingly, in March 1978 a 
working group was constituted, which soon began its 
preliminary work of settling procedural and other 
organisational matters.[53] The Working Group’s task was to 
develop a draft CPD on the basis of all relevant proposals 
made since the joint statement of principles by the 
superpowers in the early 1960s. Proposals were also submitted 
to the Preparatory Committee holding the General Assembly’s 
first special session on disarmament (SSODI), where the CPD 
question was actively considered.
It was clear from the meetings of the Preparatory 
Committee and also from the problems encountered at SSODI that 
the CPD negotiations would prove difficult.[54] Yet, the fact 
that a final document was agreed at SSODI - an event described 
as ‘no small miracle’ - seemed to offer an opening for 
embarking on CPD negotiations with some, hope of success.[55]
The Final Document reaffirmed the CPD’s importance and 
defined its purpose to be a coherent scheme of specific arms 
control measures that would ultimately lead to the goal of 
general disarmament.[56] Much ground-work on the CPD question 
was done at SSODI, and the Final Document provided a point of 
reference for further efforts in this field. In addition, at 
SSODI a Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was created, comprising 
all member-states of the UN, to serve as a permanent 
deliberative body. Inter alia, “the UNDC was instructed to 
make recommendations to assist the work of the CD on the CPD 
question. [57] Accordingly, in 1979 the subject was taken up in 
the UNDC, to which the non-aligned, socialist and western 
groups of states submitted working papers.[58] China also 
demonstrated its interest in CPD negotiations by presenting a 
general statement of its outlook on the question.[59]
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The UNDC succeeded in its task to the extent that it 
adopted a recommendatory report in June 1979, containing the 
basic structure and the general substance of a CPD.[60] 
Nevertheless, it was clear from the deliberations in the UNDC 
and from clarifications made by various member-states before 
the adoption of the report, that areas of disagreement were 
considerable, despite expressions of general satisfaction with 
the UNDC’s report.[61] The United States and Britain felt that 
the issue of horizontal nuclear proliferation had not been 
properly addressed.[62] Britain also expressed displeasure 
with the way the issue of nuclear disarmament had been 
treated.[63] The report had indeed urged that ‘special 
attention’ be given to the nuclear arms race in the first 
phase of the programme.[64] The Soviet Union, while generally 
satisfied with the report’s stress on curbing the nuclear arms 
race, said it was disappointed with the lack of consensus in 
the UNDC on two of its proposals: a ban on the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons in the territory of other states where such 
weapons did not exist; and the elimination of military bases 
in foreign territory as well as the withdrawal of foreign 
troops.[65]
China’s reservations reflected its preoccupation with the 
responsibility of states in the disarmament process. China 
wanted more emphasis to be given to the primary responsibility 
of the superpowers for arms control and disarmament and also, 
more broadly, for international peace and security. In 
particular, China felt that the UNDC’s report was too vague 
about superpower responsibility in the area of conventional 
arms limitation and reduction.[66] The Group of 21 was 
disappointed with the UNDC’s failure to agree to the 
dismantling of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of 
foreign troops, and the prohibition of the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons.[67]
Agreement was however reached on the basic structure 
(though not the substance) of a CPD.[68] The comprehensive 
programme would consist of six substantive chapters along with 
a preamble or introduction. The chapters would cover the 
following subjects: objectives, principles, priorities, 
measures, stages of implementation, and machinery and
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procedure. The UNDC’s report enabled the CD to proceed with 
substantive work on the CPD question, which marked the 
beginning of negotiations on the subject after a lapse of 
fifteen years.
Negotiations in the CD
The Western Group envisaged disarmament under an 
‘effective’ and ‘strict’ system of international control. The 
other two groups did not subscribe to such a rigorous 
definition of the control system. The contention over the 
term ‘strict’ was related to the verification issue which the 
Western Group wanted to be strongly emphasised. The Western 
Group also wished to ensure that, at a minimum, the 
disarmament process would not at any stage diminish or 
unbalance the security of states and that the process would 
incorporate all states and regions. The Western Group linked 
the disarmament process to strict adherence by states to the 
principles stipulated in the UN Charter, particularly the 
non-use of force.
The Socialist Group’s apparent consent to engage in a 
disarmament process rested on the recognition by other states 
that the existing military balance between the central 
alliances was equitable and therefore should not be disturbed 
during the reduction process. The Socialist Group also 
stressed that the disarmament process should be guided by the 
principle of ‘equal security’. Thus, the Western Group’s 
reference to the UN Charter implicitly contrasted with the 
Socialist Group’s unilateral concept of equal security. The 
former’s idea of disarmament did not go beyond the structure 
envisaged in the UN Charter, while the latter’s outlook fell 
short of it.
The Group of 21 was by far the most ambitious. It sought 
to establish a link between the pursuit of disarmament and the 
creation of a new international economic order. Peace, 
security, and socio-economic development were declared to be 
indivisible goals. The Group of 21 strongly objected to the 
continued existence of military alliances and it was only 
prepared to accept the system of collective security envisaged
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in the UN Charter as a stage of transition to the goal of 
general disarmament.
The deliberations in the CD on the CPD issue also 
revealed that the superpowers and their allies were primarily 
interested in arms control. The three groups differed 
considerably on the CPD’s role in the arms control area. The 
Group of 21 sought an agreement that would make it difficult 
for states to abandon the arms control process or renege on 
negotiating specific measures. The central alliances put 
forward a much looser concept of CPD. The Western Group in 
particular did not wish to enter into any firm commitments, 
preferring a CPD that would be largely confined to holding 
periodic conferences to review the situation.
The deliberations in the CD also revealed disagreements 
on the principles that should determine the arms control 
process. In addition, disagreements existed on the inclusion 
of certain measures and on the overall balance of obligations 
or undertakings between states. Unlike the Group of 21, the 
central alliances defined the CPD concept primarily in terms 
of arms control. But even as an arms control exercise, the 
Western Group displayed little interest in committing itself 
to a structured process or to the CPD’s initial phase. 
Indeed, the Western Group appeared to be skeptical about the 
foreseeable importance of arms control for its security. In 
part this was probably because of disappointment with its 
recent experience with arms control.
Though ostensibly more interested in a CPD than the 
Western Group, the Socialist Group envisaged a gradual process 
of arms reduction. More importantly, the Socialist Group 
insisted on the highly contentious principle of equal security 
and on acceptance by states of the existing military balance 
as ein equitable basis for pursuing reductions. The Group of 
21’s outlook on arms control drew from its definition of a CPD 
as a general disarmament exercise. At any rate, the Group of 
21 was not prepared to accept a milder version of the CPD 
concept unless the first phase of the arms control process 
included certain substantive measures in the nuclear arms 
control area.
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The Group of 21 desired a tightly regulated process of 
arms control that would lead over a relatively short period of 
time to the goal of disarmament as well as a new international 
economic order that would address the economic and related 
concerns of most Third World states. The Group of 21’s 
concept of disarmament was not however sufficiently clear or 
elaborated. The political aspects of security, such as 
procedures for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, 
were not addressed in the proposals submitted in the CD. The 
end envisaged by the Western Group was not strictly 
disarmament but rather a cautious process of arms control 
supported and facilitated by an increasingly strict observance 
by states of the principles of the UN Charter. No firm 
commitment was made to such an end-result or indeed to a 
continuation of the process. Both the ends and means were to 
be subject to periodic review.
Apart from simply declaring its acceptance of disarmament 
as a long-term goal, the Socialist Group’s CPD proposals did 
not envisage either a system of disarmament or a system 
similar to the one alluded to by the Western Group. Of the 
three groups, the Socialist outlook was more status guo 
oriented. The three groups appeared to be preoccupied with 
their own interests during the deliberations in the CD, 
including the Group of 21 at whose initiative the CPD question 
was introduced in the CD’s agenda. In other words, the 
question of disarmament suffered from either obvious lack of 
interest or merely display of apparent interest on all sides.
The CPD negotiations in the CD began with the 
re-establishment of a special working group in 1980, on the 
basis of the general structure suggested by the UNDC.[69] The 
CD initially engaged in a general exchange of views on various 
aspects of the prospective programme. It was hoped that this 
would lay the basis for drafting negotiated texts on different 
subjects in the following year.[70] The CD was expected to 
complete its preparation of a draft CPD in time for submission 
to the General Assembly’s second special session on 
disarmament (SSODII), scheduled for mid-1982.[71] The general 
exchange of views helped to clarify the magnitude of the work 
involved in attempting to elaborate a CPD. It became clear
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that disagreements existed on a variety of issues affecting 
both the form and content of a CPD.
In 1981, the CD undertook a preliminaxy examination of 
all the major aspects of the subject-matter.[72] It was agreed 
that work on the introductory part of the programme should be 
set aside for a later stage, after the essential points of 
contention had been resolved. The consideration of each 
chapter of the prospective programme was undertaken on the 
basis of working papers submitted by member-states, the 
provisions of the Final Document, and the UNDC’s 1979 
report.[73] The chapters dealing with ‘Measures’ and ‘Stages 
of Implementation’ were considered jointly. This was followed 
by an exclusive focus on the question of measures for 
inclusion in the first stage of the programme. The initial 
consideration of ‘Measures’ was based on the understanding 
that the exercise would be exploratory - that is, it would not 
be binding.[74]
In late 1981 and early 1982, major working papers were 
submitted by the three groups of states, and this took the 
negotiating process beyond the preliminary stage. Hectic 
diplomacy at the SSODII in mid-1982 could not provide a 
breakthrough. Yet, the special session added greatly to the 
momentum of CPD negotiations in the CD. Nevertheless, the 
CD’s 1983 sessions failed to produce an acceptable overall 
compromise. A subsidiary body was reconstituted in 1984 but 
it was soon decided by that body that the circumstances for 
pursuing CPD negotiations were unfavourable. Even in the CD’s 
plenary meetings, little discussion took place on the CPD 
question. Also, some members of the Group of 21 seemed to 
lose interest, at least temporarily, in the resumption of 
negotiations.[75]
Objectives
In the UNDC’s recommendatory report of 1979, the 
suggested long-term objectives of a CPD were: general and 
complete disarmament; the avoidance of the danger of war; 
and the creation of conditions for establishing a durable 
peace as well as a new international economic order.[76] The
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immediate objectives were: a curb on the arms race in all its 
aspects; the initiation of a global disarmament process; and 
the reduction of tensions, including the building of 
confidence between states.[77] In the CD, the three groups 
agreed that one of the long-term objectives should be general 
and complete disarmament and also that the immediate 
objectives should include the curbing of the arms race, the 
initiation of the disarmament process, and the reduction of 
tensions as well as the raising of confidence levels between 
states. But there were other contentious points and on 
balance their disagreements were more significant.
The Socialist Group’s position was that general 
disarmament under ‘effective’ international control should be 
the ‘ultimate’ objective.[78] Among the immediate objectives, 
the non-controversial ones were: halting the arms race, 
facilitating durable international peace, and reducing 
international tensions. The contentious ones were: the 
prevention of ‘nuclear catastrophe’ and the strengthening of 
‘peaceful coexistence of states with different social 
structures’. The Soviet position indicated a primary concern 
with the danger of nuclear war and military confrontation 
between the two superpowers, and their avoidance through a 
series of nuclear and non-nuclear arms control measures. The 
CPD’s objective was declared to be the complete elimination of 
all weapons. But the reference to ‘all weapons’ did not 
appear to be consistent with the thrust of the Soviet proposal 
which seemed devoted to short and medium term concerns. 
Earlier, in a general statement, the Socialist Group had 
stressed the importance of seeking ‘practical agreements’ for 
curbing the arms race.[79] Thus the Socialist Group’s 
preoccupation seems to have been with arms control measures, 
with a minimal display of interest in general disarmament.
The Western Group spoke of the CPD’s ultimate objective 
to be general and complete disarmament. But, unlike the 
Socialist Group, it put special emphasis on the importance of 
verification, declaring that the system of international 
control should be both ‘effective’ and ‘strict’. The Western 
Group also referred to the principle of undiminished security 
of states during the disarmament process.[80] Other objectives
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were not mentioned initially, apart from the general statement 
that the CPD should help to strengthen international peace and 
security along the lines laid down in the UN Chaxter. 
Subsequently, a more elaborate proposal was presented in the 
CD whose immediate objectives included the consolidation of 
agreements already reached, the halting of the arms race, and 
the relaxation of international tensions as well as confidence 
building. Presumably to placate the Group of 21, the Western 
Group agreed that the CPD should contribute effectively to the 
social and economic development of states, especially the 
developing states.
The Group of 21 also spoke of the CPD’s ultimate goal to 
be general disarmament but, following the Socialist Group, the 
international control system was defined only in terms of the 
criterion ‘effective’. In addition, the Group of 21 wanted 
the disarmament process to facilitate the creation of a new 
international economic order. Like the central alliances, the 
Group of 21 included among a CPD’s immediate objectives the 
initiation of a global disarmament process, the relaxation of 
international tensions, and the halting of the arms race. 
But, it put more emphasis on the urgency of curbing the arms 
race and thus on the need to commence and expedite relevant 
negotiations. A CPD was also required to help mobilise world 
public opinion in support of disarmament. Like the Socialist 
Group, the Group of 21 regarded the most immediate objective 
to be the elimination of the danger of nuclear wax and the 
curbing of the nuclear weapons aspect of the axms race.
The three groups of states agreed that the ultimate goal 
of a CPD should be general disarmament - that is, the 
limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and axmed 
forces to a level consistent with internal security, and a ban 
on all other weapons and armed forces. But they differed in 
their approach in several important respects. In particulax, 
the Group of 21 gave prominence to general disarmament and 
linked the disarmament programme closely to the pursuit of 
that goal. The Western and Socialist Groups seemed more 
concerned about specific arms control agreements and about the 
short value of a disarmament process.
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For the most part the text of the CD’s initial work on 
CPD was cluttered with brackets, indicating strong 
reservations either on the form or content of various 
proposals.[81] A small number of proposals survived being cast 
in brackets but even these were among the least substantive in 
character. Two such proposals referred to the relaxation of 
international tensions as a perennial objective of the CPD, 
and the initiation and stimulation of a global disarmament 
process as one of the immediate objectives. [82]
The CD’s last report in 1983 contained a modified 
negotiated text on ‘objectives’ which was without 
brackets.[83] Although without brackets, the 1983 text did not 
represent a firm or final agreement among the member-states. 
The work had been carried out on the understanding that final 
positions would be taken only after agreement had been reached 
on all major points of disagreement and the CPD had been 
elaborated in its entirety.[84] In other words, the 
formulations put in the unbracketed text were not binding on 
the member-states. Yet, the text, based on provisional 
compromise, represented a step forward in that it helped to 
clarify a possible basis of agreement and also the 
difficulties of arriving at one. Though not significant for 
the outcome of negotiations, it nevertheless offered a more 
structured approach to the problem, being organised on the 
basis of three categories of objectives - the ultimate, the 
immediate, and the perennial.
Some of the objectives that had been bracketed in the 
initial text were reformulated to strike a balance between the 
divergent positions of the three groups. Other contentious 
ones were put selectively in the modified text so as to 
establish a compromise. The proposal by the Group of 21 and 
the Socialist Group that the most immediate objective should 
be the elimination of the danger of war, was amended to read, 
‘to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear wax, 
the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task 
of the present day’.[85] An exclusive focus on nuclear wax was 
avoided to placate the United States and almost to an equal 
degree the Western Group as a whole. Similarly, the Group of 
21’s proposal emphasising the urgency of negotiations was
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altered in such a way that the commitment to negotiate was 
mellowed down to accord with the Western Group’s approach but 
without understating the former’s concerns about the nucleax 
arms race.[86] In other words, the problem as defined by the 
Group of 21 was retained but not its prescription for starting 
and expediting negotiations on an urgent basis.
By selective inclusion, the three groups of states were 
able to get at least one of their proposals into the text 
unaltered.[87] The ultimate objective of the CPD was defined 
in terms that incorporated the Group of 21’s proposal for a 
new international economic order. Similarly, the Western 
Group’s proposal that an objective throughout the disarmament 
programme should be the strengthening of ‘international peace 
and security as well as the individual security of states’ (in 
accordance with the UN Charter) was also incorporated in the 
CD’s 1983 text.[88] The Soviet proposal on peaceful 
coexistence between states was also included. But in 
deference to the Western Group’s sensitivity to the proposal’s 
ideological implications, a milder formulation was chosen from 
the Final Document to cover the general point of the Soviet 
proposal.[89]
Principles
The initial text of the CD’s work on ‘Principles’ 
consisted of 48 self-contained paragraphs, about half of which 
were put within brackets, either in whole or in part.[90] Most 
of the proposals were taken verbatim from the Final Document. 
The situation worsened during the SSODII when the subject was 
negotiated again in a special subsidiary body.[91] The text of 
the CD’s work in 1983 also showed no improvement. It 
contained 39 independent paragraphs - 9 less than the initial 
text, of which 14 were subject to reservation in their 
entirety.[92]
Views also differed on how the subject should be 
approached and treated. The Group of 21 desired an elaborate 
text containing a large number of principles. Its proposal 
consisted of 33 separate paragraphs, drawn almost entirely 
from the Final Document and for the most part reproduced
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without amendments or modifications.[93] On the assumption 
that a CPD would be a ‘self-contained’ document, the Group of 
21 axgued that the section should therefore ‘encompass in 
extenso all the principles that are thought to be relevant, 
including even those that are not to be found in the Final 
Document but which may be found appropriate[94] Since some 
of the proposals for inclusion could not be strictly 
classified as principles, the Group of 21, anxious to buttress 
its CPD approach as much as possible, suggested that the title 
of the section could be broadened to read ‘Principles and 
guidelines’.[95]
The Socialist Group preferred an approach obviating the 
need to spell out the principles in the text of the CPD. It 
suggested that the CD should simply make reference to the 
relevant provisions of the Final Document. [96] The Socialist 
Group nevertheless accepted the Group of 21’s elaborate 
proposal as a basis for further consideration, and presented 
several of its own points for inclusion in that document.[97] 
An important proposal which attracted reservation from the 
outset, declared that ‘the existing balance in the field of 
nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with 
the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced’.[98] 
The Western Group strongly disagreed with the notion that the 
military balance between the central alliances was equitable. 
The proposal was eventually deleted from the CD’s text. 
Suffering a similar fate, another Soviet proposal stated: ‘In 
the negotiations between parties approximately equal 
militarily the principle of equality and equal security must 
be strictly observed’.[99] However, one important Soviet 
proposal survived in the CD’s text. It wanted a CPD to 
stipulate the adoption of ‘parallel political and 
international legal measure’s in a CPD, in addition to 
measures of a military nature. [100] Presumably, this referred 
to Soviet proposals for joint declarations on mutual 
non-aggression and on renouncing the first use of nuclear 
weapons.
The Western Group preferred a short text limited to 
defining some essential principles, especially the need to 
maintain balance, stability, security, and confidence about
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compliance with agreements.[101] It also proposed setting out 
the responsibility of states in the disarmament process, with 
no distinction being made between different militarily 
significant states. That is, all such states should be 
treated in equal terms in the exercise of responsibility 
towards curbing the arms race.[102] The special responsibility 
of the nuclear weapon states was recognised only in relation 
to nuclear disarmament measures. In addition, a balance was 
sought between measures related to nuclear and conventional 
weapons in order to avoid ‘destabilising effects’ during the 
disarmament process.[103] In particular, measures proposed for 
adoption in a CPD would have to ensure that no state or group 
of states gained an advantage over the other.[104] The 
security of all states would have to be ‘assured and 
safeguarded’ throughout the disarmament process.[105] 
Similarly, disarmament measures would have to ensure the 
maintenance of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ in all regions.[106] 
The norms of behaviour set out in the UN Charter would have to 
be ‘scrupulously’ respected. [107] ‘Effective’ verification was 
also mentioned as a fundamental principle. However, only one 
of these proposals was included in its entirety in the CD’s 
1983 text - the one about maintaining the undiminished 
security of states and ensuring that no state or group of 
states obtained advantages over other states during the 
disarmament process.[108]
Several proposals by different groups failed to attract a 
consensus of opinion in the CD throughout the negotiations. 
One such proposal sought to condemn the arms race, 
particularly the nuclear weapons aspect of it, for aggravating 
the international political situation and also for preventing 
its amelioration.[109] Another abortive proposal by the Group 
of 21 sharply criticised the dependence of states on military 
alliances and the pursuit of military balances through 
doctrines of deterrence and military superiority.[110] It 
urged instead the pursuit of general disarmament through the 
collective security system envisaged in the UN Charter. A 
third such proposal by the Group of 21 spoke about reaffirming 
the commitment of mankind to the goal of general disarmament 
and the conviction of states of the goal’s ‘utmost 
importance’. [ill] The proposal also declared peace, security
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and socio-economic development to be indivisible goals. Even 
an alternative formulation expunged of the reference to 
popular conviction failed to win consensus. [112] Most of the 
other proposals emanating from the Group of 21, which 
attracted strong reservations from the outset, were related to 
the UN’s role in the promotion of disarmament, particularly in 
relation to mobilising world public opinion.[113]
Some proposals survived being bracketed in the eaxly 
stages of negotiations, but were denied sustained approval or 
even reluctant acceptance. A significant proposal in this 
regard, presumably emanating from the Group of 21, declared 
the halting of the arms race and the goal of general 
disarmament to be ‘tasks of primary importance and 
u r g e n c y [114] Another such proposal by the Group of 21 and 
the Socialist Group referred exclusively to nuclear weapons, 
perceiving such weapons to pose ‘the greatest danger to 
mankind and the survival of civilisation’.[115] A third, of 
particular concern to the Socialist Group, put forward the 
proposition that ‘progress on detente and progress on 
disarmament [would] mutually complement and strengthen each 
other’.[116]
The numerous paragraphs which comprised the CD’s 1983 
text were intended to be read independently of one another. 
Yet, many of them overlapped, some to a considerable extent. 
Moreover, some paragraphs represented guidelines or outlines 
of specific measures. Sensitivity of the groups to the 
possible implications of a particular formulation meant that 
sometimes different formulations had to be made about the same 
subject to meet the preoccupations of different states or 
groups of states. Attempts were sometimes made to accommodate 
the variations in the positions of member-states within a 
single paragraph. Such efforts often failed or resulted in a 
complex verbal form that was either internally inconsistent or 
almost incomprehensible. The negotiations on ‘Principles’ 
departed from the guideline recommended by the UNDC’s 1979 
report, which had recommended that the principles enunciated 
in the Final Document should be strictly followed. [117] This 
implied that those principles should be either supplanted en 
masse into the draft CPD or such a draft should simply point
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to them as its terms of reference, as preferred by the 
Socialist Group.
The adoption of the Group of 21’s framework compounded 
the problem presented by the mutual link between progress on 
’Principles’ and ‘Measures’ because the Group of 21’s 
extensive coverage of principles also included some guidelines 
for measures. Yet, the Socialist Group’s preference for a 
mere reference to the Final Document raised problems, since 
the Final Document no longer enjoyed consensus. Moreover, its 
provisions were not always consistent. The Western Group’s 
suggestion for a limited set of fundamental principles would 
have reduced the burden of work and the size and perhaps the 
superfluity of the text. But, most of the points the Western 
Group wished to emphasise, such as those about balance, 
stability, effective verification, and the responsibility of 
states, were highly contentious.
Measures
The UNDC’s guidelines stated ambiguously that the CPD 
should ‘encompass all measures thought advisable’ to achieve 
general disarmament and enduring international peace and 
security.[118] By qualifying all measures to those thought 
advisable, the UNDC left the question essentially unresolved. 
The Group of 21’s proposal in the CD was by far the most 
elaborate and wide-ranging.[119] The programme of measures 
consisted of four stages. In the first stage the superpowers 
were required to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems by at least 20 percent and by a further 50 
percent in the second stage. The 50 percent reduction in the 
second stage would also apply to tactical nuclear weapons and 
other lesser types of nuclear weapons. The nucleax weapons of 
other nuclear weapon states would be subject to ‘agreed 
proportionate reduction’ in the second stage. The elimination 
of nuclear weapons would be completed in the third stage.
The elimination of conventional forces, barring light 
arms and contingents for internal security purposes, would be 
accomplished in the fourth stage. The conventional forces of 
the superpowers would be subject to a 25 percent reduction in
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each of the three preceding stages. ’Smaller proportionate 
reductions’ in the first stage and ’proportionate reductions’ 
in the second stage would be imposed on the conventional 
forces of ‘other militarily significant states’. All other 
states were required to freeze their conventional forces in 
line with pre-determined ceilings in the second stage.
In the first stage the superpowers were also required to 
conclude negotiations to stop and reverse the qualitative 
aspect of the nuclear arms race. There would be a ban on the 
development, testing and deployment of new types or improved 
versions of existing types of nuclear weapons, anti-satellite 
weapons and anti-ballistic missiles. MIRVed nuclear warheads 
would be destroyed. In the second stage, negotiations begun 
in the first stage would have to be concluded to prohibit the 
production of all kinds of nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems, as well as fissionable material for military 
purposes.
On horizontal nuclear proliferation, the Group of 21’s 
proposal reflected the influence of non-nuclear weapon states 
not parties to the NPT. The proposal did not provide any 
specific undertaking in the first and second stages, apart 
from a CTB and its application to all states in the first 
stage. But such a treaty would not prohibit PNEs. A mild and 
somewhat nebulous formulation was offered to the effect that 
in the first stage the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states 
would jointly exert efforts to develop an ‘international 
consensus’ to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The horizontal and vertical aspects of nuclear proliferation 
would be regarded as an inseparable problem and the envisaged 
consensus would not in any case prejudice the right of states 
to unhindered peaceful nuclear pursuits.
Apart from the superpowers, specific reductions of 
conventional forces were envisaged for other central alliance 
states, in the first stage, along with the dismantling of 
foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops in 
Europe. No concrete measures were proposed in the first and 
second stages for the limitation and reduction of conventional 
forces in other regions, particularly where tensions were high
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or a high level of forces existed. In this regard, the Group 
of 21’s proposal only envisaged consultations and conferences 
aimed at exploring such possibilities. Similarly, on control 
of international arms transfers, consultations between 
supplier and recipient states were proposed for the first 
stage and multilateral agreements for the second stage if 
consultations in the first stage proved successful. The Group 
of 21 also spelled out certain countervailing principles 
limiting the prospects of control of arms transfer, such as 
the right of self-defence and the right to self-determination 
of nations under colonial or foreign domination.
The Group of 21 also focused on the projection of 
military power especially by extra-regional states. In the 
first stage, foreign occupation forces would be withdrawn and 
all states, particularly the major powers, would undertake to 
refrain from the use or threat of use of force in the conduct 
of their relations with other states. This would be followed 
in the second stage by the ‘dismantling of all foreign 
military bases and [the] elimination of all foreign military 
presence from all regions of the world’. Steps would be taken 
in the first stage to reduce the risks of armed conflict by 
accident, miscalculation, or poor communication in all regions 
of the world. Confidence building measures were mentioned but 
mainly in relation to Europe, where military exercises would 
have to be made more transparent. Otherwise, the draft 
proposal simply reaffirmed the universal importance of 
confidence building measures, merely constraining states to 
consult with one another in their respective regions.
The Socialist Group wanted the CPD to contain the 
’maximum possible number of measures’[120], and sought the 
elimination of nuclear weapons and an unspecified reduction of 
the conventional forces of nuclear weapon states and other 
states allied to them through military agreements.[121] The 
reduction of conventional forces would follow an initial 
freeze. The Socialist Group did not offer a structured 
programme but rather a list of measures to be adopted at 
various, unspecified stages of the programme. It was however 
clear that a ban on the development of new types of nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems was envisaged for the first
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stage. It also seemed clear that the reduction of the nuclear 
weapon stockpile would proceed gradually. Some of the other
measures for nuclear arms control were: a ban on the
production of nuclear weapons in general and fissionable
nuclear weapon material; a ban on the development and
deployment of neutron weapons; a declaration against the
first use of nuclear weapons; and universal adherence to the
NPT.
Non-nuclear measures proposed by the Socialist Group 
included: control of international arms transfers; 
prohibition of weapons in outer space; reduction of 
conventional forces in Central Europe as well as other 
regions; confidence building measures in Europe, in addition 
to those agreed at the Helsinki Conference in 1975; the 
dismantling of alliance-systems in Europe; limitations on 
military presence and military activities in some areas of the 
high seas, such as the Mediterranean sea and the Persian Gulf; 
and the withdrawal of military forces from foreign territories 
as well as the removal of foreign military bases. Political 
measures included a treaty to reaffirm the commitment of all 
states not to use force in inter-state relations; and the 
establishment of a close link between disarmament measures and 
the reallocation of resources for social and economic 
development, especially of developing countries. The 
reduction of nuclear weapons however would be undertaken on 
the understanding that ‘the existing balance in the sphere of 
nuclear strength must remain undisturbed at all stages’. More 
generally, the whole process of arms control and the 
strengthening of international security would be pursued on 
the basis of ‘equal security’ between the superpowers. The 
Socialist Group also proposed additional measures for 
inclusion in the programme’s first stage. [122] These included 
the limitation and reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles 
in Europe, and the limitation on the naval activities of NATO 
and WTO - in particular, the reduction of zones of navigation 
by nuclear armed submarines.
The Western Group wanted a CPD to be a ‘carefully worked 
out package of inter-related measures’.[123] But little 
enthusiasm for a CPD seemed evident when the Western Group
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subsequently proposed that the formulation of measures for 
negotiations should take into account ‘the complexities and 
difficulties involved in the problems which affect the vital 
security interests of all states’.[124] Its proposal contained 
a list of measures to be initiated - though not in all cases 
concluded - in the programme’s first stage. A CTB was 
mentioned along with such on-going negotiations as strategic 
arms limitation, conventional force reduction and confidence 
building measures in Europe. The Western Group also sought 
measures to strengthen existing international agreements on 
nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional weapons. 
Significantly, all states would be required to adhere to the 
NPT, and further measures would be taken to reinforce the 
horizontal non-proliferation regime. Several political and 
other confidence building measures were also earmarked for the 
first stage, such as negative security assurances to 
non-nuclear weapon states, data disclosures on militaxy 
expenditure, and limitations on military exercises. A number 
of measures were listed for inclusion in the second and 
subsequent stages of the programme. But decisions about the 
relationship between measures and their stages would be taken 
on the basis of consensus at the review conferences. Such 
conferences would only come into play after the first stage 
had been allowed to run its course for an unspecified period 
of time. The listed measures for the second and subsequent 
stages included a ban on the qualitative improvement of 
nuclear weapons; a ban on the production of fissionable 
material for military purposes; a ban on the production of 
nuclear weapons and delivery systems; additional unspecified 
steps to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; 
and a further strengthening of various arms control agreements 
in existence.
The Western Group stressed the adoption of confidence 
building measures throughout the disarmament process because 
they would improve the chances of success of negotiations, 
help to consolidate arms control negotiations already 
concluded and facilitate progress towards more substantive 
measures. The results of studies jointly undertaken by 
states, presumably through established UN procedures, also 
occupied an important place in the Western Group’s CPD scheme.
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Such inter-governmental studies would assist the review 
conferences to make concrete recommendations for future 
negotiations. The disarmament process would move gradually 
insofar as it concerned the limitation and reduction of 
armaments and armed forces.
The Group of 21 and the Socialist Group sought 
significant and wide-ranging measures for the first stage, 
while on the whole the Western Group was considerably less 
ambitious. A significant difference between the Group of 21, 
on the one hand, and the Western and Socialist Groups, on the 
other, related to nuclear non-proliferation. The central 
alliances envisaged universal adherence to the NPT during the 
first stage, whereas the Group of 21 did not wish to make any 
such commitment for the first or second stage. Another major 
difference between the Group of 21 and the Western Group 
existed on the question of balance between measures aimed at 
the control of conventional and nuclear weapons. The former’s 
proposal envisaged nuclear disarmament in the third stage, but 
conventional disarmament in the fourth stage. Also, with 
respect to the earlier stages of a CPD, the commitments sought 
for the control of nuclear arms were generally more 
unequivocal than those for conventional, weapons. The Group of 
21 gave more importance to nuclear disarmament and to the 
responsibility of the major powers, particularly the 
superpowers, for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
The CD’s initial work on ‘Measures’ produced an elaborate 
text but one replete with brackets and reservations. [125] A 
major effort made during SSODII to improve the text saw little 
success. The CD’s work in 1983 however resulted in a much 
shorter text, more orderly in structure and without square 
brackets, though still plagued by a few reservations.[126] 
This was made possible partly because some of the issues were 
treated superficially or kept pending or even deleted in some 
important cases. Attitudes also showed more flexibility, no 
doubt facilitated by a prior understanding that the text would 
not compromise the final positions of member-states. In a 
number of instances, less stringent measures were formulated. 
Thus, in some cases it became possible to dispense with the
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use of multiple paragraphs to cover a particular issue. The 
progress made was however too limited to lead to a 
breakthrough.
The limited progress made since SSODII was mainly 
confined to the issue of nuclear disarmament measures to be 
initiated in the first stage of the CPD. The scope of such 
measures was substantially reduced. [127] The Group of 21 and 
the Socialist Group had sought the conclusion of negotiations 
in the first stage on a variety of specific measures, such as 
the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of 
MIRVed nuclear delivery systems, ABMs, anti-satellite weapons, 
and all other types of nuclear warheads and delivery 
systems. [128] All such measures were eventually removed. 
Instead, reference was simply made to freezing the nucleax 
arms race and putting a stop to the production of fissionable 
material for weapons purposes. Such measures, along with the 
reduction of existing nuclear arsenals, would be negotiated 
‘at appropriate stages’.[129] In other words, the scope of 
nuclear disarmament measures and also the obligations assumed 
by the nuclear weapon states were scaled down considerably. 
The obligation was limited to conducting negotiations. The 
question of concluding agreements was Left, open to unspecified 
‘appropriate stages’.
Varying degrees of progress occurred on the following 
issues: CTB; the responsibility of states towards the 
nuclear disarmament process; negative security assurances to 
non-nuclear weapon states; and nuclear non-proliferation. 
But progress was superficial, being largely an exercise at 
textual improvement to create a semblance of compromise, as 
notably on the CTB and nuclear non-proliferation issues. At 
any rate, the precarious balance achieved in this way allowed 
the groups to enter their reservations, since the compromise 
text was susceptible to conflicting interpretations.
Two contentious subjects were deleted from the CD’s 1983 
text - the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in other states 
and the withdrawal of foreign troops as well as the 
dismantling of foreign military bases. Both proposals 
essentially belonged to the Socialist Group and dealt largely
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with the European security situation. Narrowing the scope of 
measures also helped to lessen the potential for sharp 
disagreements. This was done not only with nuclear 
disarmament measures, but also to a significant extent with 
confidence building measures. Nevertheless, the negotiations 
in the CD provided some indication of the scope of a possible 
agreement on this subject at the present juncture.
The text on ‘Measures’ as it stood - with the scope 
substantially reduced and the measures less strictly 
formulated - leaned more towards meeting the concerns of the 
United States and the Western Group in general. Much of the 
compromises were made by the Group of 21 and the Socialist 
Group - the more ambitious groups or groups that tabled more 
self-serving proposals, especially the Socialists. Mexico had 
generally led the Group of 21 on the CPD negotiations. At the 
end of SSODII the Mexican representative had asserted, 
alluding to the Group of 21, that ‘it was unlikely that in the 
history of multilateral negotiations there was any case in 
which one of the negotiating sides’ had been so 
compromising.[130] In particular, the formulation of the CTB 
issue in the CD’s 1983 text substantially departed from the 
Group of 21’s position, as part of Mexico ’.s-frantic search for 
an overall compromise to save CD negotiations from utter 
failure.
Stages and Time Frames
The CD first worked on the basis of a four-stage 
programme as envisaged by the Group of 21. But under pressure 
from the Western Group, especially the United States, the 
number of stages was reduced to three: the second and third 
stages were redefined more loosely as intermediate and last, 
respectively. Later, because of American insistence, the work 
on a draft CPD focused entirely on the first stage. The 
second and subsequent stages were temporarily kept out of the 
CD’s purview.
Initially, the Group of 21 had proposed a four-stage 
programme along with an elaborate set of measures for each of 
these stages. The Western Group had argued that it would be
Page 299
premature and unrealistic to spell out the contents of the 
second and subsequent stages, particularly because ‘the future 
course of arms control and disarmament [could not] be foreseen 
with certainty’. [131] Therefore, the task of giving substance 
to later stages of the programme should properly be the 
preserve of periodic review conferences. The Western Group 
also argued that confidence building measures, regarded by it 
as a salient feature of a CPD, could only be devised at the 
time of implementation, in order to adapt such measures to the 
‘unforeseeable and changing requirements of the security 
situation’.[132]
The Western Group did not believe in the advance 
preparation and finalisation of a detailed scheme of measures 
as well as their allocation to particular stages of the 
programme. The CPD was expected to identify in broad terms 
rather than elaborate, measures to be pursued in the initial 
phase, and to register the intention of states to build upon 
the results of the first phase through periodic diplomatic 
efforts. The measures intended for subsequent stages of the 
disarmament process would be given a concrete form at special 
review conferences to be held at intervals. The concept of 
stages was meant to help evaluate.** the progress of the 
disarmament process and much less as a structure for the 
implementation of distinct series of measures. A central 
element in the Western Group’s approach was that, for the most 
part, the states would be left much to their discretion with 
regard to their involvement in the disarmament process.
The Socialist Group did not specify the stages or the 
overall time-span for the completion of the programme. It 
however stated that the programme should be implemented with a 
sense of urgency which, put more succinctly, meant ‘within the 
shortest possible time’. [133] The Western and Socialist Groups 
sought a gradual process of arms limitation and reduction, the 
former’s approach being more gradual and even relatively 
open-ended. The Group of 21, by contrast, wanted an 
expeditious implementation of a structured CPD.
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The Group of 21 eventually accepted the proposition that 
the second and subsequent stages of a CPD could be defined in 
general terms - that is, the detailed elaboration of these 
stages could be left to review conferences. [134] This change 
of attitude greatly reduced the gulf between the Group of 21 
and the Western Group in particular. But the problem still 
remained because of American insistence on deleting any 
reference to stages, including the first stage. [135] The 
United States entered its reservation to the use of the first 
stage to categorise the measures set out in the CD’s 1983 
text, while the Group of 21 did likewise with respect to the 
second and subsequent stages being left out entirely from the 
same text.[136]
Differences also prevailed on the extent to which the 
measures spelled out for the first stage, and the guidelines 
set for the subsequent stages, should be strictly followed. 
Another closely related issue was of time-limits for the 
implementation of measures. The Group of 21 and the Socialist 
Group desired a ‘calendar for the CPD’s implementation, though 
no rigid time-frames were contemplated.[137] The time-limits 
would be ‘indicative’ for each stage and for the programme as 
a whole.[138] In other words, a strict-adherence to them would 
not be required. They recognised that the implementation of 
the programme might necessitate readjustments along the 
way.[139] But it would up to the review conference to decide 
on the matter. Unless readjustments were deemed necessary, 
the programme’s implementation would be expected to move 
according to the schedule laid down for it.
The Group of 21 proposed a fairly restrictive time-frame, 
reflecting the urgency it apparently perceived about engaging 
in a disarmament process. The first review conference would 
take place five years from the date of the CPD’s 
commencement.[140] The second review conference would be held 
‘not later than six years after the first’. [141] Efforts would 
be made to implement the entire programme by the year 2000 
(assuming an almost immediate starting date), and each of the 
CPD’s first three stages would be completed in approximately 
five years.[142] The review conference would be held at the 
designated end of each stage. In the event the preceding
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stage had not been fully implemented in the time tentatively 
fixed for it, readjustments would be made to take up the slack 
in the next stage.
Although the Group of 21 sought a defined set of measures 
and time-frames for the CPD’s implementation, it did provide 
for both adjustments of time-span and changes in the 
composition of measures at the time of review. Again, 
although the measures for the subsequent stages would be 
defined in general terms at the beginning of the programme’s 
implementation, their concrete formulation would be undertaken 
at the appropriate time of review. Moreover, measures set out 
would not have to be strictly pursued as originally conceived 
or formulated. The Group of 21 also apparently conceded on 
the linkage it had wished to establish between the holding of 
review conferences and the designated end of each stage. Such 
a linkage would have tied the stages and review conferences to 
time-frames.[143]
The Western Group opposed the use of time-frames, even 
for indicative purposes.[144] In the Western Group’s approach, 
review conferences would perform the function of giving 
impetus to the disarmament process.and.of. deciding, on the 
basis of prevailing circumstances, how much time should be 
given to a particular stage, whether a particular stage could 
be regarded as completed and whether the conditions were in 
order for the commencement of the next stage. The Western 
Group argued against ‘a pre-determined, inflexible schedule’ 
on the ground that security perceptions could change as a 
result of changes in the political and military situation of 
states.[145] Since arms control and disarmament were sensitive 
matters, it was important that states should be ’in complete 
control of their involvement at all stages of the negotiation 
process’. [146] Another reason cited was that flexibility would 
permit ‘the opening up of avenues to disarmament which may 
have seemed closed or remained undetected at the time of the 
programme’s adoption’.[147] It was further argued that states 
could not presume ’the success of negotiations before these 
have been even started’ and, thus, they could not be bound to 
time-frames.[148]
Page 302
The Question of Balance
One of the major difficulties with CPD negotiations was 
the question of balance between different kinds of measures 
and approaches.[149] Differences between the Group of 21 and 
the Western Group, including the United States, on the issue 
of regional arms control had pre-dated the negotiations on 
CPD. For example, earlier in the CCD India had opposed 
reliance on regional arms control, insisting that the basic 
approach should be global - that is, directed at the central 
arms race and the world-wide competition for influence between 
the superpowers.[ 150] The CPD negotiations in the CD simply 
brought the issue into sharper focus. The problem was obvious 
as early as mid-1978 during SSODI. While the non-aligned 
group focused on reversing the arms race, particularly the 
nuclear arms race, the United States had sought to draw 
attention to ‘regional arms control arrangements[151] 
Regional efforts were declared to be at ‘a very primitive 
stage’ of development, with few negotiations underway.[152] 
The United States offered to provide technical assistance, 
especially in verification methods, to facilitate regional 
arms control efforts by Third World states, and agreed to 
channel its assistance through regional., organisations or the 
UN machinery.[153]
Conflicting views on the question of balance were also 
evident in the UNDC before the CD began its deliberations on 
the CPD question. The Group of 21 wanted special attention to 
be given to the ‘immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race 
and the removal of the threat of nuclear war’ during the first 
stage of a CPD.[154] The Western Group wanted the CPD to 
ensure ‘a balance between the measures to be taken in 
different disarmament fields, in particular between the 
nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid 
de-stabilising effects’. [ 155] This point was reiterated by the 
Western Group in the CD. The United States regarded the Group 
of 21’s approach as biased towards ’a nuclear CPD’. [156] A 
moderation of the latter’s attitude did not occur in the CD.
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The issue of balance also arose over the question of 
responsibility of states in the disarmament process. Inter 
alia, the operative part of the CD’s 1983 text failed to 
contain any explicit reference to the responsibility of other 
ÜJili^arily i^ant states - a term for major regional 
states.[157] Instead, the only clear reference related to 
states with the largest military arsenals - implying the 
superpowers and China in the conventional arms context.[158] 
China opposed formulations that simply said that states with 
the largest military arsenals had a special responsibility 
towards conventional arms control - a formulation supported by 
other groups, particularly the Socialist Group. Instead, 
China wanted such formulations, particularly those using the 
term states with the largest military arsenals, to state 
clearly that the United States and the Soviet Union had a 
special responsibility and that the participation of other 
militarily significant states should follow major reductions 
by the superpowers.[159]
The CD’s 1983 text on conventional weapons and armed 
forces mentioned only the special responsibility of states 
with the largest military arsenals. It did not contain 
reference to the ‘general responsibility’ of all states as 
sought by the United States during SSODII.[160] Another 
unsuccessful proposal by the United States attempted to 
establish the special responsibility of states belonging to 
regions with arms concentration or serious tensions to pursue 
‘substantial, militarily significant, and verifiable 
reductions of conventional armed forces and weapons’.[161] A 
somewhat less stringent West German proposal for the 
initiation of ‘appropriate negotiating processes’ also failed 
to win the acceptance of the Group of 21. [162] At the other 
end of the political spectrum, an Indian proposal linking the 
difficulties of regional arms control to superpower rivalries 
also failed to find a place in the draft CPD text. [163]
On conventional arms transfers, the CD’s 1983 text merely 
envisaged consultations between major arms suppliers and 
recipients, and then acknowledged some countervailing 
principles that would have to be taken into account in 
approaching this issue. One such principle was the general
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need of all states to protect their security.[164] The CD’s 
1983 text however included the containment of competitive arms 
build-up in regions along the lines envisaged in the Ayacucho 
Declaration of 1974. Bilateral, regional and multilateral 
conferences and consultations were mentioned, but only if 
‘appropriate conditions’ existed.[165]
- Agreement could not be reached on the roles that 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations would be expected to 
play on nuclear disarmament matters in a prospective CPD. 
France and China wanted negotiations in this area to be 
restricted to the superpowers until the latter had 
substantially reduced their nuclear arsenals.[166] The United 
States also wanted to confine itself to bilateral negotiations 
with the Soviet Union during the initial phase of 
measures.[167] The Soviet Union’s preference was to involve 
all nuclear weapon states in negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament measures.[168] The Group of 21 wanted such 
measures to be negotiated multilaterally and specifically in 
the forum provided by the CD, as it had sought to do on the 
CTB issue. Differences could not be reconciled as to whether 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations should be conducted 
simultaneously or whether the transformation of bilateral 
negotiations into a multilateral context should await 
substantial progress in the former. [169]
Some progress was made on the question of the UN’s and 
the CD’s role in the implementation of a CPD. The ‘central 
role and primary responsibility’ of the UN in disarmament 
matters and the deliberative and recommendatory functions of 
the UNDC in the CPD’s implementation gained general 
acceptance. [170] But, the Group of 21’s proposal to involve 
the CD in all negotiations on the CPD’s implementation was 
altered before its incorporation in the CD’s 1983 text.[l7l] 
The modification of this proposal, and the insertion of the 
importance of bilateral and regional negotiations[172], made 
the CD’s text depart from the thrust of the Group of 21’s 
approach, which sought to de-emphasise bilateral and regional 
negotiations. The formulations in the CD’s 1983 text, thus, 
reflected a compromise.
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Status of the CPD
The difficulties in resolving or reducing differences on 
specific issues derived in good measure from differences on 
the more general question of the CPD’s prospective nature, in 
particular the political and legal status to be given to it. 
The Western Group conceived the CPD as a general framework 
that would lend a measure of coherence and collective 
political commitment to negotiations on arms control measures, 
but not as a binding document in the form of a treaty with 
‘firm undertakings for all to commence and conclude particular 
negotiations in a fixed order and with a pre-determined 
o u t c o m e [173] Instead, the Western Group sought ‘a mere 
sequential ordering of desirable negotiating events of a 
non-constraining nature’.[174]
The Socialist Group wanted a fairly well defined 
programme of measures and stages for the first phase. Review 
conferences were envisaged as a means of facilitating the 
programme’s implementation rather than a forum where periodic 
attempts would be made to give substance to a skeletal 
agreement, as the Western Group seemed to desire. Yet, the 
CPD was not conceived by the Socialist Group as a treaty-type 
document. It was envisaged more as an instrument that would 
serve to stimulate universal efforts in the field of axms 
control and disarmament and ‘the resumption and intensive 
continuation’ of current negotiations as well as those 
suspended in the past.[175]
Initially, the Group of 21 wanted the CPD to have the 
status of a treaty-type document. While some member-states 
continued to press for investing the CPD with such a status, 
the group as a whole eventually seemed willing to accept 
political assurances that the CPD would be respected as a 
document.[176] The central alliances favoured such an 
undertaking by way of an unanimous General Assembly 
resolution, as had been done with the Final Document. [177] The 
Group of 21 wanted the undertaking to be a little more 
pronounced in both form and content, since the Final Document 
had allegedly been treated to a considerable extent by the 
major powers as ‘a dead letter’.[178] It proposed that, apart
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from incorporating some relevant provisions in the Final 
Document, additional material should be inserted at the 
beginning and end of the draft agreement in order to impart ‘a 
binding character to the text, which it is hoped, will be 
greater than that achieved in 1978’ with respect to the Final 
Document.[179] Another proposal was that the CPD text should 
be taken by a special envoy of the UN Secretary General to all 
the capitals of member-states for collecting the signatures of 
heads of state or government.[180]
If not in the form of a treaty-type commitment, the Group 
of 21 wanted the alternative political undertaking to be 
better than the one that had been made towards the Final 
Document - more so because of the fate of that document. The 
Group of 21 also continued to question the practical import of 
any such commitment to a CPD that was too general and did not 
contain specific measures as well as time-frames for their 
implementation.[181]
Y^Fifi^ation
The only independent American proposal presented in the 
CD related to the question of „effective verification 
procedures, regarded as a ‘key prerequisite’ for the progress 
of negotiations on arms control and disarmament.[182] 
Particular emphasis was placed on the importance of 
verification procedures for implementing the CPD. In support 
of the demand for a strict system of verification the argument 
was made that unless verification procedures could provide 
confidence that the obligations and responsibilities assumed 
under an agreement were being fulfilled, there would be no way 
of knowing whether that agreement was serving its intended 
purpose of enhancing security or at least ensuring 
undiminished security. According to the United States, 
verification procedures should serve to increase the 
confidence of states and ‘also make the situation with respect 
to the remaining armaments more transparent’.[183] The Western 
Group as a whole regarded verification to be ’one cornerstone 
for progress in disarmament and arms control’ and ‘effective 
verification’ to be of ‘paramount importance’ for ensuring 
that the disarmament process did not result in a loss of
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security.[184]
The Socialist Group began by maintaining that national 
means of verification were basically effective; that the 
inclusion of additional verification procedures should be on a 
voluntaxy basis; and that the compulsory application of more 
stringent measures should be linked to the existence of 
greater confidence between states. [185] Representing the 
Socialist Group and presenting its position at some length, 
East Germany concurred with the American view that 
verification procedures should help to increase 
confidence. [186] It also went on to recognise that 
verification procedures which provided assurance that 
agreements were being observed would ‘contribute to attracting 
other states to adhere to them and promote the general 
disarmament p r o c e s s [187] East Germany agreed with the 
principle that verification should be ‘adequate’ but disagreed 
with the United States on the practical application of that 
principle. It argued that verification procedures could not 
be relied upon to boost confidence when none existed at the 
outset. Some measure of confidence had to exist before 
verification procedures could be devised to enhance 
conf idence . [ 188] In this respect, East ..Germany declared that 
the concept of ‘detente and a recognition of mutual interest 
[would be] very conducive to the elaboration of reliable 
verification procedures’.[189] Critical of approaches premised 
on distrust, it declared that a more reasonable assumption 
should be that parties entering into an agreement intended to 
strictly abide by its terms.[190] Another argument was that it 
was not possible to devise ‘a completely foolproof’ system of 
verification.[191] It was however possible to provide for a 
‘high degree of assurance’ that violations would be 
detected.[192] East Germany considered it ‘most doubtful’ that 
violations of any military importance would go 
undetected.[193]
In an attempt to downplay the American focus on intrusive 
inspection, East Germany tried to draw attention to other 
means of verification, such as procedures for continuous 
consultation and cooperation, and thus to the overall system 
of verification rather than just the independent instruments
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to be employed by states. It also opposed attempts to 
establish a system of controls ‘in the absence of genuine 
measures of arms limitation or disarmament’.[194] East Germany 
argued that to focus attention on the verification issue in 
such a context would be ‘to make a fetish of 
verification*. [195] It expressed the view that a more 
fundamental problem underlying the verification issue was a 
lack of strong political will to reach agreement on 
‘significant or meaningful’ disarmament measures.[196] It 
posited that if sufficient political will existed, then this 
could be combined with a measure of mutual trust to resolve 
the verification problem ‘no matter how complex it may 
be’.[l97] Despite reference to the importance of political 
will and some degree of mutual trust, East Germany 
nevertheless expressed its preference for ‘a least onerous’ 
system of verification that would be both ‘practical’ and 
‘fair’.[198]
The Group of 21 did not make any collective statement of 
its position on the verification question.[199] However, 
India, one of its principal members, criticised the imbalance 
between strict verification procedures and the limited scope 
of disarmament measures envisaged in the Western Group’s 
proposal.[200] The situation was likened to ‘putting the caxt 
before the horse’. [201] India alleged that the central 
alliances lacked strong political will to seek substantive 
measures and even modicum of mutual trust to reconcile their 
differences over the verification question.[202] It was 
considered unrealistic to seek absolute guarantees of 
compliance.[203] Instead, India supported a more modest 
concept of an appropriate verification system.
India regarded verification procedures and disarmament 
measures in a CPD to be inseparably linked, and stated that 
inasmuch as ‘disarmament without controls is not a feasible 
proposition... controls without disarmament would be 
meaningless’.[204] Presumably with the United States 
especially in mind, India criticised states that approached 
the verification question on the basis of distrust and 
concealed their lack of political will by raising doubts about 
whether the requirements of verification could be met. In
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support of its allegation, reference was specifically made to 
the case of CTB negotiations. [205]
Hardly any progress was made on the verification issue 
during the course of CPD negotiations. The three groups of 
states began by inserting their declared positions in detail 
in the CD’s composite text. The Western Group wanted an 
exclusive section on the verification issue in the text of a 
prospective CPD or at least special prominence to be given to 
it.[206] Attempts were made to contain the controversy by 
limiting reference to the verification issue to the extent of 
setting out very briefly the essential preoccupations of the 
three groups of states. [207] The Socialist Group apparently 
wished to minimise references to the verification issue.[208] 
The Group of 21, though more forthcoming than the Socialist 
Group, opposed the Western Group’s proposal to highlight the 
issue.[209] In short, the Western Group’s position contrasted 
sharply with that of the Socialist Group’s and to a lesser but 
not insignificant extent with that of the Group of 21’s.
Assessment
A measure of optimism had exiated . at the outset of 
negotiations on the CPD question following the adoption of the 
Final Document at the SSODI. However, the impetus provided by 
the SSODI was soon lost. By the time the SSODII was held, the 
Final Document had ceased to attract the consensus it appeared 
to enjoy at the time of its adoption. This was particularly 
evident when the attempt to reach agreement on a draft CPD, 
which the CD had clearly failed to do, was taken up at the 
SSODII.
The CD negotiations were marred by serious difficulties 
in almost all areas of the CPD question. Some aspects 
received more attention than others, so that the text prepared 
by the CD was incomplete. Several parts of the section on 
‘Measures’ were kept pending, while closer attention could not 
be given to several other issues. It was clear, nevertheless, 
that the negotiating process had ‘stagnated’ and the 
difficulties that stood in the way loomed ‘even larger than at 
earlier stages’.[210] A major problem was the
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inter-relationship of various issues, which meant that 
difficulties in one area tended to reinforce those in other 
areas. At times, lack of progress in one area tended to 
nullify or counterbalance progress in another area. Even 
worse, the procedure of adopting ‘working hypotheses’ to 
explore possibilities of compromise or the implications of 
following a particular approach could not ignore or, even 
less, overcome the conceptual differences on the CPD question, 
particularly between the Group of 21 and the United States. 
There were also serious differences on the desirability of 
adopting specific measures. The most important of these seems 
to have been the CTB issue. More generally, this was also a 
period when relations between the superpowers had soured.
In the face of strong opposition from the Western Group, 
the Group of 21 moderated its position and made attempts at 
SSODII and subsequently at the CD’s 1983 sessions to probe the 
possibilities of compromise. The preliminary result of that 
effort, reflected in the CD’s 1983 text, proved disappointing 
to the Group of 21. It felt that the text had fallen ‘far 
short of the requirements of a genuine disarmament process’ 
and that the text had also failed to provide for ‘the 
implementation of specific measures within agreed 
time-frames’.[211] The Group of 21 found American opposition 
to a CTB in the first phase of the CPD to be particularly 
unacceptable.[212] The CPD was perceived to be ‘hollow, if not 
meaningless’ unless a CTB was included in the initial 
stage.[213]
The Group of 21 and the Western Group differed 
fundamentally in their CPD concepts, which made compromise on 
specific issues problematic. The Group of 21 had initially 
sought disarmament negotiations along the lines attempted 
during the 1950s and early 1960s, when the CPD was conceived 
in terms of a treaty. Subsequently, it modified its attitude. 
But, given that the Western Group’s approach tended to lean to 
the other extreme, the cleavage between the two groups 
remained wide. The American attitude went further than other 
NATO states in wanting the arms control process, even in the 
short-term, to be no more than minimally restrictive on 
national policy.
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The United States, on the one hand, and the rest of the 
Western Group, on the other, differed on the question of 
security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, which was an 
important matter for the Group of 21. Like the Socialist 
Group, most Western Group states were in favour of a clearer 
undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to meet the criticism 
of the non-nuclear weapon states on the issue of security 
assurances.
According to the Group of 21, the failure to reach 
agreement on the CPD at the SSODII was primarily due to 
American opposition to a CTB.[214] Despite its strong 
preference for a fairly rigid CPD and one that gave priority 
to nuclear disarmament measures, the Group of 21 was 
eventually prepared to substantially alter its overall stance 
on the CPD question, provided there was agreement that a CTB 
should be negotiated and the negotiations concluded in the 
first stage of a CPD. The United States not only opposed such 
a CTB but also at the same time continued to press for a 
symbolic CPD.
Both the Group of 21 and the Socialist Group had 
endeavoured, but only with marginal success, to give 
prominence to the danger of nuclear war and the nuclear arms 
race in the text of a prospective CPD. Yet, it is possible 
that satisfaction on the CTB issue could have altered their 
attitude towards the nuclear disarmament issue. Both groups 
had shown some willingness to compromise on other aspects of 
that issue during the CD’s 1983 session even without a change 
of American attitude on the CTB issue. Both attached 
importance to a CTB - the Group of 21 particularly so - and 
may thus have regarded a commitment to conclude a CTB in the 
near future to be a worthwhile gain for a trade off on some 
other issues.
Yet, if the CD’s 1983 text is any guide, it would appear 
that the Group of 21’s readiness to compromise would more 
likely have extended to issues such as stages, time-frames and 
the CPD’s status, than to the issue of balance, especially in 
the context of conventional arms control. The CD’s 1983 text 
did not reflect any improvement in the situation on that
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matter. Given the importance the Western Group attached to 
the question of balance, it would appear that flexibility by 
the Group of 21 on other issues - in exchange for American 
concession on the CTB issue - would still have failed to 
resolve the issue of balance for the United States. Thus, the 
claim by some members of the Group of 21 that American 
opposition to a CTB had prevented an agreement on a CPD seems 
doubtful. To be sure, the CTB was the most significant issue 
for the Group of 21 and almost equally for the Socialist 
Group, but the available evidence regarding the Group of 21’s 
propensity for compromise does not apparently suggest that it 
would have extended to the issue of balance between 
conventional and nuclear arms control and the division of 
responsibility of states.
The Group of 21’s stance on conventional arms limitation 
and reduction in regions outside Europe was not shared in 
equal measure by all its members and even less within the 
broader non-aligned group in the UN. A combination of factors 
determined the Group of 21’s approach. First, its reluctance 
to accept obligations in the area of conventional arms control 
reflected in good measure the influence of some of its major 
members, such as India, Argentina ancLBrazil. Second, though 
to a lesser extent, these countries also influenced the Group 
of 21’s focus on nuclear disarmament measures, thereby 
affecting both sides of the issue of ‘balance’ - the nuclear 
(by emphasising it strongly) and the conventional (by 
de-emphasising it significantly). Third, the non-aligned 
group’s need to present a unified stand on nuclear arms 
control issues made it easier for such countries to succeed in 
their effort to relegate conventional arms control in Third 
World regions to secondary importance. And, fourth, the 
common view prevailed within the Group of 21 that the CPD’s 
primary purpose should be to focus on priority matters, 
namely, the decisive role of the superpowers in the global 
arms build-up and the primacy of the threat posed by nuclear 
weapons and the nuclear arms race. The decline of American 
interest in nuclear disarmament measures only helped to 
increase the influence of countries like India, Argentina and 
Brazil in getting the Group of 21 (and, for that matter, the 
non-aligned group as a whole) to concentrate more of its
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attention on the nuclear weapons aspect of the arms race and 
on the need for the superpowers to take the lead in advancing 
the disarmament process.
Differences in outlook among some members of the Group of 
21 on the issue of conventional arms control related not only 
to the general question of reduction and limitation of 
armaments and armed forces but also to control over arms 
transfers and confidence building measures, especially 
limitations on military exercises and the advance notification 
and direct monitoring of such exercises. Divergent Indian and 
Pakistani attitudes on the question of zone of peace in the 
Indian Ocean were in evidence during SS0DII.[215] Differences 
between the relatively minor and major Latin American states 
over the importance of the Ayacucho Declaration of 1964[216] 
were implicit in the manner the paragraph covering that 
subject in the Final Document was formulated at SS0DI.[217] 
This is not to suggest that internal difficulties within the 
Group of 21 arose merely because of the resistance of some of 
its major member-states to accept obligations with respect to 
regional arms control. The issue itself presented some 
internal complications. Pakistan, for example, wanted 
qualified obligations in this area to^take account of the 
negative effects regional arms control might have on the local 
military balance and thus on its security. It stressed ‘the 
necessity of maintaining a military balance... and the need to 
ensure the undiminished security of states’.[218]
The division of responsibility towards regional arms 
control was no doubt a more difficult problem to resolve with 
respect to Third World regions. In Europe a comparatively 
simpler situation existed, resulting from the region’s 
bifurcation into two major alliance-systems (NATO and WTO). 
Yet, the Group of 21’s reluctance to accept obligations to 
pursue regional arms control indicated that its fairly rigid 
negotiating posture had more to do with inherent difficulties 
within the Group of 21 on that issue than with the problem of 
defining the balance of responsibilities of intra- and 
extra-regional states. In other words, on the question of 
regional disarmament, the CPD negotiations showed the Group of 
21 to be a loosely formed coalition of heterogeneous Third
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World states against the superpowers, rather than a cohesive 
and autonomous political force or a distinct negotiating 
entity.
At a more fundamental level, the Group of 21 and the 
Western group, including the United States, differed in their 
outlook on the basic structure of international security. The 
former adopted a radical position, one of seeking major 
change, while the latter a conservative stance, one of 
resistance to more than limited and incremental change. The 
tension between the two sides manifested with particular force 
on the issue of nuclear weapons. The former was strongly 
opposed to the continuation of a system based on nuclear 
deterrence and, even more, one that was based on the 
possession of such weapons by a few states seeking at the same 
time to preserve their special status in this respect. 
Another significant aspect of the Group of 21’s radical 
approach was the importance it attached, like the Socialist 
Group, to the liquidation of foreign military bases and the 
removal of foreign troops at a relatively early stage of the 
CPD. The Western Group, the United States even more so, 
believed in the continued reliance on a system based on 
nuclear deterrence and the management «,pf v3..such a system by 
those already in possession of such weapons. While the United 
States wished to give prominence to regional arms control in 
Third World regions where most post-war armed conflicts have 
occurred, the Group of 21 sought to highlight the peculiar 
nature of nuclear war and thus the need to focus on its 
prevention, not merely by attempting to control the escalation 
of regional tensions or conventional armed conflicts but more 
directly by seeking to abolish nuclear weapons from the 
arsenals of states.
The period of CPD negotiations witnessed a sharp increase 
in the Group of 21’s attention on nuclear disarmament issues. 
Argentina, for example, made a pointed reference to the Group 
of 21’s view, expressed in the UNDC, that ‘a world-wide system 
based on the continued development, possession and deployment 
of nuclear weapons’ was unacceptable.[219] Even more vehement 
was the rejection by the non-aligned summit meeting held in 
New Delhi in 1983, of ‘all theories and concepts pertaining to
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the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any 
circumstances[220] The extent of the Group of 21’s 
opposition to the possession of nuclear weapons and the 
reliance on such weapons by some states was reflected in its 
CPD proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons well in 
advance of the completion of conventional disarmament. Thus 
the Group of 21 was in effect denying nuclear weapons a 
legitimate deterrent role. The Group failed to address the 
issue of deterrence in the situation following the elimination 
of nuclear weapons, when for a time states would retain 
sizable stocks of conventional forces, as envisaged in the 
Group of 21’s CPD scheme.
Quite unlike past efforts at negotiating a CPD, the 
recent attempt was characterised by a greatly diminished 
interest on the part of the major powers, particularly the 
United States. The CPD negotiations in recent years were 
pursued mainly on the strength of initiatives by other states, 
especially the Group of 21. The Soviet Union also displayed 
little enthusiasm during discussions preceding the decision to 
create a CPD working group. [221] The interest of the United 
States and the Western Group as a whole declined further 
during the course of CPD negotiations.,'.- This was apparent in 
the hardening of their negotiating stance since SSODII, while 
the Group of 21 - more interested in the idea of a CPD - 
eventually moderated its attitude in the hope of facilitating 
an agreement through compromise. The CPD negotiations were 
also more elaborate and protracted in the past, whereas the 
recent effort stretched for five years (1978-1983) before 
being suspended.
In the past, the thrust of initial CPD efforts had 
varied, though not always very clearly, between significant 
arms control and general disarmament, later culminating in 
attempts at general and complete disarmament, which became the 
declared long-term goal of the UN in 1959. The ultimate goal 
of recent negotiations also general disarmament, but the 
concept was defined by the Group of 21 incorporated the idea 
of a new international economic order - a recent development. 
More importantly, the preoccupation of Western and Socialist 
Groups was distinctly with arms control objectives.
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Similarly, while in the past, the CPD was conceived as a 
phased scheme of pre-determined measures placed in specific 
time-frames and possessing the status of a treaty, more 
recently the concept ceased to be strictly associated with the 
goal of general disarmament. It was viewed more as a symbolic 
exercise to demonstrate a general commitment to international 
peace and security and as a diplomatic mechanism for reviewing 
the arms control process and the security situation 
periodically.
In contrast to little public interest in recent CPD 
negotiations, disarmament negotiations in the 1950s and early 
1960s received a great deal of publicity. At least two 
factors would seem to account for this. First, in the past, 
the disarmament negotiations were conducted between the 
central alliances and often at the initiative of the 
superpowers. Recent CPD negotiations were not only organised 
on a wider multilateral basis but were also undertaken at the 
urging of the non-aligned states. Second, recent CPD 
negotiations were over-shadowed by other on-going negotiations 
between the central alliances of much greater immediate 
interest and concern, such as START, INF and MBFR, while in 
the CD itself, negotiations on a - XPD were dominated by 
negotiations on chemical weapons and a CTB. Such was not the 
case in the past, when disarmament issues were central to arms 
control diplomacy. Then, even CTB negotiations were initially 
linked directly to disarmament negotiations.
The similarities between the past and the more recent 
period lay in the recurrence of several issues and in the 
absence of any significant progress towards their resolution, 
resolution. These included the American stress on intrusive 
verification procedures and on military ‘transparency’; the 
Soviet Union’s penchant for secrecy; its objection to a 
disarmament process that laid emphasis on stringent 
verification procedures at the outset without providing for 
significant disarmament measures; its primary focus on 
nuclear disarmament measures; and its long-standing proposals 
for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the 
non-stationing of nuclear weapons in other states at a 
relatively early stage of a CPD.
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Conclusions
Most of the problems that plagued the CPD negotiations in 
the CD had persisted since SSODI, when differences over a 
broad range of arms control and disarmament issues became more 
evident - notwithstanding the Final Document - than perhaps at 
any other time in the past. At the time of SSODII, these 
sharp differences among states, but usually between the major 
groups of states, became more obvious. Also, the change in 
American attitude towards the disarmament question in general 
and a CTB in particular made the situation even more difficult 
- so that a display of relative flexibility by the Group of 21 
at a more advanced stage of the negotiations did little to 
improve the prospects of progress of CPD negotiations. 
Eventual flexibility in the Group of 21’s attitude was 
counter-balanced by a stiffening of American attitude under 
the Reagan Administration.
The Group of 21’s flexibility did not however extend to 
the CTB issue, with respect to which the American position 
hardened considerably under the Reagan Administration. Nor 
did the Group of 21’s flexibility apparently extend to the 
issue of conventional arms control in.regions outside Europe, 
which the Western Group regarded as an unbalanced approach to 
the disarmament process. Similarly, American opposition to a 
CTB was considered by the Group of 21 to detract from the 
primary responsibility of the superpowers towards curbing the 
nuclear arms race and also as an unbalanced approach towards 
the nuclear non-proliferation problem.
Thus, the main problem lay in the Group of 21’s 
uncompromising stand on the issue of conventional arms control 
in regions outside Europe and in American inflexibility on the 
CTB issue. The Group of 21’s willingness to concede on the 
CTB issue (an unlikely event) would not have caused the United 
States to reciprocate on the conventional arms control issue. 
Similarly, American willingness to concede on the CTB issue 
(an unlikely event) would not have necessarily prompted the 
Group of 21 to concede, in turn, on the conventional arms 
control issue. To be sure, the difficulties in the way of 
agreement were numerous and the underlying issues both of a
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specific and general nature. But, the imbroglio over the 
issues of CTB and regional arms control appears to have been 
the biggest stumbling block.
The CPD negotiations, it would appear, were conducted at 
cross-purposes, with the different groups of states showing 
little inclination to accommodate one another’s primary and 
long-standing concerns. In seeking the CPD’s implementation 
by the turn of this century, the Group of 21 was clearly 
unrealistic, both politically and technically. Such unrealism 
when viewed together with its inflexibility on regional arms 
control, suggests strongly the absence of genuine interest in 
pursuing a disarmament or even an axms control process on a 
global basis. Yet another deficiency in the Group of 21’s 
approach was the minimal interest displayed in addressing the 
verification question. Since the CPD question was introduced 
in the CD largely at the urging of the non-aligned states, at 
least in the wider context of CPD negotiations, one would have 
expected the Group of 21’s interest to extend to all important 
issues.
The superpowers were hardly interested in a disarmament 
process, even as a loose and protracted pursuit. If at all, 
their interest seemed to centre on arms control in the 
short-term. But even in this area, there was little 
willingness to make concrete compromises. The Soviet Union 
continued to belittle the importance of verification and also 
persisted with some of its proposals which were most likely to 
be opposed by the Western Group, since they seemed intended to 
undermine the trans-Atlantic Western alliance. Such proposals 
included the removal of foreign military bases and the 
no-first-use of nuclear weapons.
American interest in a CPD even as a short-term arms 
control exercise was at best minimal, reflecting the dominance 
of conservative opinion and its highly critical attitude 
towards arms control, not to mention a disarmament process. 
In any case, American preoccupation with defence modernisation 
had effectively reversed the prospects of renewing an arms 
control process through a CPD. The CPD negotiations would 
have had some major problems to deal with in any event, but
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the change in American outlook helped to make CPD negotiations 
sterile and conceptually distorted.
In good measure, changes in American policy accounted for 
wider differences between the Western Group and the Group of 
21, than between the latter and the Socialist Group. 
Preoccupation with differences between the Western Group and 
the Group of 21 made the Socialist Group relatively secure 
from broad-based criticism of some of its proposals in the CD. 
But such criticism would probably have been limited, since the 
Group of 21 apparently subscribed to some Soviet proposals for 
specific measures and also, more importantly, went along with 
the latter’s general approach on the verification question. 
In addition, the Soviet position on certain issues of 
particular concern to the Group of 21 - notably a CTB - was 
broadly in accord with the latter’s approach. It is possible 
that on tactical grounds the Soviet Union did not attempt to 
take issue with the non-aligned states on some matters, such 
as regional arms control, since the United States in any case 
was unlikely to concede ground to the non-aligned states.
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1 See Chapter 1 of The United Nations and Disarmament 
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VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 
Introduction
The question of adequate verification of treaty 
compliance arose early in the arms control process when the 
subject of nuclear weapons was first negotiated in the UN in 
the late 1940s. The Soviet Union raised the principle of 
sovereignty in opposing intrusive verification measures, which 
were considered essential by the United States. The 
divergence has continued to persist, with no major change of 
attitude on either side. During these years, the verification 
issue marred the progress of numerous deliberations and 
negotiations and also shook the stability of several 
agreements, retarding the arms control process and damaging 
the axms control relationship between the superpowers.
Over the past decade, the verification issue has been a 
controversial subject in the United States. The debate has 
been mainly about Soviet compliance with several agreements 
reached during the 1970s. In recent years, allegations of 
Soviet non-compliance have become increasingly vociferous in 
the United States, with accompanying demand for more rigorous 
verification provisions in future agreements and also for 
revising the relevant provisions of some existing ones. The 
Administration did however resist pressure for a punitive 
response to alleged Soviet violations. It also faced 
criticism from some liberal opponents who feared that the 
verification issue could become a pretext for avoiding arms 
control agreements and for undermining the arms control 
process. The Administration eventually went public with a 
series of strong attacks on Soviet non-compliance, having 
earlier expressed its intention to seek rigorous verification 
measures in future agreements with the Soviet Union.
American Verification Policy
In July 1981, well before the official review of its axms 
control policy had been completed, the Reagan Administration 
announced that verification would figure prominently in 
negotiations with the Soviet Union.[l] The Secretaxy of State,
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Alexander Haig claimed that ‘critical obstacle in virtually 
every area of arms control in the 1970s was Soviet 
unwillingness to accept verification measures necessary for 
more ambitious limitations[2] In August 1981, the ACDA’s 
Director, Eugene Rostow also reportedly ‘underlined the 
importance [the United States] attached to verification and 
compliance by devoting one of the [Reagan] administration’s 
first contacts with the Soviets...to a presentation of the US 
thinking on the subject’.[3] Consensus was reported within the 
Administration that future arms control agreements should be 
simpler and independently verifiable with a high level of 
confidence.[4]
There were other indications of change in official 
attitude towards the verification question. Some 
Administration officials reportedly wished to preclude 
agreements in areas where the possibility of undetected 
violation existed.[5] Specific mention was made of the 
possibility of clandestine manufacture under a chemical 
weapons convention. In another significant disclosure, an 
official reportedly said that the Administration would 
separate verification from other arms control measures in 
future negotiations.[6] He claimed that in the past American 
negotiators had made concessions on substantive measures in 
order to induce concessions by the Soviet Union on 
verification provisions. But in future, he reportedly stated, 
verification would be treated as ’neutral’ in the negotiation 
of substantive measures.[7]
A working group was established by the Reagan 
Administration and assigned the task of elaborating new 
verification measures for existing arms control agreements and 
those under negotiation. The group reportedly adopted ‘some 
innovative approaches’ and engaged in formulating 
‘mind-boggling’ provisions for on-site inspection.[8] The new 
approach apparently went beyond previous official policy on 
on-site inspection and telemetry. The working group 
considered prohibiting any encryption of missile test data, 
(which previous administrations had opposed because it was not 
considered necessary for monitoring and because it would 
permit too much transparency of sensitive American
Page 339
intelligence). The joint chiefs of staff were reported to be 
sceptical about the new approach on on-site inspection because 
4 they didn’t want to accept Russian military men at [US] 
missile sites’. [9] Reflecting the evident hardening of 
American attitude under the Reagan Administration, an official 
reportedly said that ‘we are going to do it differently from 
the past’ and ‘replace the vague language [of existing 
agreements] with specifics’.[10] While discussions at the 
inter-agency level became ’increasingly polarised’ between the 
State Department on the one hand and the Pentagon and CIA on 
the other[ll], there was apparently less disagreement on 
fundamentals among senior officials, where Richard Perle, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, was able to exert much 
influence.[12]
The Administration had not finalised its position with 
regard to verification measures for nuclear arms control 
agreements (INF and START) under negotiation with the Soviet 
Union in 1982 and 1983. But evidently the previous SALT 
approach had been set-aside and there was a strong likelihood 
that a major departure from past policy would be made. The 
hardening of official attitudes was perhaps nowhere more 
obvious than on the question of the reload and refire 
capability of nuclear missile launchers. The Reagan 
Administration had decided that in a future START agreement it 
would seek a limit on additional (undeployed) missiles and 
strict controls to prevent launchers from acquiring a reload 
capability. There seemed to be general agreement at the 
senior level of the Administration that the Soviet Union would 
have to accept stringent and intrusive verification measures. 
Verification procedures would require the Soviet Union to 
declare its military inventory and the United States would 
have the right to ’inspect any suspicious-looking factory, 
warehouse, railway car, or rail-to-road trans-shipment point, 
as well as launch sites. The more secret the Soviet facility, 
the more open it should be to American inspection’.[13] 
Indeed, distrust of the Soviet Union ran so deep that concern 
continued to be expressed about the reliance that could be 
placed on on-site inspection and other intrusive measures.[14] 
Underlying the introduction of new measures in a START 
agreement was the fear that 4 if the Soviets had a hidden,
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illegal inventory of missiles that they could suddenly make 
use of in a crisis, they would be in far stronger position to 
dictate to the US’.[l5] In SALT II, both parties had not taken 
a serious view of the risk or consequence of ‘break-out’. 
They had dealt with the issue by agreeing on some logistical 
measures to make it difficult to quickly mobilise a refire 
capability.
Initially the controversy regarding Soviet compliance 
centred on the 1972 SALT I agreement. Not long after this 
agreement came into force, opponents of SALT raised the issue 
of verification. Notably, in 1977, Melvin Laird (who had 
served as President Nixon’s Defense Secretary) charged that 
‘the evidence is incontrovertible that the Soviet Union 
violated the treaties to which we had adhered’.[16] In 1977, 
Congress also decided that in future the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) should submit reports and statements 
on the verifiability of all arms control agreements before the 
negotiations were concluded.[17] The SALT II agreement under 
negotiation at the time was evidently the immediate cause for 
concern. This development marked the emergence of 
verification as a prominent public issue in American domestic 
politics. ....-- ..
The Carter Administration’s SALT II agreement with the 
Soviet Union sparked off a heated debate about past Soviet 
compliance and the verification requirements for the 
succeeding agreement.[18] The Administration had expressed 
general satisfaction with the implementation of the SALT I 
agreement and with American ability to monitor compliance with 
the SALT II agreement. Opponents of SALT II however 
questioned both past Soviet compliance behaviour and current 
American verification capability. Admittedly, verification 
was not the only issue. Opponents strongly criticised the 
substance of SALT II. But the verification controversy 
continued to grow in intensity and scope in the following 
years. The SALT II agreement was not ratified by the United 
States, but the superpowers informally agreed to respect the 
essentials of that agreement. This however took some time and 
the commitment to respect the agreement remained unclear and 
somewhat ambivalent. The controversy over Soviet compliance
Page 341
with SALT I soon extended to SALT II and some other 
agreements, and since mid-1983, the Reagan Administration also 
raised compliance issues reference to the 1972 ABM treaty.
In early 1983, President Reagan established a working 
group to draw up ‘tough new verification provisions, including 
on-site inspections’ for all agreements under negotiation with 
the Soviet Union.[19] A review of Soviet compliance was 
carried out in April 1983 by an inter-agency panel under the 
State Department’s chairmanship.[20] According to one American 
newspaper report, the panel had claimed that Soviet violations 
had occurred.[21] But another newspaper report, quoting a 
senior Defense Department official, claimed that the panel had 
essentially found ‘on close study that there appeared to have 
been skillful exploitation of loopholes’ of SALT II and other 
agreements.[22] The panel was reportedly divided on this 
issue.[23] Another inter-agency panel headed this time by the 
President’s National Security Advisor was created soon 
afterward to examine afresh the question of Soviet compliance 
with all nuclear arms agreements.[24]
The Reagan Administration took some time to decide on how 
it should proceed on the non-compliance issue... Hard-core 
opponents of SALT II wanted the Administration to publicly 
accuse the Soviet Union of having committed numerous 
violations and also to reconsider the value of arms control 
for national security. The President himself reportedly 
decided to ‘back away’ from a public denunciation of the 
Kremlin because of the seriousness of the matter and its 
possible implications for on-going arms control 
negotiations.[25] After some apparent procrastination, he 
eventually announced that his decision to publicly condemn the 
Soviet Union would depend on the results of the governmental 
review of Soviet compliance underway at the time.[26] It was 
not that the Administration had doubts about Soviet 
non-compliance but it did have problems proving its claims. 
It was ‘a case of whether you have the evidence actually to 
pin down an infraction’, as President Reagan reportedly 
explained.[27] Even before the inter-agency panel was began to 
look into the question, President Reagan had said that his 
administration had ‘reason to believe that there had been
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numerous violations[28] He had also expressed his 
willingness to accuse the Soviet Union of cheating on 
agreements, saying that he would do so in the ‘near 
future’.[29] The President’s attitude changed somewhat after 
these initial charges, probably because of complications 
during the initial governmental review of Soviet compliance. 
President Reagan began to refer to the difficulties of 
establishing ’hard-and-fast evidence that a treaty has been 
violated’.[30] Earlier, the Administration had encouraged 
conservative senators in their belief about flagrant Soviet 
violations.[31] The Administration may have even supplied a 
leading conservative senator with detailed information, to use 
in formulating and supporting his allegations of Soviet 
non-compliance.[32]
The change in President Reagan’s attitude was an 
unpleasant surprise to ‘hardline’ conservatives and the 
Administration came under pressure from the Senate, under 
strong conservative influence, to make public its position on 
the issue of Soviet compliance. The Senate reacted to the 
Administration’s indecision by voting unanimously to require 
the latter to submit a report on Soviet non-compliance.[33] In 
his speech at the UN General Assembly, which came immediately 
after the Senate’s action, President Reagan again complained 
about Soviet non-compliance but still restricted his reference 
to the four alleged cases of violation with which he 
presumably felt most confident. [34] Before President Reagan’s 
speech the Administration had sought clarification on the 
issue in the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in 
Geneva - a procedure strongly recommended by liberal critics 
who had also urged restraint on the question of public 
denunciation.[35]
American Allegations
The Reagan Administration submitted its full report on 
Soviet non-compliance to the Senate in January 1984 and 
disclosed an unclassified summary of its contents to the 
public at the same time. Allegations of violations or 
suspected violations were made in relation to a number of arms 
control agreements in force at the time. SALT I was not
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mentioned, presumably because it had expired and been replaced 
by SALT II. The Soviet Union was accused of ‘repeated 
violations’ of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention for its alleged ‘involvement in 
the production, transfer and use of toxins and other lethal 
chemical warf axe agents’ in Laos, Kampuchea and 
Afghanistan.[36]
With regard to SALT II, the Administration claimed that 
Soviet encryption of telemetry during missile testing impeded 
verification and thus constituted a violation of SALT II. The 
Soviet Union was also suspected of infringement of other 
provisions of SALT II. The testing of SS-X-25 was regarded as 
a ‘probable violation’ of the prohibition on the testing or 
deployment of more than one new type of ICBM and, in any 
event, a violation of the provision limiting the testing of 
single re-entry vehicle of existing ICBMs. The Administration 
also claimed that a violation had probably occurred with 
respect to the ban in SALT II on the deployment of Soviet 
SS-16 ICBM. Earlier, President Reagan had more forthrightly 
accused the Soviet Union of violating the 1974 Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty, but the report to the Senate spoke more cautiously 
of ‘likely’ violations on a number .,.of occasions. Soviet 
notification of a major military exercise in 1981 (Zapad-8l) 
was deemed inadequate and thus not in keeping with the 
political commitment made in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. 
Politically, if not also militarily, perhaps the most 
important case of alleged Soviet non-compliance mentioned in 
the report was related to the 1972 ABM agreement. The 
Administration declared that the construction of a large 
phased-array radar in interior Siberia ‘almost certainly 
constituted a violation’ because of the radar’s siting, 
orientation and capability.
Meanwhile, conservatives outside the Administration 
presented a longer list of alleged Soviet violations to the 
public, including those raised at the time of SALT I 
agreement, which had been clarified or resolved in the SCC to 
the satisfaction of previous administrations.[37] In his 
report to the Senate, President Reagan had also reportedly 
maintained that cases of Soviet non-compliance mentioned in
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his list were only the tip of a substantial ‘i c e b e r g [38] 
Similarly, in a testimony to the Senate, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle said that in addition to 
the President’s list there were 20 to 25 other violations that 
warranted investigation.[39] Yet another leading conservative, 
Senator Steve Syms, claimed that the Soviet Union was guilty 
of ‘more than 30 violations of SALT I, the [ABM] treaty, SALT 
II, and other arms control agreements[40]
The Soviet Union reacted by accusing the United States of 
violating SALT II, the ABM agreement, the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and SALT I.[41] The 
Soviet Union took the unprecedented step of publicising the 
contents of its diplomatic note to the Reagan Administration. 
The note accused the United States of systematically violating 
the agreed principle of confidentiality of talks in the SCC 
for resolving compliance issues. The document did not address 
American accusations but simply declared that those 
allegations were untenable and appeared to be ‘openly directed 
at worsening Soviet-American relations’.[42] Some of the 
Soviet allegations covered events that apparently had already 
been clarified to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union in the 
SCC.[43] Other charges included the recent American deployment 
of Pershing IIs and long-range, ground-based Tomahawk cruise 
missiles in Western Europe, which the Soviet Union maintained 
were ‘an obvious addition to the strategic offensive arsenal 
of the United States’ and thus a circumvention of SALT II’s 
limits. Another charge was that the United States was 
developing missile and radar components of an anti-ballistic 
missile system in violation of the ABM agreement.[44]
The Soviet statement also expressed annoyance with 
American failure to ratify SALT II and TTBT.[45] It maintained 
that the controversy about Soviet compliance with TTBT would 
not have arisen if the United States had ratified the treaty. 
The Soviet Union apparently believed that ratification would 
have raised American confidence about Soviet compliance 
because ‘a number of important [verification] measures’ 
provided in the TTBT would have come into force.[46] The 
American record of compliance with the ABM treaty was severely 
criticised by the Soviet Union. President Reagan’s ‘Star
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Wars’ speech in March 1983, the Soviet Union argued, indicated 
clearly that the United States intended to ‘break out’ of that 
treaty. The Soviet statement expressed surprise at alleged 
American indifference to Soviet sensitivity to the ‘star wars’ 
programme and that such a programme, as the Soviet Union had 
waxned earlier, would have ‘far-reaching consequences’ in 
terms of the severity of Soviet reaction.[47] At any rate, the 
Soviet Union stressed that a ‘strict fulfilment’ of the ABM 
treaty required the United States to renounce ‘preparations to 
deploy a large-scale ABM system’.[48] Interestingly, the 
Soviet aide-memoire did not contain any rebuttals to specific 
American allegations. The Soviet statement side-tracked that 
issue, holding the United States responsible for the situation 
because of the latter’s ‘approach to the very process of arms 
limitation and reduction and the fulfilment of the legal and 
political commitments it has assumed in this field’. [49]
The Soviet statement and the State Department’s 
subsequent rebuttal[50], showed clearly that both parties had 
entered into an arms control relationship with expectations 
the other side did not accept and with a sensitivity that
could easily weaken the stability of their relationship. As 
reflected in its aide-memoire, the Soviet Union’s expectations 
were not limited to American compliance with specific 
obligations under existing agreements but apparently extended 
to American arms control policy in general.[51]
Official American allegations of Soviet non-compliance 
both, in terms of the number of cases cited and the
formulation of charges - turned out to be more restrained than 
President Reagan’s earlier statements and his responses to 
queries by the news media. Indeed, official allegations
failed to placate some conservative elements within and
outside the Administration. The ‘hardliners’ continued to 
make additional and unequivocal allegations of Soviet 
non-compliance, questioning the wisdom of engaging in any arms 
control relationship with the Soviet Union. The official 
studies conducted by the Reagan Administration, according to a 
leading conservative, ‘tended to give the Soviet Union the 
benefit of the doubt when reasonable grounds existed for doing 
so*. [52] By contrast, prominent hard-core conservatives
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frequently seemed to adopt the reverse principle. In a number 
of cases, they tended to regard Soviet exploitation of 
loop-holes or ambiguities arising from the drafting of 
agreements to constitute a violation or a culpable 
circumvention.
In October 1984, yet another report on Soviet compliance 
behaviour was transmitted by President Reagan to the Senate 
and a summary was released to the public. The 300-page report 
had been prepared by ACDA’s General Advisory Committee (GAC) 
and had been sent to President Reagan as far back as December 
1983. [53] ‘Hardline’ conservatives - in this case, some 
existing or former members of the ’hawkish’ Committee on the 
Present Danger - formed a majority in GAC and the report 
reflected their distinct approach to the issue of Soviet 
compliance.[54] The GAC report, which claimed 17 violations or 
‘material breaches’ by the Soviet Union since 1958 [55], lacked 
rigour and included patently questionable charges, was passed 
on to the Senate by President Reagan with some apparent 
reluctance. The GAC report was submitted at the behest of 
Congress which had made it a requirement in the 1984 Defense 
Authorisation Act.[56] In his letter accompanying the GAC 
report, President Reagan had sounded- a note of caution, 
stating that ‘neither the methodology of analysis nor the 
conclusions reached in this report have been reviewed or 
approved by any agencies of the US Government’.[57] The Soviet 
Union described the GAC report as ‘an open political forgery’ 
and reiterated its earlier allegations of American 
non-compliance.[58]
In his report to the Senate, President Reagan had said 
that Soviet compliance behaviour had altered his 
Administration’s perception of arms control’s significance for 
national security.[59] To influential ‘hawks’ within the 
Administration, the report on Soviet non-compliance confirmed 
their doubts about the value of arms control.[60]
Compliance Controversy
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‘Hardline’ conservatives concluded from the controversial 
record of Soviet compliance that the Soviet Union had 
systematically violated numerous agreements. They also 
accused American administrations over the past decade of 
condoning Soviet behaviour, if not ’collaborated tacitly’ with 
the Soviet Union to help the latter conceal its serious 
misdemeanours.[61] Such conservatives asserted that the Soviet 
attitude towards the sanctity of treaties and agreements was 
cynical[62], and claimed that the Soviet Union viewed arms 
control as ’a form of political struggle - an instrument of 
"war in peace" rather than a vehicle for a genuine 
accommodation of interests’.[63] The ‘hardliners’ also 
maintained that the Soviet strategy had been devious from the 
outset of the SALT process; it had aimed at gaining military 
superiority over the United States and ‘breaking-out’ of 
agreements after this insidious purpose had been achieved.[64] 
Specifically, the Soviet Union’s alleged purpose was to 
acquire a ‘nuclear wax-fighting and war-winning 
capability’.[65] Such a view enjoyed support in influential 
circles within the Reagan Administration. In a Senate 
hearing, Richard Perle charged that the Soviet Union had 
deliberately entered into agreements with the aim of violating 
them and gaining superiority over the^United States. [66] He 
claimed that ‘a great deal of evidence’ existed and specially 
mentioned the case of SS-19s in the context of SALT I.[67] 
Even if somewhat half-heartedly, Perle conceded that the 
problem probably lay with the ‘imperfections’ of SALT I. Yet, 
he regarded the Soviet deployment of SS-19s to be a clear 
circumvention of SALT I.[68]
‘Hardline’ conservatives also raised the question of an 
effective sanctions policy. They criticised arms control for 
lack of sanctions and the means of enforcement. Indeed, they 
believed that such means could not be put in place to deal 
with infringements, as is usually the case in legal 
relationships. This deficiency enabled the Soviet Union to 
indulge in violations, since it did not have to ‘fear 
detection and...the probable consequences of detection’.[69] 
The ‘hardliners’ suggested that it would be better to avoid 
arms control in view of constraints against denouncing the 
Soviet Union and the political and practical difficulties of
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taking concrete steps to punish non-compliance.[70]
A more moderate view has been that the Reagan 
Administration’s arms control policy was partly responsible 
for the situation, and also that declining compliance in 
recent years was largely a consequence of uncertainty about 
the future of existing agreements and the prospects of 
additional ones.[7l] By taking steps not strictly prohibited 
by agreements, but which undermined such agreements, both the 
superpowers - the Soviet Union more so - had been ‘hedging 
their bets’, with both sides increasingly losing interest in 
their existing arms control relationship.[72] Previous 
administrations had managed to resolve compliance matters with 
reasonable success because ‘neither side questioned the 
other’s intentions towards the SALT agreements[73] But in 
the early 1980s, ’these calculations [sic] changed 
dramatically’ in both capitals.[74] Critics of the Reagan 
Administration pointed to its de-stablising behaviour and 
postures: the initial opposition to SALT II and the 
subsequent refusal to ratify it; the uncertainty about the 
Administration’s political commitment to abide by SALT II; 
the Administration’s failure to discuss compliance matters in 
the SCC in 1981 and 1982, while it.«, made informal public 
charges of Soviet violations or suspected violations during 
this period; the doubts about the future of the ABM agreement 
because of the Administration’s declared enthusiasm for ‘Star 
Wars’; and certain military R&D activities with a bearing on 
the integrity of the ABM agreement.[75] Criticism directed at 
the Soviet Union was stronger because its de-stablising acts 
were considered more wide-ranging.
The compliance issue is now a decade old. Charges of 
Soviet non-compliance with SALT I were made by conservatives 
not long after the agreement went into force. Such charges 
partly underscored the opposition to the succeeding SALT II 
agreement. Compliance issues pertaining to SALT I were also 
raised by American and Soviet governments of the day, but were 
resolved confidentially in the SCC to mutual satisfaction. 
But critics of the SALT process added their old charges about 
SALT I to new ones about SALT II in their campaign to pressure 
the Reagan Administration to publicly accuse the Soviet Union
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of numerous violations and to demonstrate American political 
resolve by abandoning SALT II and suspending the arms control 
process, if necessary.[76]
The overall record of Soviet compliance is more 
complicated than an ’open and shut case’ of numerous 
violations, as claimed by Senator McClure and believed many 
other conservatives.[77] As in the past, the conservatives 
tended to reach firm conclusions on the basis of arguable 
evidence. Indeed, sometimes they even accused the Soviet 
Union of non-compliance when the latter’s actions were clearly 
within the legal framework of agreements or political 
commitments. Conservatives also tended to judge Soviet 
compliance behaviour on the basis of expectations spawned by 
official statements interpreting the agreement or claiming an 
unwritten political commitment unconfirmed by the other 
side.[78]
The Soviet Union has often taken advantage of loopholes 
in agreements and has exploited or attempted to exploit such 
agreements to their very limit. There is little disagreement 
in the United States on this issue. Indeed, in a joint 
report, former Carter Administration officials challenged the 
view that the Soviet Union was a dedicated cheater, but agreed 
that the SALT I and TTBT agreements had shown the Soviet Union 
to take advantage of ambiguities in agreements.[79]
An example of hasty allegations by ‘hardline’ 
conservatives is the case of SS-24 (or PL-5) ICBM.[80] On this 
issue the Reagan Administration’s report to the Senate spoke 
of a ‘probable violation’, while staunch conservatives alleged 
a clear violation. Reality was more complicated because of 
ambiguities in the SALT II agreement.[81] Conservatives also 
tended to show little restraint in alleging Soviet 
non-compliance with the 150-kiloton ceiling on nuclear weapon 
tests under the TTBT, while the Administration’s report to the 
Senate spoke cautiously of a number of ‘likely violations’. 
On other occasions however the President Reagan, not to 
mention other conservatives, seemed certain of Soviet 
violations of the TTBT. Yet, according to several experts, 
this may not have been the case.[82] Another example was the
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Administration’s allegation of Soviet possession of a 
biological warfare research and development facility in 
violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. The case 
involves an epidemic of anthrax in 1979 in the Soviet city of 
Sverdlovsk. The circumstantial evidence cited in support of 
the allegation is by no means compelling. The possibility 
that the bacteria in question could have originated in a 
weapons laboratory cannot be summarily dismissed, but the 
bacteria known to be endemic to the region could have been a 
naturally occurring one, affecting humans through contaminated 
meat. According to an independent expert, ‘most probably the 
Sverdlovsk epidemic did not arise as a result of Soviet 
biological warfare work’, but more likely through contaminated 
meat, as the Soviet Union maintained. [83]
A more convincing example of treaty violation was the 
discovery in August 1983 of a large radar facility in 
Siberia.[84] The Soviet Union maintained that the radar in 
question was meant for space-tracking, but the radar’s 
location in the interior and its proximity to some major 
missile silos strengthened conservative suspicion that the 
facility was intended for ABM purposes - a possibility 
acknowledged by two prominent experts, Richard Garwin and 
Herbert York, who have usually been strong supporters of arms 
control. [85] Most experts believe the radar is a treaty 
violation but the consensus now seems to be that the purpose 
is early warning rather than ABM battle management - still a 
clear treaty violation but with a less sinister purpose than 
ABM ‘break-out’.[86] Such a violation is politically 
significant, though not of sufficient military consequence to 
justify the clamour raised by ‘hardline’ conservatives.[87]
American and Soviet Attitudes
Both, the United States and the Soviet Union contributed 
in their respective ways to the decline of their arms control 
relationship. The poor management of that relationship on 
both sides exacerbated the problem already posed by the 
deterioration of their overall relations. The issue of Soviet 
non-compliance was complicated by the refusal of the United 
States to ratify SALT II and TTBT, which conservatives had
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roundly condemned as ‘fatally flawed’ during the Carter 
period.[88] The failure to ratify SALT II and the acrimonious 
debate over it ‘poisoned US-Soviet relationship and gave 
grounds for [a Soviet perception of] America as an unreliable 
partner’.[89]
For its part, the Soviet Union displayed little interest 
in shoring-up its declining arms control relationship with the 
United States. Curiously, this happened at a time when 
American conservatives were particularly influential. 
Compared to the 1970s, Soviet behaviour in the early 1980s was 
less sensitive to American concerns - and thus more open to 
political exploitation by ‘hardline’ American conservatives. 
The Soviet Union also showed an apparent insensitivity towards 
the fate of these agreements and its arms control relationship 
with the United States by constructing the large radar in 
possible violation of the ABM agreement. The Kremlin could 
hardly have believed that such a structure would remain 
undetected and its claim that the radar was for ‘space 
tracking’ found few supporters. Unlike SALT II and TTBT, the 
ABM treaty is a de jure agreement ratified by the United 
States. The Kremlin also progressively increased encryption 
of electronic data of flight tests of jiew missiles, which made 
it harder for the United States to monitor Soviet compliance 
with certain aspects of SALT II. While it remains unclear if 
earlier encryption practices had impeded verification in the 
sense of violating SALT II, the almost complete encryption of 
telemetry of SS-25 (or PL-5) tests in 1983 does suggest a 
noticeable hardening of Soviet attitude and, indeed, a lack of 
concern about SALT II.[90] Previous encryption of missile test 
data appears to have been substantially less.[9l]
The record of Soviet behaviour lends some support to the 
Reagan Administration’s concern about the form and substance 
of future agreements. Verification provisions in existing 
agreements have been inadequate and need to be improved in 
future agreements. The concern about adequate verification 
applies most strongly to such agreements as the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol on 
chemical weapons, which do not provide for international 
control measures. Improved verification measures are also
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politically necessary if arms control is to progress. 
Conservative influence in the United States is a reality not 
likely to change easily or moderate substantially over the 
short-term. Unfortunately the Soviet Union will resist any 
significant departure from its traditional position on 
verification.
Soviet behaviour raises the importance of avoiding 
ambiguities in future agreements both with regard to 
substantive measures and verification provisions. But it is 
also important not to overstate the case. Instances of loose 
drafting of substantive measures and verification provisions 
were not always a consequence of Soviet machination, as some 
opponents of SALT have tended to suggest. The elimination of 
ambiguities has often been difficult because of technical or 
political considerations.[92] Indeed, as with the definition 
of ‘launchers’ in SALT II, ‘sometimes the US negotiators 
[insisted] on imprecise formulations to preserve US 
flexibility’ in order to keep options open for the future or 
to be able to respond to unforeseen developments.[93] Nor does 
it seem realistic to expect future agreements to be ‘so 
specific and comprehensive as to preclude differences of 
interpretation’. [94] ..
The Soviet non-compliance issue revealed important 
differences between the Carter and Reagan Administrations and 
more generally between the liberals and conservatives. The 
conservatives were more suspicious of Soviet intentions and 
less inclined to give the Soviet Union the benefit of the 
doubt. When compliance issues were raised by the United 
States during the duration of SALT I, for example, 
clarifications and subsequent corrective measures by the 
Soviet Union satisfied the Carter Administration. But the 
Administration’s conservative opponents focused on initial 
Soviet attempts to exploit ambiguities in SALT I, declaring 
that the Soviet Union was not trustworthy and lacked 
commitment to arms control. The liberals also exercised 
restraint because the suspected Soviet violations were not 
regarded as militarily significant.
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The Nixon Administration’s approach also seems to have 
focused on the military significance of possible violations by 
the Soviet Union. According to Henry Kissinger, President 
Nixon’s National Security Advisor and subsequently Secretary 
of State, when the SALT process initially got underway in 1969 
and 1970, ‘the Nixon Administration undertook painstaking 
studies to determine the lowest level above which a 
strategically significant violation could not be 
c o n c e a l e d [95] During the Johnson Administration, it was also 
considered sufficient that agreements should ensure that any 
militaxily significant violation would be easily detected and 
that retaliatory forces should be adequate to make the early 
detection of lesser violations unnecessary.[96] A similax 
approach had prevailed during the Carter Administration. In 
1979, after negotiating SALT II, the Secretaxy of State, Cyrus 
Vance, explained his administration’s position to the Senate: 
’Although the possibility of some undetected cheating in 
certain areas exists, such cheating would not alter the 
strategic balance in view of US programs. Any cheating on a 
scale large enough to alter the strategic balance would be 
discovered in time to make an appropriate response’.[97] 
’Hardline’ conservatives have typically argued that concern 
over Soviet non-compliance hinged ‘fartless on the militaxy 
advantages the Soviet Union has or has not secured, or even on 
the accuracy of the fine print of US charges, than on the need 
to maintain American credibility in order to prevent 
disastrous Soviet miscalculations of US resolve’.[98] Their 
concept of verification seems to derive from the principle 
that it should be possible to make a positive assessment of 
Soviet compliance and ‘not just a negative one that no 
violations of any importance have been deleted’.[99]
Conservatives also tended to be ambivalent, if not 
unconcerned, about possible errors in their approach to 
evaluating Soviet compliance behaviour. A particularly good 
example relates to TTBT. In early 1977 President Caxter had 
formed a special panel to examine the technique used for 
estimating Soviet nuclear test explosions. ’With the support 
of an overwhelming majority of the seismic intelligence 
community’, the panel reported that ‘US methodology should 
include a correction for the difference in seismic wave
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attenuation between US and Soviet test sites’.[lOO] The 
Defense Department subsequently agreed to correct the bias by 
reportedly 20 percent. The percentage was later increased, 
but some experts continued to criticise the bias as being both 
inadequate and politically motivated - that is, intended to 
show the Soviet tests to be above the 150-kiloton limit under 
the TTBT.[lOl] Yet, the initial move to provide for correction 
was criticised by some conservatives. Senator Malcolm Wallop 
suggested that the bias was introduced as a result of pressure 
from those who sought to cover-up Soviet violations.[102] 
Interestingly, the Senator did not think that there was ‘much 
reason to prefer one yardstick over another [sic]’.[103] His 
explanation for the adjustment made during the Carter 
Administration was that the uncorrected method had produced 
‘unpleasant answers’.[104]
Assessment
A number of observations can be made about the 
controversy over verification and compliance, an issue now 
well entrenched in American domestic politics. The 
conservative campaign over the past decade, especially since 
the late 1970s, to influence public opinion on the compliance 
issue has been quite effective. An opinion poll conducted in 
1980, shortly after the American presidential elections, 
showed that 90 percent of respondents favoured arms control in 
principle. About half of them nevertheless agreed with the 
statement that ‘because the chances are that we will keep our 
end of the bargain and the Russians will not, we should not 
sign any agreement limiting nuclear weapons’.[105] Another 
opinion poll in April 1984 reportedly indicated that ’some 70 
percent of the [American] public believe the Soviets are 
cheating on existing agreements and would cheat on future 
agreements’. [106] Despite a sharp division of opinion among 
analysts and commentators, the public influence of 
conservatives increased in the early 1980s. A significant 
body of opinion in the United States feels strongly about the 
importance of verification and the need for strict provisions 
in future agreements. This body includes individuals who 
question arms control, deeply distrust the Soviet Union, and 
are strongly inclined towards traditional reliance on military
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power for national security.
The controversy over compliance reflected ‘a deeper 
political conflict over the issue of arms c o n t r o l [107] Those 
sharply critical of Soviet behaviour had also been less 
enthusiastic about arms control, while others advocating 
restraint had wanted the arms control process to continue with 
minimum damage. The conservatives tended to be less rigorous 
in their allegations of Soviet non-compliance. The liberals 
tended to judge Soviet actions in terms of the letter of 
agreements rather than their spirit. Similarly, while the 
conservatives regarded recent Soviet behaviour to be a test of 
basic Soviet commitment to arms control, the liberals did not 
subscribe to such a ‘fundamentalist’ approach. The debate on 
Soviet compliance thus overlapped with the more general 
controversy over arms control.
It is possible to argue that Soviet compliance behaviour 
that is, a lack of Soviet sensitivity to the concerns of a 
significant body of American opinion - has cast doubt on 
Soviet commitment to arms control. ’Hardline’ conservatives 
made such an argument and argued further that regardless of 
whether Soviet actions constitute legal infringements, Soviet 
behaviour was contrary to the spirit of arms control. Yet, on 
the whole, Soviet behaviour was not illegal and the arms 
control relationship between the superpowers had been unstable 
since SALT II. Thus, the assumption that it is unrealistic to 
expect a viable arms control relationship with the Soviet 
Union seems premature. While President Reagan did not follow 
much of the extreme advice from ‘hardline’ conservatives, 
influential elements within his administration tried with some 
success to relegate arms control to a secondary status for 
reasons that seemed to go beyond questions of Soviet 
compliance.
The difficulties of engaging in clandestine activities in 
breach of agreement, together with the danger of being found 
out domestically, is clearly much greater in the case of the 
United States. The Soviet Union thus enjoys, as it were, a 
measure of natural advantage over the United States. This 
partly explains the importance the United States has attached
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to the verifiability of agreements since the beginning of 
post-war negotiations with the Soviet Union. The ‘imbalance’ 
complicates the verification problem. The perception of the 
Soviet Union as a 4 vast and secretive country’ helps to spawn 
such distrust that even intrusive verification measures have 
not been considered adequate by some in the United 
States.[108] During discussions in the National Security 
Council on inventory limits for surplus missiles, the 
Secretary of State, George Shultz reportedly indicated his 
concern that 4 almost no matter how intrusive the accompanying 
verification measures, any set of measures designed to 
prohibit the Soviets from hiding excess missiles other than at 
launch sites was basically unverifiable’ and posed a serious 
potential threat.[109] Time Magaziners defence correspondent, 
Strobe Talbot further reported that ‘this line [of thinking] 
was getting to be a refrain in the Administration’s [top 
level] deliberations’.[l10]
Plausibly, ‘whether their motive is to conceal strengths, 
weaknesses, or both, the Soviets seem to feel they have more 
to gain by preserving tight controls on information and access 
to their territory than by agreeing with the Western notion 
that openness promotes stability and security’.[ 111] Even if 
the Soviet Union should see that ‘openness’ would promote and 
strengthen arms control, they might still regard such 
‘openness’ as a major ideological and political gain for the 
United States, outweighing the benefits to be derived from 
greater and more stable arms control. A complicating factor 
is the Soviet view that ‘cooperative measures should not 
provide more information about Soviet military activities than 
is strictly necessary to verify treaty obligations’. [112] It 
is often difficult to reconcile the two. What is strictly 
necessary for verification is not easy to determine 
objectively, especially if strong psychological factors at 
work.
Judgements about verification requirements are ultimately 
subjective, being influenced by both technical and political 
considerations.[113] Despite sophisticated unilateral 
monitoring capability offered by satellites, there is no 
certainty of detecting non-compliance at an early stage or in
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all instances. Although ‘marvelously capable’, American 
reconnaissance satellites are ’subject to limitations. As a 
result, suspicious violations can go undetected for a long 
time’.[114] The sensitivity of the Reagan Administration and a 
large body of American conservatives to possible violations, 
regardless of their military significance, accentuates the 
imperfections of verification capability. A leading advocate 
of arms control urged the Reagan Administration to provide 
special funds to activate ‘scientists and engineers to work 
harder on verification problems, [because] solutions might 
appear that have thus far escaped us in what can hardly be 
called an all-out search for new verification 
techniques’.[115] Recent advances in photographic and 
computer-related technologies relevant to improved monitoring 
by satellites are regarded as ‘a technological tour de force 
which future verification schemes cannot ignore’.[116] 
However, while such advances ‘could be useful in helping to 
break the political impasse in the control of nuclear 
weapons *[117] , arms control in general would still have to 
come to terms with the possibility of violations and the need 
to supplement independent means with cooperative measures.
Cooperative measures of verification have not been such a 
failure as to justify the Reagan Administration’s view that 
independent means of verification should predominate in future 
agreements. At any rate, cooperative measures will retain 
considerable importance in view of the limitations and 
imperfections of independent means. Indeed, independent means 
cannot be used effectively for some purposes unless 
facilitated by cooperative measures. For example, monitoring 
missile tests can be significantly impeded through encryption 
of telemetry. Similarly, procedures for on-site inspection 
and arrangements for obtaining data through emplacement of 
monitoring instruments, as envisaged in CTB and other 
negotiations, presuppose cooperation between states.
In order to meet the requirements of verification 
envisaged by the United States, the Soviet Union would have to 
make a significant departure from its traditional stance. The 
basic positions of the superpowers, which have often been at 
sharp variance, have grown more polarised. The verification
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issue could thus prove to be a greater obstacle to arms 
control in future than it has already been for many years. 
Its impact will however vary according to the nature and scope 
of agreement sought. Fluctuations in superpower relations 
will also increase or lessen the weight of political and 
psychological factors that bear upon the verification problem. 
In any case, a return to the flexible American attitude of the 
1970s seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. In recent 
years, the conservatives have demonstrated their political 
strength and also their success in making the public more 
suspicious of the Soviet Union and sensitive to the issue of 
Soviet non-compliance. The recent controversy has shown that 
‘public confidence will often depend less on esoteric 
assessments of whether possible violations are militarily 
significant than on simple perceptions of whether the Soviets 
are cheating, regardless of the military significance’.[118]
To a limited extent, the Soviet Union can be expected to 
show more flexibility in future negotiations, provided the 
arms control process resumes in some earnest. After all, the 
Soviet Union has not been uniformly inflexible in all recent 
negotiations or over the entire post-war period. The past 
decade has witnessed a tangible change in Soviet attitude, 
with possible signs of more flexibility. If this happens, 
some agreements involving less intrusive verification measures 
might be possible, unless compounded or obstructed by other 
problems. Limited Soviet flexibility will not however meet 
current American requirements of verification for most major 
agreements, such as a chemical disarmament treaty.
Though not necessarily ‘a key [sic] to a new era of arms 
control’[119], on-site inspection is extremely important to 
overcoming the verification problem. But the Soviet 
attachment to secrecy greatly complicates the delicate task of 
providing for improved verification measures without 
jeopardising national security. The Soviet penchant for 
secrecy seems deep-rooted. Secrecy is probably considered a 
significant asset, both for purposes of domestic politics and 
military competition with the United States. If this is the 
case, then any substantial change of Soviet attitude is highly 
unlikely in circumstances of intense rivalry between the
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superpowers.
A relationship of detente that can proceed for a 
reasonable period of time without running into serious 
difficulty might mitigate the putative Soviet ‘compulsions’ 
towards secrecy. The potential for attitudinal change would 
increase, though not perhaps to any dramatic degree. Public 
pressure on the Soviet Union, as has been suggested[120], 
could cause the Kremlin to show more flexibility. But 
attempts to do so would require the United States to make its 
interest in arms control more credible to international public 
opinion. The political significance of public pressure would 
be distinctly greater if the non-aligned group could be 
persuaded to extend its support for more Soviet flexibility. 
But this would also require the United States to substantially 
improve its arms control dialogue with major Third World 
states.
Notions of ‘equal security’ and ‘mutual benefits’ perhaps 
also figure in Soviet resistance to intrusive verification 
procedures, especially those sought by the United States. The 
benefits of intrusive verification might be considered unequal 
or unbalanced by the Soviet Union, in the, sense that the gain 
for the United States would not be simply limited to greater 
assurance of compliance. The ‘opening up’ of the Soviet 
system, envisaged in the American approach to verification, 
would also mean substantial political and ideological gains 
for the United States in the context of its global rivalry 
with the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, verification and compliance have been a 
significant concern of American arms control policy since the 
beginning of post-war negotiations with the Soviet Union. The 
question of adequate verification has been a subject of 
domestic debate for many years. The controversy grew in scope 
and intensity over the past decade, reaching a high point in 
1983-1984. ’Hardline’ conservatives eventually achieved a 
partial success when the Reagan Administration publicly and 
officially accused the Soviet Union of various acts of
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non-compliance, though not as severely as conservatives would 
have wished. While grounds for serious concern about Soviet 
non-compliance existed in some cases, more often the 
allegations were either excessive or misplaced. Nevertheless, 
on the whole, Soviet behaviour in the post-Carter period 
showed little sensitivity to American concerns or interest in 
bolstering American confidence. Both sides managed their arms 
control relationship poorly as it slid to its lowest level in 
over a decade.
The compliance issue has shaken confidence on both sides 
with regard to the other’s bona fides. This can only make the 
task of negotiating verification measures in future 
negotiations more difficult. The problem however is not 
limited to negotiating verification measures alone. 
Maintaining the stability of such agreements is also going to 
be a demanding task, given the real danger of over-reaction on 
both sides. A shift to a more complex and intrusive system of 
verification would be more than a simple transition or 
progression. There could be risks of a more damaging outbreak 
of controversy over compliance than the one witnessed in 
recent years. Intrusive measures and procedures, especially 
for fact-finding purposes, could certainly help to promote 
verification or assuage distrust, but such instruments could 
also be abused or used irresponsibly with serious consequences 
for one or the other party and thus for the agreement itself, 
if not for the arms control process. The application of such 
measures could generate disagreements and delays not 
necessarily of deliberate intent, yet detrimental to the 
agreement if the parties should misperceive such situations.
The compliance controversy - not to mention the overall 
decline of superpower relations in recent years - does not 
provide an encouraging record of superpower management of 
their arms control relationship. Given the imperfections of 
independent verification capability and thus the continued 
importance of bilateral or multilateral cooperation, some 
degree of mutual trust and self-confidence will remain 
necessary. Distrust will impede and may even retard the axms 
control process, unless the superpowers approach axms control 
more flexibly, interpreting their past conduct in less
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fundamentalist terms and recognising the linkage between the 
arms control process and their overall relations. Since 
public interest in arms control is not likely to fade, ‘the 
only real alternative to imperfectly enforceable restraints is 
no restraint at all - and that is just not acceptable to a 
world that lives in fear of nuclear Armageddon[121]
The question of adequate verification, both from a 
technical and political standpoint, has a significant beaxing 
on arms control, but its impact nevertheless -varies. The 
issue is not a major stumbling-block for CTB negotiations. 
But it is more complicated and contentious in the case of CW 
negotiations, if only because of the scope of the proposed 
convention and the nature of weapons and facilities to be 
prohibited. Yet the issue has sometimes been raised to 
conceal policy indecisions or lack of interest in seeking 
certain agreements, such as the American attitude towards CW 
negotiations in the late 1960s and early 1970s and towards a 
CTB, particularly under the Reagan Administration. The Soviet 
method appears to have been in the reverse - that is, to deny 
the need for international control, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, as they had done, for example, with the subject 
of CW negotiations in the early and mid-1970s.. As such, 
verification could also become a convenient pretext for not 
pursuing negotiations or seeking agreements.
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CONCLUSIONS
CPD
The CPD negotiations in the CD took some time to get 
underway. The negotiations were undertaken largely as a 
result of pressure from the Group of 21, though Italy, Belgium 
and the Netherlands had been proponents in the past when the 
CPD issue was first raised in the CCD. The CD failed to 
submit an agreed negotiating text to SSODII in mid-1982. 
Further efforts, both at SSODII and subsequently in the CD, 
could not break the deadlock. CPD negotiations were suspended 
in early 1984. The prospects of progress seemed extremely 
bleak following a preliminary effort to explore the situation 
in the CD.
The groups differed substantially in the way they 
envisaged a CPD. The Western and Socialist groups did not 
wish to bind themselves in any way to a scheme of global arms 
control. The differences were at their sharpest between the 
Group of 21 and the United States, partly due to changes in 
American attitude under the Reagan Administration. The Group 
of 21 began with a highly ambitious „.^scheme but eventually 
moderated its overall approach. However, a lack of American 
flexibility, especially on the CTB issue, led to an imbroglio. 
Though anxious for an agreement, the Group of 21 found the 
termination of negotiations preferable to accepting the 
Western Group’s innocuous idea of a CPD.
Apart from conceptual differences, other major stumbling 
blocks were the CTB and regional arms control issues. The 
Group of 21 opposed American insistence on highlighting the 
importance of regional arms control in the Third World. 
Similarly, the United States objected strongly to the Group of 
21’s preponderant focus on nuclear disarmament and arms 
control between the superpowers. The United States also 
refused to make any clear commitment to a CTB in the short and 
medium term. The Group of 21 attempted to draw the 
superpowers into a format of negotiations reminiscent of 
general disarmament negotiations between the latter in the 
1950s and early 1960s. The superpowers were however
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indifferent to the idea of general disarmament. They also 
displayed little interest in any process of substantial arms 
control.
CTB
The negotiations on a CTB were afflicted by both 
procedural problems and substantive issues. The United States 
sought a protracted examination of the verification issue, 
regarding it a serious problem that had to be resolved before 
negotiations could commence. But the professed American 
concern about verification was not convincing. The Reagan 
Administration had evidently lost interest in a CTB for the 
foreseeable future. The verification issue had become an 
excuse not to make progress rather than a real barrier to 
negotiations. The verification question was not serious 
enough to justify a lengthy examination of that issue alone in 
the CD, as sought by the United States. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union was only likely to display flexibility on the 
verification issue in the context of substantive CTB 
negotiations. In other words, apart from being of dubious 
intent, the American approach was counter-productive.
More complicated than the verification issue was the 
status of PNEs in a CTB. On this matter, serious differences 
existed between the Group of 21 and the United States, 
reflecting in large measure the festering tensions between the 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states over the NPT regime.
In the 1980s, the United States was increasingly axguing 
that reliability-testing of its nuclear stockpile was both 
necessary and a further barrier to agreeing to a CTB. There 
was no consensus among technical experts in the United States 
that such testing was in fact necessary. The Reagan 
Administration’s position on this issue as in others reflected 
the most conservative segment of expert opinion. the opinion 
of conservative circles. Another major impediment was the 
unwillingness of France and China to join a CTB until the 
superpowers had substantially reduced their nuclear 
stockpiles. The Soviet Union was more adamant than the United 
States that a CTB should include other nuclear weapon states.
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This was not surprisingly since all the other nuclear weapons 
states were hostile to the Soviet Union.
A change of administration in the United States could 
lessen the influence of CTB critics. But many such critics 
hold influential positions in the political and scientific 
establishments. They could, as they have in the past, 
frustrate the efforts of an administration genuinely committed 
to achieving a CTB. A new test ban, limited both in scope and 
participation, would reduce the technical and political 
problems associated with a CTB. But such an approach has 
failed to gain much support in the CD. Nevertheless, an 
improvement in the arms control dialogue between the major 
groups could make a limited test ban an acceptable interim 
measure and a confidence building step for further progress in 
the future. In any case, such an agreement could be 
negotiated outside the CD’s multilateral context.
CTB negotiations were abandoned in 1984. The United 
States continued to insist on a mandate for CTB negotiations 
that was limited both in scope and status. The Group of 21 
and the Socialist Group eventually refused to negotiate on 
that basis. The only concrete work reJLated to a CTB in the CD 
was undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts which 
periodically reported the results of its technical studies and 
tests to evaluate the capability to detect and identify 
seismic events through the international seismic and 
telecommunications network.
CW
The negotiations on a CW ban proceeded more seriously and 
systematically. By the end of 1984, however, the negotiations 
were still far from complete. Most of the problems evident in 
1983 persisted in 1984, though some progress was made towards 
clarifying the definition of CW agents and their precursors. 
Outstanding issues that remained unresolved included the 
declaration of weapon stockpiles and facilities, the 
non-production of weapons and the use of methyl-phosphorous 
compounds in commercial facilities, and verification 
procedures for confirming compliance with most obligations.
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Verification was by far the most important issue. American 
concept of wide-ranging and intrusive verification measures 
went far beyond what the Soviet Union was prepared to concede. 
Prompt on-site inspection upon request - a prerequisite from 
the American point of view - was not the only thorny aspect of 
the verification issue, but it weighed most heavily on 
deep-seated Soviet fear of American abuse of intrusive 
verification procedures for espionage purposes. Despite some 
flexibility, the Soviet approach in turn raised American fears 
of Soviet non-compliance.
Soviet interest in CW negotiations began to decline as 
the verification issue was increasingly pushed by the United 
States. A further hardening of American attitude in 1984 led 
to an evident loss of Soviet interest in CW negotiations in 
the CD. The Soviet focus shifted to creating a chemical 
weapons free zone in Central Europe. The free-zone proposal 
lacked in seriousness. It seemed a propaganda exercise to 
encourage European resistance to moves within NATO, largely at 
American initiative, to modernise and augment CW deployments 
in Western Europe.
The verification issue represents... the most significant 
impediment to CW disarmament for several reasons: the nature 
of chemical weapons; Soviet distrust of American motives; 
and Soviet penchant for secrecy. The problem assumed almost 
insuperable proportions when the Reagan Administration decided 
to seek an unprecedented degree of intrusion of Soviet 
territory through its proposed system for on-site inspection 
for fact-finding purposes.
The prospects for overcoming the verification barrier 
will be all the more gloomy in conditions of acute tensions in 
superpower relations, as have existed in recent years. Some 
lessening of mutual distrust seems necessary to bring the 
verification problem within manageable proportions. The 
problem is not simply one of achieving a technological 
breakthrough or a technical ‘fix’. There are also ponderous 
political considerations that affect one side’s perception of 
the other’s motives and intentions over the short and long 
term.
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The CD in Context
The negotiations in the CD occurred at a time when 
US-Soviet relations were at their lowest ebb for many years 
and no real progress was being made in central arms control 
talks. From the outset, the INF and START negotiations became 
more of an exercise in political and psychological warfare 
than discreet and serious attempts to make progress in arms 
control. The arms control process initiated in the late 1960s 
also suffered from intractable problems, so much so that a 
number of existing agreements - notably, SALT II and ABM 
were under a cloud. There were several reasons for this. 
First, the entrenched opposition to arms control from 
‘hardline’ conservatives who had become increasingly 
influential in the United States in the 1980s. Second, Soviet 
compliance behaviour and American handling of that issue. 
Third, the new American enthusiasm for ABM defence. The CD 
thus had to function in circumstances least favourable for the 
progress of its work.
The CD’s difficulties were compounded by a worsening of 
relations between the non-aligned group and the superpowers, 
and also by their disagreements on other political and 
security-related issues addressed in various UN forums. These 
issues included de-militarisation of the Indian Ocean, 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, prohibition of use of force, 
and institutional strengthening of the UN’s international 
security role.
The UN’s role in arms control was more central in the 
first post-war decade than at any other period since the late 
1950s. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the superpowers 
engaged in negotiations in the UN on nuclear and conventional 
disarmament, along with some of their NATO and WTO allies. 
The UN’s role declined towards the late 1950s. Amidst 
pressures for expanding the Disarmament Commission, the 
superpowers decided to resume their disarmament negotiations 
outside the UN in bilateral and limited multilateral forums 
jointly sponsored by them. The expansion of the Disarmament 
Commission did not enjoy American support and that body 
quickly receded into the background as the focus of attention
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shifted to activities in external forums created by the 
superpowers.
It was not until the late 1970s that member-states agreed 
to refurbish the UN’s role, which had fallen into neglect 
during the 1960s and the better part of the 1970s. It was 
generally felt that during this period the superpowers had 
failed to meet the concerns of most member-states about the 
arms race and the declining conditions of international 
security. Indeed, many states, especially the non-aligned 
ones, felt that the superpowers had been indifferent, if not 
opposed, to discharging their responsibilities towards 
collective security under the UN Charter. They also felt that 
the bipolar politics of the superpowers had stultified the 
UN’s international security role.
Though less important, a wide range of issues were 
considered in various UN forums. Central arms control issues 
however continued to be addressed outside the UN in bilateral 
and limited multilateral forums. Unlike the focus on general 
disarmament in the 1950s, in the 1970s and early 1980s the 
superpowers agreed to discuss the CPD concept mainly at the 
non-aligned group’s urging. Moreover, the superpowers 
visualised a CPD in terms that differed greatly from the idea 
of general disarmament. The reluctance of the superpowers to 
negotiate major arms control issues in the UN could be 
explained as follows: the superpowers did not wish to lose 
any control over the pace and pattern of negotiations; the 
issues were considered bilateral in nature, if only because 
arms control was still at an incipient stage; unlike the more 
recent period, the negotiations in the 1950s were conducted in 
the context of general disarmament, which brought other states 
into the picture and thus made the UN directly relevant; 
acceptance of the UN’s central role would draw the superpowers 
more deeply into arms control than they would prefer; and 
such acceptance would also raise the UN’s status, while making 
unilateralism more difficult.
Recent CTB and CW negotiations were in a sense exceptions 
to the rule. But both the issues had been initially taken up 
in bilateral talks between the superpowers. In the case of CW
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negotiations, active American involvement was probably due to 
strong Congressional pressure. At any rate, the superpowers’ 
willingness to engage in CTB and CW negotiations in the CD 
probably derived ultimately from non-proliferation 
considerations, as it was evidently the case with NPT 
negotiations in the ENDC in the late 1960s. The attitude of 
the superpowers however varied. The Soviet Union seemed eager 
to upgrade the CD’s consideration of the CTB issue and to 
begin negotiations on two other issues - the prevention of 
nuclear war and the prohibition of weapons in outer space. 
Soviet interest in negotiating on these subjects in the CD 
probably arose because attempts to initiate bilateral talks 
with the United States had failed and perhaps more importantly 
because these issues had a direct beaxing on the American 
nuclear modernisation programme and the ‘Star Wars’ plan. The 
Soviet Union may have also hoped to score propaganda points, 
given that the non-aligned group was particularly critical of 
American defence policy.
The general decline of the UN’s involvement in arms 
control negotiations since the late 1950s seems linked to the 
transformation of the UN’s arms control forum from an 
essentially bilateral one between the,„superpowers in the late 
1940s and 1950s to an increasingly multilateral one in the 
1960s and 1970s, marked by a growing number of disgruntled and 
assertive non-aligned countries. The growing numbers of Third 
World states and their increasingly non-aligned stance 
undermined the initial political dominance of the United 
States in the UN, rendering that organisation less amenable to 
American or superpower control. The UN became less attractive 
as it began to lose its usefulness for the American 
containment policy towards the Soviet Union, or for the 
superpowers to immerse the UN in their ideological and 
political rivalry.
American support for the UN’s involvement in arms control 
in the early period coincided with its political pre-eminence 
in that organisation, as demonstrated for example by the 
General Assembly’s 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution following 
the outbreak of the Korean War - as also by the composition of 
separate commissions for atomic and conventional weapons
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negotiations, constituted in the late 1940s. Irked by its 
glaringly weak diplomatic position during that period, the 
Soviet Union initially took the lead in demanding and then 
supporting the proposal by Third World states for an expansion 
of the Disarmament Commission in the late 1950s.
The collective security system envisaged in the UN 
Charter does not incorporate the idea of disarmament nor, 
indeed, any significant regulation and reduction of armaments 
and armed forces. The invention and use of atomic weapons 
towards the close of the Second World War made arms control 
and disarmament issues matters of obvious concern. Since then 
the General Assembly has passed many resolutions, including 
some major ones with the unanimous support of member-states, 
which suggested that arms control and disarmament had emerged 
as one of the UN’s primary concerns. More recently, at SSODI 
in 1978, member-states unanimously adopted the Final Document 
which again reiterated their support for arms control and 
disarmament. Yet the consensus in recent years, if not also 
in the past, has been more apparent than real. By the time of 
SSODII in 1982, Mexico’s veteran Ambassador for Disarmament, 
Garcia Robles, aptly remarked that, although member-states 
apparently supported and accepted the .^need for disarmament, 
there was generally ‘a great difference between words and 
deeds’.[l]
The superficial consensus represented by the Final 
Document soon gave way to overt differences of approach and 
preoccupation between the major groups of states. The change 
of administration in the United States - from Carter to Reagan 
accentuated the differences between the Western and 
non-aligned groups, contributing to an unprecedented decline 
of consensus on arms control and disarmament issues in the UN.
The erosion of consensus had begun earlier with growing 
disappointment among most non-nuclear weapon states with the 
performance of the nuclear weapon states, especially the 
superpowers, in the implementation of the NPT. Under the NPT 
the non-nuclear weapon states had renounced the production and 
possession of nuclear weapons, while the nuclear weapon states 
had undertaken to reduce their nuclear stockpile expeditiously
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with the ultimate objective of achieving nuclear disarmament. 
The non-nuclear weapon states had also expected that a CTB 
would be instituted to control vertical nuclear proliferation. 
However, by 1980, roughly a decade after the signing of the 
NPT, the SALT process stood suspended and even the future of 
the limited test ban agreement of 1974 looked uncertain in the 
wake of growing conservative opposition in the United States 
to SALT and TTBT, not to mention a future CTB.
The Western Group considered the non-aligned group’s arms 
control approach to be unbalanced, in that the latter’s focus 
was much more on the central alliances than on regional powers 
in the Third World. In particular, the Western Group objected 
to the non-aligned group’s almost overwhelming focus on 
nuclear war and weapons, and axgued that conventional wars and 
weapons were a more immediate concern. More significantly, 
the Western Group questioned the non-aligned group’s belief in 
the urgency of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, much to the 
annoyance of non-aligned states, the Western Group asserted 
that nuclear weapons performed a vital deterrent function and 
that in any case more attention should be given to the 
resolution of political issues than to the reversal of the 
arms race because the latter was an effect of the former.
The non-aligned group maintained that the Western Group’s 
concern about the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons was 
both discriminatory and excessive, especially when compared to 
the latter’s less steadfast attitude towards vertical nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear weapon testing. On the question of 
regional arms control, the non-aligned group axgued that Third 
World conflicts and arms build-up were largely a consequence 
of big-power rivalry and manipulation and that, as relatively 
insignificant producers of weapons, the responsibility of 
regional powers to global arms control was either peripheral 
or secondary. The divergences between the major groups of 
states reflected the limited and somewhat one-sided interest 
in arms control on all sides. The non-aligned group’s 
approach envisaged changes that would improve the position of 
the major regional states in the global balance of power. The 
central alliances did not wish to concede changes that would 
substantially alter the international system and wealcen their
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power; they were prepared to consider some changes but 
through a process that would be both incremental and could be 
terminated at any stage.
The non-aligned group’s approach reflected in large 
measure the influence of such major regional states as India, 
Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria and Brazil. The need for group 
cohesion persuaded numerous other states to go along with the 
emphasis on nuclear disarmament and limited focus on 
conventional arms control and confidence building measures in 
Third World regions.
The differences between the non-aligned group and the 
central alliances also extended to the pattern and pace of 
deliberations and negotiations which they wished to initiate 
and sustain in various UN forums. Being persistent and 
numerically dominant, the non-aligned group was able to put 
its distinctive mark on the conduct of diplomacy in the UN. 
The group operated in an environment in which the central 
alliances seemed relatively impervious to the decline of arms 
control and the UN’s very limited role in maintaining 
international security.
The non-aligned group’s strong tendency to engage in 
rhetorical debate and heated exchanges on a wide range of 
issues was probably because of frustration with the stagnation 
in the central arms control area and the increased 
preoccupation of the superpowers with their bipolar rivalry. 
The superpowers also showed little hesitation in using UN 
forums for polemical and propaganda purposes and this occurred 
frequently in the CD, a negotiating body. The Soviet Union 
has been more guilty in this respect than other states. Since 
the General Assembly and the First Committee provide ample 
opportunities for debate and criticism, it is unfortunate that 
polemics and propaganda should occur in the CD, where the 
conduct of diplomacy should be more business-like and 
professional in approach.
The Crisis in Arms Control
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Recent years have witnessed a veritable crisis over arms 
control, both bilaterally between the superpowers and 
multilaterally among the major groups in the UN. Given the 
impasse it seems appropriate that the groups of states to 
review their past efforts with the aim of identifying the real 
barriers to progress, rather than engage in still more sterile 
exercises in polemics and propaganda. Issues that deserve the 
most serious consideration include the nature of the axms race 
and the role of arms control. This requires going beyond the 
technical arguments and concentrating more on the political 
issues. The non-aligned group has focused excessively and 
thus unrealistically on the nuclear arms race. It has thereby 
made its position vulnerable to criticism from the Western 
Group that it is not serious about the vital issues of 
regional arms control.
The problems associated with multilateral diplomacy run 
even deeper than these problems suggest. There is a very real 
question about the commitment of the major groups to arms 
control. Soviet inflexibility on the verification issue 
reinforces doubts about the genuineness of Soviet interest in 
arms control. The ‘hardline’ conservative approach to arms 
control in the United States in recent .years has .. made 
prospects for progress even bleaker, while threatening 
existing agreements - ABM, TTBT, and SALT II. The non-aligned 
group’s radical stance in the UN has probably helped to 
strengthen the tendency of the superpowers towards 
unilateralism.
On the verification issue, while in principle there seems 
to be an undeniable need for intrusive measures, their absence 
is not the most important barrier to progress. The real 
problem is the extent of distrust which underlies the demand 
for intrusive measures - a distrust which also threatens the 
stability of existing agreements. The superpowers have 
displayed a limited capacity for self-restraint in managing 
the arms control process. If such weaknesses persist and 
provisions for intrusive procedures in future agreements axe 
poorly managed, the repercussions on the future of arms 
control and international politics in general could be more 
adverse than in recent years.
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Partly because of difficulties with multilateral arms 
control efforts, the non-aligned states have tried to revive 
the idea of strengthening the UN’s role in settling disputes 
and conflicts between states. But proposals to amend the UN’s 
Charter in order to increase the Security Council’s ability to 
intervene have met with predictable superpower resistance. 
The Soviet Union has opposed any limitation on the veto power 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council and also 
to other changes in the UN. The changes sought by the 
non-aligned group would alter the political power balance 
within the UN and also to some extent in the international 
arena. Once more, as with the non-aligned group’s arms 
control proposals, the major groups have to contend with the 
balance of power implications of change. Yet the response of 
the major powers to the non-aligned group’s proposal for 
strengthening the UN’s security role seems too cautious. Such 
changes need not carry any substantial power-political 
implications.
The difficulties in the way of introducing changes axe 
ultimately power-political, but such difficulties are 
compounded by the overall relations between the major groups, 
which have been very strained and circumspect. Indeed, the 
conduct of arms control diplomacy over the past decade, if 
anything, has contributed to this problem. More crucial has 
been the relationship between the superpowers, which remains 
extremely problematic.
Thus, quite apart from the conceptual, political, and 
technical issues directly related to arms control, a more 
fundamental difficulty has been the resistance of influential 
states, both global and regional, to any major structural 
change in the international system. Such resistance is 
probably strengthened by uncertainties and apprehensions about 
the functioning of an alternative or modified system. The 
strong tendency towards circumspection in matters concerning 
sovereignty is not limited to the most powerful states but it 
has been more pronounced in their case. Constraints on 
unilateral actions through greater multilateral control would 
have a greater impact on the stronger states.
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Notwithstanding their high-flown rhetoric, the 
superpowers have adhered to a narrow conception of national 
security as the basic criteria for accepting or rejecting arms 
control measures. In recent years this has been more evident. 
Some of the major non-aligned states also seem to have moved 
to a more ‘state-centric’ attitude towards arms control.
There are some attitudinal changes that member-states can 
adopt without seriously compromising their basic positions, 
and which could lead to better prospects for arms control 
diplomacy in the UN in future. Being in a majority, the
non-aligned group could exercise some self-restraint in 
setting the pattern and pace of diplomacy. Also,
consensus-building should not be attempted in a haste or in a 
haphazard manner. There are, after all, sensitive questions 
of security that have to be addressed in one form or another 
if the arms control process is to progress.
Political tensions among states, especially between the 
major groups, have weighed heavily on consensus-building on 
arms control and on the pattern of diplomacy in the UN. The 
groups have usually been deeply suspicious of one another in 
their deliberations on security-related issues. If only in 
the larger interest of consensus-building, the non-aligned 
group should concede some ground to the central alliances on 
the question of arms control obligations of regional states. 
In the post-war period, many conventional wars have occurred 
in Third World regions, a pattern that seems likely to 
continue. As such, it is in the interest of Third World 
states in general that this problem should be regarded as 
important and even urgent. Moreover, some of the regional 
states are important enough to be a cause for concern to the 
major powers in the event the latter should accept constraints 
on their unilateral actions. Similarly, because of their 
involvement in most armed conflicts in the Third World 
sometimes in the form of outright military intervention - the 
superpowers should concede the significant impact of their 
rivalry on the security of other states, especially those in 
the Third World.
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Compared to the 1950s and 1960s, the non-aligned group’s 
role in recent years has been somewhat different both in style 
and substance. It has been more assertive and ambitious and 
also much less aimed at facilitating compromise between the 
superpowers. The non-aligned group needs to modify and 
moderate its approach in order to make the UN’s involvement in 
arms control diplomacy more productive. It could play a 
useful mediatory role on contentious issues between the 
superpowers. On the verification issue, for example, the 
non-aligned group’s role has been both limited and largely 
insensitive to concerns about the dangers of non-compliance. 
Depending on the subject-matter, it could adopt positions in 
this area aimed at pressuring or persuading one or the other 
superpower to show more flexibility.
Arms control requires cooperation and restraint by all 
parties, not only to make agreements more durable but also to 
strengthen mutual confidence in the overall arms control 
process. Especially in recent years, the superpowers have 
shown little interest in preventing the decline of their arms 
control relationship. The 4 Star Wars’ controversy has added 
greatly to the difficulties of reversing the decline over the 
short-term, and perhaps even over a longer period.
Sharp ideological differences aggravate the inter-play of 
fear and ambition in the national security outlook of the 
superpowers. Such differences become more difficult to manage 
over the short and medium term in a bipolar world where the 
competition for influence tends to be seen in terms of a 
’zero-sum game’. Fear of nuclear devastation and thus also of 
direct conventional military confrontation seem to have been 
the driving force behind the post-war efforts at arms control. 
Even in the declaratory sense, arms control negotiations were 
frequently approached from the standpoint of stabilising the 
central military balance and reducing related tensions. 
Apparently, the reduction of armament levels did not derive 
from a desire to introduce changes in the structure of 
international security arrangements. (The early post-war 
period, if something of an exception, appears to have been so 
in the superficial sense). Even within these parameters, the 
superpowers displayed limited, and sometimes grossly
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inadequate, willingness to cooperate or exercise restraint. 
They seem attached to the prevailing system of international
security, characterised by the primacy of their central
alliances. This has been more evident in the way the
superpowers have engaged in multilateral arms control
diplomacy in the UN and also in their attitude towards the 
question of strengthening the UN’s international security 
role.
The question of balance is both a contentious and 
complicated issue of some real significance for the future of 
arms control between the superpowers. The United States 
adheres to a concept that is defined in quantitative and 
bilateral terms, while the Soviet Union has continued to 
emphasise the more difficult idea of ‘equal security’. The 
impact of such differences was felt, perhaps most 
conspicuously, in the INF talks. The Soviet Union adamantly 
sought the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in 
any agreement on equal reduction of medium range nuclear 
missiles in Europe, while the United States would only agree 
to bilateral equality on a global basis. The issue generated 
some sharp exchanges between the chief negotiators in the INF
talks, demonstrating the practical_import of conceptual
differences and also the reluctance, if not unwillingness, of 
both sides to appreciate, if only implicitly, the difficulties 
arising from their very different geostrategic positions. The 
issue has also had an important bearing on the controversy 
over military balance between the superpowers and their 
central alliances, both at regional and global levels.
Both, arms control and the UN’s role in maintaining 
international security are bedevilled by the rivalry and 
antagonism between the superpowers. In the interest of 
multilateral arms control and international security in 
general, the non-aligned group cannot ignore the importance of 
its role as a stabilising or ameliorating factor in bipolar 
politics. However, the group’s ability to play such a role is 
circumscribed by the fact that it is, on the whole, an 
amorphous political entity. It derives much of its sense of 
identity from its opposition to the systemic dominance of the 
superpowers. Part of the problem of internal cohesion may be
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related to its enormous size. But the group suffers from more 
serious problems of internal disputes, regional rivalries, 
poor management of local crises, and cross-cutting 
associations with the major powers - in many cases close 
enough to be regarded as alliance relationship.
The non-aligned group’s primary purpose has apparently 
been to increase the sense of security of its member-states 
vis-a-vis one or the other superpower through reliance on its 
numerical size. Its political style and arms control approach 
have been shaped by considerations of consensus to keep a 
large body together, which has usually been possible only at 
the lowest common denominator. The preoccupation of 
member-states, especially some of the major ones, with 
superpower domination, has constrained the non-aligned group’s 
ability to develop a more realistic and systematic approach to 
arms control and international security issues. The group’s 
orientation has been further reinforced by considerations of 
consensus within a large body that also happens to suffer from 
many intra-group disputes. In other words, given its internal 
political make-up and pressures for consensus, the group 
cannot play an effective role in the international arena or 
make an impact of some consequence on the major powers on arms 
control issues or on the UN’s international security role.
Though somewhat simplistic and not altogether applicable 
today, certain observations made in the early 1960s by the 
American arms negotiator, John McCloy, about the role of 
non-aligned states in arms control, retain some relevance. 
Alluding to the more strident among such states, he remarked:
Unfortunately very few of them have done or are 
prepared to do the work which is involved in 
making a real contribution to the subject. [sic]
Such a highly technical and frequently abstruse 
subject demands knowledge, thought and 
considerable research. Those who sit on the 
sidelines and merely chant ’’general and complete 
disarmament" without putting their minds to 
mastering the difficulties of the problem neither 
make much of a contribution nor are they apt to
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influence those whose efforts are more serious.
In addition to doing the independent homework 
needed for making a real contribution, they can in 
a number of cases, by their own concrete example, 
indicate the affirmative steps which they believe 
the international community must take. Such 
action would be much more persuasive than an 
exhortation to others to take risks they axe not 
prepared to take themselves.[2]
On the whole, arms control diplomacy seems to have been 
something of a political game responsive to periods of public 
pressure, or an expedient exercise for pursuing short-term 
security interests. Developments in recent years point to a 
continuation of such a pattern, familiar since the UN’s 
inception. At best, arms control is likely to remain of 
limited significance for international security in the 
foreseeable future. The post-war experience provides a basis 
for making a more realistic and informed effort in the future. 
In any event, arms control should be seen as a means - and not 
an adequate one by itself - for realizing the ends of 
international peace and security. Consensus-building on arms 
control should therefore occur within that wider perspective 
and as part of a broader political approach.
The post-war experience seems to confirm the argument 
that the promotion of arms control cannot be divorced from 
progress in dealing with underlying political tensions and 
festering disputes between states that have a bearing on 
international security. In particular, the US-Soviet 
experience suggests that arms control will not necessarily 
improve the behaviour of states in other areas of interaction 
and that the stability of arms control is linked to the larger 
pattern of international politics.
Briefly then, the major problems with multilateral arms 
control are: first, there is no consensus on the relevance 
and significance of arms control; second, there are specific 
political and technical complexities, which in some respects
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have deepened in recent years; third, there axe relational 
difficulties between the principal groups of states that too 
seem to have worsened. Continuing North-South tensions on 
political, economic, and social issues, both inside and 
outside the UN, have only helped to increase the problems of 
multilateral arms control diplomacy, and fourth, states have 
generally displayed a strong attachment to their sovereignty. 
Of late, this tendency has strengthened, more significantly in 
the case of the superpowers. The non-aligned group has 
contributed in no small way to the imbroglio in multilateral 
arms control, but the central problem has been the nature of 
superpower relations.
Arms control diplomacy seems to have reached a stage 
where renewed efforts would have to be exerted to rebuild 
consensus if any progress is to be made. Being more numerous 
in the UN and with a greater and more immediate stake in 
multilateral arms control, the non-aligned states need to take 
a closer look at their performance in the arms control axea 
and more generally in the international arena. They should 
focus more on regional approaches to arms control and 
international security, if only because reliance on global 
arms control or on the UN’s international security role seems 
excessive in contemporary conditions. The conduct of 
diplomacy in recent years has not served the longer-term 
interests of the UN or of multilateral arms control. Being by 
fax the weaker of the three groups and thus also more 
dependent on the UN, it is in the non-aligned group’s interest 
to adopt a more universalist approach that is less likely to 
be perceived by other groups as directed at undermining their 
security and basic status.
Such a development is more likely to occur in the event 
of flexibility in US-Soviet attitudes towards arms control and 
the UN’s international security role. But there seems to be 
little prospect of such changes taking place in the near 
future. Indeed, unless there is a major reappraisal of policy 
in the Kremlin and a change of administration in the White 
House, the danger of an even greater reversal of multilateral 
diplomacy will be more than a remote possibility.
Page 389
NOTES
1 UN Chronicle September 1982, p.3.
2 John McCloy ‘Balance Sheet on Disarmament’ 
Affairs April 1962, Vol.40, No.3, p.359.
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